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Summary 
Since its beginning, European Community law has provided for equality between the sexes. 
The European Coutt of Justice has been asked by the Member States' national coutts to 
interpret the principle of equality as provided for by Article 141 of the EC Treaty and 
associated legislation on many occasions. The Court has generally been perceived as 
progressive in its interpretation of Article 141 which has been held to be directly effective. 
The scope of potential claims arising under the equality provisions of Community law has 
been broadened significantly since its inception. Despite this, women continue to suffer 
discrimination and inequality in the labour markets of all EU Member States, as evidenced by 
enduring pay gaps. One contributory factor has been identified as the high incidence of 
gendered segregation that exists, whereby women work in different occupations and at 
different levels within organisations from men. FurthernlOre, the use of different terms and 
conditions of employment on the basis of working arrangements and/or contractual status is 
commonplace with many low status part-time and temporary jobs filled by women. 
The growing complexity in working arrangements has made it difficult to target employment 
legislation effectively. Utilisation of the existing provisions of Community law requires a 
reorientation of the traditional conceptualisation of gender relations. This is possible through 
the application of broad principles, as provided for by the Treaty and the general scheme of 
Community law, to specific circumstances. The Court of Justice occupies a unique 
institutional position in this respect as the only authority capable of undertaking such a task 
coherently and consistently. This thesis considers the Court's reasoning in a group of cases 
concerning the right to equal treatment of women workers classified as 'atypical' on account 
of their working arrangements. The purpose of the thesis is to uncover the extent to which the 
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Court's adjudications on cases referred under the Article 234 procedure can be characterised 
as having a common output amounting to an identifiable jurisprudence on gender relations. In 
order to accomplish this task, a systematic analysis of a range of cases conforming to certain 
specified criteria is undertaken through which the Court's application of certain key principles 
is examined. The fmdings reveal inconsistencies in terms of the Court's theoretical dogma 
and its conceptualisation of the basic tenets of equality which are not discernible £i'om an 
assessment of its judgments alone. It is concluded that a reassessment of the relative positions 
and roles of women and men within contemporary society is required in order to enable a 
more effective application of the law in this respect, starting with the standardisation of 
'atypical' working arrangements. 
Xl 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
'The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience,1 
Bacl{ground 
From its beginning, the European Economic Community recognised the attainment of 
equality between the sexes as a desirable goal. The inclusion of the equality principle in 
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome may have arisen as a pro-competitive measure intended to 
harmonise the Member State's provision in this area, but its potential was soon exploited by 
the European Court of Justice for the purposes of furthering the social as well as the economic 
aims of the Community. The impact of its judgments on the Member States' legal systems has 
led to the common perception of the Court as a primary force in European integration, 
particularly in the field of sex equality. When considered as part of a coherent scheme, the 
Court's judgments on sex discrimination appear to be generally consistent and its decision-
making progressive. In its articulation of the direct effect of Article 119, the COUli has made 
use of teleological reasoning enabling consideration of its place within the wider scheme of 
Community law in order to give effect to its interpretation. Furthermore, the law-making 
institutions of the Community have been at the forefront of the development of anti-
discrimination law with the introduction of a range of instruments by which the COUli has 
been able to interpret the meaning of Article 141 in ever-more expansive terms. The 
perception of the Court's jurisprudence on sex equality has been largely favourable as the 
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 1881, (Kessinger Publishing, reprinted 1989), at p.l. 
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increase in women's labour market participation which has occurred in post-War Europe has 
been accompanied by the incremental, yet steady, development of the equality principle to 
encompass such new phenomena as part-time working and maternity rights. 
The origins of Community law lie in the development of a political union intended, inter alia, 
to further the neo-liberal ideal of the free market within the context of a unified Europe. This 
means that the particular conception of equality that underpins Community law generally is 
formal rather than substantive. Despite the fact that the focus of legislative intent has been on 
process rather than outcome, the jurisprudence of the ECl has enabled the development of 
new and innovative concepts such as indirect discrimination and equal value. Their 
application has required a reorientation of some of the provisions of anti-discrimination law. 
The realisation that prima facie gender-neutral policy may impact unfavourably on women 
and that the values ascribed to different types of work might be challenged require an 
acknowledgment that the causes of labour market inequity may run somewhat deeper than the 
directly discriminatory behaviour of employers. In seeking to uncover the hidden causes of 
gender inequality in order to develop a suitable legal response, complex questions emerge 
which require a re-examination of the ideology on which the very foundation of the common 
market is predicated. In such circumstances, what choices has the Court made and how has it 
sought to reconcile its decision-making with the liberal beliefs on which its existence is 
premised? This thesis is concerned with seeking answers to these questions. 
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Objectives and Methodology 
Primal'Y Objective 
The primary objective of the analysis presented here is to uncover the extent to which the 
Court's adjudications on cases referred under the Atticle 234 procedure can be characterised 
as amounting to an identifiable jurisprudence on gender relations. This requires a deeper 
examination of the Court's decision-making than can be achieved by a cursory assessment of 
its judgments. In reaching a decision, the Court engages in a process of reasoning which 
requires the consideration and prioritisation of the various factors at stake. This task 
necessitates the ascription of value to those factors with the result that some are identified as 
being of paramount importance and, thus, form the basis for the judgment, while others are 
rejected as irrelevant or unworthy of attention in the context of the case. This reasoning takes 
place within the relevant framework provided by Community law which, given the particular 
nature of the legal order, enables the Court to draw on a wide range of sources including 
Treaty Atticles and secondary legislation as well as certain fundamental principles which are 
based on the provisions ofIntemationallaw and the constitutional law of the Member States. 
In its interpretation of Community law, the Court has been subjected to criticism surrounding 
the nature of its reasoning which has been characterised as teleological or purposive. This 
approach has led to charges of judicial activism and claims that the Court has, on occasion, 
acted as law-maker rather than interpreter. Responses to such criticism, which have sought to 
defend the Court's position in this respect, are centred on two inter-related factors: a general 
movement towards a less formalist judicial function and a focus on specific features of the 
Community legal order such as the fledgling institutional framework and the opaque language 
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and indetenninate nature of the Treaties themselves. In this thesis, consideration will be paid 
to the exercise of the judicial function in relation to the Court's jurisprudence on gender 
relations with a view to ascertaining whether such claims to political activism are, in fact, 
evidenced by the Court's rationalisation for its decision-making in the field of sex 
discrimination. What is posited here is that, if proven, the Court's tendency towards activism 
in the cunent context may be perfectly defensible on the grounds that the recognition and 
exercise of the principle of equality is a fundamental precondition to the effective operation of 
the rule oflaw. 
A Focus on 'Gende." 
Rather than focusing on the conferment and adaptation of rights, a deeper assessment of the 
Court's influence must take account of the theoretical foundations underpinning such 
provision. Only through such assessment is it possible to identify the driving forces of the 
Court's decision-making and, thus, to pinpoint its oveniding influences. By applying this 
process to a range of cases it is possible to retrace the path the Court has taken through the 
choices it has made and, thus, to detennine its likely future development. In accomplishment 
of this task, it is necessary to consider not just the outcome of the Court's thought processes 
but, as far as possible, those processes themselves. This requires examination of the central 
concepts utilised by the Court in its reasoning. Such concepts are grounded, not just in legal 
tenninology, but also in the language of the political and socio-economic anangements 
which, in the current context, detennine the division of labour within the family as well in the 
labour market. 
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The Court's jurisprudence is primarily concerned with the prohibition of sex discrimination 
within employment. However, the application of the equality principle often necessitates 
broader consideration of social relations and institutions which, due to the gendered nature of 
work, are instrumental in determining the effects of policy and practices on the individual. 
The conferment of equality depends not on a strict application of the relevant legal rules, but 
rather, on an understanding of the relative positions of women and men within labour 
markets, the identification of differences in behaviour and the reasons for such differences. 
Thus, the focus of this thesis will be on gender, rather than sex, in recognition of the social 
and psychological factors that determine society's perceptions of women and men. By 
considering its decision-making in the context of gender relations, it is possible to examine 
the extent to which the Court's reasoning has been influenced by the socially constructed 
normative values ascribed to both sexes. 
Intel'disciplinary Appl'oach 
The central enquiry with which this thesis is concerned is based on broad themes which draw 
on the contributions made by scholars across a range of disciplines. In exploring the concepts 
which inform the Court's reasoning, account will be taken of theory grounded in social and 
economic scholarship as well as that arising from the study of industrial relations. The 
analysis undertaken, therefore, is interdisciplinary by design, although the focus will be 
primarily on the contribution of law, defmed in its broadest terms, and the methodology 
utilised in the original analysis presented in Chapter 6 is undoubtedly legal. 
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Timescale 
The research undertaken in this thesis predates the most recent enlargement of the European 
Union and, therefore, does not take into account specific issues concerning the accession of 
the 10 newest Member States in May 2004. Although this most recent expansion - in 
geographical, political and cultural terms - offers obvious opportunities for analysis along 
gender lines, the effects of enlargement on the Court's jurisprudence are still to be felt. 
Despite this factor it is anticipated that the analysis offered here will have a wider application 
than that associated with a particular timescale. A suitable cut-off date has been identified as 
being 31 December 2005, with the effect that the law is as stated up to and including that date. 
Amendments and additions to the legislative framework and case law arising after that date 
have not been considered. 
Overview of the Thesis 
The theoretical perspectives which inform mainstream thinking in relation to the various 
concepts examined in this work are considered in Chapter 2. Traditional social and legal 
theory has tended to undervalue the contribution made by women in the context of social 
arrangements and this is reflected in the literature reviewed. Furthermore, the fact that many 
of the dominant theorists have overlooked or have chosen to ignore the gender dimension in 
the context of their work is explored through an examination of the concept of equality. The 
absence of woman's voice has led to the development of a specific school of feminist legal 
theory as a means of taking account of the life experiences of women in the development of 
proposals for legal and social reform. The perspective adopted in the proceeding analysis is 
drawn from this work and seeks to discover the extent to which the Court's reasoning has 
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been influenced by this particular line of enquiry. This thesis seeks to detennine whether, and 
to what extent, the Court's philosophical position in cases concerning sex discrimination has 
encompassed consideration of women's life experiences. 
The facilitatation of this aim requires a consideration of the labour market experiences of 
women and men. The gendered nature of work and theoretical attempts at explaining such 
phenomena as sex-based discrimination and enduring pay gaps are examined in Chapter 3. 
This analysis depends largely on the work of labour economists who have presented a range 
of explanations for the different work experiences of women and men, the most compelling of 
which is that relating to segmented labour market theory which posits that labour markets are 
themselves highly gendered. In considering the nature of the market as a determining factor, 
industrial relations theory is applied. In common with that relating to social and legal theory, 
much of the literature here is also notable for the lack of a specific gender dimension. 
However, as the analysis in Chapter 3 demonstrates, the changing nature of work has led to 
differentiation in terms and conditions between groups of workers, not explicitly on the basis 
of gender, but rather on the ground of working arrangements. This development has classified 
those who work part-time and/or on temporary contracts as the providers of cheap, flexible 
labour in deregulated or unregulated sectors of employment. The flexibility associated with 
such atTangements serves to benefit employers who enjoy lower wage costs and are able to 
dismiss workers easily. 
Although not specifically provided for under the anti-discrimination legislation, the fact that 
the majority of such workers are women has meant that protection has been sought by the 
application ofthe equality principle to these arrangements. Thus, the Court of Justice has been 
instrumental in the conferment of rights to such workers which have been largely shaped by 
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its interpretation of Article 141 of the Treaty. In giving such interpretation, the Court has been 
required to consider a wide range of factors concerning gender relations such as motherhood, 
fatherhood and the arrangements pertaining to the division of labour within families. The 
approach taken by the Court in exercising its judicial function in this respect will inform the 
consideration of the Court's reasoning throughout this thesis. 
The legislative responses which have been developed by the law-making institutions of 
Community law are presented in Chapter 4. The historical factors which led to the creation of 
a European Union are considered as is the changing political environment within which such 
development has taken place. An assessment of Community provision in the broad area of 
gender relations is undertaken with specific reference to the work of Sandra Fredman. 
Although Fredman's original analysis was conducted in 1992, many of the weaknesses that 
were identified in relation to the conceptual foundations of the sex discrimination provisions 
still hold good. Fredman's critique, which informs many of the sub-themes explored 
throughout this thesis, focuses on: the particular concept of equality on which the provisions 
are based; the reliance on a dichotomy between equality and difference; the assumption of 
neutrality; the subordination of anti-discrimination legislation to the market order and the 
individualistic nature ofthe provisions and their enforcement. 
The Court of Justice is charged with the interpretation of legislation rather than with its 
proposition or enactment. Nevertheless, the Court has been required, in discharging its 
judicial function, to add detail otherwise missing from the provisions themselves. 
Furthermore, in giving interpretation to the body of Community law, the ECl's judges have 
been presented with certain choices regarding the conceptualisation of gender relations 
required to give meaning to the provisions in the context of the cases before it. The Court's 
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role can, thus, be seen as pivotal in the perpetuation or rejection of the weaknesses identified 
by Fredman. This factor informs much of the proceeding discussion surrounding the Court's 
rationalisation of its decision-making in its case law on sex discrimination. 
The composition and function of the ECJ is considered in Chapter 5, alongside an assessment 
of its jurisprudential development. Recognition is given to the importance of the Article 234 
procedure as a means of promoting a dialogue between the Court of Justice and the national 
courts. This process has been crucial to the interpretation of Article 141 and has led to its 
application across a wide range of cases arising from the Member States' legal systems. The 
Court's position within the institutional framework is explored with particular attention to the 
impact of external factors on its decision-making. The Court has been subjected to criticism 
regarding its perceived judicial activism on the grounds of its methods of interpretation which 
have, on occasion, made use of a wide range of sources in order to justify its judgments. It is 
submitted that the Court's unique position, which arises from a combination of institutional 
factors, the relative infancy of Community law and its duty to provide adjudication on a 
diverse range of issues, have necessitated this approach. Furthermore, the relatively wide 
discretion given to the Court in its decision-making coupled with the lack of binding 
precedent have enabled the Court to undertake its judicial function in a more creative and 
purposive way than national courts and this has enabled the adoption of a progressive stance 
on occaslon. 
In Chapter 6 an analysis of the Court's interpretation of the equality principle in a group of 
cases is presented. The female claimants in these cases are deemed as 'atypical' due to their 
engagement on part-time or fixed-term bases. As identified in Chapter 3, the last two decades 
have witnessed an increase in these types of working arrangements which are, nonetheless, 
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still categorised as 'non-standard'. This is because they do not conform to the normative 
construct of the standard worker model which is identified through its association with stable, 
regular full-time work undertaken for a single employer under an open-ended contract of 
employment. This model has been the main target for legislative intervention intended to 
provide, inter alia, employment protection. Many workers categorised as non-standard have 
been excluded from the scope of such provisions or differentiated from their full-time, 
permanent counterparts in relation to pay rates and associated terms and conditions. Sex 
discrimination claims arising in the Member States have highlighted the fact that many of 
those with 'non-traditional' working atTangements are women. There is no universally 
accepted definition of the tenn 'atypical' which is an unsatisfactory description in light ofthe 
growth in these types of working arrangements. The cases considered in Chapter 6 illustrate 
the different labour market experiences of women and men and this factor has informed their 
selection. A full rationale for the selection of cases is set out in Chapter 6 alongside a textual 
analysis of the judgments. The cases are thematised and grouped according to the nature of 
the claims and the issues highlighted. This process enables observations to be made regarding 
the relative values ascribed to specific factors which are identified as being relevant to the 
Court's treatment of gender relations. 
The fmdings presented in Chapter 7 identify and consolidate the main themes which have 
emerged during this investigation. By focusing on the reasoning of the Court of Justice in a 
specific group of cases, it is possible to draw some broad conclusions regarding the status 
afforded to gender relations in the Court's jurisprudence. It is hoped that these fmdings will 
have a wider significance, beyond the narrow subject matter of the cases under review, which 
will inform our understanding, not just of the Court's modus operandi, but of the nature of 
Community law generally. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Pel's pectives 
'Female Her Whole Life,2 
Int.'oduction 
The European Community legal order has long been at the forefront of the development of 
sex discrimination law. Much of the progress of recent years has arisen from the 
Commission's legislative programme, which was particularly active during the 1970s and 
1980s in bringing forward a range of legal instruments intended to supplement the provision 
of the equality principle as enunciated in Article 141. However, the interpretation and 
application of Article 141 and associated secondary legislation has been the work of the 
European Court of Justice. Although the COUlt'S operation differs greatly from that of 
national courts/ it is apparent that a certain consistency in approach has emerged. This may 
be tentatively characterised as a philosophical position or jurisprudence and relates to the 
Court's interpretation of the underlying concepts of equality and discrimination as well as to 
the development of a common treatment of the issues identified in the cases that have come 
before it. Despite the fact that the legal competence of Europe's institutions is fettered by the 
Community'S creation as an economic entity, the satisfactory disposal of such cases depends 
on a range of factors which inform and reflect the public and private lives of Europe's citizens 
- employment, the family, motherhood and, more recently, fatherhood and patemity. 
Although commonly bound by the application of the relevant legal rules of Community law, 
2 From 'Emile' by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762). The fuller quote (considered infi'a at p.22) being 'The male is 
male only at certain moments; the female is female her whole life ... ' 
3 See Chapter 5 supra. 
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these cases originate from the distinct and diverse legal systems of the Member States and the 
policies and practices on which they are based are often the product of cultural factors related 
to specific national features and consolidated within Member States' welfare systems. The 
judges who hear these cases also bring with them a rich and diverse cultural heritage 
combining the various aspects of their own legal educations and training as well as the 
broader ideologies of their native states. The purpose of this thesis is to uncover the extent to 
which the Court's adjudications on cases referred under the Article 234 procedure, which are 
subject to such a range of influences, can be characterised as having a common output 
amounting to an identifiable jurisprudence on gender relations. 
Before embarking on the key investigation, it is necessary to explore the context within which 
those rulings have been made. This is because all judicial decision-making has, at its heart, 
certain notions of the central concepts relevant to the issues under review and their theoretical 
construction. In the present context, ideas of equality and distributive justice underpin the 
judiciary's treatment of certain legal questions as well as informing the policy and legislation 
from which such questions arise. Some of these ideas come from the national legal systems 
and corresponding industrial relations' traditions of the countries in which the national courts 
responsible for referring the cases operate and this aspect is central to the thesis presented 
here. However, all such systems have, at their foundation, common concepts which continue 
to inform and shape the development of law and policy and which can be reviewed through 
the work of certain legal and political theorists. What is startling about many of the theorists 
under consideration is that, although all of them have made important contributions to a 
general understanding of power relations and the attainment of equality, many have ignored 
or dismissed the importance of gender in their analyses of human and/or institutional 
behaviour. This point will be further explored in the following review through the work of 
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contemporary feminist critiques of traditional theory. I shall also endeavour, where possible, 
to contextualise the work of the classical theorists by drawing on examples found in 
contemporary society and legal systems in order to illustrate the continuing relevance and/or 
influence of their teachings and to introduce some of the themes which inform the later 
discussions within this thesis. 
The Greek School- What is a Woman? 
Considerations of the role of women in society can be found in the works of Plato and 
Aristotle, although the writings of both reveal a misogynistic underpinning unpalatable to 
contemporary theorists. 4 As Bamett has noted, careful analysis of their work reveals a 
complex stance, displaying radicalism for the time and place and amounting to 'an ambiguity 
about women's position in society,.5 In The Republic,6 in which he speaks through the mouth 
of Socrates, Plato discusses the family and women's role. Although of the belief that women 
and men have different natures which make it difficult to argue that they should have the 
same function, in Socrates' view the only relevant difference is that the 'female bears and the 
male begets.,7 The 'best' women could, therefore, be Guardians (a ruling class) and pursue 
the same occupations as men. Women's role is thus attributed according to ability and not 
biological difference. Furthermore, Plato's ruminations on the family and its role within 
society reveal his belief in a State in which equality is only possible through the abolition of 
the private family and its replacement with communal wives and children. 8 As Moller Okin 
has observed, his vision of an egalitarian society as well as being one in which private 
4 Moller Okin S., Women in Western Political Thought, (Princeton UP 1979). 
5 Bamett H, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence, (Cavendish 1998), at p. 84. 
6 Plato, The RepUblic, R. Waterfield (trans) (OUP 1993). 
7 Id. Bk V, 454e. 
8 Id., Bk V 454, 456. 
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property and the family have ceased to exist,9 is restricted to the lUling class only, with 
women in other sectors of society retaining proprietary status subordinated to men and to the 
lUling class. 
In contrast, Aristotle's writings focused on the biological differences between the sexes, 
which he saw as justification for women's subordination. Woman's physical difference from 
man was proof of her inferiority as he, by nature, is 'more fitted to lUle than the female'. 10 
Unlike Plato who sought to change the world in order to reach his 'ideal State', Aristotle 
accepted the State as a natural entity and sought to explain it.l1 In The Politics, he argued that 
the father should retain absolute authority and power over his family, the form of which 
should be preserved, with women remaining the 'property' of their husbands alongside other 
existing proprietary arrangements. 12 Although Aristotle rejected much of Plato's schema, the 
philosophy of both originated from a common set of assumptions relating to the distinction of 
form and matter. 'Form' was associated with the rational mind and Reason, and 'matter' with 
the non-rational: rather the object of rational thought and knowledge. Within this framework, 
the theorists were able to polarise or dichotomise alternatives and this approach is central to 
Aristotle's considerations of the sexes with women depicted as less than rational and, thus, 
inferior. 13 This binary method of analysis, although rejected by feminist jurists for its 
misogyny, continues to underpin much contemporary thought and emerges as the foundation 
on which certain institutional arrangements are based. Fredman argues that the 'polarisation 
of alternatives,'14 posited by the Greek scholars and adopted by later philosophers as a means 
of explaining the different experiences of men and women, is unhelpful in that 'the dichotomy 
9 S. M. Okin 'On Plato' in M.L. Shanley and C. Pateman (eds), Feminist Inte1pl"etations and Political Theo1JI 
(polity Press 1991). 
10 The Nicomachean EthiCS, D. Ross (trans) (OUP 1925): the Politics Bk 1 xii, 1259a 37. 
11 Aristotle, The Politics, T A Sinclair (trans), (penguin 1962). 
12 Ibid 
13 Bamett, ibid, at n. 4, at p. 84. 
14 S. Fredman, Women and the Law (OUP 1997) at p. 4. 
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obscures the possibility of elements of both poles in the same individual. ,15 Likewise, de 
Beauvoir rightly questions Aristotle's logic on the basis of his own belief in the division of 
matter and form thus, '[I]f matter and form must co-operate in all action, there is no necessity 
for the active and passive principles to be separated in two different categories of 
individuals. ,16 Furthermore, to focus on women's sameness or difference from men only 
serves to contribute to the perpetuation of 'man' as the standard against which 'woman' 
should be judged, so that 'He is the Subject, he is the Absolute - she is the Other. ,17 
Unhelpful as the dichotomisation expounded by the Greek School is in reaching an 
understanding of the true nature of gender relations, the ideological doctrine intended to 
explain the relative social positions of women and men is endemic in the philosophy 
underpinning contemporary social arrangements and supporting institutions. For example, the 
welfare systems of most industrialised countries are predicated on the assumption that the 
division of labour within families will place men in the position of main earner or 
'breadwinner' and women in that of primary carer and 'homemaker', at least during the 
childbearing and rearing years. That such ideology continues to inform policy-making at both 
the macro and micro-levels is not necessarily intentional on the part of governments or 
employers; there are very few who would articulate the belief that men are better suited to 
participate in full-time paid employment than women. Furthermore, laws prohibit any policies 
founded overtly on such presumptions. However, such beliefs are so entrenched in our 
psyches that they inform our individual and collective actions and enable our unquestioning 
acceptance of rules and institutions founded on dis criminatory criteria which exist at all levels 
of society. Furthermore, the relationship between certain social groups and the development 
of legal systems has led to the furtherance of particular interests through the medium of the 
15 Ibid 
16 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (trans. HM.Parshley) (Vintage 1949) at p. 38. 
17 Id. at p. 16. 
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law. Male dominance in the 'public sphere', particularly within political institutions, has led 
to the furtherance of male interests. 18 
In the current context, the most important of Aristotle's dicta is that 'likes should be treated 
alike',19 meaning that if two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant 
respect, they must be treated equally with regard to this respect. This 'formal equality' 
principle has been used as a starting point for legal intervention targeted at the attainment of 
equality between different social groups. From this theoretical perspective, the question for 
those concerned with the attainment of equality between the sexes then becomes, "How are 
men and women the same and how are they different?" Apart from their obvious biological 
diversity, other differences might better be explained as socially constructed through the 
application of gender. The distinction between sex and gender is central to an understanding 
of the experiences of women and men necessary in any analysis of women's labour market 
position. 
Biological difference, which culminates in women's exclusive ability to bear children, may be 
the basis for much of the social construction of gender roles so that women are different from 
men in actual (physical) terms and also due to their placement in the wider society according 
to their gender. This distinction is closely related to the work of the Greek classicists in that it 
necessitates scrutiny ofthe differences between the sexes by consideration of the internal and 
external relations of the family, both of which can be explored through their efficiency in the 
18 The polarisation of the 'private' and 'public' spheres of civil society, discussed infi'a, actually derives from the 
Greek school, which drew a distinction between the polis (public) and oilds (private) - see 1. Swanson, The 
Public and The Private in Aristotle 's Political Philosophy (Cornell University Press 1992). 
19 The "Aristotelian formula" - Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V. 3 ll3lalO-blS; The Politics, III.9.l2S0 as-IS, 
m12. l2S2blS-23,. 
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allocation and use of resources. 20 The fact of woman's ability to bear children has been the 
basis of her role as primary carer within the family and, accordingly, subscription of the role 
of breadwinner to man. Institutions have been created in support of this arrangement, so that 
man's space has become the public and woman's the private. While assisting in a general 
understanding of the sexually divisive nature of society, this simplistic analysis ignores the 
fact of women's participation in the public sphere as well as belittling the contribution of men 
in the private. Although familial alTangements and corresponding gender roles may explain 
the different positions of men and women within contemporary labour markets, they do not 
assist in reaching an understanding of why such positions persist. Furthermore, if the 
ascription of women to the private and men to the public spheres is indeed a socially 
constructed phenomenon, the State's reluctance to intervene in the private arrangements of the 
family can be seen to have contributed to the continuing subordination of women. 
Social Contract Theory - Where is the Woman? 
The political and economlC changes that swept through European society during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gave rise to a particular theoretical movement in which 
the State's regulation of the public and private spheres was of particular concern?! The 
concept of patriarchy is central to any discussion of the construction of gender roles but it is 
acknowledged as being "one of the most conceptually and analytically complex theoretical 
20 The term 'resources' is used here and, unless otherwise indicated, throughout this chapter in its broadest sense 
to refer to all appropriate available resources, including those distributed through the provision of welfare 
benefits. 
21 In the context of rights-based legal instruments, the period from the early seventeenth until the late eighteenth 
century witnessed landmarks such as the English Petition of Rights (1627), the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), the 
American Declaration of Independence (1776), the United States Constitution (1787), the American Bill of 
Rights (1791) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789). These instruments, based on 
the concepts of individual rights and popular sovereignty, form the basis for the international standards still 
applied today as encapsulated by modem-day instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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constructs. ,,22 The term "patriarchy" refers to a fonn of political power which lies at the heart 
of traditional jurisprudence and the feminist critique. 23 However, as Pateman has noted, 
"although political theorists spend a great deal of time arguing about the legitimacy and 
justification of forms of political power, the patriarchal form has been largely ignored in the 
twentieth century".24 As Pateman's analysis shows/5 the disappearance of consideration of 
the influence of patriarchy in social and political theory coincides with the emergence of 
social contract theory during the seventeenth century when the dissolution of the feudal 
system and the emergence of capitalism were accompanied by a focus on the concepts of 
individual autonomy and equality before the law. Individuals were no longer the subjects of a 
pre-ordained hierarchy with their position dependent on whichever level was their bitihright. 
Rather, in the words of Locke, 'Men [are] by Nature all free, equal and independent,.26 In 
political terms, the notion of 'individual consent,27 became paramount so that the State 
retreated in matters involving personal decision-making, its main function being 'to act as a 
neutral umpit-e between conflicting interests'. 28 In terms of legal intervention, this model of 
the liberal State can be seen as the basis for the public-private divide, in which 'the 'public' 
State should intrude as little as possible into the sphere of individual autonomy, or the 
'private' sphere. ,29 This division is accompanied by legal abstentionism from the market, 
which, left to its own devices, will regulate itself Unfortunately, the promise of greater 
22 Barnett ibid at n. 4, at p. 57. 
23 Ibid. 
24 C. Pateman The Sexual Contract, Cambridge, (Polity Press 1988), at p. 19. 
25 Ibid. The concept of patriarchy is a recuning theme throughout Pateman's text, but of partioular interest in 
this oontext are Chapter 2 'Patriarchal Confusions' and Chapter 4 'Genesis, Fathers and the Political Liberty of 
Sons '. 
26 John Looke, Two Treatises of Government, P Laslett (ed) (Cambridge University Press 1988), 'The Second 
Treatise', at para. 95. 
27 Id. 
28 S. Fredman op cit., at p. 6. 
29 Id, at p. 7 
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individual freedom did not extend to women who, on the basis of the rationality criterion, 
were denied full participation in politicallife?O 
Hobbes's Leviathan3! posited the existence of the Mortal God in place of the separation 
between the law of God and the law of man. Hobbes's theory is grounded in the notion of 
sovereignty under which a ruler is granted the power to command tlu'ough the consent of the 
govemed. The contract made with the sovereign is for "the greater security of society as a 
whole". 32 Although the concept of the social contract can be said to replace man's 
subordination to God, the arrangements surrounding the contract are still patriarchal in that 
society is still govemed by an absolute ruler. Filmer argued that the idea of a social contract 
between the sovereign and his subjects was mythical as there was no freedom of choice 
whether to enter the contract - men were not bom free as the social contract theorists argued, 
but rather into a 'preordained subject status. ,33 For man, this took the form of subjection to the 
Monarch and, for woman, subjection to the Monarch, her father and her husband?4 In his 
Two Treatises on Govemment,35 Locke rejected most of Filmer's analysis of social contract 
theory, but retained his ambivalence about women, accepting women's naturally inferior 
social status, but arguing that such 'natural disabilities' could be overcome. Although Locke 
maintained that in matrimony men and women enter a voluntary contract with each other with 
the primary objective of procreation, he also acknowledged that there is an element of 
'mutual Support and Assistance, and a Communion of Interest too, as necessary not 
only to unite their Care and Mfection, but also necessary to their common Offspring, 
30 For an analysis of the literature relating to feminist critiques of liberalism, see N. Lacey 'Feminist Legal 
Theory and the Rights of Women' in K. MOp (ed), Gender and Human Rights (OUP 2004), pp. 20-22. 
31 T. Hobbes 'The Leviathan' (1651), R. Tuck (ed), (Cambridge University Press 1991). 
32 Bamett, ibid at n. 4, at p. 110. 
33 Sir R. Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, J. P. Sommerville (ed) (CUP, 1991) 
34 Bamett, ibid, at p.59 
35 Edited by P. Haslett (CUP, 1988). 
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who have a Right to be nourished and maintained by them, till they are able to provide 
for themselves. ,36 
However, despite the husband and wife's apparent equality in Locke's analysis of marital 
relations, the husband retained overall power through operation of the 'last Determination' 
which gave him ultimate decision-making on matters pertaining to jointly held propelties and 
interests. This right was based on his 'ability and strength' and a husband's exercise and 
potential abuse of it separated marital relations from monarchical rule on the basis that the 
wife had 'in many cases, a Liberty to separate from him; where natural Right or their contract 
allows it. ,37 
As Fredman observes, Locke's views on women 'contradict his proclamations offreedom and 
equality for all' and, his 'apparent rejection of patriarchy,.38 On closer consideration, it 
becomes clear that his writings on patriarchy, made largely in response to Filmer's work in 
the context of absolute monarchy, related to man's subjection to a Monarch and not men's 
power over women. 39 Locke's position on women's equality with men, although perhaps 
explicit in his recognition of the voluntary nature of the marriage contract,40 is obscured by 
his promotion of the 'last Determination' and his separation of political activity from family 
life. Although he opposed patriarchy in the political context of civil society on the grounds 
that subjection to a Monarch was in conflict with the freedom to enter a contract voluntarily, 
Locke did not apply the same standard of justification to the exercise of power within the 
family. This separation preserves women's subordinated status within the private sphere and 
36 JdPt II at p. 78. 
37 Jd at p. 82. 
38 Fredman op cit. at p. 8. 
39 Jd. 
40 Bamett, op cit at p. 59. 
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leaves public life and political participation the domain of men. 41 Furthermore, Locke's 
categorisation of 'conjugal society' as a voluntary compact between husband and wife gives it 
'a measure of legitimacy on his own terms. ,42 Locke's declarations of freedom certainly 
appear to have been quite literally restricted to 'man' alone, so that Mary Astell, writing in 
1700, was moved to comment 'If all men are born free, why are women born slaves? If 
absolute sovereignty be not necessary in a state, how come it to be so in a family? ,43 
Pateman rightly questions Locke's acceptance of the marrIage contract as a necessary 
transaction when, in his hypothesis, 'women are declared to be naturally subject to men. 
There are other ways in which a union between man and his natural subordinate could be 
established, but, instead, Locke holds that it is brought into being through contract, which is 
an agreement between two equals. ,44 
As Lacey states, 'liberal and Enlightenment thinking has been associated with an 
intensification of feminist analysis',45 however this was not apparent in the work of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau who was, nonetheless, instrumental in the development of social contract 
theory during the period of the Enlightenment in the late seventeenth century. Rousseau 
posited that the formation of the social contract was the moment of the creation of the law 
and, as such, 'a moment of distinct rationality, in which nature becomes a society, and human 
41 Jd at p. 60; Pateman op cit at p. 21 and Chapter 4. 
42 Fredman op cit at p. 8. 
43 M. Astell 'Reflections upon Marriage' in M. Astell and B. Hill, The First English Feminist (Gower 1986). 
44 Pateman op cit at p. 54. 
45 Lacey op cit at p. 14. The most notable feminist writer of the time was Mary Wollstonecraft, whose 
Vindication a/the Rights a/Women was published in 1792. By today's standards, Wollstonecraft's aspiration of 
improved educational standards for women appears to present a very restricted vision for a more just society. 
She believed that education would better prepare women for their roles as wife and mother. However, that 
Wollstonecraft developed and articulated such thoughts at the time that she did is in itself remarkable and is the 
reason why she continues to be revered today as a forerunner of the later feminist visionaries. 
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beings become persons, as citizens under law. ,46 The subject of gender was certainly under 
discussion at this time and was the focus of great deliberation in the work of Rousseau and his 
contemporaries. 47 The replacement of superstition with reason led theorists of the time to 
question human beings' capacity for rationality over the pull of nature. Rather than 
questioning the continued subjection of women, however, Rousseau sought to justify it as 
being based on the division between mind and biology, with women's role determined by the 
latter: 
The male is male only at certain moments; the female IS female her whole 
life ... everything constantly recalls her sex to her, and to fulfil its function, an 
appropriate physical constitution is necessary to her ... she needs a soft sedentary life to 
suckle her babies. How much care and tenderness does she need to hold her family 
together! ... the rigid strictness of the duties owed by the sexes is not and cannot be the 
same. ,48 
Rousseau's view that woman's position in society was determined by her physical capacity 
entrenched the notion that women's place was the private sphere of home and family and 
men's the public sphere of political and economic participation. Such division was justified 
on the basis that women were less rational and, thus less suited to public life and were more 
usefully engaged in the caring and nurturing role better matched to their biological state.49 
Mary Wollstonecraft, writing in response to the views of Rousseau and others, drew a parallel 
between the subjection of women and that of slaves, arguing 'if women are by nature inferior 
46 S. Baer 'Citizenship in Europe and the Construction of Gender by Law' in K.Knopp (ed) Gender and Human 
Rights (2004 OUF) at p. 89. 
47 For exanlple, David Burne and hnmanuel Kant. 
48 1_1. Rousseau 'Emile' (1762) Bloom A. (trans) (penguin 1991), at p. 450. 
49 It should be noted that not all Enlightenment writers shared Rousseau's views on women, and stark contrasts 
can be drawn between his ",ritings and the work of Voltaire and Montesquieu who believed women to be 
capable of equality with men. 
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to men, their virtues must be the same in quality, if not in degree, or virtue is a relative 
idea ... virtue has only one etemal standard. ,50 
The work of the social contract theorists analysed the emergence of a new way of organising 
society's relations by means of a contract between the ruler and the ruled under the auspices 
of the Sovereign state. From the outset, women were not party to that contract and their 
absence from the new order went largely unnoticed. It seems likely that the diminishing 
influence of patriarchal relations in subsequent considerations of political and social theory is 
linked to the emergence of what was perceived to be a more egalitarian form of society. That 
theorists overlooked the continuation of women's subordination is itself illustrative of the 
dominance of a male perspective in analyses of civil society. As Pateman argues, '[t]he new 
civil society created through the original contract is a patriarchal social order'. 51 Furthermore, 
the patriarchal right or 'sex right' defined by Pateman as 'the power that men exercise over 
women,52 extends through civil society. Analyses which attempt to separate the public and 
private spheres, so that the former becomes the domain of the 'social contract' and the latter 
the subject of the 'sexual contract', are, therefore, misleading as 
'[t]he two spheres of civil society are at once separate and inseparable. The public 
realm cannot be fully understood in the absence of the private sphere, and, similarly, 
the meaning of the original contract is misinterpreted without both, mutually 
dependent, halves of the story. Civil freedom depends on patriarchal right. ,53 
50 Wollstonecraft op cit at p. 108. 
5l Pateman Ibid, at n. 23, at p. l. 
52Id. 
53 ld at p. 4. 
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This interrelationship provides a crucial component of any understanding of women's 
attachment to and performance in contemporary labour markets. What matters in the current 
context is the extent to which recognition of the interplay between women's real life 
experiences and patriarchal right has influenced how policy and law have been conceived and 
interpreted and the nature of such influence. Has adequate consideration been given to the 
power relations played out within families and workplaces and are the resulting policies and 
laws prescriptive in this respect? If so, how? Alternatively, do courts and other legal 
institutions act in a manner that is merely reflective of what is occurring in the context of the 
society in which they operate, be that at national or supranational level? Of course 
jurisprudential developments depend, to a large extent, on the nature of the political 
environment within which courts operate, as characterised by the resulting policy strands 
from which the legal rules have developed. For example, policies targeted at encouraging 
women to participate in paid employment must take account of their decreased labour market 
participation during the childbearing and rearing years. In doing so, it is possible to offer 
solutions that incorporate pre-existing arrangements within families, thus preserving the 
status quo. Alternatively, such arrangements might be challenged through the operation of 
targeted policy by which incentives to reconsider the traditional familial arrangements might 
be introduced. For example, increasing the supply of suitable part-time work enables women 
to continue to provide childcare and domestic work within the home, whereas the provision of 
state-funded childcare would facilitate longer working hours for mothers. Perhaps more 
radically, policy might be targeted at equipping and enabling fathers to share in the care of 
their children so that the nonnative construction of 'the worker', on which much domestic 
policy is based, moves away from the full-time and towards the part-tinle model. Although it 
is possible, through policy implementation, to introduce and develop such ideological 
underpinnings within existing legal systems, the incremental nature of law-making and its 
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dependence on a range of different actors means that what most systems lack in this respect is 
a coherent approach. At the supranational level, judicial decision-making can certainly 
contribute to the development of greater coherence and is, perhaps, uniquely placed in this 
respect due to its influence over the conceptualisation of certain provisions of national legal 
systems. 
Rawls' Theol'Y of Distributive Justice - Who is a Woman? 
In considering the role of judicial decision-making in shaping approaches to gender relations, 
it is helpful to explore theories of social justice in order to unpack the law and policy-making 
processes and uncover their foundations. John Rawls, recognised as one of the most 
influential contemporary political philosophers, uses a model known as the 'original position' 
in order to rationalise or explain the quest for equality in the conte>..'i: of political and personal 
freedoms and cooperative arrangements. 54 In the original position, free and rational beings 
acting as representatives of real persons are placed behind a 'veil of ignorance' so that they do 
not know the sex, race, physical disabilities, social class or 'conception of the good' of the 
persons they represent, although they are aware that such characteristics exist. The 
representatives also possess a good knowledge of economic systems and human psychology. 
The aim of the representatives is to choose principles of justice that are suitable to govem a 
just and fair social order. 'Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design 
principles to favour his particular position, the principles of justice are the result of a fair 
b . ,55 agreement or argam. From this artificial stance, stripped of self-knowledge, the 
representatives must make decisions about which societal rules best cater to all potential 
members of society, rather than those favouring a particular individual or group situation. 
54 John Rawls, A The07Y of Justice, (OUP, 1972). 
55Id. at 12. 
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Under these conditions, rationality dictates that the best way to optimise the interests of the 
represented is to rule out discrimination on the basis of any of the possible characteristics in 
order to prevent any resulting disadvantage. 
Rawls' work is based on the tradition of social contract theory discussed above through the 
work of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau and offers a contemporary application of the social 
contract as a basis for civil society providing guiding principles of justice and accompanying 
criteria for a 'nearly just society'. From their original position, the representatives prioritise 
individual liberty over equality with each citizen having an equal right to the 'most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others'. 56 The equal basic liberties include 
'freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of 
association, as well as the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and 
finally, the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law. ,57 This is often referred to as the 
'equal liberty principle'. In the second of Rawls' principles, social and economic differences 
must be equally distributed under conditions of equality of opportunity and should provide the 
greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of society. This might require the giving of 
more power, income or status to some persons provided that certain conditions are met, 
basically that life will be made better for those who are currently 'worst off' and that access to 
the positions of privilege are not blocked by discrimination based on irrelevant criteria. This 
is the 'difference principle'. 
Rawls' work has been subject to scrutiny by feminist theorists with criticisms drawn on a 
number of fronts. With regard to the inlplications of his theory on the position of women in 
society, Fredman finds it 'striking that nowhere in the Theory of Justice is this question 
56 Rawls ibid, at p. 60 
571d. at p. 29l. 
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expressly addressed'. 58 Moller Okin, questioning the absence of notions of justice within the 
family from Rawls' analysis, finds that his theory appears to overlook the fact that 'modem 
liberal society to which the principles of justice are to be applied is deeply and pervasively 
gender structured. ,59 The reason for Rawls' lack of concern for women's position may be 
attributable, at least in part, to his methodology, so that the level of abstraction required in the 
creation of the original position 'proves nothing and clouds our vision,60 or, in Pateman's 
words, creates a 'logical abstraction of such rig our that nothing happens here. ,61 As Matsuda 
notes, we need to move away from the artificiality created by such abstractions and 'return to 
concrete realities, to look at our world, rethink possibilities, and fight it out on this side of the 
veil, however indelicate that may be. ,62 Rather than enabling identification of the principles of 
justice required to create a fair society, the level of ignorance required by Rawls' original 
position makes any understanding of the influences on each individual's perspective 
impossible. The needs of those disadvantaged groups or members of society can only be truly 
understood and met by their inclusion in the decision-making process. 63 
The individualistic focus adopted by Rawls has also been the subject of critical scrutiny from 
those subscribing to the communitarian approach. In essence, the communitarian view finds 
Rawls' promotion of the individual as an atomistic being deeply flawed, as it fails to consider 
the individual's place within the political community. Without such placement and resultant 
social network of connections to others, the individual has no identity and, correspondingly, 
rights cannot be ascribed to groups or group members. 64 The concept of community and its 
58 Fredman Women and the La\1J op cit, p. 23. 
59 Moller Okin, S., Justice, Gender and the Family, (1989 Basic Books) at p. 184. 
60 M. Matsuda 'Liberal jurisprudence and abstracted visions of human nature: a feminist critique of Ra\1Jls ' A 
TheO/y of Justice' (1986) 16 New Mexico Law Review 613 at 624. 
61 Pateman, op cit, at p. 43. 
62 Matsuda op cit at p. 624. 
63 Lacey N. 'Theories of Justice and the Welfare State' Social and Legal Studies' Vol 1 (1992) 323 at 338. 
64 See Sandel M. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (CUP, 1982), MacIntyre A, After Virtue: A Study in Moral 
TheO/y (Duckworth, 1984). 
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absence from Rawls's theory is, according to Cornell, particularly relevant in the context of 
gender relations due to the maternal bond. 65 To deny the importance of community in the 
construction of a theory of justice represents a denial of woman due to the intrinsic 
connection between mother and child. Moreover, the principles upon which much feminist 
methodology is predicated require deep consideration of the shared experiences of women, so 
that techniques such as awareness-raising are deemed particularly useful as a means of 
identifying and articulating woman's viewpoint. 66 To overlook the connection and 
interdependency between individuals and groups of individuals is to deny the contribution of 
such techniques to contemporary social theory. Furthermore, the individualistic approach 
taken by Rawls appears, at times, to be misleading when it is remembered that he is, after all, 
attempting to identify principles for community life. 
The exclusion of gender analysis from Rawls's principles of justice cannot be attributed to his 
choice of methodology alone. His subsequent consideration of other social, economic and 
political institutions67 makes the fact that he omits to apply his theory to the family 
unsatisfactory and it is in this respect that his work has drawn its greatest level of criticism. In 
Justice, Gender and the Family,68 Moller Okin, although critical of Rawls's lack of attention 
to justice within the family, is otherwise receptive to his theory believing that it has potential 
from a feminist perspective. Moller Okin views the sharing of childcare within the family as 
key to the distribution of justice between men and women within individual relationships and 
also in the context of the wider society. If men shared equally in the provision of childcare, 
the impact would be felt in the workplace with men and women requiring periods of non-
participation in the labour market and flexible working arrangements. The provision of 
65 Cornell, D., 'Beyond tragedy and complacency' (1987) 81 Northwestern University Law Review 693; 'The 
doubly prized world: myth. alleg01Y and the feminine' (1990} 75 Cornell Law Review 644. 
66 Or, more accurately, vievvpoints as, of course, not all women share a common viewpoint. 
67 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996) at p. 11. 
68 Moller akin op cit, at n. 58. 
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education would also be implicated so that children would 'become fully aware of the politics 
of gender' and the perpetuation of sexual stereotypes would diminish. By eradicating the 
relevance of gender from the childcare equation, children would be subjected to a process of 
socialisation that encompasses the principles of justice. Rawls' approach enables the 
elimination of characteristics such as gender in the ascription of tasks so that they are 
distributed on the basis of notions of justice rather than assumptions pertaining to perceived 
suitability on stereo-typical grounds. This is a particularly useful device when considering 
concepts that are socially constructed, such as gender, as it enables actions based on 
preconceptions to be stripped away and replaced by strategies grounded in notions of 
community. Nonetheless, Rawls' failure to properly apply his own theory to family relations 
shows that he is 'trapped into the traditional mode of thinking that life within the family and 
relations between the sexes are not properly to be regarded as part of the subject matter of a 
theory of social justice. ,69 
Much can be deduced from Rawls' theory about the nature of justice in abstraction, but to 
uncover a perspective that is useful for analysing gender relations specifically, it is necessary 
to consider theory that explicitly confronts existing inequalities. Such an approach must pay 
due consideration to difference, sameness and institutional factors and should seek to explain 
the nature and causes of inequality as a means of promoting the standard of equality as a 
desirable goal. Out of such endeavours, a specific line of enquiry has emerged, known 
collectively as "equality theory". This is a generic tenn, encompassing a diverse body of 
work. The various strands it encompasses share a common focus on the attainment of formal 
or substantive equality and borrow elements of the theories so far explored: from the Greek 
School, the dichotomisation of central themes and concepts and the principle of formal 
69 Moller akin ibid, at p. 184. 
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equality; from the social contract theorists, the notion of a voluntary agreement between the 
members of society and the State; and, from Rawls, use of the concept of distributive justice 
as a levelling tool between social groups. 
Equality TheOl'Y - How to Treat a Woman? 
It is interesting to note that A.V. Dicey, the main architect of the British Constitution with its 
recognition of the primacy of the rule of law and equality of all individuals before the law, 
was strongly opposed to the extension of suffrage to women. 70 Despite Dicey's disapproval, 
the women's movement gained momentum during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries as society's attention tumed to the attainment of individual autonomy and equality 
for all and the legal framework slowly expanded to include such concepts. 7 ! In 1867 John 
Stuart Mill made the first parliamentary speech in favour of votes for women and continued in 
his writing to call for legal recognition of equality between the sexes: 'I am convinced that 
social arrangements which subordinate one sex to the other by law are bad in themselves and 
form one of the principle obstacles which oppose human progress; I am convinced that they 
should give way to perfect equality.,72 Mill's call for 'equality' was not new - the concepts of 
'Liberte, egalite, fratemit6' inspired the French Revolution and have served as the ideals of 
the body politic ever since. However, the concept of equality is contested73 and, before 
contemplating its attainment, it is necessary to consider what is meant by 'equality' as a 
political ideal. 
70 AY. Dicey, Letters to a Friend on Votes for Women (John Munay, 1909), as cited in Fredman op cit at p. 39. 
71 Although it would be 1928 before women in Britain achieved the suffrage. 
72 IS Mill, The Subjection of Women (Longman, 1869). 
73 As Dworkin has written about the concept of equality, 'People who praise it or disparage it disagree about 
what they are praising or disparaging'. R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theol)1 and Practice of Equality 
(Harvard University Press, 2000) at p. 2. 
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The tenn itself signifies a comparison between two or more objects, persons or processes with 
at least one quality in common. In order for equality to be achieved or achievable, the subjects 
need to be similar, but need not be the same. 74 The term 'equal' can be both descriptive andlor 
prescriptive depending on the context in which it is used. 75 For example, although society 
may accept, fundamentally, that individual members are equal, it may also be true that certain 
social processes and procedures lead to inequalities between individuals that can be remedied 
through the application of nOlmative rules. For example, resources may be distributed 
unevenly so that some are in receipt of greater quantities and prosper at the expense of others. 
One way of attempting to rectify such inequality is through the use of legal intervention 
aimed at ensuring equal distribution. In attempting to implant the concept of equality into a 
legal system, the key issues become identification of the persons or processes to whom the 
concept might be applied and the areas and degrees of similarity which provide a basis for 
application of the equality principle. In other words, the tenn 'equal' might be used to 
describe different individuals or groups of individuals to whom the prescription of 'equality' 
might be applied through political intervention to remedy uneven distribution of a particular 
resource. In whichever context the tenninology is used, however, one central question arises: 
in what respect is equality sought? 
In the current context, the common characteristic is men and women's membership of the 
human race. In the employment sphere, what is at question is the equal right of men and 
women to economic resources despite their differences. Are those differences significant in 
this context or should they be overlooked as irrelevant? The distinction between sex (which 
accounts for biological difference) and gender (which is the socially constructed cause of 
difference) has been considered, but is it possible or desirable to overlook difference on one 
74 P. Westen, Speaking Equality (Princeton University Press, 1990) at p. 39. 
75 F. Oppenheim 'Egalitarianism as a Descriptive Concept' in L. Pojman and R. Westmoreland (eds) Equality: 
Selected Readings (OUP, 1997), pp. 55-65. 
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ground in order to overcome difference on the other? Furthermore, is biology the only real 
ground of difference between the sexes that does not arise through the process of socialisation 
or do men and women's physiologies give rise to other, psychological,76 differences which 
make it difficult or impossible to treat the members of both sexes exactly the same in political 
terms? Furthermore, even if gender roles are the product of social construction, why have they 
been assigned in the way that they have? The answers to these questions depend largely on 
the particular conception of equality that is applied. Those subscribing to a strictly utilitarian 
viewpoint may argue that, once an appropriate degree of similarity has been established, any 
remaining differences are irrelevant and should be overlooked wherever possible. 77 The 
extreme application of this approach results in the assimilation model discussed below in 
which sex is treated as a wholly irrelevant difference. Those adopting a more pragmatic 
position, however, argue that the causes of such differences matter as much as the differences 
themselves, with both requiring adequate consideration if resulting inequalities are to be 
overcome. Differences which arise out of historical factors manifested through social 
constructs, such as the ascription of childcare as a ''women's issue", must be given due 
attention alongside differences arising out of the biological functions of both sexes if equality 
is to be achieved. Of course the methods and extent to which such differences are 
accommodated are subject to variation depending on the particular political philosophy 
applied, which might itself be prescriptive or descriptive. The approaches presented are not as 
simplistic or unitary as this brief description might suggest.78 Over time, theorists have 
76 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Harvard University 
Press, 1982). 
77 Feminist thinkers may also wish to set aside the same/difference debate on the ground that to focus on it is 
counter productive. In the words of Fredman, 'The dualism needs to be abandoned, and instead the underlying 
power structures need to be challenged and reformed' Women and the Law, op cit, at p. 16. For a full and frank 
exposition of this approach, see the work of MacKinnon (discussed infi'a at pp. 50-53), specifically Feminism 
Unmodified (Harvard University Press, 1972). 
78 Theorists may, of course, be both utilitarian and pragmatic in their outlook. For example, Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill while both proponents of utilitarianism were also influential social reformers. For an 
illuminating discussion of their approaches to the furtherance of rights, see HL.A. Hart 'Natural Rights: 
32 
developed sophisticated models that utilise different combinations of the concepts outlined in 
attempting to present explanations of existing inequalities and to offer appropriate remedies. 
Some of the posited approaches will be explored in the context of their relevance to sex 
equality issues. 
Utilitarianism 
Under a strict utilitarian approach, the concept of equality is of paramount concern in 
attainment of the ideal that 'each is to count for one, no-one more than one.' 79 On this basis, 
the interests of all should be treated equally regardless of the nature of those interests or the 
individual situations out of which they arise, the overall goal being the maximisation of 
human happiness. In the context of group or social activity, the morally correct action is the 
one that maximises utility.80 However, this approach has been criticised for failing to be able 
to deliver its very promise - equality for all. This is because, in the utilitarian calculation, all 
desires must be accommodated with equal weight including those based on selfish motives 
and external preferences 81 even when they diminish the rights of others. This distorts the 
application of the equal treatment principle, which should ensure that everyone is able to 
claim a fair portion of the available resources. The lack of consideration for morality or 
justice in the inclusion of interests means that utilitarian theory cannot meet its goal of 
treating all as equals. As Rawls argues, neglect of the separateness of individuals does not 
allow a proper interpretation of moral equality as equal respect for each individual. 82 
Bentham and John Stuart Mills' in Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theol)1 (OUP 1982), 
Chapter 4. 
79 Ascribed to Bentham by Mill - see 1. S. Mill, Utlitarianisl11 in 1. Gray (ed) Mill on Liberty and Other Essays 
(OUP, 1991) at p. 199. 
80 R. M. Hare, lvIoral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point (OUP, 1981). 
81 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriollsly (Harvard University Press, 1977) at p. 234. 
82 1. Rawls, A Theol)1 of Justice, op cit. at p. 27. 
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Despite its shortcomings as a 'grand theory', the utilitarian conception of equality has 
influenced many contemporary thinkers who have taken from it certain elements for use in 
their work. MacConnick83 has used Bentham's conception of rights as specially protected 
benefits to develop a specific application of the utilitarian approach in his work on rights as 
interests. Within this framework, a right can be deemed to exist where someone benefits or 
stands to benefit from the perfolmance of a duty or where an interest is regarded as 
sufficiently important to justify the imposition of a duty. As Lacey has noted, this inclusive 
approach can be applied to both basic human rights and private law rights on the grounds that 
'interest theory can simply accommodate choice as one form of interest which - as in the case 
of contract - may in some circumstances be regarded as sufficiently important to merit special 
protection by means of a right. ,84 Furthermore, the conversion of interests into rights enables 
a more inclusive approach so that 'children and the mentally incapacitated can indeed be 
rights-holders,.85 In the context of sex equality, the broad scope offered by this approach is 
useful as it enables inclusion of those areas traditionally dichotomised as 'private' and 
'public' in reaching an understanding of the extent of existing inequalities, as well as offering 
a way out of such dichotomisation. However, criticism of interest theory centres on its 
downgrading of rights as mere reflections of duties and, in its wider context, the ascription of 
rights as a general feature of utility ranked equally in terms of importance alongside all the 
other factors likely to maximise human happiness. Furthermore, the lack of consideration for 
institutional factors,86 such as the identification of those against whom rights should properly 
be imposed and the appropriate enforcement methods, detract from its usefulness as a holistic 
response to social inequality. 
83 N. MacCOlmick, 'Rights in Legislation' in P. Hacker and 1. Raz (eds), Law, J..;forality and Society: Essays in 
H onou/, of H.L.A. Hart (OUP, 1977) at p. 189. 
84 N. Lacey 'Feminist Legal Theol)1 and the Rights of Women " op cit. at p. 33. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Contemporary theorists such as Dworkin, discussed infi'a, have built on interest theory to encompass the 
institutional features of rights. See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, op cit at n.80; A Matter of Principle 
(Harvard University Press, 1981). 
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The Assimilationist Ideal 
As discussed in the context of the Greek School, much of the debate on the attainment of 
equality between different social groups focuses on the extent to which members of those 
groups can be deemed to be the same or different from each other. Application of the concept 
of equality depends on the existence of some level of similarity between the relevant subjects 
and this in itself requires comparisons to be drawn. Comparability is the basis for much of the 
current legislative provision in this area and will be given extensive consideration later on. 87 
What is now under review is the relevance of the same/difference debate and, specifically, the 
degree of sameness required in order for the goal of equality to be achievable. Mary 
Wollstonecraft, writing in late eighteenth century England, revealed her frustration at the 
perception of women as naturally inferior which, she believed, was responsible for their 
continued subjection, 
A wild wish has just flown from my heart to my head, and I will not stifle it, though it 
may excite a horse-laugh. I do earnestly wish to see the distinction of sex confounded 
in society, unless where love animates the behaviour. For this distinction is, I am 
firmly persuaded, the foundation of the weakness of character ascribed to women. ,88 
In seeking to improve the educational prospects of women, Wollstonecraft wished her sex 
away so that the preconceptions and prejudice that had hitherto prevented equality between 
the sexes would disappear too. Although Wollstonecraft's understandably limited aspirations 
and apparent idealism may appear unsophisticated when placed against the backdrop of 
87 See Chapter 4 infi·a. 
88 Wollstonecraft, op cit, at n.44, at p. 2l. 
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contemporary society, the philosophical foundations of her argument still have currency in 
what has been termed the 'assimilationist ideal'. 89 
From this perspective, the 'substantially different role expectations and role assignments 
[ascribed] to persons in accordance with their sexual physiology,90 would, in a just society, 
acquire no more importance than inelevant categories such as eye colour. Wasserstrom posits 
the possibility that this type of society might be the product of true sex equality, although he 
acknowledges the likelihood that 'pluralistic ideals founded on diversity and tolerance,91 
might provide a sounder basis for accommodating sex differences. The philosophical question 
underpinning Wollstonecraft's and Wasserstrom's vision of equality, that relating to the 
degree of consideration of difference necessary in the development of legal interventions to 
counter inequality, is still the subject of intellectual debate. Although it may be impossible 
and undesirable to ignore genuine biological differences between the sexes in the formulation 
of policy, the differences ascribed through the construction of gender roles, many of which 
are based largely on myth,92 might be better consigned to the wastelands of history.93 
Theoretically, this makes some sense but it requires an over simplistic and inherently 
unrealistic conception of 'gender' predicated on an assumption that differences arising 
through the ascription of gender roles can be neatly unpacked from those based on biological 
difference. In reality, it appears unlikely that a theory that seeks to overlook differences on the 
basis of sex or gender, although desirable in some respects, would be particularly useful when 
89 Mainly in the context of the US race debate, see, for example, R. Wasserstrom 'Racism, sexism and 
preferential treatment: an approach to the topiCS " 24 University of California Los Angeles Law Review 581 
(1977). 
90 Ibid at 587. 
91 Id at 607. 
92 Such as the belief, traced back to the ancient Greek philosophers but universally accepted until as recently as 
the late nineteenth century that women, by nature, were ilTational and thus unsuitable to participate in 'public' 
life. 
93 In Women and the Law, op cit. at p. 16, Fredman cautions against differential treatment of women which 'has 
its own dangers, most importantly, in perpetuating stereo-typical assumptions about women and therefore 
entrenching subordination' 
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such differences, regardless of their origins, are the basis on which society and its institutions 
are grounded. Furthermore, by attempting to eliminate difference, we risk obscuring the 
causes and effects of that difference, when, as Fredman has observed, 'in a plural society, 
such as that in modem Britain, difference and diversity should be regarded as positive 
attributes. Equality, far from suppressing difference should accommodate and even celebrate 
it,.94 This approach is in contrast to that cutrently endorsed by the provision of legislative 
intervention in the UK and European Community contexts, which relies heavily on the 
application of equal treatment. 
Equal Treatment or Treatment as an Equal? 
The equal treatment model is based on the Aristotelian formula that 'likes should be treated 
alike and, thus, bestows the same treatment on individuals regardless of individual 
circumstances or group membership. Although falling somewhat short of the complete 
disregard for biological or socially constructed differences expounded by the assimilationist 
ideal, equal treatment nonetheless explicitly disregards such differences in favour of 
application of the 'merit principle'. This assumes that, given equal access to the same 
opportunities, individuals will achieve success through personal effort enabling benefits to be 
distributed according to merit. The problem with this approach is that it fails to take into 
account the effects of historical and continuing disadvantage by presupposing that all players 
have an equal starting point. The continuing effects of patriarchy on gender relations mean 
that, in the case of women and men, this is simply not true. Although both are recognised as 
being sufficiently alike so as to be accorded equality, this has not always been the case. 
Women were expressly excluded from full political participation until relatively recently on 
94 S. Fredman, Discrimination Lmv (OUP, 2002) at p. 3. 
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the basis that they lacked the requisite level of rationality necessary for decision-making. The 
legacy of this exclusion continues through contemporary arrangements, such as the division 
of labour within families and employment-based discrimination, and the institutional and 
social norms that support them. As decades of equality legislation have proved, the 
conferment of formal equality through equal opportunities has not eradicated the effects of 
historical, legally sanctioned inequality.95 Although the impact of law is severely limited in 
this respect, if its normative effects are considered, greater progress might have been 
expected. Furthermore, even those areas appearing, prima facie, to be appropriate targets for 
legislative intervention have been slow to change as the approach applied continually misses 
the target - the most obvious example being the persistence of gendered pay gaps. 
Contemporary theorists have grappled with the dilemma posed by the need to formulate a 
legal response capable of bestowing substantive equality on the one hand, whilst preserving 
the traditional liberal values associated with individualism and freedom of choice on the 
other. The most influential modern theorist in this respect is Ronald Dworkin whose theory on 
rights will now be considered. 
Dworkin has been categorised as a 'modified liberal,96 as his work, while based on the 
attainment of equality as an individual right, recognises the role of the State in securing that 
right. In building his theory, Dworkin distinguishes between the right to equal treatment and 
the right to treatment as an equa1. 97 The first entails the equal distribution of opportunities, 
resources and burdens and the second is the right 'to be treated with the same respect and 
concern as anyone else,.98 In recognising the differing needs of individuals, the appropriate 
treatment may vary to enable all individuals to be treated as equals - this is 'fundamental' 
95 See Chapter 3 inji·a. 
96 Fredman, Women and the Law, op cit, at p. 18. Fredman also includes the work of John Rawls, discussed 
infi'a, and Joseph Raz, specifically The Morality of Freedom, (Clarendon Press, 1986), within this categorisation. 
97 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriol/sly (Duckworth, 1978) at p. 227. 
98 Ibid 
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whereas the right to equal treatment is 'derivative'. As Dworkin notes, 'In some 
circumstances, the right to treatment as an equal will entail a right to equal treatment, but not, 
by any means in all circumstances. ,99 This is essentially a pluralist argument that recognises 
and accommodates difference and which goes some way towards countering the difficulties 
inherent in the application of the equal opportunities approach in the context of gender 
relations. Although 'Dworkin's theory can be categorised as individualistic to the extent that 
it is each individual's conception of the good that matters', 100 he argues that it is possible for 
individual conceptions of the good to involve work for the community. 101 
Dworkin's approach enables consideration of the relative positions of the targets of equality 
to be considered in the formulation of political responses and even endorses reverse 
discrimination or preferential treatment in certain circumstances. This builds on the 
conceptualisation of interests as rights categorised as 'interest theory,102 and is grounded in 
the utilitarian ideal that 'all should count for one and none no more than one.' In achievement 
of this aim, Dworkin argues that claims of rights have a special force that will always trump 
policy considerations and even general utility on the grounds that resources should always be 
targeted at those who need them most. Explicit in Dworkin's theory is a core belief that 
'conceptions of legal rights are irreducibly connected to wider precepts of political 
morality. ,103 As his focus on law as a moral-based construct illustrates, Dworkin's analysis is 
grounded in an attachment to the natural law school of thought and a rejection of legal 
positivism. 104 The latter's dependence on rules based on purely human phenomena as the 
99Id. 
100 Fredman, Women and the Law, op cit., at p.19. 
101 Dworkin 'Liberalism' in A Matter of Principle (Clarendon Press, 1985) at p. 203. 
102 Discussed above at pp. 33-34. 
103 Lacey, op cit., at p. 34. 
104 See Dworkin Taking Rights Seriollsly, op cit at n.80, in which Dworkin takes positivism in general, and 
HL.A. Hart's theory in padicular, to task on the basis that it is rights, underpinned by principles, and not judicial 
discretion which determine the outcome of difficult cases. Dworkin, cannot be categorised as a strict follower of 
39 
detenninants of law and legal systems cannot be reconciled with Dworkin's belief in the 
fundamental importance of principles which represent: 
, ... a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an 
economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a 
requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality. ,105 
Dworkin views the market as a useful means of distributing resources and endorses State 
intervention as long as such interference in the market is predicated on an obligation to treat 
all individuals as being entitled to equal concern and respect. Therefore, intervention by the 
State is justified in order to prevent discrimination and to ensure fair distribution of available 
resources. Dworkin's hypothesis of the equality of resources involves an auction in which 
everyone can accumulate bundles of resources through equal means of payment with the 
measure of resources devoted to a person's life being defined by the importance of those 
resources to others. l06 Once the auction is complete, distribution in a free market then depends 
on an individual's ambition, with post-auction inequalities attributable to personal 
responsibility on the basis of 'option luck'. Where unjustified inequalities arise, these should 
be countered by way of a differentiated insurance system. 
Dworkin's form of modified liberalism with its acceptance of a tolerant State, respectful of 
individual difference yet proactively engaged in protecting against discrimination on moral 
grounds, has much to commend it as an appropriate theoretical basis for legal intervention 
the natural law school as he has formulated his own theory which, while founded in natural law, encompasses a 
wider range of concepts. 
105 Dworkin 1977 op cit at p. 22. 
106 Dworkin 1981 'What is Equality? Part II: Equality of Resources' Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 283-345 
at 290, (reprinted in Dworkin, Sovereign Virtues. The TheOlY and Practice of Equality (Harvard University 
Press, 2000) 65-119). 
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aimed at countering inequality. Indeed his observations on the appropriate legal response to 
racial discrimination have been widely influential and provide a compelling justification for 
the use of affirmative action in certain circumstances. 107 However, his theories have not found 
such wide acceptance in their application to gender issues, due largely to his unsatisfactory 
treatment of the family and familial relations. As Fredman has noted, 'his notions of 
rationality, autonomy and individualism fail to recognise, and therefore to value, relations of 
dependence and care, the paradigm example being that of mother and child. ,108 This lack of 
recognition, which stems from his acceptance of the individual's conception of the good life 
as the central value attracting State protection, 'simply fails to capture a relationship whereby 
one person's activities are dictated by another's needs for care, particularly if the dependent 
could not otherwise survive. ,109 Dworkin's lack of appreciation for the existence of altruism 
in certain contexts 110 is symptomatic of deeper flaws in his analyses of the community111 in 
general and the family in particular. 
The framework within which Dworkin's consideration of the family takes place is, in itself, 
questionable. His use of terminology is inappropriate - he consistently refers to familial 
obligations as fratemal 112 - and his exposition of group obligations as always reciprocal1l3 is 
undoubtedly flawed. 114 However, it is in Dworkin's consideration of specific family 
relationships, such as that which exists between father and daughter, that his analysis reveals a 
107 See 'Reverse Discrimination' in Taking Rights Seriously. 
108 Fredman, Women and the Law, op cit, at p. 20. 
109Id. 
liD Whether such altruism is exercised through choice or not see Dworkin, Law's Empire (Fontana Press, 1986) 
at 437, n 20 in which he remarks that becoming a parent is matter of 'choice' which, of course is not always the 
case. 
III For a comprehensive application of the feminist perspective to communitarianism, see E. Frazer and N. Lacey 
The Politics o/Community: A Feminist Critique o/the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Harvester, 1993) 
112 Law's Empire, op cit, at p. 198. 
113 For example, see Law's Empire, id, at p. 196. 
114 See Fredman Women and the Law, op cit, at p.21. 
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particularly worrying dynamic. In Law's Emp ire J J5 he considers the individual's obligation to 
the community and examines the concept of integrity which, he claims, infers that 'each 
citizen must accept demands on him' and may 'make demands of others' .116 He illustrates this 
analysis by reference to 'the dutiful daughter' and asks if a daughter has 'an obligation to 
defer to her father's wishes in cultures that give parents powers to choose spouses for their 
daughters but not sons?,117 Dworkin posits that a community which believes daughters to be 
less equal than sons is not a community of integrity but, if gender equality is accepted, a 
belief that women need paternalistic protection may give rise to a 'genuine conflict' in terms 
of moral obligation. In such circumstances, the daughter's obligation to defer to parental 
control over her choice of spouse is in conflict with her right to individual freedom and 
autonomy. In contemplating the daughter's 'choices', Dworkin observes that, if she marries 
against her father's wishes she 'has something to regret. She owes him at least an accounting 
and perhaps an apology, and should in other ways strive to continue her standing as a member 
of the community she otherwise has a duty to honour. ,118 Dworkin's response, as Barnett has 
observed, 'reveals his lack of concern with the daughter's dilemma, and her lack of rights ,119 
which Hutchinson interprets as being attributable to his implicit acceptance ofthe 'oppression 
of women masquerading as honour. ,120 
Dworkin's apparent lack of empathy with the hypothetical daughter's predicament displays an 
absence of appreciation for the factors that contribute to women's disadvantage and which are 
underpinned by the power relations in families as reflected in societal arrangements. Although 
far from being misogynistic, he nevertheless neglects to attempt an understanding of the life 
115 Law's Empire ibid at p. 196. 
ll6Id. at 189. 
117Id. at 204. 
llS Id at 205. 
119 Barnett op cit. at p. 109. 
120 A. C. Hutchinson 'The Law Emperor?' in Reading Dworkin Critically, (Berg 1992) at p.63. 
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experiences of women in his consideration of the 'general politics of integrity, community, 
and fraternity'. 121 Rather than amounting to a minor oversight, this omission resonates 
through his work which, after all, claims to 'identify and distinguish the diverse and often 
competitive dimensions of political value'. 122 This indicates that his 'grand theory' approach 
to equality, although useful in some respects, is not suited to the study of the nature of gender 
relations which requires specific consideration of the causes and effects of family relations 
and their placement in the wider society. As consideration of the work of social theorists 
demonstrates, Dworkin is not alone in his neglect of the women's perspective. Analysts from 
the Greek philosophers, through to the social contract theorists, and on to those concerned 
with contemporary studies of the principles of justice and equality have been guilty of the 
same neglect. It is no wonder that a body of theory has emerged specifically in defence of the 
women's perspective in analyses of social, political and economic life. Known collectively as 
'feminist theory', this school of thought encompasses a range of ideas so diverse that the use 
of a common term perhaps obscures more differences than the similarities its use purports to 
unite. However, central to all of these ideas is a commitment to include the hitherto excluded 
voice of woman in accounts and explanations of the past with a view to advocating suitable 
political reforms for the future. Fragments of the work of some of the most prominent 
feminist theorists have been used throughout this chapter as a means of critiquing the 
traditional theories under review. In this final section, that work will be considered in more 
detail with the aim of identifying an appropriate theoretical framework within which the 
analysis comprising the core of this thesis can take place. 
121 Preface to Law's Empire, op cit at vii. 
122 Ibid at viii. 
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Feminist Legal Theory - Putting Women in the Picture 
Categorisations of feminist theory have identified four main classifications: liberal, socialist, 
radical and difference feminism, although, as Lacey has observed, the liberal and socialist 
schools amount to specific applications of existing political philosophies to women rather 
than autonomous and distinctive theories in their own right.123 That feminist writers have 
sought to include the experiences of women in accepted analyses of society is hardly 
surprising given their long-term exclusion, but such transplantation has been problematic in 
celiain respects. The organic nature of the development of feminist theory means that it is 
important to consider the various stages of that development in, as far as is possible, 
chronological order. This will be attempted alongside representations of the criticisms that 
have been levelled at the different theoretical classifications. It should be noted that these 
classifications represent models, rather than self-inclusive theories, with the work of some 
theorists falling between several of the categories. 
Liberal Feminism 
The liberal ideal, centred on notions of equality and individual freedom, has become the 
dominant political ideology in Western democratic society. As considered above, the concept 
of liberalism depends on the acceptance of certain fundamental conditions such as the 
availability of legal rights, the distribution of resources via markets free from unjustified State 
intervention and the protection of the private sphere, all of which are predicated upon a 
primary concern for rationality in society's organisation. From their earliest conception, these 
conditions have impacted on the lives of women. They have been used to explain the 
123 Lacey, Feminist Legal Them)! and the Rights a/Women, op citn. 83, at pp. 20 and 25. 
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dichotomisation of the sexes and their corresponding gendered roles, to reinforce the status 
quo and to justify the continued subjection of women through their exclusion from full and 
effective participation in society. Liberal feminists,124 while mindful of the weaknesses 
inherent in the liberal school of thought, seek to eliminate gender-based discrimination by 
utilisation of the ideological strengths encompassed by the doctrine, specifically through 
application of the ideals of equality and autonomy. In seeking to apply these ideals, liberal 
feminism is 'committed to creating similarities between women and men where possible and 
to eliminating the differences between them. ,125 Pursuance of this strategy will 'lead to 
assimilation of women to men in the public world', the downside being, in O'Donovan's 
estimation, a corresponding 'denial of needs and responsibilities in the private. ,126 
The application of liberal ideals to women's employment is the basis on which legal 
intervention in the national and EC contexts in the employment sphere is grounded. 127 The 
legislative approach owes much to the protection of the individual right to equal treatment 
articulated through the liberal promise of the same (equal) opportunities for all. The resulting 
symmetrical application of equality provides corresponding rights to equal treatment to men 
as well as women. The identification of unequal treatment between two individuals depends 
on the existence of a preordained standard against which any such treatment can be assessed. 
In the contemporary employment context, this standard is personified by the normative model 
of the 'standard worker' who is engaged on a permanent, full time basis and whose labour 
market behaviour, thus, conforms to that of the (male) breadwinner. For any individual found 
124 For examples, see the work of early feminist theorists such as Mill cited infi'a at p. 30 and Wollstonecraft at p. 
35. The work of liberal theorists such as Ronald Dworkin can also be aligned with this perspective insofar as it 
can be described as 'feminist'. Dworkin's equality theory, discussed infra, is distinct from the 'equal 
opportunities' approach generally identified with liberal feminism as it recognises and endorses the use of 
reverse discrimination as necessary for achievement of the individual right to treatment as an equal. 
125 K. O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), at p. 35. 
126 Ibid 
127 See Chapter 4 infi·a. 
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to be in receipt of different (and therefore unequal) treatment, there exists, theoretically at 
least, a comparator of the opposite sex for the purposes of bringing a legal case. This is so 
whether the recipient of the less favourable treatment is male or female, as rights lie in either 
direction. On its face this approach prohibits favourable treatment or 'reverse discrimination' 
although, in some theoretical applications of the liberal perspective, reverse discrimination is 
accepted as a necessary means to an end, specifically, as a means of protecting the 
individual's right to equality. 
As Fredman notes, the early contribution of liberal feminism should not be under-estimated as 
it was the 'effective harnessing of liberal concepts to the cause ofwomen's emancipation' that 
led to the removal of formal legal impediments against women, culminating in the extension 
of suffrage in 1928. 128 However, the limits of this approach have since been realised and are 
illustrated by the lack of progress made in certain respects despite women's formal right to 
political participation. Criticisms of liberal feminism arise largely from the fact that 'it is not 
so much a distinctly feminist theory as liberalism applied to women. ,129 Therefore, any 
shortcomings inherent in the traditional liberal conception of equality are transferred to its 
application to considerations of women's perspective.13o These arguments, which have 
already been versed, focus on the individualistic nature of liberalism,131 its conception of 
freedom 132 and adherence to the public/private divide as a means of determining the social 
arrangements worthy of legal intervention and those best left to self-regulation. 133 
Liberalism's reliance on these factors has been criticised on the basis that, collectively, they 
128 Fredman, Women and the Law, op cit, at p. 11. 
129 Lacey, Feminist Legal TheOl)!, op cit at p. 20. 
130 For a discussion of the characteristics of liberalism subjected to a feminist critiques, see A.M. Jaggar, 
Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Harvester 1983) at pp. 39-48. 
131 See Lacey ibid at p. 20 and Fredman op cit at p. 14. 
132 Lacey, id at 21, Fredman op cit at 14. 
133 See K. O'Donovan Sexual Divisions in Law, op cit at pp. 146-59. 
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contribute to the preservation of the status quo and lead to a failure to take account of the 
changing lives of women. 
The State's role in the liberal analysis, to act as 'neutral umpire', 134 has also been the subject 
of fierce criticism by feminists who argue that this is illusory as the State in its various guises 
is undeniably male. MacKinnon contends that liberalism's promise of equality for women, as 
achievable by the removal of obstacles to participation in public life, conceals the concept of 
power in society. In fact, the liberal State is profoundly male and exclusionary of women so 
that gender relations are actually political relations with gender roles determined by power 
and powerlessness. MacKinnon questions whether, 'the State [is] to some degree autonomous 
of the interests of men or an integral expression of them?' 135 In law, the power relationship is 
obscured: whether it is the sameness of women and men or their differences which are at 
question, in both regards the normative standard remains that of man, so that sex equality law, 
' ... fails to notice that men's differences from women are equal to women's 
differences from men. Yet the sexes are not equally situated in society with respect to 
their relative differences. Hierarchy of power produces real as well as fantasised 
differences, differences that are also inequalities. The differences are equal. The 
. 1· . 1 b· 1 ,136 mequa lties, rat ler 0 VlOUS y, are not. 
Socialist (Marxist) Feminism 
Although women have been largely left out of the traditional Marxist position, Engels's work 
on the family incorporated some useful examples of how socialist ideals could be used to 
134 Fredman id at 12. 
135 C. MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Them)! of State, (Harvard University Press, 1989) at p. 161. 
136 ld at pp. 224-5. 
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transform the lives of women as well as men. 137 In subsequent analyses of Marxist theory, 
feminist writers have attempted to incorporate women specifically,138 although the central 
tenet of Marxism remains class and not gender. The attractions of Marxist political 
philosophy to those concemed with society's power relations are obvious - Marxism offers an 
altemative analysis to liberalism in which the State is not viewed as neutral but rather as an 
agent of ideological and political change. Law emerges as an instmment of power used to 
control and maintain control of the elite over the proletariat. The role of law is not, however, 
as central to the operation of society as the liberal perspective might suggest. In Marxist 
theory, society's conditions and the individual's place are determined by the economic base, 
primarily by the relationship between the relations of production (the means by which 
individual needs are satisfied) and the forces of production (the available natural resources 
and available technological skills). A person's social class is determined by his or her position 
within the relations of production so that those with economic power have control over all 
other lower classes. By applying the central premise of Marxist ideology, namely the 
oppression of one class by another, to women's subordinated position within society, 
feminists have contended that, 'According to this 'dual systems' theory, women's 
reproductive labour is exploited by men in the same way as the working class's productive 
labour is exploited by capitalists,.139 
Despite the obvious parallels between the working class's oppresslOn at the hands of the 
capitalists and women's subordination through their unequal power relationship with men, 
there are certain aspects of Marxist theory that deem its application to gender relations 
unsatisfactory. Women's omission from Marx's original, apparently all-encompassing, 
137 F. Engels, 'The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State' (1884) in Marx and Engels Selected 
Works (Lawrence and Wishart, 1968). 
138 For example, H Collins, MGI:-..;ism and the Law, (Clarendon, 1982); M.Ba11'ett, Women's Oppression Today 
(Verso, London, 1991). 
139 Lacey op cit at p.2S. For an example of this particular theory, see Ba11'ett ibid. 
48 
analysis of society makes their subsequent 'writing in' appear as the afterthought it patently 
is. In fact, Marxism's denial of woman's place in society's power dynamic amounts to a 
benign acceptance of her subordination rather than an oversight. In Engels's analysis of the 
family, private property and the State,140 he contends that the destruction of capitalism will 
result in women's emergence as the equal partners of men. However, the inherent assumption 
that all exploitation arises on class grounds, fails to take account of the very nature of 
women's oppression. By failing to acknowledge the patriarchal nature of society which 
coexists with differences of class and gives rise to a whole other set of inequalities, 'Marxist 
theory assumes the lack of differentiation in women's lives. Woman's identity becomes 
invisible. ,141 As Harstock has noted, 'Marx's procedure was in fact to set out from men's 
labour and to ignore the specificity of women's labour. ,142 The failure of Marxist theory to 
take specific account of the life experiences of women is difficult to set aside and has lead to 
the development of a 'third wave' or radical feminism through which some of the more 
compelling observations arising fi-om the Marxist analysis of society can be specifically 
applied to issues of gender relations. 
Radical Feminism 
Lacey has described radical feminism as 'the most autonomous and distinctive conception of 
feminism, in that it is exclusively a feminist theory. ,143 However, she also acknowledges the 
difficulties in identification of any unifying features among the various strands of feminism 
whose proponents have claimed a radical basis. Part of that difficulty rests on the fact that all 
feminists may, by definition, claim to be 'radical' due to the movement's questioning of the 
140 Engels ibid 
141 Barnett op cit at p. 137. 
142 N.Harstock, lvJoney, Sex and Power, Toward a Feminist HistoricaZA'{aterialism, (Routledge and Kegan Paul 
1983) at p. 146. 
143 Lacey op cit at p. 23. 
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central tenets of legal and political thought and aspirations to reorganise society's 'public' 
institutions to enable women's inclusion. However, as the liberal perspective illustrates, not 
all feminist perspectives are as challenging to the status quo as might be expected, with 
variation dependent on the nature and methods of change advocated. What the many and 
diverse theories subscribing to a more radical approach have in common is their focus on the 
problem of men's dominance over women and women's c01Tesponding subordination to men. 
As Barnett has observed, 'Women's sexuality lies at the heart of the radical feminist debate. 
Thus radical feminists analyse the means by which men's se;.,.'Uality is expressed in forms 
h· 1 1· ,. 1· ,144 W 1C 1 resu t m women s mequa lty. 
Olsen's analysis of the binary divisions in Western political philosophy is particularly useful 
in pinning down the identifying characteristics of radical feminism. 145 A number of central 
concepts are considered: male and female; subject and object; public and private; form and 
substance; mind and body; active and passive; reason and emotion. Radical feminists 
recognise the hierarchical and sexualised nature of the dichotomies and seek to reclassify the 
valuations so that the 'second' concepts attract greater recognition. The need for such 
reconceptualisation arises from the fundamental acknowledgment of women as beings in their 
own right without reference to their sameness to or difference from a male standard. 
Arguably the most influential, and certainly the most prolific, radical feminist theorist is 
Catharine MacKinnon whose 'dominance theory' is based on the premise that considerations 
of the extent to which men and women are the same or different are at best unhelpful, at worst 
conceptually erroneous. Such consideration takes attention away from the real issue - men's 
power over women. From this perspective, 'Difference is the velvet glove on the iron fist of 
144 Barnett op cit at p. 163. 
145 Olsen, 'Feminism and Critical Legal TheoIY', 8 International Joumal of the Sociology of Law (1990) 199. 
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domination. ,146 MacKinnon contributes convincingly to the sex/gender debate by noting that, 
while sex discrimination law focuses on the sameness of the sexes, gender has been socially 
constructed on the basis of their differences. 147 In fact both approaches are misleading in the 
quest for equality as both rely on the male standard, so that 'man has become the measure of 
all things. ,148 
In MacKinnon's view, the equality question requires a reconceptualisation that places power 
and dominance at its heart. In order to achieve this, MacKinnon breaks down the baniers 
between the public and private by exploring a wide range of issues such as rape and other 
forms of violence against women, prostitution, pornography and sexual harassment tlrrough 
the eyes of the subordinated woman. From MacKinnon's perspective all of these issues share 
a common theme in that they represent manifestations of the abuse of men's power over 
women. MacKinnon challenges the liberal conception of the neutral State and calls for greater 
legal regulation of the 'private sphere' in order that society can begin to redress the imbalance 
of power. In short, for MacKinnon 'the task of feminist analysis is to unmask, unravel, 
women's subordination and lack of power. ,149 Much of MacKinnon's analysis focuses on the 
objectification of women, which takes place through the construction of the female as a 
sexual object for men's use. Society'S gender divisions ensure that women remain 
subordinated in all aspects of private and public life so that 'we are not allowed to be women 
,150 I d···· I h h . on our own terms. n sex Iscnmmahon aw, t e sameness approac reqUIres women to 
'measure our similarity with men to see if we are or can be men's equals ,151 and the 
difference debate 'views women as men view women: in need of special protection, help, or 
146 MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist The01)} of the State, op cit at p. 8. 
147 C. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination Law in Feminism Unmodified: 
Discourses on Life and Law, 1987, (Harvard UP, 1987). 
148Id. 
149 Bamett op cit at p. 169. 
150 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at p. 71. 
151Id. 
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indulgence. ,152 Only by analysing gender relations as a matter of political and social power 
can feminism break out of this paradigm. 
Critiques of MacKinnon's work identify an apparent paradox in that the branch of feminism 
which declares itself radical relies heavily on the essential or 'natural' physical differences 
between the sexes in order to justify the need for change. The concem is that such 
essentialism may 'undercut the main basis for feminist advancement. ,153 Furthermore, the 
reduction of women to little other than sexual objects and the supposed homogeneity of 
women which is inherent in the construction of a 'woman's position' may actually lead back 
to the objectification of women that radical feminism purports to challenge. This, in tum, 
excludes consideration of relevant social differences such as etlmicity and class. Comell has 
identified an overemphasis of women's sexuality in MacKinnon's work that restricts the 
development of her thesis, as she is 'unable to affirm feminine sexual difference as other than 
victimisation. ,154 The personification of woman as victim is reflected in the limited range of 
substantive issues on which radical feminist lawyers have focused their attention, chiefly 
those directly associated with sex, sexuality and reproduction. As Lacey notes, 'they show 
less interest in economic and political inequities which, one might argue, the law plays a 
central role in constituting and sustaining. ,155 
Despite such shortcomings, the influence of the radical perspective on feminist legal theory 
cannot be denied. Perhaps the greatest contribution made by theorists such as MacKinnon to 
developing a better understanding of gender relations has been the construction of woman's 
identity in response to the generations of silencing, from the express exclusion of women 
152Id. 
153 Lacey, op cit at p. 24. 
154 D. Cornell 'Sexual difference, the feminine and eqUivalency: A critique oflviacKinnon's Towards a Feminist 
TheO/)! of the State' (1990) 100 Yale LJ 2247. 
155 Lacey, op cit at p. 24. 
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from public life on the grounds of their 'unsuitability', to the omission of women from social 
and political analyses by some of the most influential contemporary thinkers. MacKinnon's 
response to such silence is inspired, 'I'm evoking for women a role that we have yet to make, 
in the name of a voice that, unsilenced, might say something that has never been heard. ,156 
Difference Feminism 
In contrast to MacKinnon's rejection of comparison as a means of understanding gender 
relations, those theorists comprising the fmal classification share an interest in the recognition 
of women's difference from men. From this perspective such difference, which may arise on 
physical, psychological or social grounds, should be incorporated into the rules and 
institutions governing society so that women are explicitly included and are able to benefit 
from their innate right to equality with men. Despite this common interest, the work of 
'difference or cultural feminists' is diverse, largely because of the various academic 
disciplines within which their theories have evolved. The three most prominent of these 
theorists are: educational psychologist Carol Gilligan; sociologist Nancy Chodorow and 
psychoanalyst and philosopher Luce It-igaray. Gilligan's work on the differences in girls' and 
boys' moral and psychological development has had a profound effect on feminist theor/ 57 
due to its recognition of the different and distinct female voice which can be distinguished 
from that of the male on the grounds of its 'insights central to an ethic of care'. Chodorow's 
groundbreaking study of mothering158 through which she promotes the need for 'equal 
parenting' has obvious value both in its contribution to the theoretical debate sUlTounding 
nature and culture and as a basis for policy reform. Building on the work of De Beauvoir, 
156 Feminism Unmodified at p. 77 
157 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Them)) and Women's Development (Harvard UP, 1982). 
158 N. Chodorow, The Repmduction ofMothel'ing: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender, (Califomia UP, 
1978). 
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Irigaray's 'analysis of woman', 159 which takes place tluough a definition of 'the rights and 
duties of each sex insofar as they are different', 160 has provided a compelling articulation of 
woman's social and cultural identity. In seeking to uncover the roots of women and men's 
differences, the categories of sex and gender are fused rather than denied or rejected. This 
approach enables recognition of the influences of both physiological and psychological 
difference as well as the effects of socialisation in the construction of woman's identity, 
which itself is multi-faceted. 
As well as an unashamed interest in women's difference from men, these writers all share 'a 
certain engagement both with theoretical preoccupations of postmodemism and the 
sociological category of postmodemity. ,161 The movement towards difference feminism 
entails 'a shift in emphasis towards a questioning ofthe very idea of gender neutrality, both as 
ideal and as possible. ,162 The application of 'difference feminism' to legal theory has 
incorporated consideration of legal reasoning163 and method164 as well as the exploration of 
specific provisions and corresponding shortcomings in current enforcement. This holistic 
approach differentiates it from other forms of feminist analysis and frees it from the criticisms 
of radical feminism's preoccupation with a narrow range of 'women's issues'. Furthermore, 
by recognising the differences between the sexes without compromising their innate right to 
equality, difference feminism provides a suitable theoretical framework within which 
meaningful analyses of gender relations can take place. 
159 L. Trigaray 'Equal or different?' in M. Whitford (ed) The b'igamy Reade7; (Blackwell, 1991). 
160 De Beauvoir op cit at p. 33. 
161 Lacey op cit at p. 26. 
162Id. See N. Naffine, Law and the Sexes, (Allen and Unwin, 1990). 
163 N. Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects (Hart Publishing, 1998). 
164 M.l Frug, Postmodern Legal Feminism, (Routledge, 1992). 
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Conclusions 
In seeking inclusion in political and economic life, women have faced many barriers. The 
categorisation of men as subjects and women as objects, stemming from the ancient Greek's 
beliefs in the separation of form and nature, was used to justify the exclusion of women from 
participation in public life on the grounds of their lack of rationality. This dichotomisation, 
although no longer expressed, continues to influence the organisation of contemporary 
societies and the law and policy-making institutions that support them. The separation of the 
public and private spheres has provided institutional manifestations of the separate worlds of 
men and women with woman's ability to bear children used to justify her consignment to the 
latter. In the employment context, the effect of this separation can be seen through the ways in 
which women participate in labour market activity: by combining paid employment with high 
levels of family responsibility and by the overcrowding of women into types of work which 
require the caring and nurturing skills associated with motherhood. 
The Enlightenment brought with it many important social and political changes and the 
reorganisation of social relations that followed in its wake was identified by theorists of the 
time as comprising a contract between the ruler and his subjects based on consent. However, 
this analysis failed to take account of the lives of society's female subjects whose 
subordination was perpetuated. The liberal acceptance of the public/private divide and support 
for legal abstentionism from the private sphere of the family have contributed to the omission 
of a female perspective from liberal political theory. This absence of a women's voice is still 
notable to varying degrees in the work of such influential modern thinkers as Rawls and 
Dworkin. 
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This silencing of a woman's voice led to the development of a distinct body of feminist theory 
which, like womanhood itself, incorporates many views. Some feminist legal theorists 
attempted to write the experiences of women into existing male-oriented analyses. It is 
contended that the liberal and Marxist paradigms, which offer valuable insights into the 
gendered nature of particular socio-economic factors, incorporate the weaknesses of their 
'host' theories into analyses of woman's perspective. Radical feminism offers an altemative 
to existing theory and is specifically designed to take account of women as the subject rather 
than in the context of their relation to men. Difference feminism enables an articulation of 
women's cultural identity for its own sake, away from the traditional paradigm of the male 
standard. Difference feminism has been described as the 'dominant approach within feminist 
legal theory,165 and is the theoretical perspective within which the proceeding analysis 
presented in this thesis will take place. 
What is posited here is the need, through legal intervention, to recognise and value women's 
autonomy within contemporary labour markets, specifically through the standardisation of 
women's work The influence of all of the other theoretical strands outlined can be identified 
throughout the following analysis. The European Community's very existence was founded 
on the liberal notion of the free market with minimal State intervention and this is evident in 
the legislative approach adopted which is based on the equal treatment model. As discussed 
above,166 the dichotomisation of public and private life continues to shape the policy agenda 
at both national and supranational levels and this, in tum, has a marked impact on the labour 
market experiences of women. The dualist approach which characterises legal intervention in 
the spheres of family and paid employment, coupled with the assimilationist objective of the 
equal opportunities approach to labour market regulation, combine to necessitate the 
165 Lacey op cit. 
166 At p. 15. 
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identification of an ideal against which all behaviour can be measured. This ideal is 
personified by the standard worker model characterised by engagement with full-time, 
permanent employment. In this model there is no evident impact on labour market behaviour 
arising from personal circumstances, be they the result of the physical experience of 
pregnancy and childbirth or through the longer-term, but non-sex specific, commitment to 
raising children and keeping house. The personal experiences of women, which arise due to 
the sex and gender-based characteristics of womanhood, make it less likely that individual 
women will be able to confonn to the standard worker model, making this implicitly a male 
model. 
The value ascribed to the standard worker model is based on the perception that this is the 
most efficient means of organising labour and is, therefore, conducive to the smooth running 
of the market. However, the ability of workers to confonn to this arrangement within the 
public sphere of paid employment depends largely on the provision of unpaid labour within 
the private domain of the family. Given the nature of contemporary social arrangements and 
corresponding patterns of labour market behaviour, it is contended that this model is no 
longer reflective of the experiences of men or women and, therefore, its relevance is 
questionable. The perpetuation of the standard worker model as a basic tenet of legal 
intervention and policy formulation arises through a combination of historical factors and 
continued dependence on certain ideological beliefs in which patriarchy undoubtedly plays a 
role. Under the current legislative provisions at both national and supranational levels, the 
promise of sex equality depends largely on the ability of women workers to conform to the 
normative model of the standard (male) worker. Thus, women's right to equality IS 
subordinated to the male standard, so that man is the subject, women the object or 'other'. 
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It is asserted that the role ofthe judiciary within Community law provides a potential way out 
of this predicament through the teleological approach which has characterised the legal 
reasoning of the Court of Justice and which enables the use of the broad aspirations contained 
in the Treaty as a basis for such reasoning. This thesis seeks to determine whether, and to 
what extent, the Court's philosophical position in cases concerning sex discrimination has 
encompassed consideration of women's life experiences in order to give effect to the principle 
of equality, for example, through the improvement of living and working conditions as 
outlined by the Treaty provisions themselves. 167 Before any discussion of the potential role of 
the ECJ in overcoming obstacles to the attainment of equality can take place, it is necessary to 
identify and analyse the specific differences which exist in the labour market behaviour of 
women and men and this undertaking will provide the basis for the next Chapter. 
167 As articulated by Articles 136 and 137/EC. 
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Chapter 3 
Introduction 
Women's Work 
168 
'Man/or tltefield and woman/or tlte Iteartlt' 
A transformation has taken place in women's employment in post-war Europe. Women's 
labour market participation rates have increased in every EU Member State during this period, 
so that 55% of women are now economically active 169 compared with an average of below 
40% in 1960. 170 As closer scrutiny of such statistics reveals, the aggregate figures mask a 
range of diverse arrangements in relation to the types of paid work in which women are 
engaged. This diversity relates to hours of work and other terms and conditions of 
employment. 32% of women across Europe work part-time compared with 7%171 of men and, 
if job security is taken into account, more women than men are employed on fixed-term 
contracts. 172 Although women's aggregate patiicipation rate has risen, it still lags 17.2 
percentage points behind that of men,173 with the mothers of small children having a lower 
168 From 'The Princess' by Alfred Tennyson (1847). The fuller quote, from which this excerpt is taken, is: 
, ... but this is fixt 
As are the roots of earth and base of all; 
Man for the field and woman for the hearth: 
Man for the sword and for the needle she: 
Man with the head and women with the heart: 
Man to command and women to obey; 
All else confusion.' 
169 European Commission (2004) Report on Equality Between Aden and Women, COM (2004) 115 Final, at p. 4. 
170 The statistics for 1960 are based on the labour market participation rates of women aged 25 to 49. 
171 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2002) Quality o[Women 's 
Work and Employment Tools [01' Change, at p. 8. 
172 D. Stonie, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, TempormyAgency 
rVork in the European Union, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002. 
173 European Commission op cit at p. 4. 
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aggregate participation rate than childless women. 174 The persistence of gendered pay gaps in 
all Member States means that, on average, women earn 16% less per hour than men. 175 Part of 
the explanation for such variations in pay lies with the highly segregated nature of labour 
markets which are gendered, so that women work in different employment sectors and jobs 
from men (horizontal segregation) and at different levels within occupational hierarchies 
(vertical segregation). Although women have made some inroads into previously male 
dominated areas of work, the most constant and enduring feature of women's employment in 
the post-war era can be said to be its comparatively low status. Although it is outside of the 
scope of this thesis to provide an in-depth analysis of the different employment experiences of 
women and men, consideration of the appropriate legal responses obviously demands some 
understanding of the causes of those differences. 
As Dickens has noted, the nature of employment is changing with one of the reasons for 
change attributable to a growth in 'atypical' or 'flexible' employment. 176 The other dominant 
feature identified by Dickens is the rise of 'networked, boundaryless, (sometimes virtual) 
organisations in which highly skilled autonomous professional individuals, with occupational 
or portfolio careers rather than organizational careers, link together with others to work on a 
non-hierarchical project basis.,177 This form of highly valued and well rewarded work is 
generally performed by self-employed individuals through contracts for services and has had 
an impact on men's work, while increases in atypical employment are more commonly 
reflected in women's aggregate work patterns. Both of these changes to the working 
environment have been reflected in recent developments in policy-making at the European-
174 Some 12.7 percentage rates lower - ibid at p. 4. 
175 European Commission op cit at p.5. The gendered pay gap has hardly changed in recent years and it is 
significantly higher in the private sector compared to the public sector. 
176 L. Dickens 'Problems of Fit: Changing Employment and Labour Regulation' British loumal of Industrial 
Relations 42, 42004, pp. 595-616. 
177 Ibid at p. 595. 
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level and are incorporated in the goal of the Lisbon Agenda178 'to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. ,179 
This shift in the objectives of Europe's social policy, which has effected a reorientation of 
focus away from the programme of harmonisation of social standards towards facilitation of 
the co-existence of national policies, is likely to have a marked influence on the shape of 
future regulation at the supranational level. The rationale for such redesign is based on the 
notion that greater labour market flexibility requires a move away from State intervention. 
This, according to the industrial relations literature, is a flawed assumption based on an over-
simplification of the relationship between regulation and labour market behaviour. 18o If 
sustained, this notion has obvious implications for any future improvements in the quality of 
women's employment which is closely intertwined with the growth in atypical work 
Furthermore, as Wajcman has argued, gender relations have been omitted from much 
contemporary industrial relations theory with the result that the changing nature of 
employment relations has not been the subject of feminist analysis. 181 This Chapter will 
comprise an overview of women's contemporary employment patterns which will identify the 
salient features of women's labour market position relative to men's. The attempts of 
economic theorists to rationalise the reasons for such differences will be assessed. This 
analysis will be contextualised by reference to the relevant literature relating to the study of 
industrial relations at the supranational level which reveals that the relationship between 
178 Adopted by the Member States' representatives at the meeting of the European Council in 2000. 
179 European Commission 'From the Lisbon Summit to a New Social Policy Agenda', available at: 
wvvw.europa.eu.intlcomm/employment sociallnews/2000. The Lisbon Agenda and its articulation through the 
European Employment Strategy are discussed in Chapter 4 infra. 
ISO See G. Standing (1999) 'Globalisation, LaboltI' Flexibility and Insecurity: The Era o/Market Regulation', 
European Journal of Industrial Relations 3, 1, 7-37; R. Hyman, 'The Europeanisation - 01' the Erosion - 0/ 
Industrial Relations? ' (2002) 32 Industrial Relations Journal 4, 280-294; 
lSI J. Wajcman 'Feminism Facing Industrial Relations in Britain', 38 British Journal of Industrial Relations 2, 
2000, 183-20l. 
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gender and changes ill labour market structure is somewhat more complex than generally 
perceived. 
The Rise of Women's Paid Employment 
The distinction between paid work outside the home and unpaid work within it originates 
from the time of the Industrial Revolution. Prior to the concentration of labour in factories, 
the division between different forms of work had been largely obscured by the prevalence of 
subsistence agriculture and the various forms of craft work emanating from cottage industries. 
In the UK, for example, the participation rates of married women engaged in paid labour 
outside of the home declined from 25% in 1851 to 8.7% in 1921. 182 Following the Industrial 
Revolution, the need to work outside the home became paramount. Women's primary 
responsibility for childcare impacted on their working opportunities with a constraining effect 
in both the ideological and practical senses, so that they were prevented from obtaining paid 
work by what was believed to be appropriate for them to do and also by what they could 
actually do. Both of these factors continue to have an influence over the labour market 
experiences of women. 
Although women's employment rates have risen in all 15 of the European Union Member 
States under review since the mid-1960s, there has been considerable variation in the 
increases that have taken place in specific countries. Much of this divergence arises from the 
different relationships between motherhood and paid employment that coexist within the 
European Union. At the time that women's participation rates started to rise, there were three 
182 S. Atkins and B. Hoggett, Women and the Law (Robertson 1984) pp.18-19. 
62 
main categorisations applied to European countries: 183 the Scandinavian model; the Southern 
European model; and the 'camel's back' model. The Scandinavian model was characterised 
by the continuous employment patterns of women which were almost the same as those of 
men. This model has continued to strengthen since the 1980s. The Southern European model 
reflected those countries with very low participation rates which peaked at around the age of 
25 and fell to below 20% for women aged between 25 and 49. During the 1960s this model 
reflected the patiicipation rates of women in Italy, POliugal, Spain and Greece as well as 
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, although the patterns of female employment in these 
countries have evolved very differently over the past 40 years. The 'camel's back' model was 
used to describe the participation rates of women in those countries in which the majority of 
women left paid employment upon the birth of their first child, returning (often on a part-time 
basis) once the children were older. In the 1960s the employment rates of women in 
Germany, Denmark, France and the UK were characterised by adherence to this model, 
although these countries no longer show similar patterns of behaviour. Despite the fact that 
the aggregate employment profiles of women in the Member States have developed 
differently from these models since the 1960s, the employment rates of women in the 25 to 49 
age group have continued to increase in all countries. 184 This has been attributed to two inter-
related factors: first, women's labour market behaviour has moved closer to that of men and, 
second, the impact of motherhood on women's employment rates has decreased so that 
women's economic activity rates in all EU countries have become closer over time. 
183 N. Le Feuvre and M. Andriocci, Employment Opportunities for Women in Europe, A report of the EU-funded 
project 'Employment and Women's Studies: The Impact of Women 's Studies Training on Women's Employment 
in Europe.' (European Commission, 2003) at p. 16. 
184 Ibid at p. 17. Although the trend in women's participation rates is an upward one, the rate of growth should be 
interpreted with a note of caution as longitudinal analyses of women 's engagement in paid employment over a 
longer time period reveal that the notion that the rise in women's economic participation rates is a twentieth 
century phenomenon is a myth. In fact, since the mid-nineteenth century, female employment rates have 
remained remarkably stable. It is the nature of work and the working anangements that have changed, notably in 
the UK with the growth of paid pati-time work since the 1970s. See C. Hakim, 'The lvlyth of Rising Female 
Employment', Work, Employment and Society, 7, 1993 97. 
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Women's right to participate in employment has not been won easily, with access to certain 
occupations and to any paid work at specific stages in the lifecycle denied on ideological 
grounds. Attempts to introduce some forms of market control over the exploitation of workers 
in the wake ofthe Industrial Revolution resulted in the introduction of protective legislationl85 
which did not always operate to the advantage of women. Maximum working hours and 
prescriptive safety regulations which applied only to women and children, although largely 
welcomed, were used as a means of suppressing women's engagement in certain types of 
workl86 while male workers escaped such restriction. The arduous nature of manual work and 
poor working conditions that prevailed during the early nineteenth century, coupled with high 
fertility rates and low infant mortality, undoubtedly made some occupations particularly 
unsuitable for women of childbearing age. However, it is notable that women's 
characterisation as the 'weaker sex' was used as a means of reinforcing their unsuitability for 
participation in the public sphere of work. 187 In the international arena, the exclusion of 
women from night work was the subject of an early ILO Convention188 which was followed 
by a later Convention prohibiting underground work by women in mines. 189 Both of these 
Conventions are still widely ratified. In the UK, women's exemption from certain professions 
was enshrined in national law until the start of the twentieth century190 when exceptions 
permitted under the reforming legislation allowed for women's exclusion by regulation from 
any branch or post within the civil or foreign services. This enabled the continued operation 
of the 'marriage bar' by which women were required to leave certain public sector posts on 
185 For example, the Factories Acts 1819-1844. 
186 S. Fredman, Women and the Lmv, op cit at p. 68 et seq. 
187 See further A John (ed.) Unequal Opportunities, Women's Employment in England 1800-1918 (Blackwell, 
1986). 
188 Convention No 4 (1919) revised 1934, 1948 and 1990. 
189 Convention No 45. 
190 The Sex Disqualifications (Removal) Act 1919 made it unlawful to disqualify anyone on the grounds of sex 
or marriage from exercising a public function, holding civil or judicial office or entering a civil profession or 
vocation. 
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marriage. 191 From a contemporary perspective it is not the introduction of such measures that 
is most surprising, but the adherence to their ideological foundations in the making and 
shaping of policy which still persists today despite advances in women's health and socio-
economic status and the existence of anti-discrimination legislation. 
The obvious tension between domestic responsibility and labour market participation has 
undoubtedly been the most important factor in the rise of part-time employment among 
women during the twentieth century. That such work has, until relatively recently, been 
detrimentally differentiated from full-time employment by Member States' legal systems 
reflects the State's reluctance to intervene in the operation of the labour market and the 
willingness of governments to trade off women's employment rights in favour of increased 
flexibility for employers. As the continuing rise in women's share of the paid labour market 
relative to men's demonstrates, the central issue in improvements to 'women's work' isn't 
one of increasing its quantity, but rather improving its quality. This factor will be addressed in 
the remainder of this chapter with reference to two fundamental questions; what features of 
'women's work' are responsible for its low status and what are the potentially effective legal 
responses? 
The Nature of "Women's Work" 
A high level of gendered segregation still persists in the labour markets of all Member 
States192 despite women having increased their share of employment, making important 
191 Which led to a spate of cases brought by teachers who had been forced out of their jobs due to the malTiage 
bars operated by various local education authorities during the 1920s, illustrating the depth and breadth of the 
use of the exception. See, for example, Price v Rhondda UDC [1923] 1 Ch 372. 
192 P. Paoli and D. Merllie European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Third 
European sU/vey on working conditions, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2001; C. Fagan andB. Burchell., European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
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inroads into some previously male-dominated sectors and jobs over the past 40 years.193 The 
highly segregated nature of labour markets along gendered lines, has led to the identification 
of certain types of paid employment as 'women's work'. Such work is crowded into a narrow 
range of occupations and, as well as its predominance within certain sectors, has other 
common characteristics. Although there are some national variations with regard to the degree 
to which the following identifiable features are present, they have come to represent areas of 
commonality in the types of paid work undertaken by a large number of women across all EU 
Member States. 
Horizontal segregation occurs where the members of one sex are concentrated in certain 
sectors, occupations and job types. In the European context, research indicates that there is a 
high concentration of women in the public sector which accounts for 32% of all women 
employees, compared with 19% of all male employees. 194 Women who work in the private 
sector tend to be employed in small and medium sized companies rather than large ones. 195 
Women's employment is concentrated in the provision of services within private households, 
health, education and other care-related activities as well as in sales, hotels and catering, while 
men predominate in constl1.lction, manufacturing, transport, agriculture and fmancial 
services. 196 Most people work in sectors in which their own sex either forms the majority or 
the entirety. In the occupational context, women's jobs tend to involve caring, nurturing and 
service-related activities with men predominating in jobs involving managerial responsibility 
and manual and technical work often categorised as 'heavy' or 'complex'. Thus, men fill 
80% of the employed armed forces, craft and related trades and jobs associated with plant and 
Working Conditions, Gender, Jobs and Working Conditions in the European Union, Luxembourg, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002. 
193 Eurostat, (2000) The Lifo o/Women and Men in Europe: A Statistical Portrait, Luxembourg, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities. 
194 Third European Working Conditions Survey 2000. 
195 Fagan and Burchell ibid.. 
196 Third European Working Conditions Survey 2000. 
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machine operation. Men also hold more than two-thirds of the skilled agricultural and fishery 
jobs with women predominating in two-thirds of clerical, service and sales jobS. 197 In 
professional and manual occupations, there is a more even split between men and women at 
the aggregate level with segregation discernable at the sub-category level: men holding the 
vast majority of jobs within the physical, mathematical and engineering professions and 
women predominating in the health and education professions. 198 
Vertical segregation occurs where, in any gIVen sector or industry, one or other sex 
predominates in senior, managerial or well-paid positions and the other is correspondingly 
over-represented in lower paid jobs and within certain types of employment contract. 
Although women in Europe have increased their representation within managerial jobs in 
recent years, there are still clear differences in the gender composition of those filling such 
jobS. 199 63% of European workers have a man as their immediate superior, with only 21 % 
working under the authority of a woman. 200 Women who are managers or supervisors are 
more likely to be in charge of other women as less than 10% of male workers have a female 
manager or supervisor. Men occupy more than 60% of the legislative and managerial 
occupations, rising to over 70% if the sub-categories of corporate managers and senior 
government officials are considered. 
An assessment of employment status also reveals gendered differences. Women are under-
represented in self-employment and account for only 1 in 3 of the 17% of self employed 
workers in the European labour market. As far as employment arrangements are concerned, 
197 OECD, Employment Outlook, 2002. 
198 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Quality of Women 's WOl'k and 
Employment: Tools fol' Change, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
2002 at p. 12. 
199 Ibid at p. 13. 
200 The remainder do not have a manager. 
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women are less likely than men to work under permanent contracts with only 44% of all 
women employed on full-time permanent contracts, compared to 64% of all men. Women are 
over-represented in respect of fIxed-term contracts and men in respect of temporary agency 
work contracts.201 As already noted, women predominate in part-time work and there are 
persistent gendered pay gaps202 in all European Member States203 which produce an aggregate 
average of 16%. 
Explaining the Low Status of 'Women's WOI'k' 
In attempting to rationalise the distinctive employment expenences of men and women, 
theorists have developed a range of different explanations. These theories can be categorised 
within three broad groupings: the neo-classical economics perspective; human capital theory 
(both of which owe much to the work of labour economists of the post-war period); and, 
segmented labour market theory, often referred to as dual market theory, which provides a 
socio-economic perspective. All of these theories add something to our understanding of the 
ways in which gender relations have been played out in the post-war labour markets of 
Western Europe and each will be considered in tum. 
201 D. Storrie, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Temporal)! Agency 
Work in the European Union, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2002. 
Although the nature of temporary agency work varies considerably with men predominating at the well-paid end 
of the specttum and women at the precarious, low-paid end - see Busby, N, and Christie, D, The Regulation of 
Temporal)! Agency Work in the European Union, The Cambrian Law Review (2005) 36, pp. 15-28. 
202 Defined as the differential in average gross hourly earnings between men and women in percentage. 
203 European Commission, Employment in Europe 2002, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 2002. 
68 
N eo-classical Economics 
Those who believe in the primacy and efficacy of the free market as the central means of 
distributing resources 204 argue that the jobs performed by women and the pay they receive are 
the result of rational decision-making based on free choice by the individuals concerned. 
Following this ideology, the price of labour is determined in the same way as the price of all 
commodities, namely by the forces of supply and demand. Wage levels settle at a rate which 
represents the lowest the employer can pay while still being able to attract suitable applicants. 
Following this line of reasoning, discrimination appears to be irrational and unnecessary as 
women's apparent willingness to work for less pay than men should lead to an increase in 
their employment across all relevant sectors and occupations which should, in tum, break 
down gendered segregation and contribute to an evening out of the pay differentia1. 205 
However, as the available statistics reveal, this hypothesis not been shown to be accurate 
within the labour markets of the Western European Member States, all of which continue to 
experience gendered segregation and pay gaps. Disciples of free market ideology have 
attempted to explain such anomalies away by attributing the differences in men and women's 
experiences to women's career choices which are made on the basis of their 'natural' capacity 
as carers. Following this rationale, occupations such as nursing are poorly paid because large 
numbers of women choose to pursue careers in such sectors on the basis of factors other than 
pay, such as the feel good factor attained through the altruistic pleasure of 'caring' and the 
resulting satisfaction in community well_being. 206 This analysis asselis that women's 
relatively low labour market status in comparison to men's is due to supply-side 
204 For the most well-known example of neo-classical economic theory applied in the context of sex 
discrimination, see S.W. Polachek and W.S. Siebert, The Economics of Earnings (CUP, 1993). The authors are 
also proponents of human capital theory (discussed supra) as the next 'logical' step in explaining the persistence 
of wage anomalies within a 'free market' order. 
205 Ibid at p. 14l. 
206 Id at p. 206. 
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characteristics rather than resulting from discrimination in the labour market. As well as the 
ideological problems inherent in this analysis, the fact that it is premised on the existence of a 
free labour market has also been the subject of criticism from other theorists. Hyman points 
out that, 'only in limited respects do 'labour markets' actually constitute markets ,207 as they 
lack the key determinants such as a saleable commodity.208 Furthermore, their sensitivity to 
influences other than market factors distinguishes labour markets from their more traditional 
counterparts. Such factors are manifested through the national industrial relations systems 
which, in the EU context, 'represent varieties of institutional stmctures which ensure that the 
employer-employee relationship is not primarily determined by market forces. ,209 
The neo-classical view that the labour market constitutes a marketplace in the economic sense 
is, thus, flawed due to the influence of external pressures which serve to dilute the purity of 
the market so that distribution of relevant resources, through the allocation of jobs and pay 
rates, are not controlled by market forces. This point can be illustrated with reference to three 
central principles: 'the rate for the job; no money wage cuts and the right to retain jobs in 
relation to other potential recmits. ,210 In the valuing of labour, unlike in product markets, the 
worth of a particular job is not ftxed by the market but is vulnerable to sectoral, regional and 
organisational variation with many employers operating internal markets where increases in 
pay are based on such non-market factors as length of service. Public sector collective 
bargaining can be said to result in the closest thing to a 'going rate', but even in the public 
sector, wage rates are subject to wide diversity, a trend which looks set to continue further as 
many public sector employers seek a move towards localised bargaining processes. The 
207 Hyman op cit at p. 281. 
208 As Marx: insisted, 'labour' is not a commodity, rather the worker sells her (or his) ability to work, making it 
impossible to measure any quantifiable property with precision as would be the case with a commodity traded in 
a product marketplace. 
209 Hyman op c it at p. 281. 
210 C. Craig, E. Gamsey and J. Rubery, Payment St11lctllres in Smaller Firms: Women's Employment in 
Segmented Labour Markets, 1984, London, Department of Employment at p. 5. 
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preservation of tenns and conditions under a 'live' employment contract make wage cuts in 
monetary tenns difficult to achieve, even where drops in productivity occur, and this factor 
also contributes to the protection of employment. As consideration of these principles 
demonstrates, social factors are more likely to provide explanations for divergence in pay 
levels than the economic laws of supply and demand. 
This is not to say that the neo-classical perspective can be completely dismissed in analyses of 
the gendered nature of labour markets. On the contrary, its acceptance into mainstream 
ideology has informed much of the policy development in this area in recent years. Attempts 
to transplant market-based principles into the operation of labour markets include the 
increasing use of short-tenn contracts, particularly through tripartite arrangements which do 
not attract the same levels of protection under European law as direct employment, and of 
contracting-out arrangements, by which workers can be legally dismissed and re-engaged 
through a third party on a lower rate of pay. 211 It is, in fact, particularly important to keep the 
neo-classical perspective firmly in view as some observers have identified a return to the 
dominance of market factors in the management of industrial relations in Europe.212 In neo-
classical theory the market is assumed to be an impersonal mechanism that operates for the 
greater good, separate from the prejudices which might influence the thought-processes of its 
participants. In reality, the market is no more or less than the sum of its parts which are 
constituted by the behaviour of those participants as much as by any other influencing factor. 
Such behaviour may very well include 'a propensity to discriminate'. 213 Furthermore, the very 
foundations on which the market is built are vulnerable to the effects of institutional 
discrimination. As Wacjman has noted, the organising forces of industrial relations' systems 
211 See the discussion of Case C-256/01 Allonby v. Accl'ington and Rossendale College and Others [2004] ECR 
1-873 in Chapter 7 supra. 
212 See, for example, Hyman ibid. 
213 R. Townsend-Smith, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases andAlaterials (Cavendish 1998) at p. 37. 
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themselves, such as 'management, trade unions and the State - which appear in the literature 
as gender neutral are indeed profoundly gendered. ,214 Perhaps this explains why neo-classical 
analyses have failed to address the persistence of gendered segregation across Member States 
in what has otherwise become a fast-moving and dynamic social environment. This failure 
has caused proponents of labour market rationalisation to develop an alternative approach 
which, although similar to the neo-classical perspective in its foundations, develops further 
the justification of differences in women's labour market position relative to that of men. 
Human Capital Theory 
Human capital theory uses the rationality offree choice as a basis for explaining the relatively 
low pay and diminution in other terms and conditions of employment which characterise 
'women's work'. Following this view, the reasons for such divergence between the pay rates 
of women and men arise out of a conscious choice made by some women not to invest in their 
human capital. This is due to the likelihood that such investment will be wasted when, during 
the years of child-bearing and rearing, they will cease to participate in the public domain of 
paid employment and return to the private sphere of the home. 'Human capital' is measured 
by the investment made by an individual in his or her career in terms of such factors as 
education and training. Investment is translated into monetary worth on the labour market so 
that an individual who is highly skilled is worth more than an unskilled worker with little 
fOlmal education and low levels of training. As Polachek and Siebert postulate, women's 
lower human capital is due to a 'rational (family wealth maximising) division of labour in the 
home due to women's comparative advantage in child-bearing and rearing. ,215 This position is 
214 Wajcman op cit at p. 184. 
215 Polachek and Siebert op cit at n. 37. Although, as women are the only sex capable of child-bearing, their 
capacity in this respect is exclusive rather than comparatively advantageous. 
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underpinned by an assumption that women are less productive than men in economic terms 
because of their child-bearing capacity. 
The closure of the pay gap between men and women in respect of full-time employment, 
which has arisen partially on the basis of women obtaining more and better qualifications,216 
may provide some evidence to SUppatt this theory. However, this analysis presents more 
problems than solutions which are both practical and conceptual in nature. First, the 
persistently high value afforded to some forms of qualification over others cannot be easily 
explained by application of human capital theory. The fact that scientific and technical tasks 
and appropriate qualifications are valued more highly than the socially important tasks 
undertaken by qualified primary school teachers indicates that their relative worth owes more 
to the sex of those who predominate within associated jobs than any other factor. Such 
differentiation also raises questions about whether the relevant (right) factors are rewarded 
when pay rates are set on the basis of qualifications and skill. Second, evidence suggests that 
other grounds for extended absence from work do not have the same consequences for an 
individual's career prospects or the same impact on loss of earnings as breaks related to chi1d-
bearing or rearing. The difficulties experienced in obtaining employment by women returning 
to work after extended absence on such grounds point to the conclusion that the 'choice' 
exercised in relation to the length and consequences of such absences may be that of 
employers rather than of workers. When such factors are considered together, it is apparent 
that the human capital perspective fails to adequately address the persistence of gendered pay 
gaps. 
216 In 2003 58% of new graduates in Europe were women - Equal Opportunities Commission, Women: Europe's 
Competitive Edge, 2005, at p. 1. 
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On a conceptual level, human capital theory appears flawed due to the assumption that all 
decisions regarding whether to participate in paid employment are made freely and rationally. 
In reality, the full information on which to base such decisions is rarely available and, even 
when it is, circumstances may have more to do with decisions regarding the conciliation of 
family formation and employment than free choice. Furthermore, the perpetually low status 
afforded to 'women's work' may produce a self-fulfilling quality by which women who 
realise their prospects are poor will not take a chance on making the necessary investment to 
improve them. The most fundamental problem with this particular theory as an explanation of 
women's comparatively poor labour market position, however, is that its application 
apportions all the blame for that position with the women who [md themselves in low paid, 
low status work, thus exonerating employers and the State from any responsibility for 
discriminatory practices. In addition, the responsibility for childcare is placed on women who 
must take the consequences for reproduction in terms of poor employment prospects so that 
the role of fathers in raising their children, or indeed the role of the State in providing support, 
are beyond question. This perpetuates the stereotype pertaining to mothers of young children 
who are perceived as unreliable and uncommitted to paid employment which in tum serves as 
justification for employers' decisions not to employ or to employ on non-permanent 
arrangements with less risk attached. Given the lack of alternative available choices, women 
confonn by their acceptance of such tenus. 
In both the neo-classical and human capital perspectives, the focus on market rationalisation 
mitigates against the use oflegal intervention as a means of improving the quality of women's 
work on the basis that the market will deal effectively with discrimination where it occurs. 
This model has been very influential in relation to government policy-making in recent 
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years. 217 The empirical basis on which economic theory is often predicated has the effect of 
making its application appear plausible and, therefore, persuasive. However, economics is a 
subjective discipline which is not scientifically objective. As Fredman has observed, 
'economics, like law, is deeply ideological,218 Market discourse depends on exactly the same 
conceptual tools as liberal theory with a focus on individualism, autonomy and the neutral 
State. As discussed in chapter two, such notions and their role in improvements to gender 
relations may be, at best, illusory and at worst, damaging due to the justification that they 
provide for different outcomes in the experiences of men and women. Once 'explained' on the 
basis of the exercise of individual freedom, such differences cease to be subjected to the 
scrutiny necessary to effect change. 
The third and final economic perspective uses some of the features of market rationalisation 
but applies them from a feminist viewpoint which seeks to avoid 'blaming the victim' and 
thus results in a more sympathetic, enlightened and enlightening approach. 
Segmented Laboul' Market TheOl'Y 
In seeking to explain why women are employed in certain jobs which, on average, attract 
lower rates of pay than jobs filled predominantly by men, Beechey219 distinguished between 
two types of job: primary and secondary. Each type predominates within a particular section 
of the labour market to such an extent that there are, in effect, two separate markets operating 
simultaneously. Primary sector jobs have 'relatively high earnings, good fi'inge benefits, good 
217 Although in recent years, a modified version of the non-interventionist model has been particularly influential 
across Western Europe - the 'Third Way' ideology underpins much of the European Social Model and, in the 
UK context, New Labour's 'New Deal' policy initiatives of the last decade. For a feminist critique of this 
movement and its effects on women's employment, see Fredman 'The Ideology of New Labour Law' in C. 
Barnard, S. Deakin and G. MOiTis (eds) Essays in Honour of Bob Hepple (Hart, 2004) 
218 Fredman, Women and the Law at p. 405. 
219 V. Beechey Unequal Work 1987 (Verso 1987). 
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working conditions, a high degree of job security and good opportunities for advancement 
while secondary jobs have relatively low earnings levels, poor working conditions, negligible 
opportunities for advancement and a low degree of job security.,220 Primary jobs are part of 
a highly structured internal market within which jobs are organised hierarchically, dependent 
on skills level and corresponding rewards. Recruitment to all but the lowest level jobs is 
through promotion within the internal market. Secondary jobs are not subject to the same 
0ppOltunities for advancement and the low skill levels required in performing such jobs 
means that training is non-existent or minimal. This detracts from the ability of secondary 
jobs holders, who are predominantly female, to make advancements in their careers. 
Although dual labour market theory provides a useful starting point in analyses of men's and 
women's work, it does not explore gendered occupational segregation adequately as it merely 
describes what happens on the labour market rather than explaining it. Although providing 
some insight into vertical segregation, by which occupational hierarchies are linked to reward 
schemes, dual market theory does not even touch on horizontal segregation by which some 
occupations are constituted as 'women's work,.221 Furthermore, Craig et al found that many 
workers in secondary jobs actually have 'considerable levels of skill and experience acquired 
through informal on-the-job training, and undertake work which makes heavy demands on the 
workers. ,222 Beechey has argued that the under-valuation of the requisite skills for the jobs 
predominantly performed by women rests on the basis of those skills, which are often learnt 
informally in the home and, as such, are not subjected to the same forms of formal 
measurement applied to other skill sets. Faced with opposition from employers, trade unions 
have been unable (or unwilling) to establish such skills as being worthy of recognition in pay 
220 Ibid at p. 32. 
22l Beechey 'Women's Employment in Contemporary Britain' in Beechey and Whitegg (eds) Women in Britain 
Today 1986 (OUP, 1986) at p. Ill. 
222 C. Craig, E. Gamsey and 1. Rubery, Payment Structures and Smaller Firms: Women and Employment in 
Segmented Labour Mmkets 1984 (London, Department of Employment) at p. 92. 
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detennination. Such factors have had a profound effect as 'the concept of skill is socially 
constructed, and an adequate account of the exclusion of women from skilled jobs has to take 
account of this. ,223 
The separation of markets into distinct entities, thus, appears to be far more complex than the 
two-autonomy model presented by dual market theory. Craig et al posit the existence of a 
structured or differentiated labour supply which is 'created through the interaction of the 
employment system and the system of social organisation. ,224 Through the process of 
matching jobs with applicants, a market emerges which consists of many diverse segments 
with differences in the supply of labour dependent on four inter-related factors. First, even if 
workers enter the labour market with similar characteristics and opportunities, they will 
acquire different work histories, experience and skills. These factors will limit the mobility of 
some workers and may even restrict their prospects. Second, the different social 
characteristics of individuals translate into unequal access to jobs on entry to the labour 
market. Social characteristics include such factors as educational qualifications and family 
connections. Third, workers are not generally independent individuals who rely solely on their 
own wages, but members of social and family groups who pool or share income with others. 
In recognition of this, employers make assumptions about the relative income needs of 
specific demographic groups in structuring pay and employment practices. Even if they are 
not borne out in reality, workers must adjust to those assumptions in order to gain and keep 
employment. Fourth, the different levels of responsibility that individuals assume in relation 
to family and domestic commitments restrict some workers' availability in the labour market. 
Employers are able to take advantage of such workers by paying lower rates that do not 
necessarily reflect productivity levels. Through the interaction of these four factors, it is 
223 Beechey op cit (women's employment in contemporary Britain) at p. 121; see also A. Phillips and B Taylor, 
1980, Sex and Skill: Notes towards a Feminist Economics, 6 Feminist Review 79. 
224 Craig et ai, op cit at p. 6. 
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possible to reach an understanding of women's relative disadvantage in the labour market. 
The operation of each of the factors allows for the possibility of discrimination which may be 
direct or indirect and may operate at the organisational level or through more covert, 
institutional means. 
The gendering or sex-typing of jobs arises due to a combination of all of these factors so that 
employers' assumptions and workers' aspirations converge in a cycle of influence. Cockburn 
has shown how the whole concept of work is purposefully constructed on gender lines 
including the use of tools, machinery and new technology.225 Her fieldwork uncovered the 
relationships that members of both sexes have with the various physical manifestations of 
different jobs. Sometimes this relationship is influenced by the association of such objects and 
their uses with one or other sex, so that 'it is impossible to get a teenage lad to wipe the floor 
with a mop, although he might be persuaded to sweep it with a broom. ,226 Often, the very 
design and marketing of objects reflects the expectations of their manufacturers so that they 
are 'ergonomically sex specific'. Attempts to resist such sex-typing place the dissenter outside 
of the established workplace norms and the resistance encountered from peers and superiors 
results in such high social costs that the gendering of jobs is rarely challenged. As Cockburn 
has observed 'The dichotomies, separations and power inequalities that occur at home and 
those that occur at work are related and mutually reinforcing. ,227 
225 C. Cockburn, In the Way afWamen: Men's Resistance ta Sex Equality in 01'ganisatians (Macmillan, 1991). 
226 Ibid at p. 38. 
227 Id. at p. 41. 
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The (Information) Age of Enlightenment? 
Identification of the existence and persistence of segmented labour markets on gender 
grounds offers a valuable insight into the nature of men's and women's work, with the latter 
undervalued due to its relationship (actual and perceived) with the private sphere of the family 
in which the labour expended is unmeasured and fmancially unrewarded. Given the stated 
aims of governments and policy-makers at both national and supranational levels in relation 
to the furtherance of sex equality, it is notable that little attempt has been made to mount an 
effective challenge in relation to this factor. A cursory glance at relevant policy developments 
in recent years actually indicates the opposite as evidenced by the reliance that is placed on 
the perpetuation of the normative construct of the standard worker model in the distribution of 
resources and the continued polarisation of different working anangements. Consideration 
will be paid to these inter-related factors to explore how legal intervention might effectively 
be used as a means of reconciling the private and public spheres of family and work by 
improving the employment prospects of those women who fmd themselves unable to comply 
with the standard worker model. 
Dickens has identified a misfit between the changed circumstances of the working 
relationship and the cunent regulatory framework which is based on the model of a 'standard' 
atTangement, specifically that of full-time, permanent employment between an employee and 
single employer.228 If gender is added to this conceptualisation, the 'standard' worker is male 
and there is an implicit assumption that he has responsibility for earning, if not all, the 
majority of the 'family wage'. Despite its decline and replacement with new forms of social 
228 Dickens op cit at p. 597. 
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arrangement,229 this model is the basis on which much employment and social security 
regulation continues to be based. 230 As Wajcman has observed, '[a]lthough the male-
breadwinner household is now in the minority, the concept of the family wage lingers on in 
social policy. ,231 In the European context, this point is well illustrated by the very terminology 
adopted to describe the new forms of work, such as part-time and temporary jobs, which are 
referred to as being 'atypical. ,232 The fact that such jobs are overwhelmingly filled by women 
only serves to reiterate the implicit assumption that man is 'the subject' and woman is 'the 
other,.233 This conceptualisation is further entrenched by the use of such phrases in 
contemporary welfare and employment policy as 'family ii-iendly' and 'work/life balance'. 
Although such terms appear, on face value, as innocuous - perhaps even comforting - they 
actually serve to perpetuate the dichotomisation of work and famill34 by endorsing the 
supposition that, by implication, other employment policy may be unfriendly to families and 
that work is somehow separate from the 'lives' of the beneficiaries of such measures. For 
most people, working life is seasoned with a variety of challenges which relate, in different 
measures at various stages in the life cycle, to both family and career aspirations so that life's 
experiences cannot be neatly categorised as arising from the public world of work or the 
private world of family but, rather, arise out of a combination of both. The working mother of 
pre-school or school-age children personifies this combination of the public and private in a 
way which appears to have confounded policy-makers. Admittedly, the rise of 'flexible' 
forms of work among this particular demographic may have occurred as a result of 'worker 
choice', but is such choice the result of free autonomous decision-making when it arises out 
of the lack of a suitable alternative? 
229 Due to changes in family formation, such as the rise of single parent households. 
230 Dickens op cit at p. 611. 
231 Wajcman op cit at p. 195. 
232 For a discussion of the use of the term 'atypical' - see Chapter 1 inji-a. 
233 See S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (1949), refelTed to in Chapter 2 infi·a. 
234 The 'public' and 'private' spheres of men and women respectively. 
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Women 'choose' to work part-time, often through precarious arrangements, because they are 
expected to combine high levels of unpaid domestic responsibility with paid work 
Furthermore, the targeted use of such work as a means of overcoming high unemployment 
rates illustrates the stubborn refusal of policy-makers to reassess the world of work with a 
view to uncovering a more reflective model on which to base initiatives. While such a refusal 
may result in injustices to women, it very effectively preserves existing arrangements whilst 
appearing to offer an alternative. The continuing rise of women's labour market participation, 
largely within such 'atypical' employment, provides a useful antidote to critics, which, in 
tum, gives such initiatives 'the illusion of inclusion'. This self-serving cycle preserves the 
status quo by enabling women to perform their 'dual role' of mother and worker while the 
assumption of the existence of a male breadwinner within each family unit actually endorses 
the precariousness of such employment on the grounds that 'women's work' is actually 
extraneous to the family wage. 
The continued undervaluing of women's work, and the subjection of the female workforce 
through marginalisation of the forms of working arrangement with which women are 
predominantly associated, provide clear evidence that the forces of patriarchy continue to 
influence and shape the nature of employment and related policy within the Member States of 
the European Union. The absence of any real policy focus on childcare issues further 
illustrates that it is the preservation of the nuclear family with its distribution of roles and 
responsibilities that holds the attention of policy-makers despite its demographic decline. The 
existence of segmented labour markets provides the most satisfactory explanation for the 
continuation and perpetuation of the distinct working patterns and employment experiences of 
men and women. Furthermore, despite the stated aims of government at both the national and 
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supranational levels to improve women's employment prospects, it appears that labour 
markets are becoming more segmented over time235 with greater divergence in types of work 
and corresponding arrangements. Through adherence to outdated models, regulatory regimes 
are failing to keep abreast of such change. The remainder of this chapter will consist of a 
consideration of the industrial relations literature which, as well as providing a useful 
articulation of the marriage between standard employment models and regulatory policy, also 
presents some potential solutions to the current 'problems of fit'. 
Indust.'ial Relations in Europe: A Workforce in Transition 
Although the growth of women's paid work, characterised as the 'feminization' of the labour 
force, is noted in industrial relations scholarship, it often appears as an 'add on' rather than as 
an intrinsic factor in studies of the relevant institutions. 236 This is disappointing as industrial 
relations, with its innate consideration of labour market trends and the underlying power 
relations of the employment relationship, provides an ideal framework for the study of gender 
relations. Indeed, the deep analysis of interaction at all relevant levels which is often 
undertaken on an empirical basis by scholars in the field potentially provides a far more 
useful insight into the dynamics of contemporary workplaces and supporting institutions than 
economic or legal theory can achieve. However, while calls for the neglect of the gendered 
nature of institutions to be addressed237 are obviously welcomed, perhaps some of the most 
useful contributions to the issues under review in this thesis arise from studies which are not 
235 See Dickens ibid at n.9; Hyman ibid, at n. 13. 
236 See Wacjman op cit; A. Forrest 'A view from outside the whale: the treatment of women and unions in 
industrial relations' in L. Briskin and P. McDermot (eds) Women Challenging Unions (University of Toronto 
Press, 1993) 325-41; L. Dickens, 'What HRA;f Means for Gender Equality', Human Resource Management 
Journal 8 1998 23. 
237 See Wajcman op cit, Dickens (2004) op cit at p. 611. 
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directly concerned with gender relations per se, but rather with the changing nature of work in 
contemporary labour markets. 
The changes in working arrangements predicated by the growth of the so-called 'knowledge 
economy' and the corresponding shift away from heavy industry have commonly been 
perceived as contributing to the deregulation of labour markets although, as Hymans has 
observed, this may be misleading. The re-establishment of neo-liberal principles via a return 
to the laissez-faire approach to industrial relations which took place during the 1980s and 
1990s necessitated 'the systematic intervention of government in economic affairs and 
required an unprecedented increase in the societal pervasiveness of state power. ,238 Rather 
than any relaxation in the State's engagement with the industrial relations process, 
'deregulation' 'actually consecrates new rules: intensifying the law of value, with effects 
which empower some economic actors while dis empowering others (the majority). ,239 
Furthermore, the intervention of the state in most market economies has been traditionally 
targeted at restricting the scope for a 'free market' in labour240 on humanitarian grounds or 
'from concern at the potential social disruption and disorder which might ensue if competition 
were to drive standards below a certain threshold. ,241 In the current context, attempts at 
equalising pay rates between the sexes provide an obvious example of state intervention in the 
operation of the 'free market'. However, the use of state enforced mechanisms is not - and 
has never been - restricted to overt attempts at impl'Oving working conditions. 
The rise in 'flexible' working practices has taken place more by design than by accident, with 
such arrangements providing a solution to high unemployment rates which is popular with 
238Hyman op cit at p. 283. 
239Id. 
240 See K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Beacon, 1957). 
241 Hyman op cit at p. 283. 
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employers due to the relatively low levels of long-term commitment required on their part. In 
regulatory terms, the shift from jobs for life to flexibility has involved 'the advance of 
contract and the erosion of status in employment ,242 with increased emphasis placed on the 
individual nature of the relationship between employing organisation and worker. As Supiot 
has observed, 'The terms of the qUid pro quo that originally underpinned wage-employment 
status - i.e. subordination for security - have broken down, and the telIDS of a new qUid pro 
quo have yet to be worked OUt.,243 While the various forms of regulation utilised in this 
respect are not explicitly targeted at reducing the quality of jobs, their knock-on effects 
d · d' . h 244 succee m omg Just t at. 
Classifications of industrial relations systems represent an articulation of the vanous 
relationships that have arisen over the last century as a result of the 'tension between market 
pressures towards the commodification of labour (power) and social and institutional norms 
which ensure its (relative) 'decommodification".245 The national industrial relations systems 
in place thus provide a forum for the settlement of the pursuit of free market ideals and the 
defence of moral principles with national variations representing the various bargains which 
have been struck between the forces of market efficiency and social justice. The changes that 
have taken place over the last 20 years in the sectoral make-up of Europe's labour markets 
and the corresponding shifts in regulatory approaches have made it difficult to apply the 
traditional industrial relations models as analytical tools. The three models of social 
regulation which can generally be distinguished in order to provide a conceptual framework 
242 Hyman op cit at p. 289. 
243 A. Supiot 'The Transformation of Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe: A Multidisciplinary 
Perspective', International Labour Review 138 (1999) 1, 32 at 36. 
244 P. Paoli and D. Merllie, Third European Survey on Working Conditions 2000, (2001, Dublin, European 
Foundation for the Improvement in Living and Working Conditions). The survey's results indicated that 
employment conditions are worsening for considerable sectors of the workforce, irrespective of contract status. 
245 Hyman op cit at p. 285, the term 'decommodification' is borrowed from Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds 
of Welfare Capitalism (Polity Press, 1990). 
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in this respect are: the Anglo-Irish system which favours a voluntary approach, the Roman-
Germanic system which is based on state interventionism; and the Nordic system which relies 
heavily on self-regulation based on labour market collective agreements. 246 
Attempting to fit the industrial relations systems of the each of the Member States neatly into 
one or other of these classifications has always been problematic, with 'fit' more likely to be 
found on the interface between two or more of the categories. However, any such 
categorisation, however loosely applied, is becoming increasingly difficult as systems move 
closer together through a process of Europeanisation. This is largely due to the growth of the 
multi-national corporation, which has occurred in response to the globalisation of capital 
markets, and the need to compete effectively. As a result, collective bargaining and other 
forms of worker solidarity which have emerged from different sets of national circumstances 
as finely-tuned mechanisms intended to equalise power between the relevant players, have 
been severely weakened and, in some instances, completely eradicated. Without an effective 
collective response, individual workers within certain sectors have found themselves 
increasingly vulnerable to the exercise of managerial discretion. Hyman posits that what is 
now needed in place of national industrial relations systems is a new fom} of supranational 
social regulation. 247 The suitability of the European Union as a vehicle for the development 
of such an innovation is questionable in its current form on the basis of its lack of a 'moral 
economY'.248 Hyman's reservations are on both ideological and practical grounds. First, the 
Union's very existence, which is predicated on the grounds of free market ideology, would 
mitigate against any effective involvement in the negotiation of power between workers and 
246 Hyman posits an altemative tripartite classification consisting of three models founded on: legislation and 
other types of state intervention; agreements (or contracts) negotiated through collective bargaining and; the 
norms, beliefs and values prevailing in civil society, referred to as 'communitarian regulation', see Hyman op cit 
at p. 284. 
247 Hyman op cit at p. 291. 
248 Hyman ibid. 
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employers. Second, the operation of industrial relations regImes has, at the national level, 
retained credibility because of their localised nature. Furthermore, the very institutions of 
which the European Union is comprised are not suitable players in the settlement of the social 
contract on the grounds that, 
It comprises a Parliament which is not a legislature, a Commission which is a 'policy 
entrepreneur,249 and the intermittent bearer of a federalist project which would 
facilitate a meaningful European industrial relations system (one possible translation 
of that elusive term, espace social), and a Council in normal circumstances firmly 
committed to restrain such ambitions. The result is a 'regulatory conundrum,250 within 
a set of processes that 'hovers between politics and diplomacy, between states and 
markets, and between governments and governance. ,251 ... the EU is in key respects 
not a supranational state and the European 'social partners' are not authoritative 
national trade unions and employers' organisations at a higher level. 252 
The net result of all this is that the domination of market logic in industrial relations, which 
has emerged as a central feature of its Europeanisation, is likely to mean that outcomes such 
as status and reward will be shaped by inequalities so that workers 'already disadvantaged (by 
gender or ethnicity, for example) will suffer further,253 in relation to access to collective 
bargaining and in terms of their individual exchanges with employers. If this factor is added 
249 G. Majone Understanding Regulatory Growth in the European Community in D. Hine and H. Kassim (eds) 
Beyond the Market: The EU and National Social Policy (Routledge, 1998) 14 at p. 24. 
250 M. Rhodes, A Regulatory Conundrum: Industrial Relations and the Social Dinlension in S. Liebfried and P. 
Pierson (eds) European Social Policy: Between Fl'agmentation and Integl'ation (Washington Brookings, 1995) 
at p. 78. 
251 B. Laffan, 'The European Union: A Distinctive lv10del of Internationalization', Journal of European Public 
Policy, 5 1998 2, 235 at p. 236 
252 Hyman op cit at pp. 290-291. 
253 Hyman ibid at p. 285. 
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to the reliance on the standard worker model as a suitable nOlm at which to target labour 
market policy, the future realisation of improved quality in women's work appears elusive. 
The Role and Application of Law 
The European Commission has pursued a programme of legislative activity in an attempt to 
respond to some of the issues identified with the relatively low status of 'women's work'. 
Although these features are present in the national labour markets of the Member States, the 
Europeanisation of labour has exacerbated their effects due to its increased focus on 
individualisation within the bargaining process. These proposals, which have been met with 
varying degrees of success, will be considered in Chapter 4. However, before it is possible to 
scrutinise the various provisions and their effectiveness in countering the more undesirable 
effects of market factors in any meaningful way, it is necessary to consider the role of law and 
its limitations in this respect. Supiot argues against the classification of law as a 'mere tool 
subservient to some socio-economic rationality' which predominates in some political 
thinking or, alternatively, as a 'closed system of rules with nothing to offer the world of hard 
facts,.254 Rather, he posits that law is 'both a determinant and an expression of social 
relationships,.255 However, although law can anticipate developments, it can also lag behind 
them and Supiot questions the extent to which the reference model underpinning the 
conceptualisation of the employment relationship, on which the development of legislation is 
largely based, is shifting. The reliance of European legal systems (including European 
Community law) on the 'typical' employment model has already been considered. 256 
However, in Supiot's analysis, a key feature of the 'new' model is the emergence of a third 
254 Supiot op cit at p. 32. 
255 Id. 
256 See Dickens ibid. 
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category of worker257 who is 'legally independent (i.e. self-employed) but economically 
dependent,258 and whose numbers look set to grow. Whatever their contract status, workers 
are increasingly expected to adapt to the changing demands of employing organisations in 
respect of acquiring and developing new skills and autonomous working methods while the 
security associated with the standard employment model continues to diminish. In order to 
respond effectively to this changing climate, labour law must develop new ways of measuring 
and classifying occupational status that can 'accommodate career individualization and 
b 'l' , 259 mo 1 tty. 
The role of the State in the developing industrial relations environment is not as neutral as 
subscribers to the neo-liberal ideal claim. While it is correct that cultural and historical 
diversity has shaped national economic and social expectations so that the foundations of the 
State's legitimacy is subject to variation from one country to another, the widespread 
tendency to classify the State's interaction with socio-economic policy into two broad 
categories is misleading. Rather than the bipolar classification of the 'minimalist State' and 
the 'protector State', the Member States of the European Union each 'embody a combination 
of these two views - which are not necessarily contradictory - and have endeavoured to 
ensure both freedom and security for their citizens. ,260 On the other hand, the interventionism 
of the State has implications for its role in the perpetuation of inequalities which cannot be 
solely attributed to market forces. Through the transfer of state sovereignty to the European 
Union, such responsibility is shared with the institutions of Community law. Supiot posits the 
development of a new modus operandi for state intervention based on the realisation of 
procedural and substantive guarantees; the former recognising the need to legislate for the 
257 Alongside the legally distinct 'subordinated worker' ("employee" in UK labour law parlance) and genuinely 
independent entrepreneur ("self employed contractor"). 
258 Supiot op cit at p. 34. 
259 Ibid at p. 36. 
260 Id at p. 43. 
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involvement of as many members of society as possible in the decision-making process and 
the latter requiring the European Union to 'strive to guarantee fundamental social rights at the 
European leve1'261 as a matter of priority. 
In Dickens' analysis, the relationship between regulation and employers' use of non-standard 
workers is considered. Although identification of a close correlation between the two has been 
used as justification for deregulation of the labour market viewed as a necessary step in the 
creation of part-time and temporary jobs, there is little evidence to support this notion. 262 It 
is, Dickens argues, 'possible to over-estimate the role of law in shaping employer decisions, 
particularly where these are decentralized to company level'. 263 Conversely, the proposition 
that improvements to the conditions of atypical work through legal intervention will have a 
positive impact on workers' acceptance of such contracts can be empirically supported?64 
This view of legal regulation 'as enabling rather than constraining ,265 can be characterised as 
the nOlmalisation of atypical or non-standard work. This approach finds some reflection in 
recent attempts at improvements to part-time and fixed-term work which have been 
introduced at European level266 as a means of balancing the apparently conflicting concepts of 
security and flexibility. The theoretical conceptualisation underpinning this legislation will be 
considered in Chapter 4 alongside other legislative instruments more specifically targeted at 
the elimination of sex discrimination. However it is worth considering, at this juncture, the 
importance of the environmental context of 'flexicurity'. 
261 Id at p. 44. 
262 Dickens (2004) op cit at p. 602. 
263 Ibid. 
264 E. Rasmussen, J. Lind and 1. Visser, (2004) 'Divergence in Part-Time Work in New Zealand, The 
Netherlands and Denmm'l" 4 British Journal of Industrial Relations 42, 637-658. 
265 Dickens op cit at p. 603. 
266 The Part-time Workers Directive 97/81/EC and the Fixed-Term Workers Directive 99/70/EC. 
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In their work Wilthagen et ae67 explore the varying degrees of emphasis placed on levels of 
flexibility and security and the resulting trade-offs made within the legal systems of various 
Member States.268 They conclude that decentralized and flexible multi-level governance 
within the national industrial relations systems are important preconditions for the successful 
introduction of such measures. Fredman posits that the precariousness associated with non-
standard work lies in the 'failure to address the gendered dimension of the issue. ,269 From the 
legal perspective, the ability to move in and out of the labour market, crucial to many women 
as they juggle paid employment and family responsibility, 'is portrayed as an autonomy or 
independence, which makes it both unnecessary and illegitimate to impose social duties on 
the employer. ,270 Courts correspondingly find it 'difficult to envisage that a social 
commitment arises on behalf of the employer' for activities undertaken during time spent 
away from work. The net result of this is exclusion of the most vulnerable workers from the 
protection of labour law and, for those able to conform to the contractual requirements, the 
fault based model on which equality laws are based has severely restricted their use. What is 
needed to address the difficulties experienced by the non-standard worker is an all 
encompassing approach to the bestowment of employment rights in which employer duties 
are recognised as arising due to their labour market power and civic responsibility rather than 
on the basis of their control over the individual worker. 
Conclusions 
Women's disadvantage on the labour market can largely be attributed to the different working 
patterns of the sexes, with women more likely to work in certain sectors and occupations and 
267 T. Wilthagen, F. Tros and H. Van Lieshout, 'Towards "Flexicu1'ity"? Balancingflexibility and security in EU 
Member States' (abstract) lIRA 13u, World Congress Plenary and Workshop Abstracts, Berlin, Freie Universitat. 
268 Gennany, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
269 S. Fredman (2004) 'Women at Work: The Broken Promise ofFlexicu1'ity' 33 ILJ 4,299-319 at p. 318. 
27°Id. 
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under particular contractual arrangements than men. The distribution of women's 
employment in a narrow range of professions clustered at the bottom of organisational 
hierarchies leads to the low rates of pay and poor tenus and conditions associated with 
'women's work'. The reasons for the differences in men's and women's labour market 
experiences are manifold but arise largely as a result of the unequal division of labour within 
families, with women taking responsibility for childcare and unpaid domestic work. In recent 
years, the focus of policy on the development of the 'knowledge-based economy' has seen an 
even wider divergence between the labour market behaviour of men and women. The 
adherence of policy-makers and legislatures to the 'standard worker' (male breadwinner) 
model as a suitable target for employment regulation has led to a misfit between current 
working patterns and labour law. 
Economists have attempted to explain the differences in women's and men's work on the 
grounds of market rationalisation: women are worth less in the labour market because they 
make free, informed decisions to invest less in their skills and education as they will 
invariably take long career breaks or hone down their commitment by working part-tinle 
during the child-bearing and rearing years. However, such theorising is based on a set of 
assumptions about women's aspirations and career 'choices' which are not empirically 
supported. In fact, the decision-making of girls/women over their career aspirations can rarely 
be said to have been made while in receipt of all the relevant information. Furthermore, 
market rationalisation and human capital theory cannot adequately explain the persistence of 
gendered occupational segregation and pay gaps in the light of factors such as the increasing 
educational achievements of girls. Feminist labour economists have applied a socio-economic 
analysis, concluding that women and men work largely in segregated labour markets, to 
which different and diverse conditions apply dependent on a range of factors. All of these 
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factors create conditions for the exerClse of employer discrimination and which rely on 
employment-related institutions which may themselves be discriminatory. For example, the 
undervaluing of certain types of work performed by those in the 'caring' professions271 
predominantly filled by women, is likely to arise due to its association with the unpaid work 
women perform in the 'private sphere' of the home rather than any corresponding lack of 
skills or qualifications. Conversely, the higher value ascribed to celiain male-dominated 
occupations272 arises due to assumptions based on the persistent implicit acceptance of the 
male breadwinner model and the accompanying notion of the 'family wage'. Such unfounded 
assumptions are translated into policy which serves to entrench and perpetuate existing 
inequalities. 
National industrial relations systems are unable to rise to the challenges presented by the 
mismatch of employment patterns and labour market regulation due to the dilution in their 
power which has taken place, in pali, due to a process of Europeanisation. In any case, the 
study of industrial relations is not as attuned to gender issues as might be expected due to a 
lack of gender-based analysis in the work of specialists which has impacted on the way in 
which relevant issues are perceived and prioritised. This oversight is not intentional, but arises 
due to the predominance of industrial processes and an attachment to old-style working 
arrangements which are somewhat out of step with the new forms of working. Women's 
labour market participation rates have increased in all Member States, but it is the quality of 
women's work which is the primary issue, not the quantity. Europe's 'Lisbon agenda,273 
looks set to deliver more jobs, but not necessarily better ones. 
271 Such as nursing, primary school teaching, nursery nursing and care workers. 
272 Such as secondary school teaching and lecturing in Higher Education. 
273 See European Commission 'From the Lisbon Summit to a New Social Policy Agenda', available at: 
w\vw.europa.eu.int/comm/employment social/news/2000. 
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Although the role of law in the current context may be overemphasised, it can make a 
difference as an enabling force rather than as a constraint on market forces which, in any case, 
are not as free from state intervention as is often claimed. The challenges for Community law 
in overcoming such a range of factors to improve women's relative labour market position are 
complex: the target for legislation and its interpretation is no longer sex discrimination per se, 
but the nonnalisation of atypical or non-standard employment; the goal is no longer seen as 
the conferment of equality, which is correctly perceived as a fundamental human right, but 
rather the recognition of female characteristics currently conceptualised as 'different', in order 
that women have access to a more equitable distribution of resources. Discrimination, like 
gender, is not an organic concept but is socially constructed through the processes and 
practices of employment-related institutions. What is now required is its deconstruction 
through careful analysis and targeted activity. 
The role of the Court of Justice as interpreter of the Treaties and associated legislation is 
integral to this endeavour. As working arrangements become increasingly complex and 
diverse, legislative targets are more difficult to defme adequately. Consequently, the resulting 
provisions are often ineffective in giving protection to those who need it most. Furthermore, 
the existing body of Community law implicitly provides the appropriate responses to many of 
the legal problems identified, which are best addressed by the application of broad principles 
to specific circumstances rather than by the development of restrictive legislation. The Court 
of Justice occupies a unique position in this respect. By its interpretation ofthe Treaty and the 
corresponding principles of Community law, the Court has the potential to assist in the 
realisation of the objectives of equality and non-discrimination. This is possible in its 
reasoning in the area of gender relations with which it has the opportunity to engage through 
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its jurisprudence on sex discrimination. This aspect of the Court's reasoning will be explored 
later in this thesis,274 the main purpose of which is to uncover the extent to which the Court's 
adjudications on cases referred under the Article 234 procedure can be characterised as having 
a common output amounting to an identifiable jurisprudence on gender relations. The 
development of a coherent and consistent approach by the Court is crucial if it is to have a 
lasting influence in this respect. 
This is not to say that the future legislative activity is not also required. Effective restructuring 
of the labour market can only take place if both men and women's employment behaviour is 
studied and adequately understood. Affirmative action may be necessary in order to reorient 
the gender balance in jobs performed predominantly by men or women. Furthermore, the 
relationship between childcare and paid employment needs to be reassessed so that the access 
of either/both parents to flexible working arrangements during the child-rearing years is 
properly supported and those employed under such arrangements are given the same status as 
'standard' workers. Flexible arrangements such as job-sharing, home working, task rather 
than tinle-measured working, career breaks and family days are also required and should be 
legally supported to enable easier conciliation of the dual roles of family care and paid 
employment. Such initiatives should be available without 'penalties' such as loss of income 
for taking parental leave. Undoubtedly this reads like a wish list of 'ideal world' aspirations 
but it is somewhat less fanciful than much of the ideological dogma underpinning 
contemporary labour and welfare law which relies heavily on outdated and/or illusory 
concepts such as the male breadwinner, the separation of the private and public spheres and 
the neutral State. What is required by law-makers is recognition of the reality of people's 
working and family lives and the adoption of an inclusive approach. Community law has, in 
274 See Chapter 6 infi'a. 
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certain respects, moved towards such recognition, and the development and effectiveness of 
the various initiatives will be considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
European Community Sex Equality Law: 
Development and Conceptualisation 
()\T I .. ,275 Hot mere ')J all ecollomlC UIlWIl 
Int.·oduction 
In considering the conceptualisation of gender relations in the context of the European legal 
order, it is necessary to take account of a broad range of legal and policy instruments. In the 
legal domain, the so-called 'social dimension' consists of both primary and secondary sources 
covering a wide range of provisions, including those targeted at introducing and improving 
workers rights generally as well as more specific anti-discrimination measures. Without 
casting a wide net, it is impossible to assess the overall contribution such provision has made 
to gender relations at the European level. For example, Directive 97/811EC276 which 
introduced the concept of equal treatment for part-time workers in line with that received by 
their full-time counterparts has undoubtedly had more of an impact in terms of improvements 
to working conditions for greater numbers of women than, say, Directive 86/613IEEC277 
which was intended to provide equal treatment between men and women who are self-
employed. This is despite the fact that the former contains no reference to sex equality and 
the latter is specifically targeted at the prohibition of discrimination between men and women. 
275 From the ECJ's ruling in Case 43175Defi'enne v SABENA [1976] ECR 455 (hereinafter referred to as 
'Defi'enne 11'), in which the direct effect of Article 141 (ex 119) was established. 
276 Council Directive 97/81IEC of 15 December 1997 concerning the framework agreement on part-time work 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC. 
277 Council Directive 86/613IEEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed capacity, and on the 
protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood. 
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This apparent anomaly arises due to the gendered nature of labour markets in which it is 
predominantly women who work part-time, often in low status, poorly paid jobs.278 Self-
employed women are not always officially recorded as being so due to the nature of their 
work which often arises in small family enterprises but, nevertheless, form a relatively small 
proportion of the total female working population. The nature of women's work makes it 
difficult to target legislation effectively and some specific provisions may miss their intended 
target altogether. Furthermore, Directive 92/85/EC279 , which provides rights for pregnant 
women and those who are breastfeeding, arises as a health and safety initiative280 rather than a 
measure intended to improve equality between the sexes, despite its undeniable contribution 
in this respect. 
This apparently rich tapestry of legislative prOVISIon makes the task of identifying the 
constituent parts of European Community law's overall contribution to gender relations a 
challenging one. In fact, many of the most influential initiatives that have arisen at the 
European level are not legally enforceable in the strict sense, but form part of the 
Community'S soft law or policy, 281 leading to further complexities. The main focus of this 
thesis, being an analysis of the case law of the European Court of Justice, enables some terms 
of reference to be mapped out here - obviously the legal base on which cases are referred 
under the Article 234 procedure serves to limit the range of variables that can be taken into 
account. The cases considered in Chapter 6, were all referred by national courts for the ECJ's 
278 See Chapter 3 inji·a. 
279 Council Directive 92/851EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or 
who are breastfeeding (tentll individual directive within the meaning of article 16(1) of Directive 89/391IEEC). 
280 The Directive has Article 138 of the Treaty as its legal base and was introduced under the auspices of Council 
Directive 89/3911EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety 
and healtll of workers at work, commonly referred to as "the health and safety framework Directive", Atiicle 16 
(1) of which provides for the Council to adopt individual Directives based on Atticle 118a of the Treaty. 
281 For example, the action programmes to promote equality in the workplace which were replaced, in 2000, with 
a framework strategy on gender equality, the first of which had as its aim to 'embrace all Community policies in 
its efforts to promote gender equality'- see COM (2000) 335. 
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interpretation of Article 141. However, the underlying purpose of the analysis, which is to 
identify the existence and nature of any emerging jurisprudence, means that the context of the 
overall environment in which such cases are considered is an integral factor and must take 
account of any corresponding interrelationship between hard and soft law and policy, 
however subtle such connections may appear to be. For this reason, the following overview of 
the development of European social law takes a wide perspective, considering peaks and 
troughs of legislative activity and identifying impoliant cornerstones before focusing on the 
specific provision of Article 141 on which the Article 234 referrals under review in Chapter 6 
are based. 
The Development of Em'opean Social Law 
European Community law has been described as an 'ideal vehicle for upholding the principle 
of sex equality,282 due to its 'undoubted potential for growth,/83 and it is true, certainly from 
a UK perspective, that the European institutions have been at the forefront of developments in 
law and policy aimed at improving women's labour market opportunities and associated terms 
and conditions. In the European legal context, sex equality law forms part of the social policy 
area in which progress has not always been steady. Indeed, in the early years of the European 
Economic Community, so little consideration was given to this aspect of European 
integration, that its initial inclusion appears almost as an aftelihought based on economic, 
rather than social, grounds. The incremental development of social policy, charted from the 
foundations of the Common Market through to the European Union ofthe present day, can be 
divided into five broad stages with degrees of relevant legislative activity varying from one 
282 E. Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law, OUF, 2005, at p. 7. 
283 Id. This potential encompasses institutional and geographical growth as well as the extension of relevant 
concepts, for example, the inclusion of consideration for human rights in developing and interpreting relevant 
provisions of EC law. 
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period to another. Intenuittent phases of activity have been followed by intervals of 
consolidation and "bedding in", during which law-making has been sparse. In the following 
classification, which is partially based on that employed by Hervey,284 particular attention will 
be paid to the development of sex equality legislation and policy. 
Laissez Fah"e (1957 -1972) 
The period from 1957 to 1972 has been categorised as 'laissez-faire' due to the neo-liberalist 
non-interventionist stance taken in respect of social law. 285 The European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) Treaty was concluded in1951, followed in 1957 by the Treaties 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom). The intended aim of the Treaties' founders was to bring about 
improvements in the economic welfare of the region on the basis of political integration 
among the European states of the post-war era. Having witnessed, at first hand, the effects of 
nationalism through the devastation of the Second World War culminating in the occupation 
of many countries and increasingly mindful of the potential of the 'Super Powers' and 
accompanying threat of Communism, the notion of increased co-operation between states 
held many obvious attractions. 
The Schuman Declaration of9 May 1950 had articulated the political consensus in clear tenus 
by proposing that the French and German coal and steel production industries should be 
placed under a common 'high authority'. This would provide a framework open to 
participation by other European countries in the following way: 
284 Hervey, T., European Social Law and Policy, (Longman, 1998), Chapter 2, at pp. 13-30. 
285 In Hervey's classification, this period is categorised as one of 'benign neglect' after T. Mosley, 'The social 
dimension of European integration' Intemational Labour Review (1990) 129 at p. 149 and Shaw, European 
Community Law (Nfacmillan, 1993) at p. 329. 
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The pooling of coal and steel production will immediately provide for the setting up of 
common bases for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and 
will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the 
manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The 
solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France 
and Germany becomes, not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. 286 
The goal of industrial co-operation was accompanied by an aspiration for greater political 
unity. However, the development of specific social policy was not, at this stage, envisaged or 
even considered. As Szyszczak has noted, the development of European labour law was 
initially impeded and has been subsequently hindered by a lack of political will to intervene in 
labour market regulation. 287 Following the recommendations of an expert report,288 those 
responsible for drafting the original Treaty of Rome kept European intervention in the area of 
labour relations to a minimum, concentrating on the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality,289 the free movement of workers290 and the establishment of a Social 
Fund to assist states with labour, welfare and training costs. The provision that 'each Member 
State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the principle that men and 
women should receive equal pay for equal work' under Article 1191EEC291 was included at 
the insistence of France as a competition measure rather than on the basis of employment 
286 The full text of the declaration can be accessed at: http://www.europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-mayldeclen.htm 
287 E. Szyszczak, EC Labour Law (Longman, 2000) at p. 6. 
288 The Ohin Report, International Labour Office 'Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation' 74 
International Labour Review (1956) 99 
289 Article 12 EC (ex Article 6). 
290 Article 39 EC (ex Article 48). 
291 Now Article 141 EC, which provides that 'Each member state shall ensure the principle of equal pay for male 
and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied.' 
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protection. 292 The other relevant legal bases were the generic Articles 100293 and 235,294 both 
of which required unanimity voting in the Council and were restricted in their ambit to 
instruments intended to fulfil the aims of the Common Market. 
The Community's founders reluctance to intervene in social matters has been attributed to a 
shared belief that the Member States' national labour law and industrial relations systems 
would continue to provide the necessary regulation unencumbered without conflicting with 
increased European integration. Furthermore, there was 'an assumption that the functioning of 
the Common Market would bring about a raised standard of living of workers in the EC. ,295 
This is clearly illustrated by the original wording of the Preamble to the Treaty which 
declared the Member States' resolve 'to ensure the economic and social progress of their 
countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe.' The original 
Article 2 set out the aims of the Common Market as being, inter alia, to promote 'a 
harmonious development of economic activities' accompanied by 'an accelerated raising of 
the standard of living.' This vague objective was further articulated by Article 117 EC, which 
provided the aims and principles of the limited Social Policy Chapter of the Treaty of Rome 
1957: 
Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and an 
improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their harmonisation 
while the improvement is being maintained. 
292 For a detailed and illuminating discussion of the origin of Article 119, see C. Hoskyns, Integrating Gender: 
Women, Law and Politics in the European Union (Verso, 1996), Chapter 3. 
293 Now Article 94. 
294 Now Article 308. 
295 Szyszczak, op cit at p. 6. 
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They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of the 
common market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from 
the procedures provided for in this treaty and from the approximation of provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action. 
To appreciate how far the development of European engagement in this area has come from 
these indeterminate beginnings, it is worth comparing the wording of these provisions with 
that ofthe current Article 136 EC, which defines the Community's objectives as including, 
the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make 
possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social 
protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human 
resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion. 
The achievement of objectives will be tlrrough the implementation of 'measures which take 
account of the diverse forms of national practices,' thus acknowledging 'an explicit role for 
the Community to bring about changes in the social policy arena,296 Furthermore, Article 140 
EC297 refers to the Commission promoting 'close co-operation' between Member States in a 
range of areas related to labour law298 and, following the Treaty of Amsterdam, a new Title on 
employment299 has been inserted into the Treaty directly after the Title on economic policy. 
These recent developments and their impact on the social law area will be considered later in 
this chapter. Of relevance at this stage is recognition of the humble beginnings of European 
296 Ibid 
297 Which repeats the wording of the original Article 118 EC. 
298 See Joined Cases 281185, 283-85/85 and 287/85 German), and Other v Commission [1987] ECR 3203 in 
which the ECJ ruled that the Commission could take legally binding measures to give effect to its duties under 
Article 118 EC. 
299 Title VIII of Part Three, discussed supra at p.113. 
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social law. From the earliest days of European economic integration, limited political interest 
and a restricted legal base resulted in little progress in the labour law area with initiatives 
focused on the development of a health and safety programme300 and provisions relating to 
the non-controversial area offree movement ofworkers?Ol 
The Bh1h of Social Action (1972 - 1980) 
In contrast to the non-interventionist stance which characterised the beginning of 'social 
Europe', the period from 1972 until 1980 can be described as dynamic. The Paris Summit of 
1972 marked a critical point in this sea change when, just prior to the first enlargement of the 
Community, the heads of state and government issued a joint Declaration outlining their 
commitment to the development of social harmonisation as well as economic integration. In 
1974 the Council passed a resolution for the Community's first Social Action Programme in 
which four main areas of activity were highlighted within a broad labour law theme: equal 
treatment of men and women at work; harmonisation of labour law; the development of 
common standards for working conditions; and, supranational employment and regional 
policy. The resulting Programme302 focused on employment protection, industrial democracy 
and the rights of third country nationals in the EC. This laid the foundations for legislative 
activity in the areas of sex equality, health and safety, redundancy, acquired rights in the event 
of a transfer of a business and insolvency rights. 
The rationale behind this enhanced interest in social matters has been attributed to a 
combination of factors. The civil rights movement had been gaining in prominence on an 
300 By way of hard law measures using Articles 100 and 235 as their legal bases. 
301 Which comprises one of the four fundamental fieedoms of Community law. As such, the relevant legal base -
Article 39 (ex Article 48) - benefited early on from being recognised as having both vertical and horizontal direct 
effects. 
302 Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2174, at p. 8. 
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international stage since the 1960s and this development was accompanied by changes in 
dominant political ideologies. 303 Political interest groups, such as trade unions, which had 
hitherto organised and garnered support at the national level, began to see the benefits from 
increased cohesion with their counterparts in other Member States. Perhaps most importantly, 
the ideologies of the social democratic governments in power within key Member States 
converged in recognising the importance of social aims in the development of European 
integration304 and questioning the neo-liberal policies which had thus far informed European-
level decision-making on economic matters but which, it appeared, had been ineffective in 
. ff hI' . 305 stavmg 0 t e approac Img receSSlOn. 
Alongside the increased emphasis on social justice in Europe's policy objectives, the ECJ was 
instrumental in the recognition of social interests as being of primary concern in the European 
legal order. Despite, the fragile legal base and initial lack of political will which informed the 
development of social policy, the Court had ii'om its inception recognised its own significance 
in relation to the Community'S activities. This can be seen in its early case law concerning the 
relevance of certain Treaty Articles. In Defi"enne II, 306 the Court considered the role of Article 
117 and, whilst acknowledging that it could not give rise to direct effect, found that it could 
be used as a teleological tool for interpreting other Community law provisions. The Court 
held that, where pay inequality was due to sex discrimination, compliance with the aims of 
Article 117 enabled wages to be raised to the higher level. In justifying its decision, the Court 
declared that the equal pay provisions of Article 119 were directly effective as they, 
303 M. Shanks, The Social Policy o/the European Communities (1977) 14 Common Market Law Review, 375-
83. 
304W. Streek, Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime? (1995) 1 European Law Joumal, 31-59 
at p. 42. 
305 Hervey op cit at p. 17. 
306 Case 43175 [1976] ECR 455. The Court's judgement in Defi"enne II is considered in Chapter 6 inji'a, in the 
specific context of its impact on the group of cases analysed there. 
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Fonn part ofthe social objectives ofthe Community, which is not merely an economic 
union, but at the same time intended, by common action, to ensure social progress and 
seek the constant improvement of the living and working conditions [of Europe's 
. . ]107 cItIzens' 
By the end ofthe 1970s a range of factors - economic, political and social- combined to stall 
further expansion of Community competence in the area of labour law. Widespread recession, 
caused by high unemployment rates and rising inflation, as well as competition from the 
unregulated labour markets of the Far East and the United States' deregulated, 'flexible' 
market, caused national governments to reconsider labour market policy and existing 
industrial structures. Throughout most of the following decade national governments would 
be prepared only to commit to 'soft law' measures in all areas of labour law including sex 
equality, so that 'EC action was minimal and ad hoc. ,308 
Labour Ma"'{et Flexibility and Deloegulation (1980 - 1985) 
During the first half of the 1980s, the Member States' governments responded to the pressures 
presented by the need to compete with unregulated markets by developing protectionist 
strategies aimed at blocking the development of social policy at the European level. These 
strategies took various forms, such as the watering down of Commission proposals309 and the 
blocking of legislation by way of the right of vet0310 made possible by the requirement of 
307 Ibid at para 10. 
308 Szyszczak op cit at p. 8. See also B. Hepple, The Crisis in EEC Labour Law, Industrial Law Joumal, 18 
(1987) 129. 
309 For example, the agreed text of Directive 86/378IEEC on Equal Treatment in occupational social security 
differs considerably from the original proposal. 
310 For example, COM(83) 686 [mal OJ 1983 C 333/6 on parental leave and leave for family reasons, an 
initiative that was eventually resunected in a substantially amended form and concluded as a social partner 
framework agreement between UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC and enacted as Directive 96/34IEC. 
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unanimity at Council-level. A period of deregulation ensued at the national levels, based on 
the principles of labour market flexibility, with Member States resisting attempts at European 
intervention. Limited social legislation was enacted during this time with the emphasis of any 
restricted developments on 'soft law' measures311 and policy initiatives such as the 
C .. d . . . -f' 312 ommlsslon-propose programme on posItIve actIOn ~or women. 
In contrast to the lack of legislative activity, this period in the development of Community 
law saw the Court of Justice's engagement with many social issues313 through the Article 
177314 procedure. Although this has been characterised as its activist phase,315 it must be 
borne in mind that the dialogues the ECJ enjoyed with the national courts during this period 
were instigated by the latter through references made for interpretation of Community 
provIsIOns. Why this was such a busy time for the Court can be explained by two inter-
related factors. First, the Court's judgment in Defi'enne 11 316 had undoubtedly raised the 
expectations of claimants and legal advisors within the Member States as to what could be 
achieved by the application of Community law, particularly through the direct effect of 
Article 119.317 Secondly, the judiciaries within the Member States, fearing misinterpretation 
of the provisions of Community law and aware of its supremacy, were increasingly willing to 
engage in dialogues with the European Court?18 Nevertheless, it is perhaps noteworthy that 
311 It was during this period that the regulation of working time was first proposed, albeit through a 'soft law' 
measure, by the draft Council recommendation on the reduction and reorganisation of working time OJ 1983 C 
290/4. 
312 Which culminated in Council Recommendation 84/635IEEC of 13 December 1984 on the promotion of 
positive action for women, OJ L 331134-35 
313 This was the period in which the pivotal cases conceming the Court's conceptualisation of indirect 
discrimination originate - see Chapter 6 infi'G. 
314 Now Article 2341EC. 
315 See Chapter 5 infi'a. 
316 Case 43175 Defi'enne v Sabena (No 2) [1976] ECR 455. 
317 See, for example, A. Lester, 'The Uncertain Trumpet. References to the European Court of Justice fi'om the 
United Kingdom: Equal Pay and Equal Treatment without Sex Discrimination' in HG. Schermers et al (eds) 
Article 177 EEC: Experiences and Problems (TMV Asset· Instituut, 1987), at 164. 
318 See C. Kilpatrick, 'Community or Communities of Courts in European Integration? Sex Equality Dialogues 
Between UK Courts and the ECl' (1998) 4 European Law Joumal2, 121. 
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while the Community law-making institutions were experiencing a phase of political inertia, 
'the Court of Justice played a crucial role in keeping labour law issues alive. ,319 
The Intemal Ma,'ket (1986 -1997) 
Following the period of stagnation that had occUlTed during the first half of the 1980s, the 
need to develop the internal market was used as an effective means of reigniting European 
social law. The French socialist administration, under President Mitterand, had been expressly 
supportive of the notion of a 'European social area'. The development of this concept gained 
momentum following the appointment of a new Commission with Jacques Delors as President 
in 1984. The commitment ofthis new regime to the furtherance of social aims is illustrated by 
the Commission's White Paper of 1985 320 on the promotion of the internal market 
programme. In the white paper, Delors argued that equivalence of social laws would be 
necessary to minimise 'social dumping' which would occur if Member States with relatively 
low levels of social protection and corresponding employment costs were able to gain a 
competitive advantage over those with higher costs. As well as attracting inward investors to 
States with lower labour costs, such disparity would also lead to the practice of posting 
workers to those States, thus disrupting the smooth functioning of the Internal Market. 
Speaking in 1986,321 Delors acknowledged the inter-dependence of the social and economic 
objectives, 
The creation of a vast economic area, based on the market and business co-operation, 
is inconceivable - I would say unattainable - without some harmonisation of social 
legislation. Our ultimate aim must be the creation of a European social area. 
319 E. Szyszczak, EC Labour Law (Longman, 2000), at page 8. 
320 COM (85) 310 final. 
321 Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/1986, at p. 12. 
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As Szyszczak has observed,322 the resulting Single European Act led to developments in three 
significant respects: the promotion of the social dialogue; the breaking of deadlock made 
possible by the requirement of unanimity in respect of social provisions and the reform and 
realignment of the structural funds. 323 The 'social dialogue' enables the two sides of industry 
to focus discussion on desired objectives and policies implemented through the Member 
States' existing industrial relations frameworks. This approach, which was envisaged as being 
more palatable to national governments and policy players than 'top down' intervention, was 
formalised by Article 118B EC which was inserted by the Single European Act. The end of 
unanimity voting requirements at Council-level in respect of social measures disenabled 
Member States from exercising their right of veto as a means of stalling progress of 
Commission initiatives. What Ellis has referred to as a scheme for 'rolling 
interdependence,324 was taken a step further when the Member States pledged to make greater 
use of majority voting, thereby relinquishing a significant pOltion of national sovereignty in 
favour of the Community. Article 118A EC granted power to the Community to enact 
legislation using qualified majority voting (QMV) and introduced the co-operation procedure 
with the Parliament for use in areas concerning 'the work environment'. This latter 
innovation, described by Szyszczak as 'an ingenious device',325 enabled the development of 
non-contentious health and safety measures, but also introduced a wider concept of 'working 
environment' based on the Nordic approach, which incorporates employment protection 
rights and the organisation of work. This opened up the grounds for legislative proposals 
taking Article 118A as their legal base which, coupled with the simplified procedures, laid the 
foundations for greater legislative activity. The SEA also introduced a new legal base for the 
322 Szyszczak op cit at pp. 9-12. 
323 See Arts 130 a-e (now 158-162) which identified economic and social cohesion as one of the six priority 
areas in completion of the Intemal Market. 
324 Ellis op cit at p. 8. 
325 Szyszczak ibid at p. 10. 
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enactment of general measures affecting the function and establishment of the Internal 
Market, Article 100 A EC,326 for which QMV and the co-operation procedure were applicable. 
The 1992 programme for completion of the internal market contained further provisions 
relating to the development of social aspects. The Treaty on European Union, agreed in 
Maastricht in 1992/27 contained references to federalism which attracted some dissent from 
among the Member States' governments (notably the UK) but, nevertheless, was ultimately 
accepted. The creation of the European Union, following ratification of the TEU, changed the 
nature of the Community with attention focused on a wider set of issues such as the 
development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs and the 
laying of the foundations for economic and monetary union. However, this apparently 
enhanced cohesion was accompanied by, what Hervey has described as, the 
institutionalisation of the Member States' differences in approach to European social 
policy.328 These differences are most clearly illustrated by the contention surrounding the 
Social Policy Agreement (SPA) from which the UK effected an 'opt out'. The complex and 
questionable constitutional arrangements329 supporting this development saw the twelve 
Member States agreeing, by way of a Social Policy Protocol annexed to the Treaty, that the 
remaining eleven states should be enabled to utilise the EU institutions for the purposes of 
enacting measures provided for in the SPA. 330 Any such measures would be inapplicable to 
the UK. 331 
326 Now Article 95. 
327 Ratified the following year, commonly refelTed to as the 'Maastricht Treaty'. 
328 Hervey op cit at p. 25. 
329 On this issue and the equally complex atTangements necessitated by the UK's subsequent 'opt in', see N. 
BUlTows 'Opting in to the Opt-out: The UK and European Social Policy' 1997 4 Web JCLl. 
DO See 1. Shaw 'Twin-Track Social Europe - The Inside Track' In D. O'Keefe and P. Twomey (eds) Legal 
Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Wiley, 1994) at pp. 295-31l. 
331 The Directive on Works Councils 94/45IEC was the first instrument adopted under the aegis of the Protocol 
and Agreement. The Parental Leave Directive 96/34IEC was similarly adopted and was subsequently extended to 
the UK by Directive 97/75 [1998] OJ Ll0I24. The framework agreements on part-time work and fixed-tenll 
work were also concluded between the social partners during this time. 
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By the time the intergovernmental conference (IGC) took place in Amsterdam in 1996, the 
UK was experiencing a change in its political climate which was to result in the election of a 
more apparently 'Euro-friendly' Labour government the following year. 332 Discussions at the 
IGC 'coalesced round three broad interlinked themes: democracy, transparency and 
efficiency. ,333 The draft Treaty, agreed at the IGC, was subsequently signed on 2 October 
1997 and came into force on 1 May 1999. The new provisions introduced by Amsterdam 
made technical amendments intended to reinforce the economic, social and political links 
between Member States. 334 In the social policy area, the Protocol, which had been annexed to 
the EC Treaty by the TEU, was incorporated into the main body,335 replacing the existing 
social policy provisions. This act and the inclusion of a new Title on Employment,336 aimed 
primarily at countering unemployment, can be interpreted as a move away from a purely 
economic conception of the EC towards a more overtly political notion. The provisions 
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality33? were supplemented by the insertion 
of a new Article 13 authorising the Council 'to take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.' Although its use as a legal base is restricted due to the requirement of unanimity, 
the inclusion of Article 13 in the Treaty is significant for two reasons: first, it provides 
significant reinforcement in respect of non-discrimination as a fundamental principle of EC 
law and, second, it extends the of legal competence of the EC law-making institutions 
enabling legislation prohibiting discrimination on a far wider range of grounds than was 
332 After which a speedy' opt in' to the SPA was effected - see Burrows op cit. 
3331. Steiner and L. Woods Textbook 011 EC Lmv (OUP, 2003) at p. 8. 
334 The Amsterdam Treaty also renumbered the Treaties. 
335 Now contained in Title XI, Chapter 1. 
336 Title VIII. 
337 Contained in Article 12 (ex Article 6). 
110 
previously the case. 338 Furthermore, the promotion of equality of men and women was 
expressly identified as a task of the Community following Amsterdam. 339 
From Social Law to Employment Policy (1998 to present) 
Despite the amendments to the law-making process made by the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Treaties, the anticipated development of legislative initiatives in the social area had failed to 
materialise as the twentieth century drew to a close. This can be attributed to two inter-related 
factors: a reluctance to engage in further harmonisation of social standards at the Member 
State-level, and a new way of implementing such standards at the supranational level as 
introduced by the European Employment Strategy through the open method of co-ordination. 
Relations between the Member States in the social law field had always been characterised, to 
a certain extent, by what Hervey has referred to as 'utu'esolved contradictions and tensions ,340 
caused by an uneasy co-existence of conflicting models of European social policy. This is 
clearly illustrated by the disagreements over harmonisation of maternity provisions and the 
regulation of working time. In both cases, the UK government predictably took a non-
interventionist stance in accordance with the tradition of legal abstentionism, whereas 
Germany's history of state regulation made both initiatives more readily acceptable. In 
contrast, the Nordic States' employee relations systems, which are largely based on self-
regulation underpinned by collective agreements, already utilised the broader concept of 
338 Two directives have already been implemented which take Article 13 as their legal base: Council Directive 
2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin 
and Council Directive 2000178/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, which provides specifically for protection against discrinlination on the grounds of religion or belief, 
disability, age and sexual orientation. Furthermore, Council and Parliament Directive 2002173 amended the 
Equal Treatment Directive 76/2071EEC in order to apply the same definitions of direct and indirect 
discrimination to sex as those contained in the Article 13 directives. 
339 By Article 2 EC. The Amsterdam amendments also enabled an enhanced emphasis on the protection of 
human rights by the amendments made to Articles 6 and 7 of the TED. 
340 Hervey, op cit at p. 24. 
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'working environment' necessary for acceptance of such initiatives on the non-contentious 
ground of workers ' well-being. 
These differences in conception have presented the Commission with difficulties in its 
attempts to make progress in the harmonisation of social standards. The legislative 
programmes of the 1970s and early 1980s were largely concerned with the introduction of 
basic rights, many of which complemented or improved those already available within the 
Member States' own regulatory systems, so that, with a few notable exceptions, the 
Commission's proposals in this respect posed no real threat to sovereignty. However, in the 
aftermath of Maastricht, the programme for reform had simply reached saturation point so 
that any new proposals in the social law area were viewed with suspicion by national 
governments and, thus, unable to attain the initial agreement necessary in order to instigate 
the legislative process. Furthermore, the economic climate across Europe as the twentieth 
century reached its end meant that Member States were not particularly receptive to further 
labour market regulation. High unemployment rates caused by structural factors such as skills 
shortages and a lack of inward investment made it an unsuitable environment for further 
intervention at the European level. The development of the global economy and sweeping 
changes in commercial and industrial practices led by advancements in information 
technology gave rise to greater competitive threats. The combination of all of these factors 
caused the EU institutions to reconsider the policy process. Their response was the 
introduction of a system of co-ordination of the Member States' national social policy by way 
of the European Employment Strategy (EES) which is enforced through the Open Method of 
Co-ordination (OMC).341 
341 For a more detailed analysis ofthe process ofOMC in the context of the EES, see N. Busby, 'Pulp Fiction or 
Hard Fact? The Development of a European Employment PoliCY, (2005) 1 loumal of Contemporary European 
Research 2, pp. 29-38. 
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The EES is based on the Employment Title342 inserted into the EC Treaty by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. The origins of this Title were set down in the 1993 White Paper on growth, 
competitiveness and employmene43 which expressly linked the three policy areas for the first 
time. The White Paper concluded that the creation of fifteen million new jobs would be 
necessary if the key issues of growing unemployment and global competition were to be 
addressed. The oveniding objective was to develop a joined up approach to policy-making so 
that employment would be integrated with other relevant areas such as fiscal policy. 
Structural unemployment was becoming a feature of many of the Member States and was 
attributed to a combination of social and economic exclusion requiring Keynsian and supply-
side measures, specifically a mix of proactive policy designed to promote a more inclusive 
environment and the deregulation of certain aspects of national labour markets. 344 The social 
policy amendments introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty provided an opportunity to 
formalise the new approach. A new Title on employment was inserted into the Treaty, thus 
enabling an extension ofEC competence in the social policy arena. 345 The key provisions are: 
Article 125 which establishes the objective of a 'co-ordinated strategy'; Article 127(2) which 
places 'high employment' on the EC policy agenda and Article 128 which sets out the 
framework for developing and monitoring the 'guidelines for employment'. The reason for the 
focus on employment at the Amsterdam summit has been explained as arising out of a 
combination of the promotion of European monetary union (EMU) and the need for a 
unifying project.346 Despite the emphasis given to the development of an overarching 
employment policy at the European level, the soft law nature of the strategy has led to 
342 Title VIII of Part Three. 
343 European Commission (1994), Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, COM (1993) 700 Final. 
344 European Commission (2000), European Employment and Social Policy: A Policy for People: D-G for 
Education and Culture. 
345 Which, alongside the accompanying Title XI on Social Policy, Education, Vocational Training and Youth, 
has been described by Burrows as 'merely part of the routine service, an oil change rather than a new engine' N. 
BUiTOWS, 'The New Employment Chapter and Social Policy Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty' in J. Usher 
(ed) The State of the European Union, (2000 Longman) at 92. 
346 J. Goetschy, 'The European Employment Strategy: Genesis and Development', European Joumal of 
Industrial Relations 19995 (2), pp. 117-138. 
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· .. fi 347 b d 1 h cnhClsm rom some quarters. It can e argue, lOwever, t at the new approach does enable 
more activity at the European-level in areas of social policy previously the exclusive domain 
of national governments. As Goetschy has observed, the policy aspects previously 
encompassed by the development of Social Europe 'tended to lie outside the core of national 
social policies, so as not to upset sensitivities concerning national sovereignty.,348 The EES, 
perhaps because of its soft law basis rather than despite it, is arguably a useful means of 
tackling central issues of concern to all Member States regardless of the national industrial 
relations systems in place. 
The new prommence glVen to employment policy, and in particular unemployment, was 
further developed at the Luxembourg summit m 1997 through the adoption of the first 
employment guidelines by the Heads of State and Government. The approved guidelines 
incorporated the original four pillars ofthe EES: employability; entrepreneurship; adaptability 
and equal opportunities, which were all viewed as crucial factors in the development of 
sustainable job creation. At the European Council meeting in Lisbon in 2000, the Member 
States' representatives reiterated their commitment to a new economic and social agenda by 
the adoption of a strategic goal for the next decade: 'to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.,349 Achievement of this goal is through 
co-ordination ofthe labour market policies of Member States in an annual cycle. This process, 
known as the open method of co-ordination COMC), has been defined by Frank 
Vandenbroucke350 as 'a mutual feedback process of planning, examination, comparison and 
347 See, for example, S. Ball, The EUl'Opean Employment St/'ategy: The Will but not the Way.? 2001 ILJ 30 (4), 
pp. 353-374. 
348 Goetschy op cit at 133. 
349 European Commission From the Lisbon Summit to a New Social Policy Agenda, available at: 
www.europa.eu.intlcomm/employment_sociallnews/2000 
350 Belgian Minister of Pensions and Social Affairs and one of the main architects of the process. 
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adjustment of the policies of Member States, all of this on the basis of common objectives.,351 
At the start of each year, the Council approves the Commission's objectives which have, until 
now, been drawn up as guidelines based on the four pillars. Member States' national action 
plans (NAPs) are then submitted for approval by the Commission and the Council. 
Whether the co-ordination of national employment policy is the most effective way of dealing 
with persistent gendered pay gaps and associated issues at the supranational level remains to 
be seen. What is clear is that the overarching objectives of the European policy agenda are no 
longer focused on the harmonisation of social policy at the supranational level, but rather are 
targeted at the co-ordination of employment law at the national levels. The development of 
equal opportunities was identified as one of the original four pillars of the EES and sex 
equality has been a recurring priority theme in the guidance for implementation across all of 
the pillars. However, it is debatable whether the soft law mechanisms employed through the 
process of OMC will provide an adequate means of responding to discrimination within 
national labour markets and whether such means can act as an effective replacement for the 
development of hard law measures intended to harmonise provisions in this area. 
The Substantive Provision of Sex Equality in Em'opean Law 
As outlined above, the legislative provisions that have contributed towards the overall 
intervention of European law in the field of sex equality are scattered across a range of 
different instruments. Some of those provisions are specifically targeted at eliminating 
discrimination on the ground of sex; some are aimed at providing rights for atypical workers 
and have indirectly benefited high numbers of women due to the gendered structure of labour 
351 Cited by 1. Zeitlin (2002) 'The Open method of Co-ordination and the Future of the European Employment 
Strategy' Presentation to the Employment and Social Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on the first 
five year evaluation of the Employment Guidelines, 8 July 2000. 
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markets. Some prOVlSlOns, such as those provided by the Pregnant Workers' Directive,352 
recogmse women's difference from men and are intended to provide protection on the 
grounds of such difference. Consideration will now be paid to the various approaches that 
together provide the basis for the European Court of Justice's decision-making in the area of 
gender relations. 
Article 141353 was the Treaty provision which established the principle of equality between 
the sexes, specifically in the context of pay. Although its scope has been broadened 
significantly since its inception so that it now provides for equal treatment and has recently 
been extended to permit some forms of 'positive action' /54 it was originally intended as an 
pro-competition measure and its inclusion was not motivated by concern for women's labour 
market inequality.355 Despite this negligible beginning, Article 141 has grown in prominence 
so that, alongside Article 137,356 it serves as a cornerstone for legislative activity in the field 
of gender relations providing a legal base for a plethora of provisions aimed at the elimination 
of discrimination between the sexes. These provisions are divided principally into three parts: 
pay, which is governed by Article 141 and Article 75/1117357; equal treatment by Article 141 
and Directives 76/207358, 86/613359 (for the self-employed) and 96/34 (parentalleavei60 ; and 
352 92/85IEC. 
353 Ex Article 119. 
354 Following its amendment by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
355 See C. Bernard 'The Economic Objectives of Article 119' in D. O'Keeffe and T. Hervey (eds) Sex Equality 
Law in the European Union (Wiley, 1996). 
356 Ex Article 118 which gives the Community competence to support and compliment Member States' activities 
relating to the equal treatment of men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and equal treatment 
at work, giving the Council the power to adopt directives. 
357 Council Directive 75/117IEEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, OJ 1975 L 45/19. 
358 Council Directive 761207IEEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and working 
conditions, OJ 1976 L 39/40, amended by Council and Parliament Directive No 2002173 of 23 September 2003 
amending Council Directive 76/2071EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and working conditions OJ 2002 L 
269115. 
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social security by Directives 79/7361 ; 86/378/62 and 96/97363 . Over the years, distinctions 
between the three categories have become blurred, particularly in areas in which the European 
Court has been actively engaged such as the interrace between social security and equal 
pay.364 There are also provisions on the burden of proof in sex discrimination cases contained 
in Directive 97/81 365 which straddle both equal pay and equal treatment. Furthermore, the 
whole area is underpinned by a considerable amount of soft law, some of which has led to the 
adoption of hard law in specific areas/66 with other aspects providing broad policy initiatives 
intended to inform and shape Europe's overall philosophy towards gender equality.367 
All of these instruments share a common approach in that they are based on the premise that 
the provision of equal opportunities will rectify anomalies in the market by enabling women 
to achieve parity with men through application of the merit principle. The legislation relies on 
a symmetrical application of its provisions giving equal rights to men and women. Where 
positive action is permitted, this arises largely as a means of ensuring that women are 
provided with assistance to improve their access to labour market opportunities in areas where 
they are underrepresented, for example, through the targeted provision of training thus 
359 Council Directive 86/613IEEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed capacity, and on the 
protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood, OJ 1986 L 225/40. 
360 Council Directive 96/34IEC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by 
UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ 1996 L 145/4-9. 
361 Council Directive 7917IEEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ 1979 L 6/24. 
362 Council Directive 86/378IEEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women in occupational social security schemes, OJ 1986 L 225/40. 
363 Council Directive 96/97IEC of 20 December 1996 amending Directive 86/378IEEC of 24 July 1986 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes, 
OJ 1997 L 46/20. 
364 See 1. Sohrab, 'Women and Social Security Law: The Limits ofEEC Equality Law' (1994) Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 5; Sexing the Benefit (Dartmouth, 1996). 
365 Council Directive 97/80 IEC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on 
sex, OJ 1998 L 14/6. 
366 For example Commission Recommendation 92/131 and Code [1992] OJ L49/1 on sexual harassment which 
provided a precursor to the amendment to Directive 76/207 made by Directive 2002173 in this respect. 
367 Such as the action programmes and Framework Strategy on Gender Equality, COM (2000) 335 Final. 
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enabling them to compete with men. Directive 92/85/EEC368 which sets down rights m 
respect of pregnancy and maternity provides an alternative angle on the same approach, m 
that it recogmses women's difference from men and seeks to provide protection from 
discrimination in respect of such difference. Although in some respects this can be seen as 
representing a departure from the European approach to sex equality articulated by the earlier 
legislative initiatives, it is actually based on the same premise - essentially that women are 
'the other,369 and merit protection in respect of their 'otherness' in certain restricted 
circumstances. The relationship between child-bearing and rearing undoubtedly has a 
profound effect on women's labour market activity rates and has led to a predominance of 
female workers engaged in so-called 'atypical employment'. Although legislative instruments 
intended to offset the precariousness of such arrangements are not concerned with the 
attainment of 'sex equality' per se, the relationship between women's employment and 
atypical arrangements make it impossible to assess the impact of European law on gender 
relations without considering the effectiveness of such provisions. 
In an influential and oft-cited article published in 1992, Fredman identified five 
characteristics of anti-discrimination laws which have been subject to criticism and which are 
all present to varying degrees in the European provisions. 37o In considering those provisions, 
she sought to determine the extent to which EC anti-discrimination law depends on concepts 
which are 'flawed in the senses identified in the literature',371 concluding that although 
European law was more progressive in some ways than its UK counterpart, it suffered from a 
368 Council Directive 92/851EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or 
who are breastfeeding (tenth individual directive within the meaning of article 16(1) of Directive 89/391IEEC). 
369 From De Beauvoir, see Chapter 2 infi'a. 
370 S. Fredman, European Community Discrimination Lmv: A Critique, 1992 Industrial Law Joumal21, pp. 119-
134. 
371 Fredman ibid at p. 119. 
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failure 'to address the underlying structural obstacles to women's progress,.372 Although 
Fredman's critique relies on an analysis of Community provision made over 10 years ago, the 
central tenets on which her objections are based still hold true despite the substantial 
amendments that have been made to this area over the past decade. The 'flawed' 
characteristics providing the focus of Fredman's analysis, which are worth revisiting in the 
context of the current legislative landscape, are: the particular concept of equality on which 
the provisions are based; the reliance on a dichotomy between equality and difference; the 
assumption of neutrality; the subordination of anti-discrinlination legislation to the market 
order and the individualistic nature ofthe provisions and their enforcement. 
The particular conception of equality on which the European approach is built remams 
essentially unchanged. In fact the recent inclusion of specific definitions of the particular 
types of discrimination at which the provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive are aimed 
clearly conftrms this approach. Article 2 (2i73 of Directive 76/207 defines direct 
discrimination as arising 'where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than 
another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation', and indirect 'where an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at a patiicular 
disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex.' As Fredman asserts, this conception of 
discrimination is 'crucially limited by its dependence on a norm of comparison, which is 
generally the existing male norm. ,374 Echoing MacKinnon 'S375 discontent with this approach 
to anti-discrimination law, Fredman posits that the application of this conception 'is 
particularly peliinent in explaining the persistence of labour market disadvantage,376 as an 
372 Jd at 133. 
373 Inserted by Directive 2002173iEC. The 'new' definitions of direct and indirect discrimination incorporate the 
interpretation given to the concepts by the ECJ in its jurisprudence on sex discrimination - see Chapter 6 infi'a. 
374 Ibid at p. 120. 
375 For an exposition of MacKinnon's views, see Feminism Unmodified (1987), discussed in Chapter 2 infi'a. 
376 Fredman op cit at p. 120. 
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inability to confonn to a male nonn will leave women, particularly those with children, 
unable to enjoy certain employment-related benefits and might actually lead to them being 
penalized. In the European context, this approach was particularly prominent in the early case 
law surrounding pregnancy and childbirth,377 and it can still be seen as central to the ideology 
informing the ECl's decision-making in the area of justification for indirect discrimination. 378 
The work of the Court will be considered in Chapter 6 of this thesis. What is relevant at this 
juncture is recognition of the fact that the legislation on which the COUli's decision-making is 
based clearly allows for this approach, directly inviting it in certain respects. This view of 
equality, which can be categorised as being based on the 'equal opportunities' conception, 379 
is central to the provision of Community law in this respect and actually comprises the central 
orgamsmg force for the four remaining flawed characteristics constituting Fredman's 
analysis. 
The second of those characteristics is the assumed dichotomy of equality and difference. This 
concept harks back to the Aristotelian formula380 and, although useful in certain respects as a 
starting point in the development of strategies intended to eliminate discrimination, is 
severely limited in its application to real life circumstances. For example, an over-reliance on 
protective legislation aimed at countering the differences between the sexes can lead to the 
use of unrealistic gender stereo-typing that sees women consigned as the 'weaker sex', 
inferior to men both physically and mentally. For this reason, maternity rights must tread a 
377 See Case C-179/88 Handels-og KontOljimktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark v Dansk Arbejdgivelforening 
(Hertz) [1990] ECR 1-3979. See also the Court's restricted rulings in Case C-32/93 Webb v EMO Air Cargo 
(UK) Ltd [1994] ECR 1-3567 and Case C-394/96 Brown v Rentokil [1998] ECR 1-4185 in which it was held that 
a woman absent on the grounds of pregnancy- or birth-related illness is only protected for a specified period and 
will then be subject to comparisons with a sick male, regardless of the nature of her illness. The provisions of 
Directive 92/85 have assisted in certain respects in this context by providing specific rights on the grounds of 
pregnancy and childbirth (see below) but comparisons with a sick male still persist if the woman's illness lasts 
for longer than the 'protected period' which consists of the duration of the pregnancy and the appropriate period 
of matemity leave which will be subject to differing national standards. 
378 See Chapter 6 inJi"a. 
379 See Chapter 2 infi·a. 
380 That 'likes should be treated alike', discussed inJi"a at Chapter 2. 
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careful path between recognition of the very real need to provide workplace support for the 
physical and psychological well-being of pregnant workers and those who have recently given 
birth (and their unborn child or infant) and over-protective blanket provisions based on the 
assumption that pregnancy and maternity leave all women overly vulnerable and in need of 
intervention which restricts their activities and personal autonomy. 
Measurement against a 'male nOlm' means that women's physical characteristics or 
physiological functions appear 'different' or 'abnornlal' which in turn leads legislators and 
those charged with the interpretation of resulting provisions into this latter trap. Furthermore, 
the consignment of all things child-related as a 'women's problem' perpetuates women's 
labour market disadvantage through employer's assumptions about the likely effects of such 
responsibility on career commitment. This, in turn, devalues the relationship between parent 
and child as women are required either to conceal the effects of motherhood from their 
workplace, resign themselves to the low-status lifestyle that so often accompanies attempts to 
'have it all' or simply admit defeat by exiting the labour market altogether. In reality, of 
course, the range of factors which influence women's decision-making over whether or not to 
combine motherhood with paid employment include both economic necessity and personal 
fulfilment, the latter of which may be best served by labour market activity or not depending 
on individual needs and circumstances. The effective targeting of legislation aimed at 
increasing women's labour market security requires consideration to be given to a wide range 
of factors in order for it to avoid being overly prescriptive and, thus, prohibitive of the 
exercise of individual freedom. Admittedly, there is some recognition of such potential 
pitfalls within the European provisions which now incorporate specific protection on the 
grounds of maternity as well as providing a right to parental leave. 
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The approach taken toward the accommodation of difference on the grounds of pregnancy by 
Directive 92/85/EEC has been considered above, but the parental leave provisions, which are 
based on the premise of equal treatment, are worthy of specific scrutiny here. The approach 
adopted in Directive 96/34 attempts to equalise the protection of employment for parents of 
young children who require to have time away from work for family-based reasons. The 
Directive explicitly recognises that such duties need not be the exclusive responsibility of 
women by giving equal rights to both parents. The targeting of legislative activity at the 
alleviation of assumptions based on gender stereotyping makes good sense with an attempt to 
encourage men to 'assume an equal share of family responsibility,381 providing an 
oppOltunity to re-negotiate the sexual contract.382 However, the central weakness of this 
particular legislation is its reliance on pre-existing arrangements within Member States' 
national welfare systems for its execution which leaves the status quo firmly intact. This 
factor prevents the Directive from being a radical leader in policy-terms making it merely a 
whisper of dissent lost in the powerful resonance of generations of gendered role-ascription. 
The provision that such leave may be unpaid,383 adds further to the entrenchment of gendered 
stereo-types as decisions regarding who should take time off for the care of young children 
are likely to be based on financial considerations with the effect that, for many families, loss 
of the women's (lower) wage for an extended period has less of an impact than losing that of 
her partner would have. 
The assumption of neutrality forms the basis of Fredman's third flawed concept through what 
she describes as 'a central implication ... that differential treatment which benefits women at 
the expense of men [which] is considered to be as objectionable as its converse, even if its 
381 Framework Agreement on Parental Leave annexed to Directive 96/34 at para. 1 (8). 
382 See Pateman, discussed infi'a at Chapter 2. 
383 Clause 2 (8) of the framework agreement specifies that matters relating to social security are to be detetmined 
by the Member States in accordance with national law. 
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a1lll IS to redress past discrimination against women. ,384 This overlooks the effects of 
centuries of patriarchal power exercised over women which, until relatively recently, 
expressly excluded them from participation in political life385 and which continues to shape 
the nature of gender relations. It is due to this particular conceptualisation of 'equality' law 
that positive or affirmative action is expressly prohibited, although in recent years 
amendments have been made to the text of Article 141386 and to Directive 761207387 allowing 
its use in some, restricted circumstances. Under the strict application of the 'equal 
opportunities' model which forms the basis of European Community sex equality law, the 
principle of equal treatment must always be applied and both sexes always treated the same 
unless differential treatment can be justified as one of the restricted grounds for derogation. 
This means that treatment 'favouring' one sex is perceived as, at the same time, 
disadvantaging the other. While this is technically true at the time that the treatment is 
received, such an 'in the moment' interpretation of the effects of 'favourable' treatment only 
serves to restrict the uses to which the law could otherwise be put. As Fredman observes, 
such a view 'assumes that equality is an end in itself, rather than a mechanism for correcting 
d· d ,388 !Sa vantage. 
This point can be effectively illustrated by reference to what is generally accepted as one of 
the major contributory factors to women's continuing economic inequality: gendered work 
patterns and resultant occupational segregation. The labour markets of most industrialised 
384 Fredman op cit at p. 128. 
385 See the general discussion of the effects of patriarchy and MacKinnon's analysis in patiicular in Chapter 2 
infi'a. 
386 Article 141(4), inserted by the Treaty of Amsterdam, states 'With a view to ensuring full equality in practice 
between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State 
from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the 
underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in 
professional careers'. 
387 Following its amendment by Directive 2002/73, Article 2(8) of Directive 761207 now provides for the 
maintenance or adoption of measures within the meaning of Article 141(4) and Atiicle 8a establishes a duty on 
the !vfember States to communicate to the Commission every four years the text of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions or any measures adopted pursuant to Article 141(4). 
388 Fredman op cit at p. 129. 
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economies are increasingly moving towards non-standard arrangements with high proportions 
of the workforce currently engaged in so-called "atypical" employment.389 With many of the 
new working arrangements operating at the lower paid, more "flexible" end of the market, 
newly created jobs are predominantly filled by women. 390 Conversely, the work arrangement 
used as a standard against which other employment types are judged to be "atypical" is a male 
standard and has little in common with the career experiences of most low-paid female 
workers. The problems associated with occupational segregation will never be eradicated until 
labour market policies which single out non-standard working patterns as somehow deviant 
are adequately challenged. What is required is the development of policies supported by hard 
law measures that attempt to redress the imbalances found within existing structures such as 
employment sectors and supporting institutions. This may include the setting of legally 
enforceable quotas to increase representation of women (and men) in areas where they are 
currently underrepresented. In the case of female employment, such redress entails 'trading 
up' to better paid, more sought after employment. The stumbling block here is that, under the 
current legal regime, such measures are likely to be interpreted as 'preferential treatment', 
thereby crossing the line between the legally acceptable realms of positive action and reverse 
discrimination which is prohibited by law. 391 What such conceptualisation fails to 
acknowledge is that men and women's employment is not the same: it varies in terms of its 
nature, the patterns of labour-market behaviour exhibited by the members of both sexes over 
the life cycle and, concurrently, in relation to the tenns and conditions that are applicable 
under the current system. These factors must be acknowledged if law is to be used as an 
effective means of redistributing resources and effecting real change. 
389 See Chapter 3 infi'a. 
390 S Fredman, Women at Work: The Bl'Oken Promise ofFlexicllrity (2004) 33 Industrial Law Joumal299. 
391 For a compelling critique of the conceptualisation of affimlative action in policy-making, see C Bacchi, 
Policy and Discourse: Challenging the Const/'llction of Affil7native Action as Preferential Treatment (2004) 11 
Joumal of European Public Policy 128. 
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The primary difficulty faced by legislators seeking to redress the effects of an unequal power 
relationship between the sexes, whether at the national or supranational level, rests in the 
structural nature of contemporary labour markets which are, themselves, subject to a 
multitude of divisions on gender lines. 392 Gendered occupational segregation has become such 
a central feature of the organisation of labour markets that work itself is gendered, with both 
sexes working exclusively in cetiain occupations and sectors and, where men and women do 
work together, women more likely to find themselves at the bottom end of occupational 
hierarchies. It is this situation which informs the identification of the fourth of Fredman's 
flawed characteristics: that of the subordination of anti-discrimination legislation to the 
market order. 
It is the need to effectively reconcile the anomaly apparent in the co-existence of a free 
market order on the one hand with the State intervention required by anti-discrimination 
legislation on the other which poses the greatest challenge to policy-makers. Such 
intervention is, by its very nature, invasive in that achievement of the equality goal 
necessitates interference with the free functioning of the market by attempting to correct the 
inequalities resulting from the furtherance of the capitalist aim realised through the maximum 
exploitation of resources for the attainment of profit. In practice, the tensions inherent in such 
conflicting goals compete so that, without an overriding commitment to its achievement, the 
equality aim may become severely compromised. Futihermore, initiatives driven by market-
deregulation can be effectively misrepresented as constituting attempts to improve women's 
labour market position, for example, through the expansion of 'flexible' employment flaunted 
as providing an opportunity to patiicipate. In reality, newly created jobs often amount to low-
wage peripheral positions which are poorly protected in the event of changes to employer 
392 See Chapter 3 infi"a. 
125 
demand and subsequent contractions of the market. Given such basic vulnerability, 
accompanying legislative intervention is often weak and unenforceable, providing little more 
than lip service in practical terms. 
In the European context, the influence of market forces on the development of sex equality 
legislation has manifested itself in two specific ways: ftrst, tlu"ough the use of the objective 
justification defence in cases of indirect discrinlination and, second, in respect of the targeted 
protection of atypical workers encapsulated by Directives 97/81IEC393 and 1999170lEC394 
which provide rights for part-time and fixed-term workers respectively. The Court's 
jurisprudence on justiftcation in indirect discrimination will be considered in depth elsewhere 
in this thesis,395 but it is worth focusing attention here on the protection afforded to atypical 
workers under European law. Both directives are aimed at providing non-standard workers 
with a right to equal treatment with their standard worker counterparts. Although the 
Directives do not apply any sex-conscious criteria, their effects are more likely to be felt by 
female workers due to the nature of women's work and the corresponding relationship 
between childcare arrangements and paid employment. The comparisons required by the 
legislation are nan"owly construed so that the right is to equal treatment with standard workers 
engaged in broadly similar work, employed by the same employer at the same time under the 
same type of contract.396 As well as excluding high numbers of atypical workers for the 
reasons relating to segregated labour markets set out above, this approach has another 
393 Council Directive 97/811EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the framework agreement on part-time work 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ 1997 L 14/9. 
394 Council Directive 1999/701EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-ternl work 
concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, OJ 1999 L 244/64 
395 See the case analysis in Chapter 6 il?(i·a. 
396 Furthennore, Member States are given so much discretion that inequalities in contractual status can be 
transposed directly into the implementing provisions - see, for example, the UK's implementation of Directive 
1999/70 which applies the equal treatment principle to employees, rather than the broader category of workers, in 
order to preserve the differentiation of those who work through tripartite agreements and are often deemed to be 
self-employed under national law and, thus, excluded from the scope of the The Fixed-Term Employees 
(prevention of Less Favourable Treatment)Regulations 2002, SI 2002 No 2034. 
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fundamental flaw, which severely limits its likely impact. The derivative nature of the 
approach means that it does not provide any substantive rights to workers identified as being 
disadvantaged and vulnerable, which in tum, means that it presents no challenge to the cause 
or nature of such disadvantage. In practical terms, the part-time worker who finds herself 
employed in a sector which is generally low paid has no redress as long as her pay is set at a 
similarly low rate as that of her full-time counterpart. In any case, the exclusion of agency 
workers from the protection afforded by either Directive provides unscrupulous employers in 
unregulated national labour markets with a convenient method of circumventing their 
obligations. In short, this aspect of European regulation clearly illustrates the end result of a 
process which seeks to provide protection to vulnerable workers at the same time as catering 
to the deregulatory regime deemed necessary in order to increase competitiveness. 
Finally, Fredman identifies the focus on individuals as being the fifth flawed characteristic of 
anti-discrimination law, asserting that such a focus 'obscures the essence of discrimination, 
which is that the opportunities available to a person are detennined according to assumptions 
based on her membership of a group rather than her individual needs or talents. ,397 This 
approach serves to perpetuate the misconception that the problem of discrimination affects 
one individual whose inability to conform to a (male) norm makes her appear 'abnorma1'398 
and overlooks that individual's membership of a class or group which, in total, comprises 
over half the population. As Fredman acknowledges, the enforcement mechanisms of EC law 
have gone some way towards lessening some of the effects of individualism. For example the 
European Commission's ability to initiate infringement proceedings under Article 226 places 
less of a burden psychologically and financially on individual claimants and the Article 234 
397 Fredman op cit at p. 132. 
398 See N. Lacey 'From individual to Community' in B. Hepple and E. Szyszczak (eds) Discrimination: The 
Limits oiLaw, (l'vlansell, 1992) 
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reference procedure has enabled its strategic use by equality agencies and trade unions. 399 
Furthermore, the shift in the burden of proof following the establishment of a prima facie case 
provides some welcome relief to the individual claimant pitched against a generally more 
powerful employer.400 What remains beyond question, however, is the inappropriate level of 
reliance placed on individual complaints as the sole means of access to justice in this context. 
As well as arising piecemeal from the diverse legal systems of the Member States, the time 
and effort expended in the resolution of individual cases results in a slow and incremental 
development of inlportant legal principles as well as placing a heavy burden on the individual. 
However well intentioned or executed subsequent improvements to the current system may be 
they cannot counter the obvious weaknesses which will continue for as long as the individual 
complaint continues to be unsupported by any mechanism aimed at providing class remedies. 
The Role of the ECJ 
This Chapter has focused largely on the legislative provision of European Community law 
which is intended to provide the right to formal equality between men and women through the 
application of the appropriate Treaty Articles and secondary legislation. As noted, the 
European Court of Justice has been instrumental in interpreting these instruments in order to 
provide substantive rights at the national level, in particular through the direct effect of 
Article 141. The recent movement away from hard law measures intended to regulate labour 
market discrimination from the 'top down' towards the introduction of 'bottom up' 
employment policy co-ordination could lead to an increased emphasis on the role of the COUlt 
in interpreting existing provisions in line with the growing emphasis on international 
399 Fredman op cit at p. 133. 
400 See Directive 97/S01EC. 
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standards, particularly with regard to the increasing prommence of the human rights 
agenda. 401 
The Court's interpretation takes place through consideration of the legal texts themselves and 
through the application of the fundamental and general principles enshrined by the European 
legal order. In Chapter 5, the composition and operation of the Court will be considered in 
the context of the Article 234 procedure and, in Chapter 6, the court's reasoning will be 
specifically considered in relation to a selected group of cases. However, this assessment of 
the relevant provisions of Community law on which the Court's jurisprudence on gender 
relations is based would be incomplete without some consideration of the principles 
themselves. 
Fundamental and General Principles of EC Law 
In interpreting the substantive provisions of Community law in relation to the circumstances 
of a particular case, the ECl applies certain principles which, as well as aiding in the 
interpretive task itself, enable some consistency of approach. Some of these principles are 
'fundamental' in nature, meaning that they are expressed in the EC Treaty, others form the 
'general' principles of EC law as they are largely unwritten and have been received through 
the Court's jurisprudence. Certain general principles have evolved on the basis of 
fundamental rights through instruments of international law, such as the human rights 
401 As evidenced by the drafting of the EU Chatier of Fundamental Rights in 1999 which consolidates the 
various intemational human rights and national constitutional provisions within one document. Although not 
legally binding until (and unless) the Constitutional Treaty is ratified by the Member States, the Charter 'is 
certainly not without any legal influence or effect.' (p. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials, at p. 362). See further L. Betten 'The EU Charta of Fundamental Rights: A Trojan Horse 01' a 
A101lse 7 '(2001) Intemational 10umal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 151. 
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prOVISIon of the International Labour Organisation's Convention 111 402 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 403 These fundamental rights have been invoked with increasing 
frequency before the ECl even though, in contrast to the fundamental principles themselves, 
they have a precarious legal base resting on the interpretation of three Articles: Article 230404 
which empowers the Court to review the legality of Community acts on the basis of inter alia, 
'infringement of this Treaty' or 'any rule relating to its application. '; Aliicle 288 (2)405 which 
governs Community liability in tOlt/delict by providing that such liability is to be determined 
'in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of member states '; and Al-ticle 
220 EC406 which governs the role of the ECl and provides that the Court 'shall ensure that in 
the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed,.407 As they are not 
specifically provided for in the Treaty, there is no indication as to the scope or content of 
general principles which are left to the ECl to determine. 
Some of the general principles of EC law408 have a textual foundation in the Treaty, while 
others have been developed in secondary legislation. The most familiar are drawn from 
national constitutional and administrative provisions. Although not an exhaustive list, the 
following are examples of the more relevant general principles arising in the context of the 
cases under review in Chapter 6 of this thesis: 
402 See the Court's judgment in Case 149/77 Defi"enne v SABENA [1978] ECR 1365 (,Defi"enne III') in which, 
referring to the elimination of sex discrimination, it stated 'the same concepts are recognised by the European 
Social Charter of 18 November 1961 and by Convention No. 111 of the Intemationai Labour Organisation of 25 
June 1958 conceming discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.' 
403 As incorporated into the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, see n. 127 ibid. Chapter III of the ECHR sets out 
certain equality guarantees, including, under paragraph (b), equality between men and women. 
404 Ex 173. 
405 Ex 215(2) 
406 Ex 164. 
407 See Chapter 5 infi·a. 
408 For example, the principle of non-discrimination. 
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N on-Discrimination 
As a general principle, the concept of non-discrimination is binding on both the Community 
and the Member States. It is expressly mentioned in a number of distinct contexts within the 
Treaty.409 The concept of non-discrimination also arises in EC law as a Community goal and 
has, therefore, been used as the basis for Community action. As well as in the development of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, this function has also been utilised in recent years as the 
basis for the addition of Article 13 EC by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
In terms of its place within the wider scheme of EC law, the concept of non-discrimination 
should be distinguished from the concept of equality. Although the terms 'equality' and 'non-
discrimination' are often used synonymously, the former, due to its enshrinement within the 
Treaty under Article 141,410 arises as a fundamental principle and the latter is afforded status 
as a general principle. As the ECl's case law illustrates, the legal concept of non-
discrimination is problematic. In the context of indirect discrimination, the identification of a 
breach involves the specification of a difference in treatment between two people who are 
similarly placed followed by the determination of whether the different treatment is justified. 
The Advocate Generals in two pre-Article 13 cases, P v S 411 and Grant,412 argued that the 
general principles ofEC law imposed a requirement on the institutions and the Member States 
not to discriminate in the areas covered by Community law on arbitrary grounds such as 
sexual orientation or having undergone gender reassignment. However, as the judgments in 
409 Specifically: Article 13 (ex 6a); Article 12 (ex 6) non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality; Articles 
39, 43, 49-50 (ex 48, 52, 59-60) free movement of persons; amended Articles 2 and 3 and 137 and 141 (ex 118 
and 119) equal treatment of men and women; Article 34(2) (ex 40(3)) producers/consumers in field of 
agriculture. 
410 Although originally identified as a fundamental principle of equal pay by the ECJ in Defi'enne II, the 
provision of Article 141 has been significantly broadened through the Court's jurisprudence to encompass equal 
treatment between the sexes. 
411 Case C-31194 P v Sand COl'l1wall County Council [1996] ECR 1-2143. 
412 Case C-249/96 Grant v South West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR 1-621. 
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both cases demonstrate, the Court has been more conservative in this respect: in Grant the 
ECJ ruled that ensuring respect for fundamental rights could not have the effect of extending 
the scope of the Treaty provisions beyond the competences of the Community so that the 
Equal Treatment Directive could only be applied in cases concerning differential treatment on 
the grounds of sex, not sexuality. 
P.·op0l1ionality 
The concept of proportionality is the basis on which the test for objective justification in cases 
of indirect discrimination is based. 413 The concept itself as applied by the ECJ is an amalgam 
of specific Treaty provisions which justify Community action only where such action is 
deemed 'necessary' or 'required' to reach a certain end and certain provisions of the Member 
States' national legal systems. 414 A specific version of the principle is now enshrined in 
Article 5 EC which provides that action by the Community shall not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty with its requirements fleshed out in a 
Protocol to the Treaty. This provision can be used to challenge actions of the Community 
itself or to test the legality of state actions which fall within the application of Community law 
and involves a three stage test: (1) whether the measure was suitable to achieve the desired 
end (2) whether it was necessary to achieve the desired end (3) whether the measure imposed 
a burden on the individual that was excessive in relation to the objective sought to be 
achieved. 415 
413 See Chapter 6 infi'a. 
414 The provisions of German and French law have been particularly influential in this respect - see further 
Chapter 6 infi·a. 
415 Proportionality stricto sensll 
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Legal Certainty and Legitimate Expectation 
The inter-related notions of legal certainty and legitimate expectation are found in many 
national legal systems but their precise legal content may vary quite significantly from one 
system to another. What applications of the concepts generally have in common is the desire 
to develop and apply the law consistently in order that those who may be affected by the 
application of rules will have an awareness of that fact and will be able to plan and moderate 
their actions accordingly. This concept is bound up with notions of fairness and constitutes an 
important tenet of the rule of law. Accordingly, the application of a new rule to events which 
have already been concluded will generally be unacceptable as it goes against such notions by 
giving rise to retroactive effect. National legal systems and Community law are, not 
surprisingly, unreceptive to the actual retroactive application of rules. However, under 
Community law, retroactive impact may be allowed in certain circumstances if such impact 
clearly follows from n01mative terms or from the objectives of the general scheme of which 
they are part. 416 
In the legislative context, apparent retroactivity may be permissible where provisions are 
applied to events which occun-ed in the past but which have not been definitively concluded. 
This is a complex concept which is can be distinguished from actual retroactive application on 
the grounds that administrations must have the power to alter policy for the future, even 
where such alteration might have implications for the conduct of private patties planned on 
the basis of a pre-existing legal regime. In the cutTent context, the use of retroactivity by the 
416 See Case 98/78 Racke (Firma A) v Hauptzollamt lvfainz [1979] ECR 69. 
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Court of Justice as a means of restricting the effects of its own judgments in certain 
circumstances is illustrated by some of the cases considered in detail in Chapter 6. 417 
Conclusions 
The development of social law within the European legal order has been slow and 
incremental. Despite its uncertain beginnings, sex equality is now firmly entrenched as an 
important principle of European law as evidenced by the plethora of primary and secondary 
legislation supported by soft law initiatives in this area. Furthermore, complimentary 
provisions exist which are aimed at providing rights to workers, the majority of whom are 
female, who suffer disadvantage on the grounds of the non-standard nature of their working 
arrangements. Recent developments include an expansion in the areas of competence of 
Community law in the broad field of equality which signals a move towards a more inclusive 
human rights approach to social provision. However, this apparent opportunity for the 
furtherance of the European Union's social aims has been accompanied by a move away from 
hard law initiatives towards the co-ordination of employment policy at the Member State 
level. 
Despite the wide range of existing legislative instruments in the equality field, there has been 
little development in the conceptualisation of equality and related principles within such 
provision. Even where attempts have been made to strike out against the charge of replicating 
women's disadvantage by the ascription of conformity to a male norm - notably in the 
provision of rights to .women on the grounds of pregnancy and the introduction of parental 
leave - the nature of the provisions transposes the same conceptualisation, thus leaving the 
417 Case C-262/88 Barber v GRE [1990] ECR 1-1889; Case C-78/98 Preston v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS 
T/"llst [1999] ECR 1-3201; Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom AG v Schroder [2000] ECR 1-743. 
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status quo intact. The flaws identified in European sex equality law over a decade ago by 
Sandra Fredman are still relevant today and are to be found in the context of recent additions 
to the legal framework as well as in the more well-established provisions. In fact, Fredman's 
critique of European discrimination law mirrors the weaknesses in traditional and 
contemporary theory418 so closely, that her analysis constitutes a presentation of the 
theoretical perspectives placed in a specifically legal conteA1:. In this respect the European 
legal order represents a microcosm of the wider society displaying all of the same symptoms 
of patriarchal forces and this from a system of law specifically intended to eliminate 
inequality between the sexes. 
The combination of factors outlined above provides an interesting challenge to the European 
Court of Justice in respect of its role in the interpretation ofthe provisions of Community law. 
In contrast to those courts which operate within domestic legal systems, the ECJ is charged 
with a wide discretion in the execution of its duties, unfettered by the constraints of binding 
precedent and empowered to utilise a wide range of sources as aids in its reasoning. These 
factors combine to place the Court in a unique position, even within the relatively weak 
legislative framework, to develop further the rights of non-standard workers by application of 
the fundamental principle of equality. This is of particular relevance in the context of this 
thesis, the main purpose of which is to uncover the extent to which the Court's adjudications 
on cases referred under the Article 234 procedure can be characterised as having a common 
output amounting to an identifiable jurisprudence 011 gender relations. 
m Discussed in Chapter 2 infi'a. 
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In the next Chapter, consideration will be given to the Court's role within its institutional 
setting and an assessment will be made of its considerable sphere of influence over the 
development of Community law generally and, in particular, in the field of gender relations. 
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Chapter 5 
The European Court of Justice 
'The juridical top of a political iceberg ,419 
Int.'od uction 
The European Court of Justice has been identified as having a dual identity and corresponding 
role within the European Union's institutional structure. In her analysis of the concept of 
gender within the context of the role of the ECJ, Shaw adopts a 'dual vision' in which the 
Court is seen as both a legal and political institution,420 so that it operates 'within normatively 
constraining systems of legal reasoning, argument and interpretation and subject to 
conceptions of the proper judicial role within a constitutional system' as well as 'responding 
to the changing agendas inherent in the politics of the ED.' This vision of the Court is central 
to the approach adopted in this Chapter (as well as in the thesis generally) which attempts to 
link the Court's developing jurisprudence with the evolving legal and political structures of 
the ED. As stated elsewhere, the purpose of this thesis is to uncover the extent to which the 
Court's adjudications on cases referred under the Article 234 procedure, which are subject to 
such a range of influences, can be characterised as having a common output amounting to an 
identifiable jurisprudence on gender relations. The context in which the Court operates, within 
what was established as an economic community with its foundations strongly rooted in the 
neo-liberal, free market ideology of twentieth century Western Europe, is central to this 
undertaking. By considering the interplay between the political environment and the Court's 
419 From Andre Donner, The Role of the Lawyer in European Integration, (Edinburgh University Press, 1968). 
At the time the quote was made (in relation to the criticism that the Court should have adjudicated on the legality 
of the infamous Luxembourg Accords), Donner presided as ajudge in the EC1. 
4201. Shaw 'Gender and the Court of Justice' in G. De Burca and 1. Weiler (eds) The European Court of Justice 
(OUP 2001) pp. 87-142 at p. 87, see also G. De Burca, 'The Principle of SubSidiarity and the Court of Justice as 
an Institutional Actor' (1998) 36 JCMS 217. 
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interpretation of the Treaties and secondary legislation it will be possible to construct a 
framework within which the central case analysis in Chapter 6 can take place. 
Detailed consideration of the Court's jurisprudence will be undertaken in Chapter 6 and the 
analysis offered here does not attempt to replicate that, rather to ascertain the main stages in 
the Court's development, so that a deeper and narrower focus can be subsequently applied to 
a specific group of cases. Before such analysis can take place, the operational aspects of the 
Court will be considered: the rules of appointment and composition of the Court will be 
discussed; jurisdictional factors will be identified and the processes and procedures by which 
the Court operates will also be scrutinised. Particular attention will be paid to the Article 
234421 procedure by which the cases referred to in Chapter 6 are brought before the Court. 
Underpinning these considerations and emerging as a central theme throughout this Chapter 
will be an examination of the ECJ's role in the constitutionalisation of the Treaties which the 
COUli has been credited with through its development of the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy. This informs an evaluation of the ECJ's external relations with the Member 
States' national courts and the other Community institutions and also provides a useful means 
of examining the views of legal scholars and other commentators regarding the perceived 
impact of the Court's activities on the development of Community law. Finally, the 
development of the Court's judicial role will be considered to identify the interpretative 
approaches taken and legal reasoning applied in its treatment of the case law brought before it 
under the preliminary rulings procedure. 
421 Ex Article 171 EC. 
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Judicial Appointment and Composition ofthe Court 
Following the amendments made by the Treaty of Nice, the composition of the Court is 
governed by Articles 221-225a of the EC Treaty. A Protocol on the Statute of the Court of 
Justice dealing with the organisation and procedure of the Court was added by the Treaty of 
Nice. The Treaty provisions on the composition of the judiciary, which permit one judge per 
Member State, are amended upon each enlargement of the Union. At the time under review in 
this thesis,422 the number of judges was, thus, 15.423 Article 233 requires the appointment of a 
judge to be 'by common accord of the governments of the Member States'. The term of office 
is six years and the appointment of new judges or reappointment of existing judges is 
staggered with partial replacement occurring every three years. Article 227 requires the ECJ 
to be assisted by eight Advocates-General (AGs) and the qualifications, methods of 
appointment and conditions of office are the same for the Advocates-General as for the 
judges. Article 167 EC requires those deemed to be suitable for selection as judges or AGs of 
the ECJ to be 'persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the 
qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial office in their respective 
countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence.' The extent to which judicial 
independence can be guaranteed under a fL'l:ed term appointment system may be questionable, 
particularly as the Court's deliberations are not made public. 424 However, in practice, most 
judges have been reappointed and the conditions of office do allow for an element of peer 
review and self-regulation in that Article 6 of the Statute of the Comt provides for the 
removal of any judge or AG who, in the unanimous opinion of the other judges and 
Advocates-General, no longer fulfils the necessary conditions and obligations of office. 
422 As stated in Chapter 1, the law is considered up to 31 December 2005. Although the 10 newest Member 
States acceded to the European Union in May 2004, the impact on the Court's jurisprudence of that phase of 
enlargement had not been felt when the cases under review in Chapter 6 came before the Court. 
423 Now 25 - Article 221IEC specifies one judge per Member State. 
424 Although the individual opinions of the A-Gs are made public. 
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Historically, the gender balance of the Court has been predominantly male, with the first 
female judge appointed as recently as 1999425, although a female Advocate-General had 
previously served from 1981_85. 426 In recent years, further female judicial appointments have 
been made to the Court of Justice, by Germany (2000), and to the Court of First Instance by 
Finland and Sweden (on the accession of those countries in 1995), and a female Advocate-
General has been appointed by Austria (2000). As Shaw notes, the limited female 
participation rates are reflective of the gendered vertical segregation evident in the judiciaries 
of most of the Member States, particularly where entry is by competition. 427 Furthermore, 
'although women, as a percentage of the judiciary as a whole [within Member States], are 
frequently better represented than in other professions, they are very poorly represented in the 
highest positions. ,428 This has a knock on effect with regard to the pool of potential recruits to 
the Court of Justice, which is drawn primarily from the senior judiciaries of the Member 
States, although not exclusively as appointments can also be made from academia, national 
office or other branches of the legal profession. Horizontal segregation also has an impact on 
the selection of suitable recruits from the national judiciaries as many women judges operate 
in specialist areas outside of the direct competence of the European Court, for example m 
family law, and are therefore not considered as suitable potential recruits. 429 
The causes and effects of a lack of female representation in decision-making have been well 
versed elsewhere430 and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to revisit them. However, it is 
425 By Ireland - Fidelma O'Kelly Iviacken. 
426 Advocate General Simone Rozes. 
427 Shaw ibid at p. 116. See also S. Kenney, 'The lvJembe/'s of the Cou/'t of Justice of the Eu/'opean 
Communities " (1998/9) 5 Columbia Joumal of European Law 10l. 
428 Id. 
429 See M. Anasagasti and N. Wuiame, Women and Decision-Making in the Judicial)' in the Eu/'opean Union 
(Brussels, OOPEC (DG for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, Unit V!D. 5, 1999). 
430 For an intemational perspective, see H. Charlesworth, C. Chinkin and S. Wright, 'Feminist App/'oaches to 
International Law', (1991) 85 American Joumal of Intemational Law 85; for a UK view, see Department for 
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interesting to note that the same balTiers to access and progression appear to affect the careers 
of those at the top end of the legal profession in the respective Member States as in other 
areas of employment and public life in general. 431 Furthermore, in the EU context, the poor 
participation rates of women are not restricted to the judiciary but also exist across most of the 
institutions despite the efforts that have been made to improve this position. 432 
Regarding the nationality of the judges in the ECJ, Member States have tended to select from 
among their own nationals, although this is not a fomlal requirement of the 'one judge per 
Member State' rule. However, the EC Treaty does require that the judges are entirely 
independent of the govemment which selects them and from any other interest group. As 
Craig and De Burca contend, the Court's jurisprudence supports the existence of such 
independence in so far as 'the specific wishes of the individual Member States have had little 
influence on its decision-making,433 although the impact of political pressures on the Court's 
decision-making cannot be overlooked, particularly in the context of relatively 'non-legal' 
arguments made by Member States before the Court often on policy-related or public opinion 
grounds. This point can be illustrated with reference to the Court's jurisprudence on equal pay 
and treatment. In Barber, 434 the temporal limitation imposed by the Court on the effect of its 
own judgement, which resulted in the attachment of the 'Barber Protocol' to the Maastricht 
Treaty, arose as a direct result of representations made by Member States conceming the 
Constitutional Affairs, Increasing Diversity in the Judicim)' (October 2004); for an assessment of the overall EU 
picture, see M. Anasagasti and N. Wuaime, Women and Decision-making in the Judicimy in the EUl'Opean 
Union, op cit.; and for a persuasive critique of the current rejection of affirmative action in the area, see 
K.Malleson (2006) 'Rethinking the Merit PrinCiple in Judicial Selection', 33 JLS 1, pp. 126-140. 
431 For a discussion of the explanations for the different career patterns of men and women, see Chapter 2 infi'a. 
432 For examples, see the Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, and the 
ECOSOC in the implementation of Council Recommendation 96/694 of 2 Dec 1996 on the balanced 
participation of women and men in the decision-making process, COM(2000) 120. 
433 P.Craig and G. De Burca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (3 rd ed), (OUP 2003) at p. 89. An altemative 
view is that the Court's decisions reflect the interests of the most powerful Member States and, in doing so, 
reinforce their power - see G. Garrett, 'Inte1'l1ational Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European 
Community's Internal Market', Intemational Organization 46 (1992) 2, 533-58. 
434 Case 262/88 Barbel' v Royal Exchange [1990] ECR 1-1889. 
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financial implications of the retroactive application of contracted-out pension entitlements for 
all workers affected by the imposition of different retirement ages for men and women under 
national lUles. The argument that to impose the full effect of the judgment retrospectively 
would have dire consequences for the financial service sectors within Member States was 
highly influential in the Court's handling of the case. The Court's change of heart in relation 
to the treatment of positive action measures arose as a direct consequence of extemal 
commentarl35 between its lUlings in the two German constitutional court's referrals 
KaZanke 436 and Marschall,437 so that, in the former case, a national measure requiring the 
selection of a female applicant over a male was deemed unacceptable under Atiicle 2(4) of the 
Equal Treatment Directive (76/207) except where all other factors were equal (i.e. in a 'tie 
break' situation), whereas in the latter an almost identical measure was permissible as a 
means of redressing underrepresentation within a specific employment sector. What is 
interesting about the Court's differing treatment of these two cases is not the express rejection 
of lUles guaranteeing 'absolute and unconditional priority' for women which is, after all, 
perfectly consistent with the equal treatment approach adopted by European Community 
law,438 but rather the apparent need to rearticulate the nature of the condition in MarschaZf39 
(which was implicit in the policy applied in KaZanke440) widely referred to as the 'saving 
clause' in order to justify its departure from the earlier lUling. Consideration of the extemal 
factors which influence judicial decision-making is central to this thesis and will be dealt with 
further in Chapter 6. 
435 Including a barrage of criticism from women's interest groups, practising lawyers and academics - see, for 
example, D. Schiek 'Positive Action in Community Law' (1996) 25 ILl 239; E. Szyszczak, 'Positive Action After 
Kalanke' (1996) 59 MLR 876; S. Fredman, 'Reversing Discrimination' (1997) 113 LQR 575. In addition, the 
European Commission issued a communication on the interpretation of the judgment - COM(96) 88. 
436 Case C-450!93 Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR 1-3051. 
437 Case C-409!95 Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Wesfalen [1997] ERC 1-6363. 
438 See Chapter 2. 
439 Op cit at n. 19. 
440 Op cit at n. 18. 
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Jurisdiction of the Court 
The European Court of Justice occupIes a umque position within the political and legal 
systems of the ED as well as within the national legal systems of Member States. It is, at one 
and the same time, a constitutional, administrative and civil court and acts as ombudsman and 
arbiter on practically any question of Community law. 441 Although formally provided for 
under the Treaty of Rome (and subjected to subsequent amendments), its jurisdiction has 
developed over tin1e, due partly to the challenges inherent in the interpretation of its own 
complex legal base and the opaque political aims referred to in the Preamble to the Treaty but 
also due to emerging constitutional principles which have unfolded incrementally. 442 
The Court's jurisdiction is set out in Articles 226_243 443 of the EC Treaty and Article 46 of 
the TED. The key provision in the Court's own interpretation of its sphere of influence is 
undoubtedly Article 220,444 which provides that, 'the COUlt of Justice and the COUlt of First 
Instance, each within its jurisdiction, shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of 
this Treaty the law is observed.' In the current context, this power has been used most 
effectively by the Court as a means of developing principles in a process that has become 
lmown as the 'constitutionalisation' of the Treaties445 and for which the ECJ has been lauded 
as 'one of the real driving forces of European integration. ,446 By this process, the COUli can 
441 The Court's multiplicity of functions and the resulting high regard which it is held has earned it the nickname 
'hobbyhorse' among European lawyers - see T. Koopmans 'The Future of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities'(J99J) 11 YBEL 15. 
442 For a general discussion of the main principles which have been applied by the ECJ most often in this 
context, see Chapter 4 infi"a. 
443 Ex Articles 169-186. 
444 Ex Articlel64. 
445 F.G. Mancini, (1989) 'The Making of A Constitution for Europe' 24 ClYILR pp. 595-614; J.H. Weiler (1981) 
'The Community System; the Dual Character of Supranationalism' 1 YBEL pp. 268-306; (1991) 'The 
Transformation of Europe '100 Yale Law J. 2403-83; 
446 O. Pollicino (2004) 'Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle of Equality 
Between Judicial Activism and Self-restraint. ' 5 German Law Journal 3, 283, at p. 284. See also, E. Stein, 
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be seen to have used the powers vested in it to develop and expand what it has categorised as 
'key principles' of law which have, in tum, implicitly become enshrined in the COUlt's 
interpretation of the Treaties by way of the procedural devices at its disposal. The COUlt's 
utilisation of its role in this way, justified on the grounds of preservation of the rule of law, 
can be illustrated by reference to its expansion of the scope and purpose of Article 141 (ex 
119) in Defrenne 1147 by its proclamation that the status of equal pay as a principle of 
Community law meant that there could be no other finding than that the provision should 
have direct effect. This had the dual purpose of bestowing enforceable obligations on Member 
States and conferring subjective rights upon individuals. Although equal pay between the 
sexes was specifically provided for in the wording of the EC Treaty, the means by which it 
was applied in order to create a nexus between individual and State was not expressly 
mentioned, direct effect being the first doctrine not explicitly derived from the wording of the 
Treaty, but rather from the spirit and the general scheme of Community law. Furthermore, 
the COUlt ruled that the inclusion of Alticle 141 in the Treaty was evidence of the 
Community's 'double aim' as being both economic and social, thus refocusing the political 
aspirations of the Community. The specific role of the Court in the establishment of a 
European Constitution will be considered further below in the section on legal reasoning and 
judicial activism. The Defrenne litigation will be considered in Chapter 6 in the context of its 
impact on the development and application of the equality principle in European Community 
law. 
'Lml'yers. Judges and the lvlaking of a Transnational Constitution' American Journal of International Law, 1 
1981. 
447 Case 43/75 [1976] ECR 455. 
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The open-ended nature of the Court's role under Atiicle 220 also sees it acting as 'interpreter 
ofthe Treaties' (and their limits) giving cause for its adjudication in disputes between the EC 
institutions over their respective powers and, more controversially, in disputes over the 
division of competence between the Community and Member States.448 As well as its broad 
function under Article 220, the Court also has specific duties in accordance with its 
jurisdiction, inter alia: Atiicle 226 provides for the Commission to bring infringement 
proceedings before the Court against Member States in cases of alleged non-compliance with 
Treaty obligations; Article 227 for Member States to bring proceedings against each other; 
Article 228449 provides the Court with specific power to impose a pecuniary penalty on a 
Member State which fails to comply with a previous judgment against it; Articles 230-233 
enable the Court to undertake judicial review of Community legislation; and Article 234 sets 
out the preliminary rulings procedure by which national courts or tribunals may refer cases 
requiring interpretation of Community law. In the current context, it is the last of these duties 
which has the most relevance as the procedure by which the cases considered in Chapter 6 
were referred to the Court. The Article 234 procedure will, therefore, be considered in 
isolation. 
The Article 234 P."eliminary Rulings Procedure 
The preliminary rulings procedure provided by Article 234 EC has been described as 'the 
'jewel in the Crown' of the ECl's jurisdiction,450 in that its impoliance in shaping Community 
law and the relationship between the national and Community legal systems could not have 
been foreseen at its inception. The wording of Atiicle 234 is as follows: 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
448 See Weiler (1991) id at n. 27. 
449 Inserted by the TED. 
450 Craig and De Burca op cit. at p. 432. 
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(a) the interpretation of the Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of the acts of the institutions of the community and of 
the ECB; 
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where 
those statutes so provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that COutt 
or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to 
give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a 
Member State, against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law, that 
court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of justice. 
The nature of the procedure itself establishes certain factors which, in tum, have a bearing on 
the nature of the Coutt's decision-making. For example, the fact that the procedure is 
reference-based means that the relationship between the domestic courts and the ECJ is not 
appellate, but depends on the individual national court's decision to refer and to set the terms 
of reference. Once the ECJ has given its ruling, it will send the case back to the national court 
which is charged with applying the relevant interpretation of Community law to the case at 
hand. By this two-way process of communication, relations between the national and 
Community legal systems have moved from being 'horizontal and bilateral' to become 
'veltical and multilateral' m nature. 451 In the early days of the Court's operation, its 
relationship with the national coutts was viewed as existing between equals. Each of the 
ECJ's rulings on specific cases was made directly to the court of origin, thus establishing a 
series of separate bilateral relationships between the European Court and the Member States' 
451 Ibid at p. 433. 
146 
national courts. However, over time, the key principles established by the European legal 
order (mainly by the Court itself) have changed this arrangement. The ECJ now sits at the top 
of a European judicial hierarchy served by the domestic courts, which act as enforcers of 
Community law, with the doctrine of supremacy dictating that a judgment given in response 
to a referral from one national court has application in all other national courts. This has led 
to the existence of a multilateral relationship between the ECJ and the domestic coutis. 
Furthermore, the Atiicle 234 procedure has served as the main mechanism by which the 
national courts and the ECJ have engaged in a discourse on the application of Community law 
in terms of jurisdictional issues generally but, in particular, when conflicts with domestic 
provisions have arisen. 
Claire Kilpatrick has asserted that this 'dialogue' between national courts and the ECJ merits 
greater analytical attention than it has been afforded if the process of European integration is 
to be fully understood. In her work, which concentrates on the sex equality provisions of 
Community law,452 Kilpatrick argues that traditional accounts of European integration tend to 
overplay the role of the ECJ as a pro-integrationist power. This perception, Kilpatrick 
contends, is misleading in two important respects: first it downplays the significant 
contribution of national courts in the development and application of key principles of 
Community law; and, second, it presupposes that courts generally, and the ECJ in particular, 
are at all times pro-integrative institutions. In reality, as Kilpatrick has shown, the 
relationship between the national coutis and the ECJ is far more complex than generally 
assumed and, if tracked over time, displays a dynamic in which the UK courts, at least in the 
early days of the ECJ's operation, attempted to lead it into areas of uncharted territory by 
452 C. Kilpatrick, 'Community 01' Communities of Courts in EUl'Opean Integration.? Sex Equality Dialogues 
BefY.!een UK Courts and the ECJ', 1998 4 ELJ 2, 121-147; Tuming Remedies Around: A Sectoral Analysis of 
the Court of Justice, in de Burca and Weiler (eds) The European Court of JlIstice (OUP 2001) pp. 143-176. 
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offering 'opportunities to expand the reach of EC law. ,453 The ECl's reluctance to provide 
creative and expansive rulings in response to such opportunities indicates that 'The Court 
either did not want them or did not understand them', leading to the conclusion that 'The UK 
courts had a clearer understanding of the potential within the EC sex equality legal structuring 
than the ECl,454 This point will be further explored in the case analysis presented in Chapter 
6. 
That the Court has made an enonnous contribution to the development of European 
Community law generally and the promotion of sex equality specifically is beyond doubt, but 
it is important that this role is not over emphasised when the history of European integration 
is written. A number of other institutional actors have also been key players in the process, 
often unintentionally or without full knowledge of the contribution that they were making at 
the time. The respective roles of the Member States' governments and national courts (which 
have not always been in harmony with each other) and that of the other European Union 
institutions will be considered below in the section on external relations. 
The fact that the ECl does not operate under a system of binding precedent455 has also had an 
important bearing on the operation of the preliminary rulings procedure. The freedom to 
depart from its previous rulings, unfettered even from an obligation to justify such action,456 
has provided the Court with far greater opportunities than the national courts to engage in 
creative and pragmatic decision-making. Whether or not the Court has always made full use 
453 Kilpatrick (1998) ibid at p. 140. 
454Id. 
455 The Court is not patt of a hierarchical system and Community law is based on the civil law system and, as 
such, does not recognise the doctrine of stare decisis. However, in the interests of legal certainty, the Court does 
generally follow its own previous decisions unless there is good reason for not doing so. See, generally, 
A. Amull, 'Owning lip to Fallibility: Precedent and the Court of JlIstice', (1993) 30 CMLR 247. 
456 In practice, when departing from a previous decision or the reasoning in a particular case, the Court has 
tended to explain its reasons for doing so, although in the infamous example of Cases 267-268/91 Keck and 
Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097, the Court, in departing from its previous case law, neglected to specify which 
decisions were being set aside. 
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of such freedom is a moot point and will be further considered through an examination of the 
relevant literature on judicial activism below and in the context of the cases under scrutiny in 
Chapter 6. However, what is worthy of identification at this juncture, is that the lack of 
binding authority on the Court's activities has enabled the development and application of 
specific concepts which have proved to be of primary importance to the furtherance of social 
aims generally and gender equality in paliicular. As early as 1963,457 the Court decreed that 
the Treaty provided rights for individuals in Member States which could be enforced by them 
in the courts, thus creating the principle of direct effect. The following year,458 by stating that 
the Member States had 'limited their sovereign rights.. . [and] created a body of law which 
binds both their nationals and themselves,' the Court held that the principle of supremacy is 
implied into the Treaty. These concepts did not originate from the Court's consideration of 
sex discrimination per se, but have been utilised in that context to expand the available 
provis ions of Community law. 459 The fact that direct effect and supremacy were both deemed 
to be applicable to early sex discrimination cases presented to the Court by vuiue of the 
Article 234 procedure has undoubtedly created a receptive envu'onment for subsequent cases 
on related issues and has further facilitated the application of resulting principles within the 
national legal systems. The concepts themselves and their corresponding interpretation by the 
Court are certainly worthy of further analysis, but the role played in their development by the 
procedure itself should also be acknowledged. 
The way in which preliminary rulings are dealt with represents a cyclical atl'angement which 
is at once innovative and self-perpetuating: an individual litigant instigates proceedings before 
a national court on the basis that a Member State is in breach of a Community provision 
457 26/62 Van Gend en Laos v Nedel'landse Administratie del' Be I'lastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
458 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa vEnte Nazionale perl 'Enel'gia Electtl'ica (ENEL) [1964] ECR 585. 
459 Most notably in Defi'enne II in which the Court held that the former Article 119 (now 141) was sufficiently 
precise to be capable of having direct effect. 
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which provides specific individual rights enforceable through the national courts; a ruling is 
subsequently sought from the ECJ by the national court on the relevant provision of 
Community law; the ECJ finds the provision under review to be directly effective, thus 
enabling its further development in terms of both its enshrinement in the European legal order 
by implication and by its application once the case is returned to the court of origin for final 
adjudication. By this process, two things are ultimately achieved: the litigant is able to secure 
a remedy and Community law is further developed, thus illustrating the important role - both 
in national and supranational ternlS - played by the preliminary reference procedure as the 
means by which the constitutional doctrines of supremacy and direct effect were first applied. 
However, in its development of the doctrinal aspects of EC law and their resultant 
enshrinement within a constitutional context, the Court did not act in isolation but as part of a 
broader scheme in which it has acted, at times, as instigator and, at other times, disciple: in 
which it has both led and been led. It is on the Court's external relations that attention will 
now be focussed. 
External Relations 
The fact that the Article 234 procedure was used early on in the Court's history in cases of sex 
discrimination has meant that it is now perceived as providing a useful means of gauging the 
conceptualisation of gender relations in the EU institutions generally.460 Whether this 
perception is conect is open to debate, but it is easy to see how it has entered into accounts of 
the Comt's institutional role. The plethora of case law which has resulted from the refelTals of 
national courts to the ECJ provides a rich source of available data, ripe for analysis on a 
460 See, for example, RA. Cichowski, 'Women's Rights, the European COUI't, and Supranational 
Constitutionalism' Law and Society Review 38 (2004) 3, pp. 489-512. 
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seemingly endless basis. Some of this analysis is quantitative in nature,461 but much of it is 
qualitative, as commentators have used it to explore, inter alia, the process of supranational 
constitutionalism,462 the relationship between national Courts and the ECJ463 and the 
application of legal reasoning. 464 As much of the literature demonstrates, the Court has 
benefited from an influential reputation in this respect its development of the concept of 
supremacy and its subsequent ftnding of the direct effect of Article 141 has placed it in a 
unique judicial position ii'om where it has been able to influence policy-makers at both 
national and supranational levels. 
The distinct features of the ECJ's operation as a non-appellate, provider of opinion and the 
lack of binding precedent over its decision-making have meant that it is viewed as being 
distinct from national courts and is heralded as an agenda-setter in respect of national legal 
systems, wielding great influence over the established policy-making institutions within the 
Community. This perception of the Court's position within the wider institutional context 
presupposes a level of cooperation and agreement which has not always been present in its 
dealings with the Commission, Council and Parliament. Furthermore, as Kilpatrick has 
shown, it is important not to underestimate the nature ofthe two-way relationship between the 
ECJ and the national courts which serve, after all, as instigators of the references placed 
before the European Court and also reserve the power to interpret its rulings in accordance 
with existing national provisions. For this reason, any attempt to identify the nature and extent 
of the Court's jurisprudence on gender relations must also pay due consideration to the 
461 See, for example, A. Stone Sweet and T.L. Brunell, 'The European Court, National Judges and Legal 
Integration: A Researcher's Guide to the Data Set on Preliminal)' References in EC Lmv, 1958-98' ELI 6 (2000) 
2,pp.I17-127. 
462 Cichowski op cit .. 
463 Kilpatrick (1998), op cit. 
464 O. Pollicillo, 'Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of Equality: Between Judicial Activism 
and Self-restraint', 5 (2004) German Law loumal3, 283-317. 
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national origins of its case law in terms of both the legislative provisions from which they 
arise and the socio-political environment in which those provisions operate. In terms of 
identifying the scope of national origins, this is a relatively easy exercise as a preliminary 
trawl though the relevant case law identifies a multiplicity of cases from certain Member 
States,465 often on related issues, and a correspondingly low number or complete lack of 
refen-als from other Member States. This is, in itself, an interesting fmding and while it 
cannot, of course, be used as evidence of either a superior knowledge or complete ignorance 
of EC law in the case of the non-referring national courts, it does tell us something of the 
nature of the socio-political systems and resultant legal provisions of those that have made 
regular use of the procedure. For example, the Court has been asked on a number of occasions 
by the UK courts for guidance on the appropriate treatment of female part-time workers under 
EC law. 466 The case law in this respect has arisen as a result of the indirect discrimination 
provisions of the UK's domestic legislation coupled with the growth of part-time work among 
women with young children. Likewise, the relative lack of success for individual litigants in 
German referrals tells us something of the nature of current thinking on gender relations 
within that jurisdiction. 467 That the policies utilised by German employers, particularly within 
the public sector, are more progressive and controversial than those of other Member States, 
at least in the eyes of the national judiciary is illustrated by the referral of questions 
concemmg the legality of certain positive action measures under European law. These 
referrals have come about as a consequence of the German Constitutional Court's willingness 
465 The UK courts were responsible for referrals to the ECJ in over 17% of the total number of cases dealing with 
equal pay and equal treatment between 1958 and 1998, representing the largest share of such cases in national 
tenns by a quite considerable margin. The second largest share came from Denmark (5.80%). Source: Stone 
Sweet and Brunell (2000), op cit at n.43. 
466 See: Case 96/80 Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Limited [1981] ECR 911; Case C-243/95 
Kathleen Hill and Ann Stapleton v. Revenue Commissioners and Department of Finance [1998] ECR 1-3739; 
Case C-78/98 Preston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust [2000] ECR 1-3201, all discussed at 
length in Chapter 6 infra. 
467 67% of Gennal1 preliminary references in the broad area of gender equality law between the years 1971 and 
1993 concluded with the ECJ finding that the national practice was in violation ofEC law: source Cichowski op 
cit at n.42, at p. 498. 
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to make use of the preliminary reference procedure in response to a couple of cases brought 
before it on the basis of the progressive use of such measures by the Linde civil services.468 
The Court's subsequent treatment of these issues has had important repercussions in a far 
wider context than the domestic legal systems from which they arose, but, without the 
determination of the litigants involved, the requisite margin of doubt regarding the correct 
intelpretation of the law, and the national cOUlis' foresightedness, the ECJ would never have 
been given the 0ppOliunity to consider them. In this respect, the Court acts as a receptacle for 
the issues that are presented to it by national courts, rather than as an instigator of legal 
reform. This point will be further explored in the context of the cases presented in Chapter 6. 
If the Court is considered in its broader context as one of a set of institutional actors in the 
story of European integration, other pearls of perceived wisdom must be subjected to scrutiny. 
The Court's reputation as an agenda-setting institution, providing a contemporary 
Constitution based on the development and application of sound normative concepts such as 
non-discrimination and equality which have been expanded to provide a clear set of 
enforceable rights must also be open to question. On the issue of supremacy and direct effect, 
a historical analysis reveals that the Commission's Legal Service had proposed the idea that 
Treaty rules should be directly effective long before the Court adopted that approach.469 
Furthermore the seemingly incremental development of the nature of Community law in 
which the finding of supremacy followed a few steps behind the application of direct effect is 
also questionable if an historical perspective is adopted. The Court's asseliion in Van Gend 
en LooS470 that the Treaty created directly enforceable rights was clearly understood at the 
468 Case C-450/93 Kalanke and Case C-409/95 Marschall, op cit. 
469 E. Stein, 'Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution', American Joul11ai of 
Intel11ationai Law, 75 (1981) 1, at 24; D. Wincott, 'The Role of the Law or the Rule of the COllrt of Justice? An 
'Institutional' Account of Judicial Politics in the European Community', Joul11ai of European Public Policy 2 
(1995) 4,583-602. 
470 Case 26/62 [1963] ECR l. 
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time to imply the supremacy of Community law and vice versa. This much is clear from the 
opinion of Advocate-General Roemer who argued against the direct effect of Treaty Articles 
on the ground that the Treaty of Rome contained no supremacy clause.471 As Wincott has 
observed, the Court's decision to allow the direct effectiveness of Treaty provisions without 
reference to the concept of supremacy says much about its political character at the time. 472 
The introduction of the supremacy principle a year after the Court's initial fInding of direct 
effect is significant in that it happened at a time when it was clear that the decision in Van 
Gend en Laos had not, after all, been subjected to the widespread negative criticism in 
Member States that had perhaps been envisaged. The lack of a clear definition of the 
supremacy principle has not detracted from its application, but its meaning is still contested 
and, thus, the principle remains controversial. 473 The Court's original affirmation of the 
supremacy of Community law, 474 may not have defined what it actually was, but was crystal 
clear on what it meant for the national legal systems. The furore expected on the introduction 
of the concept of direct effect did occur following the Court's clear enunciation of the effect 
of the supremacy principle in Flaminio Costa. 475 The judgment attracted particular opposition 
from, inter alia, the Bundesverfassungsgericht476 which asserted that, in cases of conflict 
between European Community law and constitutionally grounded provisions of national law, 
the latter should prevail. 477 Perhaps partially in response to such criticism, the ECJ developed 
a jurisprudence which encompassed fundamental human rights worthy of protection by 
471 A-G's Opinion in Van Gend en Loos, ibid, at 118. 
472 D. Wincott (2000), 'A Community of Law.'? 'European' Law and Judicial Politics: The Court of Justice and 
Beyond' 35 Government and Opposition 1, 3-26. 
473 Article 1-6 of the Constitutional Treaty (if it is ever ratified) will provide the first explicit constitutional 
definition of the principle of supremacy by its statement that 'The Constitution and law adopted by the 
institutions of the Union in exercising competences confened on it shall have primacy over the law of the 
Member States.' 
474 In Case 6/64 Flall1inio Costa vEnte Nazionale perl 'Energia Electtl'ica (ENEL), op cit at n. 40. 
475 Ibid 
476 The Gelman constitutional court. 
477 See the Genllan court's decision in 'Solange l' [1974] 2 CMLR 540 at 549-50. 
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application of the principle of supremacy and, it is through the benevolent distribution of such 
dogma that the Court has gained its reputation as the main architect of the 
constitutionalisation of the Treaties. 478 Joseph Weiler has attributed this development to 
, 1 . d· . I ,479 b W· h d 480 . h· I h s leer JU 1C1a power ut, as mcott as asserte, 1t owes somet mg, at east, to t e 
Court's support from its fellow (political) institutions, in particular the Council of Ministers. 
Without such reinforcement fi'om the Member States' highest authorities, it would in reality 
have been incredibly difficult for the Court to have sustained its application of the supremacy 
principle despite the moral currency of its corresponding dicta. 
Acceptance of the Court's interdependence on its fellow institutions is crucial in any analysis 
of its judicial role, which has changed over time dependent on the political environment in 
which it has found itself. If a longitudinal perspective is applied to the development of the 
ECJ's reasoning, the portrait that emerges is of the Court both as a judicial activist, making 
law rather than interpreting it, and as a pragmatic driving force in the integrative process. The 
markers in the switching of the Court's role are thrown down by the various stages in the 
political development of the Community and resonate with the legislative developments 
considered in Chapter 4, so that three broad stages in the development of the COUlt's 
jurisprudence can be identified. 
478 IH.H. Weiler (1981) 'The Community System: The Dllal Character of Supranationalism' 1 YBEL pp. 268-
306; G. IVfancini (1989) 'The Making of a Constitution for Europe' 24 CMLR pp. 595-614; K. Lenaerts (1990) 
'Constitutionalism and the lvIany Faces of Federalism' 38 American Joumal of Comparative Law pp. 205-64. 
479 IH.H. Weiler, (1986) 'Eurocracy and Distrust: Some QUestions Concerning the Role of the European Court 
of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights within the legal order of the European Communities', 
61 Washington Law Review 3,pp.ll03-55. 
480 D. Wincott 'Human Rights, Democracy and the Role of the Cow·t of Justice in European Integration' 
Democratization 1 (1994) 4, pp. 251-71. 
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The Development of the Com't's Jurisp,'udence: The Impact of Exte.'nal 
Factors 
The Constitutionalisation of the Tl'eaties 
First, as outlined above, the Court's early preoccupation with the constmction of the 
framework of Community law, rather than the substantive impact of its judgments, 
undeniably placed it in the role of lead architect in the constitutionalisation of the Treaties. 
However, as a consideration of the Court's legal and political environment at the time reveals, 
the Court's activism arose as much as a result of a combination of external factors as from 
any bold brilliance on its own account. In its infancy, the ECJ's dealings with national courts 
were perceived as being between equals, thus creating a relationship of tmst. The lack of any 
clear unifying principles in the COUli's jurispmdence led to the development of a series of 
bilateral relationships based on the limited range of issues presented in the piecemeal case law 
that had come before it. In the context of the Community itself, the unanimity requirements of 
the decision-making process meant that the development of legislation was slow and 
laborious and political initiative sluggish, as typified by the 'laissez fau'e' approach 
characteristic of the early days of European social law and policy.481 Furthermore, the 
immaturity of the legal order made it possible for the Court to avoid certain difficult political 
issues on which it would have been more or less impossible to arrive at a legal decision, the 
most obvious example of this being the 'Luxembourg Accords' of 1966, which were 
responsible for the specification of unanimity within the decision-making process. 
The 'compromise' stmck by the Luxembourg Accords resulted from the French ministers' 
boycott of the Council of Ministers, at President de Gaulle's instmctions, on the basis that 
481 See Chapter 4 infi'a. 
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Member State governments should reserve the right to block Community legislation on the 
grounds of national interests. The Treaty actually provided for a move towards a decision-
making process based on a system of qualified majority voting (on expiry of the transitional 
period) which would enable any individual government to be out-voted. The setting aside of 
this provision, albeit in specified circumstances, and its replacement with a completely 
different an-angement by way of an amendment outside of the Treaty is celtainly legally 
questionable and would, under a more mature legal system, have been subjected to judicial 
review. Writing at the tinle, one of the Court's judges rejected the possibility of the ECl's 
consideration of the issue on the grounds that, 
'it would have been the definite end of the communities as communities if the 
opposing parties had gone to law and asked a ruling of the Court on details that were 
no more than the juridical top of a political iceberg. Under the existing conditions, the 
capacity of the legal framework to support the weight of such controversies is yet only 
a limited one ... The legal bearing capacities of the community must be given tinle to 
grow. Time itself is an important factor. Each ruling that is implemented by a member 
state is a nail in the construction that strengthens its solidarity and brings integration a 
step further.' 482 
The Court's early activism can thus be seen as having been born out of a combination of its 
early favourable relations with national courts, a lack of legislative activity within the 
Community and the immature constitutional at1"angements which enabled a fOltuitous 
amendment to the decision-making process to go unchallenged. Within this environment, 
unfettered by the national governments or courts and left largely to its own devices by its 
482 Andre Donner, The Role of the Lawyer in European Integration, (Edinburgh University Press, 1968), at pp. 
62-3. 
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institutional partners, the ECJ embarked on its programme of constitutionalisation, a process 
that was largely completed by the end of the 1970s. 
Development of the Internal Market 
Stage two of the Court's engagement with the development of Community law is linked to the 
construction of the internal market following the deregulatory stanoe of Community 
legislation during the first half of the 1980s. Following publication of the Commission's 
famous White Paper of 1985,483 in whioh the (then) President Jaoques Delors oalled for, inter 
alia, the equivalenoe of sooial laws in order to minimise social dumping, the Court's 
jurisprudenoe fooussed on the involvement of national oourts in enforoing Community law. 484 
This endeavour was not always suooessful,485 but its politioal motivation is clear - the 
furtheranoe of eoonomio integrationneoessary for the creation of the single market was reliant 
on a well funotioning enforoement system, whioh in tum required inoreased co-operation 
with, and mutual reoognition between, Member States. The fledgling European Constitution 
was advantageous in the programme of integration that followed486 and this, in tum, 
contributed to the legitimacy of the institutions, partioularly the Commission, as visionary 
architeots of a new system of supranational governance. The ECJ, however, was paying for 
its early aotivism and suffered a loss of reputation as the leading proponents of the baoklash 
aooused the oourt of making, rather than interpreting, the law.487 
483 COM(85) 310 Final. 
484 See E. Szyszczak, 'Future Directions in European Union Social Policy Law' (1995) 24 ILl 31. 
485 See Kilpatrick (1998) ibid at n. 34, for a compelling account of the dialogues between national cOUlis and the 
ECl which took place in the context of sex discrimination law at this time. 
486 In social law terms, this included the promotion of the 'social dialogue', the breaking of the use of unanimity 
voting in the Council of Ministers and the adoption by all of the Member States, except the UK, of the Chalier of 
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. 
487 H. Rasmussen, On Lmv and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study of Judicial 
Policymaking (Nijhoff, 1986); P. Neill, The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism 
(European Policy Forum, 1995). 
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Much of the criticism directed at the Court can also be attributed to the belated engagement 
by political scientists with the Court's perceived role in European integration. As Wincott has 
observed, 'Until the 1990s political scientists interested in European integration largely 
ignored the role of the Court. Once it had been noticed, the attention paid to the ECJ 
exploded. ,488 As far as academic opinion was concerned, this attention worked in the Court's 
favour, as well as to its detriment, with one account of the COUlt's role in the revitalisation of 
the integration process, as embodied by the Single European Act, heralding the ECJ as the 
'unsung hero' of an 'unexpected twist ofthe plot. ,489 However, the Court's early activism was 
seen by others as having contributed to the 'democratic deficit' with its engagement in policy 
bringing the issue of its independence into question. This period in the Court's history is often 
characterised as one of disenchantment among the national courts and governments and 
general distrust in the Court's neutrality490 culminating with the Barber- protoool of 1990 and 
the introduction of the concept of 'subsidiarity,491 in the Treaty on European Union in 1992. 
The Impact of Globalisation 
The third stage in the Court's development, and of Community law generally, occurred during 
the 1990s. Global factors, particularly the reshaping of the political landscape of Eastern 
Europe, the enhanced scope of the European Union and the increased complexity of the 
supporting legal structure following the TEU all contributed to the creation of a new and 
uncertain environment for the Court of Justice. Furthennore, the Court's earlier attempts at 
judicial activism and the conesponding disapproval of national governments had inevitably 
488 Wincott (2000) ibid at note 54, at p. 6. 
489 A. Burley and W. Mattli, 'Europe before the Court: A Political TheolJI of legal integration' 47 International 
Organization 1 (1993). 
490 See, for example, H Rasmussen, The EU1'Opean Court of Justice (GadJura, 1998), at p. 329. 
491 Article 5EC (inserted by the TED) provides that 'In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the COlllmunity shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. ' For a full account of 
the impact of subsidiarity on the role Court's role as a policy actor, see G. de Burca, (1998) 'The Principle of 
Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor' 36 JCMS 2, pp. 217-235. 
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led to 'a decline in judicial authority and legitimacy. ,492 During the 1990s, the Court sought 
implicitly to renegotiate the boundaries of its own competence and this was reflected in what 
has been categorised as the exercise of self-restraint in its jurisprudence. 493 
Whether such political pressures did in fact have any bearing on the Court's decision-making 
in the area of case law under review in this thesis will be specifically examined in the context 
of the cases themselves in Chapter 6. What is imperative at this juncture is an 
acknowledgement of the Court's place within its broader institutional environment. The 
Court's role as both instigator and disciple, depending on the political environment in which it 
found itself at key stages in the development of Community law, provides an interesting 
backdrop to the remainder of this Chapter which will consider the methods of interpretation 
employed by the ECJ in its own reasoning. The impact of external influences on the Court's 
jurisprudence is of primary concern in the case analysis undertaken in Chapter 6 and the 
purpose of this section is to provide a suitable framework within which that analysis can take 
place. First the relevant Treaty provisions dealing with the Court's interpretive role will be 
considered; the methods developed by the Court over time will then be examined; and, 
finally, the relevant principles of Community law will be identified in the context of their 
contribution to the Court's jurisprudence on gender relations. 
The Development of the COUl1's Jurisprudence: Legal Reasoning and Methods of 
Interp.·etation 
The European Court of Justice's approach to interpretation is generally described as purposive 
or teleological meaning that, in interpreting a rule, account is taken of the purpose, ainl and 
492 Rasmussen ibid at 297. 
493 See R Dehouse, The European Court of Justice - The Politics of Judicial Integration, (1998); M. Shapiro, 
'The European Court of Justice' in P. Craig and G. De Burca (eds) The Evolution of European Law (1999 OUP) 
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objective that the rule pursues. The Court has confirmed this approach in CILFIT,494 in which 
it declared 'every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted 
in the light of the provisions ofEC law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof 
and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied. ,495 
The teleological approach is consistent with the dynamic and evolving nature of the European 
Community within which the exclusively economic imperative has been expanded 
significantly to encompass a much broader system of values affecting social issues and the 
protection of human rights. Furthermore, the narrow scope of the Treaties' aims, which 
restrict the Community's competence, and the relative immaturity of the European legal order 
itself have combined to ensure that the Court is always conscious of its place in the greater 
scheme. Given these factors, it is not surprising that the Court has taken great care to justify 
its decision-making on the basis of the overall aims and intentions of the Treaty provisions. 
That is not to say that the ECJ has always been confined and uncreative in its decision-
making. On the contrary, as noted earlier, the Court has often attracted criticism on the 
grounds that it has overstepped the judicial mark and become law-maker, driven by the desire 
to meet political objectives rather than interpreting the law for its own sake. 496 Such charges 
are serious as they raise questions concerning judicial independence and strike at the heart of 
the Community's democratic legitimacy. In order to uncover the basis for such criticism and 
to assess whether it is valid, the Court's reasoning must be considered. This is a difficult 
undertaking as not much has been written on the subject,497 probably because little guidance 
exists on how the individual judges should reach a collective decision and the Court is obliged 
494 Case 283/81 Cilft v Italian Minist7)1 of Health [1982] ECR 3415. 
495 Id. at 3430. 
496 See H. Rasmussen (1986) op cit at n. 69. 
497 A small body of literature exists, the more noteworthy of which include: A. Bredimas, 1I1ethods of 
Inte7pretation and Community Lmv (North Holland, 1978); J. Bengoetxea, The legal Reasoning of the European 
Court of Justice (OUP, 1993); T. Koopmans 'The Theory of Interpretation and the Court of Justice' in D. 
O'Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds) Judicial Review in EU Law (Kluwer, 2000); 1. Bengoetxea, N. lvlcCorlnick and 
L.M. Soriano, 'Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning ofthe European Court of Justice' in G. De Burca 
and 1. Weiler (eds) The European COllrt of Justice (OUP 2001), pp. 43-85. 
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not to make its deliberations public, so that, 'All we know about the Court's reasoning is 
written in its judgments'. 498 As far as the processes applied in order to arrive at these 
judgments are concerned, they are 'sometimes firmly grounded and clearly spelled out, 
sometimes maddening Delphic offerings, always the product of judicial negotiation and 
. ,499 
compromIse. 
Although it is acknowledged by the judges themselves that poor legal reasonmg attracts 
criticism which can be damaging to the Court's authority and legitinlacy,500 as is the case in 
all judicial decision-making, the human element cannot be eradicated or ignored. As Schepel 
states, 'Judges are humans of flesh and blood, their motives for arriving at certain decisions 
are probably political and moral as much as legal, they probably settle differences with each 
other for strategic reasons or sheer lack of time rather than in the belief that they have arrived 
at the correct legal solution. ,501 As previously acknowledged,502 law is a subjective discipline: 
it is not scientifically objective and the thought processes of individual judges are but one 
manifestation of this. Furthermore, and attached to this point, the various ways in which the 
law evolves and operates are deeply ideological. In the current context, the judicial treatment 
of particular Community issues derives from a combination of the application of legislative 
provisions, themselves the result of political processes, and the particular theoretical 
perspectives of the Court's judges. To think otherwise, for example that judicial decision-
making takes place in a 'black box' where all external factors are (and should be) suspended, 
is both naIve and illusory. In reaching an understanding of why the Court alTived at certain 
decisions, the task, therefore, is to unpack the various elements of the decisions themselves by 
498 H. Schepel (2000), 'Reconstructing Constitutionalization: Law and Politics in the European Court of Justice' 
20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3, 457-468 at p. 466. 
499 Id at p. 466. 
500 U. Everling 'Zur Begriindung der Urteile des Gerichtshofes der Europaischen Gemeinschaften' (1994) 29 
Eurparecht 127. 
501 Ibid at 466. 
502 In Chapter 2 infi"a. 
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systematic means capable of enabling some broad comparisons to be drawn between separate 
but related judgments. 
These elements arise out of various sources, some express and identifiable, such as the Treaty 
provisions themselves, others more opaque but, nonetheless, implicit in the Community legal 
order, such as the perceived objectives of the Treaties and secondary legislation and the 
Institutions' overall vision of the Community's aims and aspirations. The interpretation 
afforded to all of these sources, however, is not static in nature but has evolved over tinle 
alongside the development of Community law and can only be fully understood tlu'ough a 
process of contextualisation. This requires the application of an holistic approach which 
places the decisions in the time and place in which they were reached and which must pay due 
consideration to the overriding political climate and corresponding objectives, as well as the 
relevant external pressures faced by the Court and its fellow Institutions. Furthermore, the 
rich cultural fabric of the COUli itself has undoubtedly had an impact on the decision-making 
process, so that different compositions of the Court and the accompanying legal traditions of 
the judges' own countries of origin must themselves give rise to differences in the 
understanding of what' legal reasoning' is. 503 
503 One clear example of this is provided by Judge Everling's observation that, during the 1970s, the Court's 
change in its approach from a tendency to lay down general principles to a more case-specific stance arose partly 
out of changes in the composition of the Court brought about by the arrival of judges 'from the common law 
tradition, schooled in case law.' U. Everling, 'The Court of Justice as a Decisionmaking Authority' in Michigan 
Law Review Associations, The Art of Governance: Festschrift zu Ehren von Eric Stein (1987), 156, 163. See 
also Advocate General Jacob's assertion that the criticism levelled at the Court in respect of its perceived 
politicisation is misconceived as it actually overlooks the notion of constitutional jurisprudence on which the 
Court's foundations are based. The misconception arises largely due to the unfamiliarity with this patiicular 
conception of the judicial role within some of the Member States - F. Jacobs, 'Is the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities a Constitutional Court?' In D. Curtin and D. O'Keeffe (eds) Constitutional Adjudication 
in European Community and National Lmv (Butterwortlls 2992), 25 at p. 32. 
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Despite being prevented from breaking the secrecy of deliberations,504 the Court's judges 
have been fairly forthcoming about what goes on in Chambers. 505 Furthermore, however they 
arrive at their decisions, they are obliged to provide a legal justification for it. 506 Although an 
appreciation of legal reasoning cannot deconstruct the role of the judges, it can restrict the 
range of possible choices and impose specific criteria of validity. Despite such restrictions on 
the decision-making process, the charge that coutis, from time to time, engage in judicial 
activism rather than legal interpretation remains. The operational features of the Court of 
Justice,507 its position as a supranational institution and the aspirational nature of many of the 
provisions which it is responsible for interpreting have made this charge particularly resonant 
in critiques of the Court's activities. 508 Responses to such criticism have tended to draw on 
the repositioning of the judicial function so that, rather than the out-dated reductive concept 
which places the judge purely in an ascertaining role without personal responsibility or 
creative means, the judiciary are viewed as interpreters and creators of law. 509 The reasons for 
this shift in focus have been attributed to the radical transformation of the role of law and 
government in modem welfare states5!0 by which a 'revolt against formalism,5!! has emerged. 
504 Article 35 of the Statute of the Court of Justice provides that 'The deliberations of the Court shall be and 
remain secret. ' 
50S U. Everling, 'The Court of Justice as a DeCision-making Authority' (1984) 82 Michigan Law Review 1294; 
D.Edwards 'How the COllrt of Justice Works', (1995) 20 ELR 539. 
50G Bengoetxea (1993) id. at p. 114, distinguishes behveen 'context of discovery' and 'context of justification '. 
The fOlmer relates to the process of uncovering what caused the Court to alTive at one decision in favour of other 
possible outcomes. Given the secrecy of deliberations, this will always be a matter of conjecture. However, the 
collective published output (the judgment and the Advocate General's opinion) provide something more than an 
account of the Court's decision-making process, rather, they provide an account of what makes the decision the 
right legal decision by stating legal reasons for what is opined or answered. This is known as the context of 
justification. 
507 Discussed supra at pp. 143-150. 
508 The most noteworthy being H. Rasmussen, On Lmv and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Martinus 
Nijolf, ed, Copenhagen 1986) , but see also H. Rasmussen, 'Between Self Restraint and Activism: A Judicial 
Policy for the European Court' 13 ELRev 28 (1988) and P.O'Neill, 'The European Court of Justice: a Case 
Study in Judic ial Activism', op cit. 
509 O. Pollicino (2004), 'Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of Equality: Between Judicial 
Activism and Self-restraint', 5 Gelman Law Joumal3, at p. 286. 
510 By which the significant growth in State intervention in fields previously the domain of self-regulation (see 
Chapter 3 infi·a) has led to a corresponding increase in judicial activity. 
511 This phrase was originally coined by the French lawyer F.Geny, who argued in favour of revealing the 
voluntaristic, discretionary element of judicial choice rather than merely focussing on the pure, mechanical logic 
of judicial reasoning. Came about in response to the excessive legalism of the post-codification era. 
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From this perspective, the judicial function is characterised as a means of providing 
meaningful contemporary solutions to legal problems which require systematic contextual 
interpretations of the applicable rules and must also take account of the impact these rules will 
have on human conduct in society.512 This movement towards enhanced judicial creativity 
encompasses an acceptance ofthe element of choice in the judicial function, whereby abstract 
logic must sit alongside concerns involving economic, political, ethical, sociological and 
psychological factors as the available means by which decisions are reached. 513 If this 
approach is considered in the context of the European Court of Justice' jurisprudence, two 
factors emerge which, together, provide a compelling justification for the Court's engagement 
in creative decision-making: the institutional framework and the language and nature of the 
Treaties themselves. 
With regard to the institutional framework, the charting of the various political phases that 
have shaped the Community's history514 reveals an inter-relationship between the relevant 
law-making mechanisms and the Court's perceived activism. For example, the need for 
unanimity in the Council of Ministers and the resulting political inertia which characterised 
the fIrst half of the 1980s led to increased activism by the Court with creative decision-
making utilised as a means of filling the void left by the relative inactivity within the 
legislative arena. As Judge Kutscher has explained, the legislature's inactivity has, at times, 
compelled the Court to engage in problem-solving which should be undertaken by law and 
policy-makers. SIS By refen-ing to the aims of the Community and to general principles ofEC 
512 See T. Koopmans, (2000) 'The Theory of Interpretation and the Court of Justice' in D. O'Keeffe and A. 
Bavasso (eds), Libel' Amicol'um in Honour 0.( Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol 1, Judicial Review in European Union 
Law, Kluwer L Intemational Law 48. 
513 For expansion of this point, see M. Cappelletti (1981) 'The Law JI/faking Power of the Judges and its Limits' 
M.U.L.Rev 15 at 22. 
514 See Chapter 4 in.fi'a. 
515 H. Kutscher, lIfethods of Jntelpretation as seen by a Judge of the Court of Justice (Luxembourg 1976) 2, sect 
6(a).2. 
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law, the Court's judges have sometimes found themselves 'compelled to interpret from the 
standpoint of the existential necessities of the Communities and ensure the maintenance of 
h . . fu' ,516 t err capacIty to nchon. Furthermore, the European democratic deficit, by which the 
relationship between the wishes of the electorate and political decision-making is often 
difficult to identify, confers legitimacy upon judicial creativity which would not apply to legal 
. l' did d . 517 systems WIt 1m eve ope emocraCles. 
As far as the language and nature ofthe Treaties are concerned, it can be argued that the Court 
is encouraged to interpret in a creative way which is distinct from the processes employed by 
national courts specifically because of the source materials that it is asked to interpret. The 
compromised nature of the Treaties and secondary legislation, which have resulted from a 
series of bargains struck between States on the basis of common goals but with divergent 
political beliefs and legislative traditions, means that the resulting framework often reads as 
little more than a series of aspirational statements lacking in the requisite detail on which 
clear, sustainable legal solutions may be based. In such circumstances, the Court is left with 
little choice but to '[tease] out the meaning and implications of the treaties (or of instruments 
enacted pursuant to the treaties), [to show] how they support one view or line of action rather 
than another.' This process 'must be the very stuff of justification in this context.,518 In the 
case of secondary legislation, the objective-based nature of directives by which the national 
legal systems are entitled to implement suitable provisions in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity, adds further to the apparent vagueness of the legal texts which the ECJ is 
compelled to interpret. The Court's obligation to provide an answer to the questions refelTed 
to it in line with the general principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectation, is also 
516 O. Pollicino op cit, at p. 288. 
517 T. Koopmans, The Roots of Judicial Activism, in rVlather and Petzold (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The 
European Dimension, Studies in Honour ofGerardJ Wiarda, (Kluwer, 1988) 327 
m 1. Bengoetxea, N. MCC0l111ick and L.M. Soriano (2001) ibid at n. 79, at p. 44. 
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relevant here as, in order not to send the litigant or national court away without an answer, the 
Court may, at times, have to provide 'a creative answer to questions when there is no obvious 
answer. ,519 Added to this dynamic, the apparent difficulties in linguistic interpretation 
inherent in the drafting of legal texts which must have application across the range of 
European languages, mean that the resulting texts are sparse and imprecise in comparison to 
national legislation. 
All of these factors conspire to make some of the usual methods employed in case analysis 
particularly unsatisfactory when applied in the European Community context. As Bengoetxea 
et al have argued, the concepts of judicial activism and judicial self restraint as nonnative or 
interpretive ideology are not particularly helpful devices when attempting to explain or justify 
the decision-making processes of the ECl and should, perhaps, be abandoned in favour of a 
1 1 . h 520 ega reasonmg approac . This makes sense for the technical reasons outlined above. 
Furthermore, attempts to separate the legal and political factors which influence the Couti's 
jurisprudence are often unhelpful as the overriding objective of European integration521 has 
justified the active role taken by the Court at certain times in its history. By focusing on legal 
reasoning as a suitable means of analysing the Court's jurisprudence, attention is drawn to 
'how the Court takes account of reasons - legal norms, values, principles, policies - to 
justify its decisions. The question is neither whether the Court uses policy arguments 
nor whether it goes beyond the literal meaning of legal provisions. The question is 
rather whether and by what considerations its decisions are justified or, at the very 
least, rationally justifiable. ,522 
519 D. T.Keeling, In Praise of Judicial Activism, but ,vhat does it mean and has the European Court of Justice ever 
practiced it?' in C. Gialdino, (ed) SCI'itti in Oncore di GF. J.,1ancini, (Bellini, Milan 1998),505 at p. 512. 
520 J. Bengoetxea et at (2001) ibid at note 79, at p. 44. 
521 In both the economic and political senses. 
522 Id. 
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In order to utilise this approach, it is necessary to recognIse the difference between the 
'context of discovery' and 'context of justification',523 and to focus on the latter so that 
account is taken of what is known, in the Court's mind, to be the legally justifiable reason for 
its decision in a given case, rather than relying, for analytical purposes, on assumption and 
conjecture. 
Conclusions 
The legal reasoning approach provides the basis for the analysis applied to a specific group of 
cases in Chapter 6, for which the published judgments and Advocates- Generals' opinions are 
scrutinised in order to determine the interpretation applied to the general principles of 
Community law by the Court in its consideration of gender relations. The COUlt'S 
conceptualisation of the principles of non-discrimination and equality is of specific interest in 
this endeavour, but the analysis is not confined merely to those principles with an obvious 
connection to the subject matter, but rather seeks to assess the Court's use of all the general 
principles in its rationalisation of specific judgments. 
The purpose of this analysis is to consider how the Court uses key principles in dealing with 
the concepts and ideology underpinning referrals from national courts in its decision-making 
processes. The ovel1"iding objective, as expressed elsewhere, is to discover whether the ECJ 
can be said to have developed an identifiable jurisprudence in its case law on gender relations 
and, if so, how this jurisprudence might be categorised. In making such assessment case 
reports will first be considered on their own merits so that common features can be identified 
enabling the cases to be grouped or categorised. Once this process is completed, contextual 
523 See note 88 ibid 
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factors will be considered and broad conclusions drawn. By this process, it will be possible to 
determine whether developments in the case law can be explicitly linked to extraneous factors 
in both general terms, for example, the extent to which the Court's conception of the role of 
family has influenced its application and interpretation of principles, and in specific 
circumstances, for example, how influential market forces have been as a suitable means of 
justifying discrimination and whether such influence has changed over time dependent on 
political factors. By this process, it is hoped that conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
nature of the Court's jurisprudence. 
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Chapte." 6 
The Case Law of the European Court of Justice 
The Context of Justijication 524 
Introduction 
Chapter 5 concluded by defending what some have seen as the Couti's 'activism' by positing 
that the unique position in which it finds itself leads the Couti to apply a contextual 
interpretation to the issues presented to it under the preliminary rulings procedure. The 
Court's teleological approach to interpretation gives it a wide discretion when faced with 
decision-making, as long as the decision reached can be justified on the basis of the Treaty 
provisions.525 The Court's constitutionalisation of the EC Treaty led to its landmark decision 
in Defi'enne 11 in which Article 141 (ex 119) was found to be directly effective, thus 
extending its scope in ways not previously envisaged. The national courts have responded by 
making use of the preliminary rulings procedure provided by Atiicle 234 EC (ex 171) ever 
since. The determination of litigants and legal advisors and the willingness of national coutis 
to make referrals, have, on many occasions, provided the Court with opportunities to utilise 
its discretion in order to apply creative judicial decision-making to a range of issues arising 
from the broad area of gender relations. Furthermore, the Defi'enne 11 judgment categorised 
non-discrimination on the grounds of sex as a fundamental principle of Community law, thus 
providing scope for according it a very high status when faced with a range of possible 
outcomes, meaning, in technical terms, that the Court could, if inclined, use furtherance of the 
524 From J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice (OUP, 1993), discussed in 
Chapter 5 infi'a. 
525 In the broadest sense. Factors aiding interpretation could, for example, include a consideration of the 'spirit' 
of the Treaty. 
170 
equality principle as a possible justification for deciding a case in a certain way. The obvious 
tension between this possibility and the Court's place as one institution within the wider 
context of a primarily economic community provides further grounds for analysis. 
If the structure of contemporary labour markets is considered,526 the deregulatory stance 
inherent in the creation of a single market has led to the emergence of new ways of working. 
This has had the effect of changing the nature of the commodification of labour in the post-
war economies ofthe Member States. This 'new' conceptualisation of work has changed the 
relationship between employer and worker from being a mutually dependent arrangement 
based on the concept of an ongoing commitment between the parties with corresponding 
rights and obligations, to a range of diverse arrangements founded primarily on the needs of 
the organisation which are increasingly met by means of dispensable, short-tenn contracts 
which lack any clear commitments on the part of the employer to the welfare and well-being 
ofthe worker. From the worker's perspective, the shift in contractual arrangements has placed 
many of those engaged in low-paid, precarious employment in a position of economic 
dependence with a decline in social protection concluding, in some circumstances, in legal 
independence from the employing organisation. 
This shift in the nature of working relationships has taken place against the backdrop of an 
increase in the labour market participation rates of women, particularly working mothers. 
Furthermore the gendered nature of labour markets which arises due to the real life 
experiences of women as the primary providers of childcare (and increasingly elder care) 
places women more often than men in low status employment, often part-tinle and/or short-
tenn. Because of its differences from the full-time, permanent model more typical of male 
526 See Chapter 3 inJi"a. 
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employment, such work has been categorised as 'atypical'. The causes of discrimination 
within the employment relationship can, thus, be identified in two ways: by the OCCUlTence of 
individual, overt acts of discrimination on gender-related grounds which place the recipient at 
a disadvantage in comparison to others ('direct' discrimination) and by the application of 
business-based or administrative policies which appear prima facie to be gender neutral but 
which have a disparate impact on the members of one sex compared to the members of the 
other ('indirect' discrimination). Because of the gendered nature of labour markets, a policy 
which places those with a particular 'atypical' working alTangement at a disadvantage is 
likely to have a disproportionate impact on women compared to men. 
These developments are clearly minored in a range of cases with which the European Court 
has been confronted over the past 20 years. The majority of the cases dealing with the rights 
of 'atypical' workers have formed the basis of refelTals to the ECJ due, in some respects, to 
the novelty factor - the new methods of working are as different from traditional working 
alTangements as those filling them are different from the normative concept of 'worker'. 
Consequently, provisions operating within national legal systems lack the requisite detail on 
which to base decisions and, faced with new problems, little previous guidance and a whole 
new range of possible legal outcomes on the basis of Community provisions,527 national 
courts have taken the opportunity to refer specific questions for adjudication by the European 
Court. Some of these cases are related to workplace practices based on assumptions regarding 
working pattems and cOlTesponding levels of employee commitment and economic necessity 
to work which have been used to justify different rates of pay on the basis of hours worked or 
through the casualisation of labour. Some of them have arisen on the basis of national 
legislation and policies which have had the explicit aim of differentiating certain groups of 
527 See Chapter 4 infi·a. 
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workers in order to distinguish them from the standard (male breadwinner) model and which 
have had the effect of marginalising the workers in question by providing them with lower 
standards of social protection. Such actions can, on the face of it, be rationalised if the 
primary objectives of Community law are assumed to be the furtherance of economic goals as 
set out in the Treaty, within the context of which even the provision of equal pay for men and 
women was included on the basis of economic integration between Member States. 
Furthermore, cetiain aspects of supranational labour market policy at the European level have 
supported the deregulation of labour markets as a means of job creation in the face of rising 
1 528 unemp oyment. 
Confronted with stark choices concerning the interpretation of substantive provisions which 
form pati of a legal system founded on the basis of the economic imperative on the one hand, 
and the chance to apply Community law creatively in order to further develop the equality 
principle on the other, what choices has the Couti made? Has it taken advantage of its unique 
position and interpreted the law creatively in its decision-making? What theoretical 
perspective has it adopted in its conceptualisation of the normative values required to interpret 
such provisions? Has its purposive approach been utilised more often to further the aims of 
the 'free' market order in preference to the pro-regulatory stance required to confront the 
challenges provided by the attainment of substantive equality or vice versa? When the COUli 
is faced with a range of possible conceptual tools, some of which may, in application, produce 
conflicting results, do certain principles trump others? If so, which ones and on what basis? 
Finally, in seeking to interpret the relevant provisions of Community law consistently in line 
with the requirements of the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectation, has the 
Court developed what might be viewed as an identifiable jurispmdence on gender relations? 
528 See Chapter 4 infi'a. 
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Methodology 
In this chapter, the judgments of the ECJ in a group of selected cases will be analysed in order 
to provide answers to the questions posited above. The approach taken in this analysis is 
based on the application of legal reasoning, as discussed in Chapter 5, whereby, attention is 
drawn to the nature and extent of the considerations used to justify the Court's decisions. 529 
In applying this approach to the selected cases, the focus will, therefore, be on the 'context of 
justification,530 within which the Court has reached its decision, with emphasis on what is 
known to be the legally justifiable reason for that decision. To assist in this endeavour, 
account will be taken of the published judgments of the Court and the Advocate-Generals' 
opinions as appropriate, the latter providing some insight into the reasoning of the Court in 
cases where the judgment and opinion concur and serving as a useful means of eliminating 
the alternative position(s) not adopted by the Court in cases in which the judgment deviates 
substantially from the opinion. 
The analytical tools providing the means by which the cases are grouped and compared will 
comprise the relevant principles of EC law as applied and interpreted by the Court. Some of 
these arise as fundamental principles of European law as well as serving as the normative 
concepts on which the legislative measures under review are based, for example, non-
discrimination. Others have been categorised as general principles and, as such, have 
developed incrementally in conceptual terms often as a result of their interpretation by the 
Court, for example, equality. The identification of the relevant principles will depend on those 
applied by the Court in the range of cases under consideration and is, therefore, deductive. 
529 See 1. Bengoetxea et al (2001) discussed in Chapter 5 iI?(i'G. 
530 Ibid at p. 44. 
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One of the aims of the analysis is to determine whether, and to what extent, a hierarchy of 
principles can be identified by which the Court gives preference to particular principles m 
terms of their perceived relative value. 
Before this analysis can take place, the terms of reference must be established comprising: the 
methods by which the cases have been selected and justification for doing so (rationale) and 
the identification of the appropriate legislative framework in which the cases have arisen and 
which forms the bases for their referrals to the ECl. 
Rationale for selection of cases 
If the COUli's case law dealing with the broad range of sex equality issues is considered, there 
are a substantial number of cases which have direct relevance and which could, depending on 
the rationale applied, ostensibly be used as a basis for the analysis within this thesis. 
However, if the salient points explored in this work are considered, such as the shortcomings 
of the current legal regime and the contemporary composition of the labour force across the 
European Union, certain central themes emerge. In order to identify a group of cases which 
could be managed adequately in order to provide some meaningful findings in response to the 
issues under review in this thesis, certain ground rules have been established. These are based 
on observations presented as a result of the enquiries undertaken in Chapters 2 - 5 and can be 
set out as follows: 
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Timescale 
During the process of writing this thesis, the European Union has undergone the most 
significant enlargement of its history by the accession of 10 new Member States from among 
the former Eastern European States, extending the membership of the Union from 15 to 25 
Member States. Another two countries, Romania and Bulgaria, look set to join the Union at 
the tum of the year 2006/7. Although this vast expansion, in geographical, political and 
cultural temls, offers obvious opportunities for analysis on gender lines, the origins of this 
work pre-date this latest phase of enlargement by some time. Furthermore, the effects of 
enlargement on the working of the Court are still to be felt. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that 
the analysis offered here will have a wider application than that associated with a particular 
timescale. As is customary in legal analyses, I have identified a suitable cut-off date as being 
31 December 2005, with the effect that the law is as stated up to and including that date. 
Anlendments and additions to the legislative framework and new case law arising after that 
date have not been considered here. 
The PI'eliminal1' Rulings Procedm'e undel' Article 234 EC 
As explained in Chapter 5, the basis of the cases under consideration here is the preliminary 
rulings procedure provided by Article 234 EC. The obvious merits in selecting cases by way 
of this procedure have been outlined in Chapter 5, but include: the procedure's importance in 
the development of Community law; the resulting discourse between the ECJ and the national 
courts on the scope of Community law; the role of the procedure as the prinlary driving force 
in the relationship between the national and Community legal systems; and the obvious 
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opportunity to examine case law which has been considered and decided specifically on the 
basis of issues concerning the place of gender relations within the employment sphere. 
The use of Article 234 EC as a means of identifying suitable case law provides a common 
framework for the cases which have all come before the Court as referrals from national 
courts. In practical terms, this means that they all have their legal base in provisions arising 
from the relevant national legal system which, in turn, have a relationship with a specific 
instrument of Community law (see below). At a basic level, the various national provisions 
can be thematised in order to identify broad parallels between the cases in relation to the 
issues they deal with and this will form part of the overview of cases presented below. 
However, the focus of the analysis is on the work of the COUlt of Justice - more specifically 
on the legal reasoning applied in order to reach justifiable decisions on a range of cases with a 
particular emphasis on whether or not there has been a consistent approach in this respect. 
Equal Pay and Equal Treatment 
In seeking to examine the development of the conceptualisation of gender relations by the 
COUlt of Justice, there are several legislative provisions that could serve as potentially suitable 
foundations on which to proceed. For example, the free movement provisions of the Treaty 
and associated secondary legislation have provided the basis for a plethora of referrals under 
the Article 234 preliminary rulings procedure dealing with issues related to both employment 
and social security rights. However, the primary focus of this thesis is on employment, more 
specifically on the relationship between the composition of the female workforce in terms of 
sectoral features such as hours of work and contract type, the forms of discrimination which 
have arisen as a result of such features and the legal responses that have developed. 
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Accordingly, the relevant Treaty provision is Article 141 EC and the associated secondary 
legislation the Equal Pay Directive 75/117/EC and the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EC. 
The cases under review have been referred to the ECl in order to ascertain the interpretation 
of Community provisions on a number of grounds and care has been taken not to be overly 
prescriptive in selecting the cases on the basis of specific provisions as to do so could detract 
from the value of the findings which are, after all, based on the fundamental and general 
principles applied by the Court in its reasoning. However, when the cases themselves are 
grouped (see below), it is the interpretation of Article 141 which emerges as the most 
commonly used ground for referrals. 
The Rights of 'Atypical' WOI'kers 
As set out in Chapter 3, political, economic and social factors have led to a change in the 
nature of working relationships within contemporary labour markets. Increased competition 
on a global scale and the information revolution have been used as justification for the 
deregulation of some aspects of the working relationship which, in tum, has given rise to 
certain common features across Member States such as the growth of atypical work. In 
contrast to the transformation that has taken place within the employment sphere, the 
unchanging nature of the division of labour within families has ensured that the role of 
women as the primary providers of care persists and this continues to have a marked impact 
on their labour market behaviour. Although women with families increasingly remain in or re-
enter the labour market during the child-bearing and rearing years, large numbers of those 
women work part-tinle or under temporary contracts, often under precarious arrangements 
and in areas of unskilled work viewed as low status. 
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Over the past 20 years, the ECl has been confronted with a range of cases dealing with 
various aspects of the relationship between female atypical workers and their employing 
organisations. The emergence of such cases from across the Member States shows that 
national legal systems have often found this shift in working arrangements difficult to 
reconcile with the existing concepts surrounding work and with established legal principles. 
In other words, where women's difference from men is most apparent - in their attachment to 
'new' working an"angements on the grounds of family responsibility - national law is often 
unclear or inadequate in providing legal solutions and courts are often unsure whether the 
established provisions of Community anti-discrimination law can be interpreted or extended 
so as to provide protection. The introduction of specific legislation intended to provide 
protection for part-time and temporary workers at the European level has been discussed in 
Chapter 4 and the shortcomings of that legislation in dealing with the challenges presented on 
gender discrimination grounds are set out there. The cases presented here are distinguished 
from those specifically related to the Part-time and Fixed-telID Directives as they either pre-
date that legislation or because they raise issues not adequately dealt with other than by a 
consideration of the pre-existing and well-established equal pay and equal treatment 
provlslOns. 
Indirect Discl'imination and Objective Justification 
As established, the focus of the following analysis is on the composition of the female 
workforce and related st11lctural features. Accordingly, the cases selected have their origins in 
the indirect discrimination provisions of national law. The concept of indirect discrimination 
is essentially concerned with a results-based approach to issues of inequality, that is to say 
that it arises where apparently consistent treatment results in an unequal outcome. This may 
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have a detrimental effect on an individual but application of the concept also recognises the 
impact of the treatment on women as a group. Although falling far short of the next logical 
step of demanding an equal outcome, European Community law has long recognised the link 
between the application of apparently neutral policy and the perpetuation of disadvantage in 
the group sense. The use of the concept of indirect discrimination as a means of challenging 
the discriminatory effects of structural factors gives it a patiicular relevance in the current 
context. This application of the concept to individual cases provides a redistributive quality, 
although its failure to explicitly link process to outcome is acknowledged as limiting the value 
of the concept as a means of ensuring full participation of groups and a corresponding fair 
distribution of benefits. 531 
The cases selected have a common foundation in that all of them have ansen from the 
application of a measure or policy whose impact is potentially detrimental to women as a 
group, or to particular groups exclusively made up of women (e.g. mothers), or to patticular 
groups which consist predominantly of women (e.g. single parents or those who act as the 
primary providers of care within families). All of these cases provide examples of challenges 
to the systemic gender discrimination which occurs due to the impact of policy, be it at the 
micro (workplace or sectoral) level or at the macro (national) level, which is detrimental 
because it fails to take account of the differences in women's working lives when measured 
against the normative employment model presented by the male breadwinner. 532 
Unlike its legislative partner direct discrimination, which can never be justified, indirect 
discrimination can be justified in certain circumstances. In the European Community context, 
defences advanced by employers and/or national governments against charges of indirect 
531 See Chapter 2 infi"a. 
532 See Chapter 2 infi·a for female labour market composition and Chapter 3 for same/difference debate and 
contribution of 'difference feminism '. 
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discrimination are subject to a proportionality test known as 'objective justification' as 
determined by the guidelines set out in one of the earliest indirect discrimination cases to 
come before the Court, Bilka Kaufhaus. 533 The nature of the reasons proffered as 
justifications for indirect discrimination vary depending on the circumstances of each case, 
but fall into two broad categories: those based on the needs of a particular business and those 
arising due to the application of an administrative rule or procedure which can be rationalised 
on non-gender specific grounds. The cases under consideration offer examples of both types 
of justification (see below). An examination of the attempts to provide justifications, 
alongside their relative merits as ascribed by the Court in its consideration of cases involving 
prima facie sex discrimination, provides an opportunity to assess the status afforded to 
principles such as non-discrimination and equality in judicial decision-making concerning 
d l · . h' 1 d 534 gen er re atlOns Wlt 111 a mar eet or er. 
In summary, the group of cases under consideration in the following analysis were selected on 
the following grounds: 
• Timescale - all pre-date the effects of the most recent EU enlargement. 
• Prelinlinary rulings procedure - all were referred to the ECJ by national courts under 
the Article 234 EC (ex 177) procedure. 
• Common legal base - All are based on questions concerning the correct interpretation 
of Article 141 EC (ex 119) and/or Directives 76/207/EC and/or Directive 75/117/EC. 
• Atypical workers - All are concerned with the rights of atypical workers within EC 
law. 
533 Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbHv. Karin Weber Von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607, discussed in detail in Case 
Analysis below. 
534 See Chapters 3 and 4 infi'a. 
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• Indirect discrimination and objective justification - All deal with claims brought on 
the basis of indirect discrimination provisions and include an attempt to objectively 
justify such discrimination. 
List of Cases under Review 
If the above criteria are applied to the ECl's case law, the following group of cases 1S 
identified (in chronological order): 
Case 96/80 Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Limited [1981] ECR 911 
Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber Von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607 
Case 171188 Rinner-Kiihn v. FWW Spezial-Gebaudel'einigung GmbH & Co. KG [1989] ECR 
2743 
Case 33/89 Kowalska v Fl'eie und Handsestadt Hamburg [1990] ECR 1-2591 
Case 184/89 Nimz v Fl'eie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1991] ECR 1-297 
Case C-360/90 Arbeiterwohlfahrt del' Stadt Berlin NV v Botel [1992] ECR 1-3589 
Case C-57/93 Vroege v NCIV Institut VOOI' Volkhuisvesting BV & Stichting Pensioenfonds 
NCIV [1994] ECR 1-4541 
Case C-128/93 Fisschel' v Vool'huis Hengelo BV & Stichting Bedl'ijfspensioenfonds voor de 
Detailhandel [1994] ECR 1-4583 
Case C-297/93 Grau-Hupka v Stadtgemeinde Bremen [1994] ECR 1-5535 
Cases C-399/92, C-409 and 425/92, C-34, 50 and 78/93 Stadt Lengerich v. Helmig [1994] 
ECR 1-5727 
Case C-457/93 Kuratorium fliT' Dialyse und Niel'entransplantation v Lewal'k [1996] ECR 1-
243 
Case C-278/93 Freel'S and Speckamnn v Deutsche Bundespost [1996] ECR 1-1165 
Case C-1I95 Gel'stel'v. Freistaat Bayern [1997] ECR 1-5253 
Case C-100/95 KOl'ding v Senator Fiil' Finanzen [1997] ECR 1-5289 
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Case C-246/96 A1agorrian and Another v. Eastern Health and Social Services Board and 
Another [1997] ECR 1-7153 
Case C-243/95 Kathleen Hill and Ann Stapleton v. Revenue Commissioners and Department 
of Finance [1998] ECR 1-3739 
Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekom v Schroder [2000] ECR 1-743 
Case C-281197 Kriiger v. Kreiskrankenhaus Ebersberg [1999] ECR 1-5127 
Case C-78/98 Preston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust [2000] ECR 1-
3201 
Case C-77/02 Steinicke v. Bundesanstalt FiirArbeit [2003] ECR 1-9027 
Case C-256/01 Allonby v. Accrington and Rossendale College and Others [2004] ECR 1-873 
Case C-196/02 Nikoloudi v. Organismos Tilepikinonion Ellados AE [2005] ECR 1-1789 
Case C-285/02 Elsner-Lakeberg v Land Nordhein-Westfalen [2004] ECR 1-5861 
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Case Analysis 
Introduction 
The preliminary reference procedure requires the framing of specific questions by the court of 
origin which form the basis of the ECJ's interpretation. These questions are shaped by the 
factual and legal bases of the case and, subsequently, by the relevant national legal 
framework. Although it desists from interpreting provisions of national law, the Comt makes 
contact with those provisions through the construction of the questions and in its formulation 
of responses to those questions. Furthermore in its investigation of the case, the Court is 
exposed to specific features of national labour markets and workplace practice which, on 
occasion, amount to contributory factors in why a patticular issue has become legally 
contentious. In the context of the Court's judgments, all of these elements, where identifiable, 
provide rich sources of analysis. In addition, a review of the arguments advanced by the legal 
representatives of the parties to the cases and the submissions made by the Commission and 
other Member States, insofar as what was accepted by the Court as appropriate and what was 
rejected, enables the analyst to deduce something of the nature of the factors which influence 
judicial decision-making in this respect. In devoting attention to the particular group of cases 
selected, I am primarily interested in discovering how what have become the accepted 
normative concepts in the Court's jurisprudence on gender relations were first articulated and 
subsequently received into Community law. 
To enable such assessment it is necessary to first establish the relevant conceptual framework 
which has developed incrementally through the Court's jurisprudence on the group of cases 
under review. The first three of the cases with which the Court was confronted have been 
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particularly influential in this respect and will be given full consideration below. Once the 
conceptual framework is established and its strengths and weaknesses identified, it will be 
used to further explore the remaining cases in terms of the issues raised and their subsequent 
treatment by the Court. Consideration will be paid to the nature of these issues in terms of 
their national origin and corresponding place within domestic legislative and industrial 
relations frameworks as a means of deducing whether the Court's jurisptudence is likely to 
have had a wide-reaching impact or has been confined, in certain respects, to the specific 
features of a narrow range of national concerns. The effect of the Court's jurisptudence on 
public policy and law-making will also be considered. 
Laying the Conceptual Foundations: Jenkins, Billm-Kaujhaus and Rinner-
Kiihn 
In chronological order, the fIrst three of the cases under review led to the establishment of 
certain key features of what is now accepted as the correct treatment of claims by part-tinle 
female workers relating to issues of alleged sex discrimination under the provisions of EC 
law. Consideration of these cases in the order in which they came before the COUlt enables 
some assessment of the incremental development of the Court's interpretation of those 
provisions and the influence of national measures. This process invites analysis of the choices 
made by the Court in determining the meaning and scope of the principle of equality under 
Atticle 141 EC and associated secondary legislation. In addition some assessment is possible 
of the nature and extent of the transposition of doctrine from the national legal systems of the 
courts of origin into the Community legal order. This takes place by a process of cross 
fertilisation in which concepts and their contextual meanings cross over from one Member 
State legal system into Community law and, through application, into the legal systems of the 
other Member States. Given the relative infancy of the Court at the time these early cases 
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came before it and the untested nature of the provisions with whose interpretation it was 
charged, it is asserted that we are looking at a stage in the development of EC law when 
everything was up for grabs: the Court's definition of its own judicial role; the underlying 
meaning of the aspiration of equality articulated by the Treaty; the identification, position and 
interpretation of the principles which would emerge as the guiding lights of Community law 
and the place of gender relations within European integration. 
In common with the overwhelming majority of the cases under reVlew, Jenkins, Bilka-
Kaufhaus and Rinner-Kiihn were all concerned with inequities in pay rates between full and 
part-time workers. Jenkins was referred by the UK's Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), 
Bilka-Kaujhaus by the German Federal Labour Court and Rinnel'-Kiihn by the Labour Court 
in Oldenberg. All sought clarification of the compatibility of national measures with Article 
119 EC (now 141).535 
T l' K' 536 Jen,(lIlS v lIlgsgate 
In the first case to come before it on the issue of inequality in pay on the basis of hours of 
work, the Court was particularly receptive to the UK Employment Appeal Tribunal's 
suggestion that such cases be viewed as indirect discrimination claims. In order to proceed on 
this basis, the fact that the majority of part-time workers are female is used to show that a 
policy of paying lower rates to part-timers has a dispropOltionate adverse impact on women. 
The door is then open for the employer to justifY the policy on gender neutral grounds 
535 Which had been found to have both vertical and horizontal direct effects in Case 43/75 Defi'enne v SABENA 
[1976] ECR 455. 
536 Case 96/80 Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Limited [1981] ECR 911. 
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In Jenkins, the applicant was employed on a part-time basis for 30 hours per week as a skilled 
machinist. In its Harlow factory, where Mrs Jenkins worked, Kingsgate (Clothing 
Productions) Ltd employed 83 full-time workers, whose normal working week was 40 hours 
per week, and six part-time workers, five of whom were women. The one male part-time 
worker was viewed as an exceptional case in that he had been allowed to stay on past normal 
retirement age and worked 16 hours per week. Before the introduction of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 and the Equal Pay Act 1970, which were jointly enacted in 1975, 
male and female employees had been paid at different rates but there was no difference in the 
hourly rates of pay of full-time and part-tinle workers. However, in response to the 
requirements of the legislation, new rates of pay were introduced which equalised full-tinle 
rates for men and women but distinguished those working for less than 40 hours per week 
who were categorised as 'part-time' and paid 10 per cent less per hour. Mrs Jenkins brought a 
complaint before an industrial tribunal that the difference between her pay and that of a full-
time male employee contravened the equality clause inserted into her contact of employment 
by the Equal Pay Act 1970. Kingsgate asserted that the differential rates of pay were not 
attributable to the sex of the workers concerned but rather were intended as a disincentive to 
part-time working so that the optimum use could be made of machinery. Jenkins' claim 
before the industrial tribunal failed and she appealed to the EAT which referred the case for 
consideration by the ECJ under the provisions of Article 177 EEC. 537 
In paying consideration to the theoretical and legal foundations underpinning Jenkins' claim 
and the subsequent reasoning of the Court of Justice, it is important to place the case in its 
historical context. The concept of indirect discrinlination was still very much in its infancy 
within the UK legal system at the time of the EAT's referral of Jenkins to the ECJ, having 
537 Now Article 234 EC 
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been introduced into statute by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA) just five years earlier. 
The SDA's enactment was not directly related to the UK's membership of the Community, 
but had been influenced by the legislative changes introduced to US law to prohibit race 
discrimination and, therefore, the Act's provisions did not result from the intended 
implementation or interpretation of any Community provisions. The influence of the US 
Supreme COUli's decision in the race discrimination case Griggs v Duke Power C0 538 on the 
development of the UK's legal framework is demonstrated by the inclusion and framing of 
the concept of indirect discrimination in section 1 (1) (b) of the Act. The concept of indirect 
discrimination, although recognised by the ECJ in its earlier case law,539 was not expressly 
provided for in the Treaty or in secondary legislation until much later. 540 
Although the concept of indirect discrimination, as articulated in the SDA, was applied by the 
European Court, the statutory provision itself was not under consideration. This is because, 
when Jenkins was originally considered by the industrial tribunal (at which stage the claim 
failed), the claimant relied on section 1 ofthe Equal Pay Act 1970 (EqP A) arguing that, as she 
was engaged on like work with a male comparator who was employed on a full-time basis, 
she was entitled to equal pay. The Industrial Tribunal accepted the employer's defence under 
s. 1 (3) EqP A, that the difference in pay was attributable to a material difference other than the 
difference of sex between Jvfrs Jenkin's case and that of her male colleague. 
In refen-ing the case to the ECJ, the EAT asked, inter alia, whether the principle of equal pay 
contained in Article 119 (now 141) of the Treaty and Article 1 of the Equal Pay Directive 
required that pay for work at tinle rates should be the same irrespective of the hours worked 
538 401 US 424 (1971) see below at pp. 208-9. 
539 See, for example, Case 152/73 Sotgill v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153. 
540 Directive 97180 IEC on the burden of P 1'0 of (OJ 1997 L1416). 
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each week, or whether the employer's aim of attaining a commercial benefit by encouraging 
workers to do the maximum possible hours of work justified the payment of different rates 
dependent on hours of work (Question 1). Furthermore, the Court was asked whether, and in 
what respects, the application of Community law would differ 'if it were shown that a 
considerably smaller proportion of female workers than of male workers is able to perform 
the minimum number of hours each week require to qualify for the full hourly rate of pay. ' 
(Question 3). 
Given the relative lack of experience of UK tribunals in dealing with the legal provisions 
under review, the EAT displayed what appears to be an impressive insight into the issues at 
stake in framing the questions for consideration in the way that it did. Question 1 invites 
consideration of the employer'S policy as an acceptable justification for prima facie 
discrimination. Question 3 opens the door, perhaps regrettably (see below), to the application 
of the concept of indirect discrimination. The identity and role of J'vfrs Jenkins' Counsel is 
noteworthy at this juncture. Anthony (now Lord) Lester QC acted on her behalf and she was 
assisted tlu'oughout the proceedings by her trade union541 and the Equal Opportunities 
Commission. Anthony Lester's involvement is particularly relevant to the conduct of the case 
given that his status as one of the chief architects of the UK legislation would have given him 
a far greater degree of familiarity with the concepts and rationale thereof than the majority of 
practitioners at that time. 542 Following the failure of his client to secure the right to equal pay 
with her male colleagues before the industrial tribunal, we are told that 'counsel for Mrs 
Jenkins conceded that ... he could not succeed [at the EAT] on the basis of the British 
541 The National Union of Tailors and Gannent Workers. 
542 See the Advocate General's opinion, at p.4. in which he contrasts Mrs Jenkins' representation with that of the 
unrepresented employer commenting that her case is 'fully represented'. 
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legislation alone' hence the invocation of Article 119 and Article 1 of the Equal Pay 
Directive. 543 
The Court's judgment in Jenkins has been the subject of criticism (see below) on the basis 
that its wider application is difficult to discern and the Court's responses to the questions 
referred reveal little of the reasoning applied. In contrast, the Advocate General's opinion, 
with which the COUlt appears to have concurred, sets out the various theoretical and 
conceptual grounds relevant to the case and so is considered at length in the following 
analysis. 
The Advocate General's Opinion 
In his opmlOn, delivered on 28 January 1981, Advocate General Warner set out the 
Commission's finding that, although no Member State had legislation which required patt-
timers' pay to be proportionate to that of full-timers, the effects of collective bargaining had 
achieved that result in many Member States. In fact the UK was the only Member State in 
which it was not uncommon for part-time work to be paid at a lower hourly rate. 544 Under the 
UK's legislative provisions on equal pay, such differential pay rates would be acceptable 
where they resulted in inequalities in pay between a female and male worker only if the 
variation was found to be 'genuinely due to a material difference (other than the difference of 
sex) between her case and his. ,545 
The Commission, in its submission, supported the argument underpinning the first questions 
posed by the EAT which A-G Warner interpreted as being that 'the very wording of Article 
543 ld at 596. 
544ld 
545 Equal Pay Act 1970, s. 1 (3). 
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119 required that pay for work at time rates should be the same irrespective of the numbers of 
hours worked each week; and secondly that, under Article 119, any commercial benefit that 
an employer might derive from encouraging full-time work by paying higher rates for it was 
irrelevant. ,546 A-G Warner considered whether Article 119 (see above) could be read in this 
light, concluding that, in order to ascribe the necessary interpretation, the phrases 'the same 
job', 'the same work' (paragraph 3 of Atticle 119) and 'equal work' (paragraph I of Atticle 
119) would all have to be accorded the same meaning, thus allowing for their interchangeable 
use. That the phrases 'equal work' and 'the same work' were intended to have the same 
meaning was, in the Advocate General's opinion, unproblematic. However, the change from 
'equal' (or 'the same') 'work' to the 'same jo b' occuned in all the different language texts of 
the Treaty and, thus, appeared to be deliberate. This meant, AG Warner concluded, that, 
although a part-time and full-time worker may perform equal work, they do not have the same 
job. 547 In drawing this distinction between the 'work' and the 'job', AG Warner effectively 
closed off the possibility that an employer's policy of differentiating pay rates on the basis of 
hours of work might potentially amount to direct discrimination. Following this reasoning, the 
jobs performed are different and the gender of the incumbents becomes inelevant and gives 
way to the possibility of justification. 
Turning to the employer'S defence that the differential pay rates were not related to the sex of 
part-tinle workers but were based on the desire to facilitate the optimum use of machinery by 
encouraging full-time working, A-G Warner again disputed the approach proffered by Mrs 
Jenkins. The 'Clay Cross approach' advocated by the claimant drew on the reasoning of Lord 
546 A-G's Opinion at 598. 
547 In its submission, the Commission rejected this approach arguing that it was the 'post' and not the number of 
hours worked which determine whether or not two jobs are the same. This line appears to be supported by the 
Court in its judgment in Case 129/79 Macarthys Ltd v Smith [1980] ECR 1275 in which it was found that, in 
deciding whether a female worker is perfonning the same work as a male worker, regard should be had to the 
nature of her services. 
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Denning M.R. in an earlier case before the Court of Appeal,548 in which Denning had clearly 
enunciated his opinion that the intention of the employer must be set aside if his actions 
resulted in unlawful discrimination. To accept market-based 'excuses' such as a woman's 
willingness to work for less than a man or a man's request for higher wages than a woman's 
would result in the UK legislation being a 'dead letter' as 'Those are the very reasons why 
there was unequal pay before the statute. They are the very circumstances in which the statute 
was intended to operate. ,549 AG Warner, although accepting of the approach adopted by the 
Court of Appeal, found 'no suppOli in the Clay Cross case for the wide proposition that 
counsel for Mrs Jenkins sought to derive from it. ,550 
In reaching this conclusion, the Advocate General relied on the decision of the industrial 
tribunal in Jenkins in asserting that there was no evidence to support the supposition that 
'differentiation was a hangover from the days when Kingsgate paid all its female employees 
at lower rates than its male employees. ,551 This is challengeable on two related grounds: First, 
the policy of paying different pay rates to full and part-time workers had been introduced by 
Kingsgate in November 1975 in response to the impending introduction of the Equal Pay Act 
1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in December of that year, 552 before which, 
although men and women had been paid at different rates, there had been no differentiation on 
the grounds of hours worked. Secondly, the IT in fmding against Mrs Jenkins as a matter of 
law, remarked that if different rates of pay were legally payable to part-time and full-time 
workers 'this in itself smacks of inequality among the sexes because by the very nature of 
things the part-time workers are bound to be mostly women,.553 Given the tribunal's 
548 Clay Cross (Qllany SerVices) Ltd v Fletcher [1979] ICR 1. 
549Id. at p. 5A, D. 
550 AG's Opinion at 599. 
551 Ibid. 
552 A-G opinion at 595. 
553 Id at 596. 
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acknowledgment of the limitations in the wording of the UK statute and the blatancy of the 
employer's change of policy, it is regrettable that the Advocate General, and ultimately the 
Court itself, were not more accepting of Lord Denning's approach in Clay Cross, in which he 
advocated a purposive interpretation of employers' attempted defences taking cognisance of 
the intention of the statute, as to do otherwise would seriously undermine its effect. 
Having opened the door for a potential justification on the part of the employer, AG Warner 
turned his attention to the concept of disparate inlpact. In her case before the EAT, Mrs 
Jenkins had argued that, if her prinlary argument (of direct discrinlination) failed, the 
disproportionate adverse impact ofthe employer'S policy to encourage workers to engage in a 
40 hour week should be considered. This arose due to the fact that, because of their family 
responsibilities, women were generally less able to work 40 hours per week than men. 
Although it is not formally acknowledged, this amounts to what is now familiar as indirect 
discrimination. In support of this line of argument, Jenkins' counsel cited the US Supreme 
COUlt'S judgment in GriggS. 554 Interestingly, the Commission had rejected this approach out 
of hand describing it as a 'half-way house' and questioning its enforcement as being 'difficult 
to monitor in practice'. 555 Nonetheless, this was the approach favoured by the Advocate 
General and, ultimately, by the Court itself and has remained the accepted formulation for 
dealing with equal pay and treatment claims by part-time (and other 'atypical') workers under 
the sex discrimination provisions ofEC law ever since. AG Warner approved this approach as 
the only one 'that reconciles the need to prevent discrimination between full-time and part-
time workers with the need to prevent injustice to an employer who differentiates between 
[such] workers for sound reasons unconnected with their sex,.556 In arriving at the conclusion 
that such cases should be approached as 'indirect discrimination' claims, the Advocate 
554 Op cit at n. 15 - see below pp. 208-9. 
555 AG opinion at 599. 
556 Id at 601. 
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General drew support from the Court's jurisprudence on the application of the principle of 
non-discrimination in the context of nationality. 557 
The Judgment in Jenkins 
In broadly concurring with the findings of the Advocate General, the Court held that the 
purpose of Art 119 was to ensure the application of the principle of equal pay for men and 
women for the same work. The differences of pay prohibited by that provision are, therefore, 
based exclusively on the sex of the employee and, thus, differences in rates of remuneration 
for full and part-timers do not offend the Article provided the difference is due to factors 
which are objectively justified and not attributable to discrimination based on sex. Article 1 of 
Directive 75/117 was designed to facilitate the practical application of Article 119 and in no 
way altered its scope or content. The provisions of Atiicle 119 would be directly effective in 
circumstances where the national court could apply the criteria of equal work and equal pay to 
establish that different pay rates for full and part-time workers amounted to sex 
discrimination. 
Criticism at the time of the judgment was centred on its opaqueness rather than its reasoning, 
so that 'it was thought from the decision ... that the ECl had a narrow understanding of the 
concept of indirect discrimination, namely that an action was only discriminatory when it was 
intended to be so.,558 The President of the EAT, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson had such 
557 Case 152173 Sotgioll v Deutsche BlIndespost [1974] 1 ECR 153; Case 61177 Commission v Ireland [1978] 
ECR 417; Case 237178 Caisse Regionale d'Assurance Maladie (C.R.A.A1.), DUe v Palermo [1979] ECR 2645. 
558 C. Barnard and B. Hepple, 'Indirect Discrimination: Intelpreting Seymour Smith' 58 (1999) Cambridge Law 
Joumal (2), 399-412 at 401. See also C. Kilpatrick (1998) 'Community or Communities o/Courts in European 
integration? Sex Equality Dialogues between the UK Courts and the ECJ' 4 ELJ 2, 121-147 at p. 140 in which 
the judgment is described as being 'extremely confused'. For continuation of the belief that Jenkins applied 
only to circumstances where there had been an intention to discriminate see the UK's submission in Bilka-
Kallfhalls. 
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difficulty trying to apply the judgment that he used his own interpretation of national law in 
finding that unintentional indirect discrimination against part-time female workers was 
contrary to the Equal Pay Act 1970 even if it was not prohibited by Article 119.559 It is 
unfortunate that, given the subsequent application of the judgment in Jenkins to a wide range 
of cases on related issues, the decision was not based on more solid foundations. In fact, the 
COUlt's treatment of the case and its use as authority in later cases dealing with the issue of 
objective justification (see below) had set the law in this respect on a path which has become 
increasingly contentious over the years. 
Given how much was at stake, the ECJ's treatment of Jenkins must be viewed as 
disappointing when placed in the context of the subsequent development of the law in this 
area. Although it has been hailed as the case in which the Court enabled part-time workers to 
utilise Article 119 as a basis for claims before national courts, one cannot help but wonder 
how things might have tumed out if the COUlt had accepted Mrs Jenkins' primary argument 
that the discrimination she endured amounted to direct discrimination. From a vantage point 
of over 20 years' experience of such cases, this may at first consideration seem entirely 
inappropriate. However, if our knowledge of the incremental development of the law in this 
respect is set aside and a deconstructed analysis of the issues is applied, it emerges as being as 
much of a possibility as the Court's actual finding that such cases should be dealt with as 
i1ldirect discrimination claims. 
When stripped back to its bare essentials, the categorisation of the claim in Jenkins as direct 
discrimination does not, in fact, necessitate a huge leap in terms of reasoning but merely 
requires the setting aside of the hours of work perfomled as a relevant criterion for the 
559 [1981] IRLR 388. 
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establishment of 'different' jobs. In other words, if the hours of work are deemed to be 
irrelevant in determining the nature of the job, a straightforward comparison between the pay 
received by :Mrs Jenkins and her male comparator for the same work amounts to a direct 
breach of the principle of equality as provided by Article 119. This was the essence of the 
claimant's primary argument and was accepted as the correct approach by the Commission in 
its submission. The wording of the Article could easily have been interpreted as supportive of 
this approach in its provision that 'pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same 
job. ,560 On this basis, the comparison would have been between the hourly pay received by 
the part-time worker with that of her full-time comparator. Given that the workers concerned 
were of different sexes, a finding of direct discrimination would have ensued with no 
opportunity for justification. 
The Court's judgment in Jenkins raises the possibility that a 'commercial benefit' might be 
used as a means of justifying differential pay rates, although it was in the next case to be 
considered by the CoUti that this issue was specifically dealt with (see Bilka below). The use 
that has been made of this potential escape route for employers in some of the case law 
involving atypical workers since Jenkins is extremely questionable with most amounting to 
little more than thinly disguised attempts at circumventing the sex discrimination legislation. 
It is important to clarify that the criticisms set out here in relation to the suitability of indirect 
discrimination as a means of dealing with the claim in Jenkins should not be read as a 
complete rejection of the use of indirect discrimination in a11 related circumstances. On the 
contrary, the development of disproportionate impact as a suitable means of assessing certain 
employer and state policies has been a very welcome addition to anti-discrimination law. It is 
560 Article 119, paragraph 3. 
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clear that indirect discrimination is the most appropriate means of dealing with cases covering 
a wide range of issues,561 but what is contentious is the assumption, explicit in the ECl's 
jurisprudence since Jenkins, that the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of 
sex will only apply to 'atypical' workers if it can be derived from the application of a 
'neutral' policy (imposed by an employer or the State - see Rinnel'-Kiihn below) which 
cannot be justified on non-gender grounds. This assumption removes the necessity of a 
thorough assessment of the factual basis against non-justifiable provisions by the national 
courts and enables claims to succeed under EC law only if a number of technical procedural 
hurdles can be cleared, often through the application of wholly subjective criteria. 
The Relationship between Women's Labour Market Pal1icipation and Family 
Res ponsi bilities 
The most significant shortcoming of the COUli's approach in Jenkins is the refusal to consider 
the actual cause and effect of the employer's policy of paying less to part-timers. Although it 
is not within the Court's jurisdiction to establish the factual basis of the case, nor to consider 
the application of the national provisions under review, some assessment of the motive 
informing the employer's behaviour would surely have permitted a more pragmatic view to 
have been taken. The EAT, in framing the questions for referral, did appear to invite this. The 
employer'S claim that the policy was for reasons of 'commercial benefit' means merely that 
the lower pay rates saved money - a 'justification' which would have had equal application in 
a policy concerned with the explicit payment of women at lower rates than men. The 
conferment of the principle of sex equality, at least in a formal sense through its enshrinement 
561 Specifically those arising from 'equal value' claims which necessitate comparisons between different jobs or 
professions - see, for example, Case C-127/92 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Another [1993] ECR 
1-5535 and those in which the discrimination arises from a combination of factors such as the application of a 
collective agreement which limits the effects of national legislation or vice versa - see below at pp. 219-227. 
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in the Treaty, carried a financial cost for employers, but it was accepted that this was a price 
worth paying. To subordinate this principle so early on in its interpretation under EC law to 
the potential whim of employers who wish to avoid associated costs has had a profound effect 
on the rights of female workers engaged in 'women's work'. 562 
If the COUli had been minded to take a wider view of the issues raised by the case in giving its 
judgment, the reasons why Mrs Jenkins and her part-time colleagues worked the hours they 
did would have been directly relevant to the outcome. This would have necessitated some 
consideration of the women's need to balance paid employment with family responsibilities 
and the employer'S decision to employ part-timers at a lower pay rate would have emerged as 
the punitive measure it effectively was. In fact, the relationship between part-time work and 
family responsibility was implicitly accepted by the Court as a relevant factor in its fmding of 
indirect discrimination. If Mrs Jenkins' reasons for working part-time had been directly 
attributed to her gender, her case could surely have succeeded as a direct discrimination 
claim. 563 Of course, there is an inherent difficulty in ascribing family responsibilities as solely 
the concern of women as this carries with it certain stereo-typical assumptions that all women 
are mothers and/or always have primary responsibility for childcare and household chores. 
Subsequently, where such assumptions inform the application of legal doctrine there is a 
danger that they will become embedded in the normative concepts on which policy and law-
making are based and, thus, be perpetuated. This difficulty illustrates the important dividing 
line recognised in the debate concerning sex and the construction of gender (see Chapter 1). 
However, to desist ii-om attempting to target law effectively at the removal of sex 
discrimination which arises through the real life experiences of women would avoid any 
562 See Chapter 3 infi·a. 
563 This has been how the jurispmdential approach to cases conceming dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy 
and matemity has evolved - see Case C-32/93 Webb v ElvIO Cargo (UK) Ltd [1994] ECR 1-3567. These types of 
claims only succeeded latterly, once the woman's sex was viewed as the reason for any discrimination on the 
grounds of pregnancy and matemity. 
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opportunity to challenge the construction of gender roles effectively. If female part-time 
workers had been recognised as the victims of direct sex discrimination and had won the right 
to equal pay with male full-timers, perhaps the construction of gender roles would have been 
the subject of informed legal debate, rather than merely providing further justification for the 
marginalisation of part-time work. 
Bilka Kauflwul64 
In the second case to come before it on the issue of equal pay and part-timers, the Court 
revisited the specific issue of justification in cases of indirect discrimination. Bilka Kaufhaus 
was refelTed by the German Federal Labour Court565 three years after the Court's judgment in 
Jenkins. It is interesting to note that, despite the infancy of the Court's jurisprudence in this 
context, the application of indirect discrimination as an appropriate means of dealing with 
part-time workers' rights had become accepted to such an extent since Jenkins that a 
straightforward application of the concept of direct discrimination under Article 119 is not 
even considered. Instead the German case, which raises questions regarding the rights of 
access of part-time workers to occupational pension schemes, was heard as an indirect 
discrimination claim in the domestic court which asked the ECJ for clarification of the 
application of Article 119 to an employer's policy which excluded part-timers from 
membership of a pension scheme and guidance on what might qualify as an acceptable 
justification in this context. The German couti's questions, on which the reference is based, 
were all explicitly framed around the Couti's decision in Jenkins. As with the EAT in 
Jenkins, the national court displays both insight into and an open minded approach to the 
issues before it as reflected in the range of questions asked. 
564 Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaujhaus GmbHv. Karin Weber Von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607. 
565 Bundesarbeitsgericht. 
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Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH was part of a chain of department stores. The company's full- time 
workers were given a non-contributory pension on retirement. Part-time employees did not 
qualify for the pension scheme unless they had been employed for at least 15 years at the time 
of their retirement. The employer contended that the exclusion of part-timers from the 
scheme was to discourage part-time employment. This was part of a strategy to make full-
time work more attractive as full-time workers were required to cover the evening and 
Saturday opening tinles which were unpopular with part-time workers. This, the employers 
contended, amounted to an economic reason as referred to in Jenkins, and was thus capable of 
justifying the differential pay rates. Conversely, the clainlant, Ms Weber von Hartz, argued 
that the reason advanced for the pay differences arose as a matter of employer choice and was 
not justified as 'An employer who wishes, as a matter of policy, to encourage full-time work 
is entitled to decide not to recruit part-time workers. He cannot, however, without infringing 
Article 119, worsen the situation of such workers, who are ah'eady at a disadvantage. ,566 
In making its reference to the ECJ, the German court asked whether the exclusion of part-time 
workers from an occupational pension scheme amounted to an infringement of Article 119 if 
it had a disproportionate effect on more women than men. (Question 1) and (a) Whether the 
exclusion of part-timers could be objectively justified on the grounds of a policy to deter part-
time working arrangements, even if such a policy is not necessary for reasons of 'commercial 
expediency'? (b) Whether the undertaking is under a duty to structure its pension scheme so 
as to take account of the 'special difficulties experienced by employees with family 
commitments in fulfilling the requirements for an occupational pension' (Question 2i67 
566 Bilka ibid, at p.710. 
567 Paraphrased from the case report. 
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The Advocate General's Opinion 
In giving his opinion, Advocate General Darmon interpreted the respondent's view as being 
that the Jenkins judgment had implied that no distinction should be made between 'direct' and 
'indirect' discrimination as 'Part-time work consolidates the traditional roles between men 
and women, without making women economically independent. It is thus, she says, a 
manifestation of the conflict inherent in the situation faced by women: home and family on 
the one hand, employment on the other. Furthermore, in the present economic circumstances 
it encourages the employment of men in full-time positions. ,568 In its defence, Bilka argued 
that market factors related to the scarcity of labour during the 1970s had led to the necessity 
to give preference to the employment of full-time workers. This had been the rationale for the 
current pension arrangements which were not based on any sex-related criteria. 
The confusion caused by the Court's judgment in Jenkins is apparent in the UK's submission 
which argued that Article 119 was only applicable where an element of intention on the part 
of the employer was present, so that 'the court cannot step into the shoes of the employer in 
assessing his choice of business policy,.569 Moreover, the UK opined that Article 119 did not 
apply to 'indirect discrimination'. 
The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination was also central to the 
Commission's submission which argued that the terms 'covert' and 'indirect' discrimination 
were not particularly useful in defining the scope of the principles laid down by the Court.570 
568 A-G's Opinion at 117. 
569 A-G's Opinion at para 10. 
570 This confusion in tenninology originated in Defi"enne II, in which it was held that Article 119 could have 
direct effect in situations of direct discrimination, but could not in cases of indirect (disguised) discrinlination 
which would require further legislation in order to define it - see [1976] ECR 455, at para. 18. This distinction 
was subsequently removed from the Court's jurisprudence, starting with its decision in the CU11"ent case. 
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The judgment in Jenkins, read alongside the reference to Griggs ill Advocate General 
Warner's OplnIOn inferred that the Court 'intended to indicate that the absence of 
discriminatory intent on the employer's part is not enough to justify a finding that a provision 
which in fact placed women at a disadvantage was not contrary to the prohibition of 
discrimination.,571 With regard to Question 2 in the current case, the Commission submitted 
that the social objective of Article 119, as articulated in Defi'enne 11, can 'be effective only if 
employers' pay policy does in fact take into account the living and working conditions of 
women employed part-tinle. ,572 This would have required a wide consideration of the social 
objective of promoting improvements in the working and living conditions of Europeans as 
articulated in Articles 136 and 137. 573 
In considering the direct applicability of Article 119, AG Darmon did toy with the possibility 
that the current claim amounted to direct discrimination. 574 He did so to draw attention to 
what he called the 'tenninological ambiguity' in the German Court's first question. If the pay 
practice in Bilka amounted to 'different pay (in a broad sense) for identical work calTied out 
under different conditions (full or palt-time)', it would be classified as direct discrimination 
within the meaning of the judgment in Defi'enne II. However, this consideration was pushed 
to one side as 'it is not the nature of the discrimination which determines the competence of 
the court,.575 In referring to the Advocate General's opinion in Jenkins, AG Darmon 
emphasised that it was the issue of Article 119's direct effect that was at stake in such cases 
rather than the nature of the discrimination. Having latched on to Jenkins, the Advocate 
General opined (quoting directly from AG Warner's Opinion) that a difference in pay applied 
without distinction to workers of both sexes is not in itself contrary to the provision of Article 
571 A-G's Opinion at para 11. 
572 A-G's Opinion at para 11. 
573 Ex 117 and 118. 
574 I d. at para. 12. 
575 ld. 
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119 as it may be based on economic grounds which may be objectively justified 'by factors 
other than discrimination based on sex'. 576 It was up to the national court to deternline 
whether the difference in pay was in reality based on sex. 
Turning to consider whether the specific pay policy in Bilka, which was referred to in 
Question 2a as not being necessary for 'reasons of commercial expediency', Advocate 
General Darmon stated that, following Jenkins, a measure that is 'not economic in nature' 
could not be dismissed as a justification. If such a measure were deemed to amount to a 
justification, 'Nothing would appear to prohibit an employer from implementing a staff policy 
which encourages full-tinle employment, if that choice complies with the applicable rules of 
law and does not reflect an intent to discrinlinate. ,577 However, this must be balanced with 
the fact that the socio-cultural constraints faced by working women 'do not inlpose on 
employers additional obligations restricting their normal freedom to determine staff 
1· ,578 po iCy. 
The Judgment in BiUca 
The Court first considered the applicability of Article 119 to the pension scheme operated by 
Bilka, holding that the contractual nature of the scheme579 meant that it did amount to 
'consideration' in return for labour and, thus, fell within the scope of Article 119. In response 
to Question 1, the Court found that Article 119 was infringed by the exclusion of part-time 
employees fi.-om an occupational pension scheme, 'where that exclusion affects a far greater 
576 Id. at para. 13. 
577 Id. 
578 Id. 
579 As distinguished from a statutory scheme which would fall outside of the scope of Article 119 - see Case 
80/70 Defi'enne v Belgium [1971] ECR 445. 
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number of women than men, unless it could be shown that the exclusion was based on 
objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex. ,580 
In formulating its answer to Question 2 (a), the Court set down what has become the 
definitive test for objective justification in cases of indirect discrimination, holding (in line 
with the Commission's submission) that justification will be possible only where the 
measures chosen correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, are appropriate with 
a view to achieving that objective and are necessary to that end. The Court then responded to 
Question 2 (b) in the negative by stating that Article 119 did not impose an obligation on 
employers to organise their occupational pension schemes so as to take into account the 
particular difficulties faced by those with family responsibilities. 
The Test fOl" Objective Justification 
The court's decision in Bilka has been widely welcomed as establishing a right of access to 
occupational pension schemes for part-time workers and the guidance it provided for the 
application of this right has been used extensively ever since. 581 However, if the reasoning 
applied in the case is considered, several weaknesses can be identified which have had far-
reaching implications for the application and development of the equality principle in this 
context. First and foremost, the Court's reliance on the shaky foundations of the Jenkins case 
has meant that the success of related claims will depend on the ability of the claimant to show 
that denial of the right of access has a group impact, or, put more simply, complies with the 
requirements of indirect discrinlination. As discussed above, this position could have been 
580 Judgment at para. 28. 
581 Although, depending on the circumstances of the case, with varying degrees of success - see the section 
below on Retirement and Work-related Benefits, at pp. 239-252. 
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avoided by a straightforward companson of the pal82 of a male full-time worker and a 
female part-time worker. The conceptualisation of all equal pay claims by part-time workers 
as potential indirect discrimination subordinated this right to the need to advance statistical 
data which support the claim. Following Bilka, this right was further qualified by the need to 
ensure that such discrimination could not be 'objectively justified' on the basis of potentially 
subjective criteria. The reliance on statistical information in this respect has provided 
difficulties in sectors where women predominate in both full and pali-time work. 583 For part-
tinle women workers in such sectors, the requirement to show that a far greater number of 
women than men are affected by the discriminatory act can be unsurpassable if the 
comparison relied upon is between full and part-time workers. In such circumstances, the 
claim becomes a non-starter and, even where such 'proof' is forthcoming, the applicant must 
ensure that the discriminatory act cannot be justified. 
The COUli clarified the nature of the test for objective justification in Bilka by attaching 
certain criteria to its use. In order for a measure to be capable of being objectively justified, it 
must correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, be appropriate with a view to 
achieving that objective and be necessary to that end. This approach represents an amalgam 
of the principle of proportionality which is present in the national legal systems of several 
Member States. 584 In German law, the test of proportionality rests on an assessment of three 
factors: suitability of the measure under review for the attainment of the desired objective; the 
necessity of the disputed measure (i.e. there is no alternative measure available which is less 
restrictive of the individual's freedom); and the propOliionality of the measure to the 
.. lIb' I d 585 restnctions t lat are t lere y mvo ve . 
582 Including, under Article 119, membership of an occupational pension scheme 
583 Such as teaching and nursing. 
584 France and Germany being the most prominent examples. 
585 Craig and de Burca (2003) op cit at p. 372. 
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The test expounded by the Court in Bilka differs substantially from the contemporary German 
formulation through its self-justifying stance that the measure be both 'appropriate' and 
'necessary' in its achievement of the objective ('the real need of the business '). Use of the 
German test is qualified only by weighing up the effect of the measure and the restriction of 
the individual's freedom, whereas no such requirement is present in the test as stated in Bilka. 
In fact, the Bilka test can be read in almost 'leading' telIDS in favour of employers' interests: 
once a 'real need' is identified, the measures chosen to support it serve to justify their own 
existence by being both appropriate and necessary to ensure it is achieved. Although the 
Court made it clear that the use of the test should always be considered by national courts in 
light of the specific facts of each case, the conceptual foundations of this test are questionable 
as a means of furthering the principle of equality. Its main weakness lies in the lack of any 
requirement to balance the employer'S needs against those of the individual disadvantaged by 
the imposition of the measure. In Bilka these components amounted to the gaining of a 
commercial advantage by a business pitched against the denial of an individual's pension 
rights. If the loss suffered by the claimant due to the discrimination caused is weighed up 
against the consequences of deprivation of the business need (as required by the German test), 
it is at least possible to make an assessment of the relative values ofthe factors at stake. In the 
context of the relationship between employer and employee, it also becomes apparent that 
some rights may be more fundamental in securing the well-being and security of workers than 
others, with entitlement to a pension placed high up this list. 
This leads to the next issue; that raised by the Court's response to Question 2 (b) concerning 
whether, in formulating the arrangements pertaining to pension entitlement, employers should 
take any account of the 'special difficulties experienced by employees with family 
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commitments in fulfilling the requirements for an occupational pension'. The Court found this 
to be beyond the scope of Article 119 with no other basis under EC law as it stood. In Bilka it 
had been argued that employers should be under an obligation to ensure that periods when 
women workers have had to meet family responsibilities should count as periods of full-time 
employment for the purposes of calculating pension entitlement. 586 The Court's refusal to 
entertain the possibility that the effects of part-time employment or breaks in continuity of 
employment could not be mitigated by the provision of Article 119 perpetuates the 
disadvantage suffered by women in old age. Furthermore, given the apparently wide 
application of Article 119 as set out in Defi"enne II, could the Court not have enabled this link 
between the principle of equality and the living and working conditions of Europeans to be 
established by applying a contextual or teleological approach to take in the effects of the 
social aims of Treaty as articulated by Article 119's near neighbours, Articles 117 and 1187587 
More fundamentally, it is questionable that the COUlt's answer to Question 1 regarding the 
prohibition under Article 119 of exclusion of patt-time women workers from an occupational 
pension scheme can be seen as indicative of any real commitment to the principle of equality 
in such circumstances if the factors influencing women's inability to work full-time cannot be 
considered as relevant to the interpretation afforded to Article 119. In its reasoning in Bilka, it 
appears that the COUlt was prepared to go only so far, in enabling Article 119 to be interpreted 
in light of the impact of measures on women as a 'group', and no further. The future success 
of such claims would depend, not on the existence or impact of discriminatory measures, but 
rather on the ability to advance statistical data in support of the existence of such impact with, 
in cases where it could be identified, the resulting discrimination vulnerable to the possibility 
of justification. 
58G Judgment in Bilka op cit. at para 40. 
587 Now Articles 136 and 137. 
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P.·oving Disproportionate Impact 
The use of statistical data as a means of providing evidence in support of (or to disprove) such 
claims has its origins in the US Supreme Court case Griggs v Duke Power Co. 588 Although 
Griggs was refened to by both of the Advocate Generals in Jenkins and Bilka and by the 
Couti in Jenkins as authority for the application of the indirect discrimination approach, the 
reasoning applied by the Supreme Couti has little in common with the ECl's approach in 
either case. 
In Griggs, the practice of applying the criteria of a high school education or passing a general 
intelligence test as conditions of employment were found by the Supreme Court to be 
prohibited589 if they were not significantly related tojob performance and operated to 'freeze' 
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices. The reasoning of the Court was 
based on the fact that the practical effect of the criteria was to disqualify black applicants at a 
substantially higher rate than white applicants. This was because, under the conditions pre-
dating the passing of the Civil Rights Act, black people had received inferior educations in 
segregated schools. Furthermore, the jobs to which the criteria were attached had formerly 
been filled only by white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to 
white applicants. Although Griggs was brought as a class action and the petitioners' claim 
was demonstrable by the use of statistical data, the Supreme Couti's decision did not rest on 
the presentation of that data590 but rather on the nature and effect of the criteria. In deciding 
588 401 US 424 (1971). 
589 By Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964. 
590 The data was in fact necessary to prove the validity of the claim, as the failure of one black individual to 
graduate from high school or pass the intelligence test could have been merely indicative of the fact that the 
individual was of below average intelligence. However, by presenting a statistical analysis showing that all of 
the applicants who had not completed high school or taken the test had continued to perform satisfactorily, the 
petitioners were able to show that the criteria were inelevant in assessing job performance. In Bilka, in contrast, 
the act of excluding part-time workers from the pension scheme and its effects on the individual were obvious 
without statistical proof. 
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whether such a policy could be justified despite its impact, the Court held that the 'touchstone 
is business necessity,/91 meaning the necessity of the application of the criteria. In the 
circumstances, the criteria were not found to be necessary as they were not significantly 
related to job performance. Although the Court recognised that a balance must be struck 
between the attainment of equality and the pursuit of satisfying genuine business needs, in 
reaching its decision preference was given to the elimination of historical disadvantage 
suffered by black people in line with the overriding objectives of the legislation. 
This approach can be fundamentally distinguished from the reasoning applied by the ECl By 
specifically stating that it was not necessary for account to be taken of the particular 
difficulties faced by those with family responsibilities in the formulation of employers' 
policies, the ECl in Bilka closed off the possibility that such issues could be raised as relevant 
factors in subsequent claims. In relation to Griggs, the guidelines set down by the European 
COUli on the test for objective justification differ fundamentally fi·om those established by the 
Supreme Court on the issue of justification for disparate impact by way of which 'the posture 
and condition of the job-seeker [should] be taken into account'. 592 Furthermore, the European 
Court's interpretation of the phrase 'commercial expediency' appears to be substantially 
different from that of the Supreme Court's reading of 'business necessity', with the former 
being established as a 'real need on the part of the undertaking' and the latter arising from a 
job-centred necessity measurable by the performance (actual or potential) ofthe incumbent. 
By the European Court's treatment of the claims in Jenkins and Bilka, the operation of the 
principle of equality in relation to those who sought to pursue part-tinle work alongside 
family responsibilities very quickly became subordinated to the technicalities of indirect 
591 Judgment in Griggs, op cit n. 65, at 43l. 
592 Id. at 430. 
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discrimination claims which were open to the possibility of justification on a potentially wide 
range of grounds. Furthermore, the subjective nature of the test coupled with the wide 
discretion given to national courts in interpreting such justifications looked set to be the cause 
of different standards of application across Member States. These concerns will be further 
explored below in the context of subsequent cases brought by atypical workers on a variety of 
grounds. 
Both Jenkins and Bilka were concerned with the applicability of Article 119 to employer's 
policies which, prima facie, disadvantaged female part-tinle workers in comparison to their 
male full-time counterparts. In both cases, the employers concerned attempted to defend their 
policies on the grounds that they were gender neutral as their objective was to discourage 
part-time work and encourage full-time work. The Court, at least theoretically, accepted that 
this was a legitimate practice as long as the use of such a policy could be justified on the 
grounds of genuine business needs. Furthermore, in the Court's interpretation of Article 119 
in Bilka, the relationship between the necessity for women to work part-time in order to 
balance their labour market activity with family responsibilities was found not to be a relevant 
factor for employers to consider in the formulation of workplace policy, at least in relation to 
occupational pension schemes. This was despite the fact that the correct approach in 
formulating such a claim was to show that the policy in question had caused a 
disproportionate adverse impact on women as a group or on a particular group of women due 
to their family responsibilities. 
Despite the recognition of formal equality as a legislative aim within the legal systems of 
Member States, the development and application of policy in many areas is still heavily 
influenced by the public/private dichotomy within which women are viewed as 'the other' by 
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measurement against a male norm. 593 This is apparent in many of the State-led policy strands 
relevant to public and private sector employment in relation to which Article 119 has direct 
effect. 594 Following the 'success' of the claims in Jenkins and Bilka, it was only a matter of 
time before a case came before the ECJ in which a worker sought to review the legality of a 
State measure which had an adverse impact on her pay due to her status as a female part-time 
employee. 
Rinnel'-Kiihn595 
The claimant, Mrs Rinner-Kuhn, was employed by an office cleaning business for 10 hours 
per week. During a period of illness, she was informed that she was not entitled to sick pay in 
accordance with nationallegislation596 which excluded those who worked 10 hours or less per 
week from the continued payment of wages. Mrs Rinner-Kuhn submitted a claim to the 
Labour Court asserting that the provision constituted discrimination against women contrary 
to Article 119 as the number of women in part-time employment was considerably higher 
than the number of men so employed. In response, the German Government stated that the 
exclusion of part-time workers from the obligation placed on employers to continue to pay 
wages during periods of illness was due to the fact that such workers were not as integrated in 
or dependent on the undertaking employing them as other workers. 
The German Court asked the ECJ to consider the compatibility of the legislative provision 
that excluded part-time workers from the continued payment of wages during periods of 
illness with Article 119 and Council Directive 75/117 (the Equal Pay Directive) in light of the 
593 See Chapter 2 infi"a. 
594 See Case 43175 Deji-enne ffECR 455 
595 Case 171/88 Rinner-Kiihn v. FfVW Spezial-GeMudereinigzmg GmbH & Co. KG [1989] ECR 2743. 
596 Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz (Act on the Continued Payment of Wages). 
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fact that the proportion of women adversely affected by the prOViSion was considerably 
1 h . f 597 greater t Ian t e proportlOn 0 men. 
The Advocate General's Opinion 
The first issue considered by Advocate-General Darmon was whether sick pay should be 
recognised as 'pay' for the purposes of Article 119. In referring to the Court's defmition of 
pay in an earlier case598 as 'any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, whether 
immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, albeit indirectly, in respect of his 
employment from his employer', A-G Darmon contemplated whether sick pay could be 
included in this definition. The crucial factor was deemed to be the origin of the payment 
which, if it had been directly made by the state, would have constituted a form of social 
security and thus been excluded from the scope of Article 119 as established in Defi'enne 
111.599 However, the payment in the present case was made by the employer and so was 
contractual in nature. This meant, in A-G Darmon's opinion, that it should be regarded as 
'pay' within the meaning of Article 119.600 
Referring to the judgments in Jenkins and Bilka, the Advocate General expressed some 
hesitancy about their application to the circumstances of the current case due to the nature of 
the measure under review as a State provision. The need to apply the criteria for objective 
justification in order to justify such an action, as established in Bilka, would necessitate 
reliance on the reasons for its enactment which may be difficult to discern particularly if it 
597 Statistics requested by the Court from the Commission showed that the category of employees whose nonnal 
working week was less than ten hours was made up of significantly more women than men in seven Member 
States with Getmany at the top of the table with 89% of such workers being women. 
598 Case 12/81 Garland v British Rail Engineering [1982] ECR 359. 
599 Case 149177 Defi·enne v SABENA [1978] ECR 1365. 
600 A-G's Opinion at pA (937). 
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had been introduced by Parliament. Following Bilka, AG Damon opined that it was possible 
to infer that a measure is not necessarily incompatible with the Treaty solely because it has a 
discriminatory effect provided 'it is based on objective factors and is not meant to be 
discriminatory,.601 In the current context, the impact of the measure could be distinguished 
from an employer's policy on the grounds that the effects of State policy on men and women 
was just one of a number of factors which must be taken into account in formulating such 
policy. In the interests of legal celtainty, the Advocate General asserted that the favoured 
approach would be to refrain from reversing the burden of proof so that the legislative 
provision should only be found to be incompatible with Article 119 if it could be shown to 
have been based on objectives related to sex discrimination. 
The Judgment in Rillller-Kiillll 
The Court appears not to have had the same difficulties as A-G Damon in considering 
whether national legislative measures should be excluded from the provision of Article 119 or 
subject to any special treatment in this respect. In referring to its judgment in Defrel1l1e II, the 
Court recalled that Atticle 119 had imposed on Member States an obligation, during the first 
stage, to ensure the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay 
for equal work. Furthermore, the exclusion of certain part-tinle workers from the provision of 
sick pay and the disproportionate impact of such a policy on women, as compared to men, 
meant that the provision was contrary to the aim of Atticle 119. 
Rejecting the approach suggested by the Advocate-General that the use of the objective 
justification requirement might not be appropriate in the case of State policy, the COUlt 
601 Ibid at p.7 (942). 
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applied essentially the same test as that fonnulated in Bilka which had equal application 
regardless of the nature of the measure as a State provision or an employer policy. The 
tenninology adopted by the Court in Rinner-Kilhn varied from that used in Bilka, so that the 
'real need of the business' became 'a necessary aim of social policy,602 and rather than 
requiring the means chosen to achieve that aim to be 'appropriate and necessary', the Court in 
Rinner-Kilhn stated that it must be 'suitable and requisite'. 603 
Although it was for the national court to detemline whether a legislative provision which, 
although gender neutral on its face, affects a greater number of women than men is justified 
on objective grounds unrelated to sex, the Court did proffer an opinion regarding the 
suitability ofthe explanation given in the current case. The German Government's submission 
that those working less than 10 hours a week were not as integrated in, or as dependent on, the 
employing undertaking as others amounted to 'generalisations about certain categories of 
workers' and thus did not enable criteria which were objective and unrelated to sex 
discrimination to be identified. 604 However, if the Member State could show that the means 
chosen met a 'necessary aim of its social policy', the 'mere fact that the provision affect[ ed] a 
much greater number of female workers than male workers' could not 'be regarded as 
constituting an infringement of Article 119. ,605 
Social Policy as a Ground fOl' Justification 
The Court's approach in Rinner-Kiihn, which was broadly consistent with that in Jenkins and 
Bilka, did serve to further the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectation in the 
602 Judgment at para 14. 
603 Id. 
604 Ibid at para. 13. 
605 Id. at para 14. 
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area of part-time workers' rights in cases of sex discrimination. However, the entrenchment 
of the conceptualisation of such pay claims as individual indirect discrimination claims with 
the opportunity for employers and Member States to defend their actions through the 
advancement of an objective justification meant that the law on atypical workers' rights was 
now written. There would be no further opportunity for Article 119 to be interpreted as 
providing an absolute right to the same 'pay' (as defmed under Article 119) for men and 
women regardless of their hours of work or other contractual arrangements which deviated 
from those applicable to the normative model of the 'standard worker'. 606 Furthermore, the 
judgment in Rinner-Kuhn regarding the possible justification for State provisions which 
amounted, prima facie, to discrimination against women workers due to their inability to 
comply with the normative model gave Member States an apparently wide discretion in this 
respect. That such provisions could be justified if they amounted to a necessary aim of social 
policy had the potential at least to enable States to develop self-fulfilling strategies which 
differentiated between different groups of workers in order to encourage or discourage celiain 
labour market behaviour on economic or social grounds, with those who were disadvantaged 
having no clear protection under Community law. In this respect, the status quo remained 
more or less intact with further opportunities for the deregulation of labour markets being 
potentially compatible with the principle of equal pay as provided for under Article 119. In 
the years since Rinner-Kuhn, Member States have sought to utilise this potential in different 
ways with various degrees of success and some of those attempts will be considered in the 
proceeding analysis. 
606 Specifically those exhibiting the 'typical' characteristics of the (male) nonn - full-time and pennanent. 
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The COUl't'S Jul'isprudence on Sex Discl'imination and Atypical Workel's 
Following the early trio of cases considered above, the ECJ has adjudicated on the 
interpretation of Community law in the context of a further 18 cases concernmg atypical 
workers' rights to equal pay and treatment. The assessment of the Court's reasoning m 
Jenkins, Bilka and Rinner-Kiihn identified certain key features which served to undermine the 
principle of equality when applied to the rights of women workers classified as 'atypical' due 
to their inability to conform to a normative model of the 'standard worker'. These are: 
l. The conceptualisation of atypical wOI'kers' claims as indirect disctimination 
The requirement to show a disproportionate impact on women as a group or a specific group 
of women coupled with the fact that, even where such claims can be made out, the 
discriminatory practice or policy is potentially capable of justification, have presented 
insurmountable difficulties to some would-be claimants. The effect of conceptualising claims 
in this way, although helpful as a means of providing otherwise unattainable redress, severely 
limits the use of Article 141 and associated legislation in this context as the interpretation of 
the principle of equal pay and treatment is not capable of providing fundamental direct rights 
to women. The use of statistical data, although 'objective' on its face, may be deeply 
subjective as the selection of different 'pools for comparison' can produce different results; 
furthermore, not all women who are disadvantaged due to their inability to work full time on 
the grounds of family responsibilities are able to show a disproportionate impact as 'women's 
work' is traditionally overcrowded with women in both full and part-time posts. The deciding 
factor for differentiating part-time and full-time work, according to Jenkins, is in the nature of 
'the job' so that, according to the COUlt's reasoning, certeris parabus, the job performed by 
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full-time and part-time workers will be deemed to be different, even if the tasks performed 
and the working methods are identical. 607 
2. The I'elationship between women's labour market pat1icipation and family 
I'esponsibilities (sex/gender) 
It is clear from the reasoning applied in Jenkins and from the response to Question 2(b) in 
Bilka that Article 119 (now 141) does not impose an obligation on employers to take account 
of the relationship between women's labour market behaviour and family arrangements in the 
formulation of policy. This finding sends out a mixed message to employers who must 
attempt to reconcile it with the possibility that the imposition of certain measures may give 
rise to indirect discrimination which is not justifiable unless the Bilka test can be met. As a 
consequence, although the reasons for women's 'different' labour market behaviour need not 
explicitly inform employer behaviour, inlplicitly the reverse appears to be true as strategies 
promoting seemingly 'neutral' policies should take account of their likely or possible impact 
on women as a group or a specific group of women. Consequently, there is no express 
requirement for any authority (employers, the State, the courts) to question the effects of 
historical disadvantage on, for example, women's labour market behaviour or career 
progression arising from a recent past of lawful discrimination against women in employment 
or to consider the social construction of gender with regard to the biological differences 
between the sexes. 
607 Case 96/80 Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Limited [1981] ECR 911. 
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3. The use of the objective justification test 
The weaknesses of this particular aspect of the Court's jurisprudence have been discussed in 
some detail above and can be summarised in the following terms: the proportionality test 
formulated in Bilka is based solely on employer's needs and, in its application, does not 
require this aspect to be weighed against the impact of the loss or detriment sustained by the 
individual as a result of the discrimination; apparently wide discretion is given to employers 
and Member States in attempts to justify indirect discrimination on the grounds of the 'real 
need of the business' or a 'necessary aim of social policy'. 
All of these factors, when considered in the context of the court's jurisprudence in the three 
early cases are indicative of the stance taken with regard to gender relations and, specifically, 
the subordination of women's rights to a market order in which the standard worker model 
(male, full-time breadwinner) is assumed to be the most efficient provider of paid labour in 
line with the smooth operation of the market. However, in order to continue to conform to this 
particular model of male behaviour during and beyond the years of family formation, men 
depend on women's conformity to an equally traditional model of female behaviour by 
providing essential childcare and other unpaid work within the family. The Court's 
jurisprudence, in effect, supports the continuance of such gendered roles within families and 
the workplace by consistently finding, in the early cases at least, that the right to equal pay is 
largely dependent on the ability of the individual to exhibit male characteristics in regard to 
labour market behaviour. Failing this, the 'right' cannot be guaranteed. The next stage of 
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analysis, will seek to establish whether this position has been sustained by the Court in its 
subsequent judgments. The following questions will underpin this analysis: 
• Did the Court consistently apply such reasoning to the cases that came after Jenkins, Bilka 
and Rinner-Kiihn or has its own evolution enabled a more progressive stance? 
• Was the reasoning applied by the Court in subsequent cases concerning the interpretation 
of Article 141 more teleological in nature in line with other areas of its jurisprudence and 
the early promise of D efi'e nne II? 
• Are restrictions to the 'wider view' permitted by the Court on occasion more often applied 
in the circumstances where women are at their most different from men (i.e. when they 
seek to reconcile the public and private domains by combining the challenges of family 
responsibility with paid employment)? 
The Differentiation of Contractual Terms through Collective Agreement 
In Kowalska,608 the Court found that a contractual arrangement applicable to civil servants 
made through a collective agreement609 did fall within the scope of Article 119. This was the 
first of a line of referrals from German courts concerning the use of collective agreements 
which discriminated against patt-timers by the imposition of less favourable telIDS and 
conditions than those applicable to full_timers 610 or, as in the present case, by their total 
exclusion from certain work-related benefits. The issue at stake in Kowalska was the 
exclusion of part-timers from the arrangements for severance pay which was normally 
payable upon retirement. The scheme under review excluded those who worked less than 38 
hours per week on the grounds that 'part-time workers do not provide for their needs and 
608 Case 33/89 Kowalska v Freie und Handsestadt Hamburg [1990] ECR 1-259l. 
609 Namely the Bundesangestelltentarifvertrag (Federal Civil Service Employees' Collective Agreement) 
hereinafter referred to as the ''BAT''. 
610 See Case 184/89 Nimz (n. 92 below) and Case C-1I95 Gerster (n. 133 below). 
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those of their families exclusively out of their income from their employment'. 6ll On this 
basis, it was contended by Ms Kowalska's employers, there was no duty to provide temporary 
assistance for such employees on termination of employment. 
The Court found that the practice of excluding part-time workers from a severance pay 
scheme amounted to indirect discrimination which was potentially justifiable under the 
Bilka612 test. In contrast to its judgment in Rinner-Kiihn,613 the Court remained silent on the 
appropriateness of the employer's defence in Kowalska which depended wholly on a stereo-
typical view of part-timers' attachment to the labour market and the classification of such 
workers' income as 'pin money' subsidiary to that of the 'breadwinner'. Nevertheless, the 
value of the judgment in Kowalska remains the Court's willingness to accept that, where 
discrimination arises as a result of a collective agreement, part-time workers should be 
entitled to the same treatment and made subject to the same scheme, proportionately to the 
number of hours worked, as other workers.614 
In Nimz,615 the Court was confronted with the differential use of length of service 
requirements for the purposes of incremental progression. As in Kowalska, the scheme in 
question had been collectively agreed by the parties to the BATG1G and provided that length of 
service for those who worked for more than 50% and for less than 75% of normal working 
hours should be calculated at half the period of employment in comparison to those who 
regularly worked normal working hours. 617 The claimant had been employed on a part-time 
basis (20 hours per week) for six years and was refused reclassification to a higher grade 
611 Judgment at para 14. 
612 Case 170/84Bilka-Kaujhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber Von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607. 
613 Case 171/88 Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW Spezial-Gebaudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG [1989] ECR 2743. 
614 Judgment at para 21. 
615 Case 184/89 Nimz v Freie lind Hansestadt Hamburg [1991] ECR 1-297. 
616 See above at note 86. 
617 Defined as 35 hours per week. 
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available to full-time workers with a comparable length of service on account of her part-time 
status in accordance with the BAT. In order to qualify for progression under the scheme, she 
would have to have worked for 12 years. Her employers contended that the differential 
treatment was based on the fact that full-time workers or those who worked for 75% of 
normal working time acquired the abilities and skills relating to their job more quickly and 
had more extensive experience than those classified as part-time. 
The Court followed Kowalska in holding that Atiicle 119 should be interpreted as precluding 
a collective agreement which discriminated against part-time workers unless such a provision 
could be objectively justified. In referring to its earlier judgment in Rinner-Kiihn, the Court 
found the employer's defence amounted to 'generalisations about certain categories of 
workers ,618 which did not make it possible to identify objective criteria which are unrelated to 
discrimination on the grounds of sex. Whilst acknowledging that 'experience goes hand in 
hand with length of service, and experience enables the worker in principle to improve 
peliormance of the tasks alloted to him',619 when deciding on the objectivity of such a 
criterion, regard must be had to the circumstances of each individual case and 'in particular 
the relationship between the nature of the work performed and the experience gained from the 
performance of that work upon completion of a certain number of working hours. ,620 
The judgment in Nimz is of particular interest in the current context for two reasons: on the 
one hand the COUli acknowledged the value of seniority as a potentially valid criterion in 
assessing suitability for career progression, but on the other, it hinted at the use of a more 
rigorous assessment than that applicable in the current case whereby the job holder's 
competences should be measured in some way as a basis for incremental progression. The use 
618 Judgment at para 14. 
619 Ibid 
620 I d. 
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of seniority as a sole means of assessing suitability for progression up a pay scale, although 
still widely used in public sector employment, will generally disadvantage women as a group 
due to the mobility in and out of the labour market during the years of family formation and 
dependency which characterises women's employment.621 That this observation did not 
inform the Court's reasoning in Nimz more explicitly, particularly given the discriminatory 
nature of the scheme in question, served to restrict the potentially wide impact of the 
judgment. However, the Court's implicit advocacy of a competence-based approach which 
takes account of the genuine connection between time served and the acquisition of skills and 
abilities regardless of pati or full-time status, is progressive. Furthermore, the establishment 
of this impoliant connection marks a move away from the Court's earlier position that once a 
job is performed on a part-time basis, it differs in some way in its nature from its full-time 
counterpart.622 In Nimz, the Court implicitly accepted that, where the tasks performed by full 
and part-time workers are identical, decisions regarding pay progression should place 
emphasis on the actual levels of competence acquired through completion of those tasks 
rather than on the assumed levels of competence of part-time workers as measured against 
those of full-time workers. In this respect, Nimz marks a change of direction in the Court's 
jurisprudence on part-time women workers by their recognition as autonomous post-holders, 
capable of having their own standards of achievement, rather than as a tolerable aberration 
from the normative model of the standard (male) worker. 
The progress made in the reasoning of the COUli in Nimz, however, was short_lived. 623 In 
joined cases Helmig, 624 the Court backtracked on this advancement in finding that an overtime 
621 See Chapter 3 infi'a. 
622 See Case 96/80 Jenkins, op cit at n. 13 
623 Although the Court's recognition of the need to view part-time workers in certain respects independently 
from their full-time counterparts did re-emerge in its later judgments in Case C-1/95 Gerstel; Case C-243/95 Hill 
and Stapleton and Case C-285/02 Elsnel'-Lakebel'g - see below at n. 160. 
624 Cases C-399/92, C-409 and 425/92, C-34, 50 and 78/93 Stadt Lengel'ich v. Helmig [1994] ECR 1-5727. 
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supplement payable under a collective agreement to full-time staff who worked more than 
their ordinary working week,625 was not payable to part-time workers working in excess of 
their normal contractual working week. The claimants in the five cases referred by German 
courts on almost identical facts, were all subject to collective agreements626 which excluded 
part-time workers from eligibility for overtime supplements unless they worked in excess of 
the nOlmal working hours applicable to full-time workers. The claimants argued that such 
supplements should be available to them for any hours worked in addition to their individual 
contractual hours. The employers' responses to the allegations of indirect sex discrimination 
were focused on two inter-related issues as articulated in the various questions referred by the 
German courts. First, the intention of the overtime premium payment was to compensate for 
an 'increased physical burden and to prevent the imposition of excessive demands upon 
employees' and, in the case of part-time workers 'no comparable burden is imposed where the 
[worker] merely exceeds the contractually agreed working hours without working the normal 
weekly hours worked by a full-time employee'. 627 Second that 'it may generally be assumed 
that restriction on leisure time affects employees employed for normal working hours ... more 
h . I ,628 t an part-tune emp oyees. 
In reaching its decision, the Court stated 'there is unequal treatment wherever the overall pay 
of full-time employees is higher than that of part-time employees for the same number of 
hours worked. ,629 Consequently, the fact that part-time employees would receive the same 
625 In this context 38.5 hours per week. 
626 In Cases C-399/92, C-425/92 and C-78/93 the BAT was applicable (see note 86 ibid). In the other cases, the 
appropriate collective agreements, containing identical provisions to the BAT were as follows: in Case C-
409/92, the Ersatzkassentarifvetrag (Collective Agreement I'elating to Private Health Insurance Scheme 
Employees); in Cases C-34/93, the Knappschafisangestelltentarifvertrag (Collective Agreement for Employees 
covered by the Miners' Insurance Fund; in Case C-50/93, the Rahmentaliivertrag fUr die Gewerblichen 
Arbeitnehmer im Gebaudereinigerhandwerk (Collective Agreement Applicable to Employees in the Industrial 
Cleaning Sector). 
627 Question 3 in Case C-399/92 see the judgment at para 4. 
628 Question 2 (b) in Case C-34/93 - see judgment at para 4. 
629 Judgment at para 27. 
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overall pay as full-timers if they worked more than the normal working hours 'because on 
doing so they become entitled to overtime supplements', 630 meant that the provisions were 
found not to give rise to 'different treatment as between part-time and full-time employees' 
and were therefore compatible with Article 119. 
The reasonmg applied in Helmig represents a nan"ow application of the already limited 
conceptual foundations of the Court's jurisprudence on indirect discrimination by failing to 
take specific account of the relationship between women's labour market participation and 
family responsibilities. The relevance of this aspect, in the Court's reasoning, was always 
restricted631 but, in its previous judgments on the application of Article 119 to part-time 
women workers,632 the reasons why women work part-time were at least acknowledged 
through its findings of indirect discrimination. In ruling that the payment of overtime 
premium rates was not applicable to part-time workers, the COUlt had taken a retrograde step 
from its position in Nimz, by reasselting the subordination of patt-time workers' rights to the 
'nonnal' working practices of their full-time counterparts. Furthermore, although not 
specifically refen"ed to in the judgment, one cannot but wonder how influential the employers' 
attempted justifications were over the Court's position. Helmig's legacy appears to be an 
acceptance by the Court that women's double burden of paid employment and family 
responsibility is insignificant when measured against the physical effort expended in 
confonnity to the normal working hours of the standard worker. Furthennore, the association 
of patt-time work and um"estricted 'leisure' time brought about by the unchallenged defence 
of the terms of the collective agreements reveals a complete lack of understanding of the 
reality of women's working lives. 
630 Judgment at para 29. 
631 See above at p. 216. 
632 See, for example, Case 98/80 Jenkins, Case 170/84 Bilka, Case 171/88 Rinner-Kiihn, Case 33/89 Kowalska 
and Case 184/89 Nimz above. 
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In a more recent case on the application of collective agreements to part-time women 
workers' tenns and conditions,633 the Court was asked to consider the applicability of Article 
141 to a Christmas bonus scheme which excluded part-time workers on the grounds that their 
employment relationship was not covered by the collective agreement governing the 
scheme.634 The claimant in Kriiger had reduced her working hours to less than 15 per week635 
following the buih of a child. She had returned to work early while on childcare leave for 
which she was paid a childcare allowance which was guaranteed for three years as long as her 
earning remained under the social insurance threshold. On being refused the annual Christmas 
bonus, equivalent to one months' salary, Ms Kruger brought an action before the labour court 
in Munich. The employers asserted that, under the collective agreement, persons in minor 
employment were excluded from its scope. The labour court regarded the practice of 
excluding such workers as indirect discrimination as 90% of those receiving similar benefits 
to Ms Kruger were women. A fuliher complicating factor was that, under the scheme, those 
who did not work while on childcare leave received the Christmas bonus in the first year of 
their leave. 
In contrast to the ECl's previous case law involving the use of collective agreements in which 
the alleged discrimination arose solely as a result of the relevant agreement, the application of 
the scheme in Kriiger came about through a combination of the agreement coupled with the 
provisions of national legislation. This enabled the use of a 'social policy' justification636 
articulated as 'the fact that persons in minor employment are not requu'ed to pay social 
633 Case C-281197 Kriiger v Kl'eiskrankenhaus Ebel'sbel'g [1999] ECR 1-5127. 
634 The BAT - see n. 86 ibid 
635 Classified as "minor employment" under the Sozialgesetzbuch (Code of Social Law). 
636 See Case 171/88 Rinnel'-Kiihn op cit at n.n. 
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insurance contributions'. 637 In considering this as a potential justification, the Court refel1-ed 
to its previous case law in the field of social securitl38 in which it had been established that 
'as Community law now stands, social policy is a matter for the Member States. 
Consequently, it is for the Member States to choose the measures capable of achieving the 
aims of their social and employment policy. In exercising that competence, the Member 
States have a broad margin of discretion. ,639 However, the Court distinguished the CUlTent 
situation from those relevant to the social security cases in that it was the tel1llS of the 
collective agreement which were the cause of the different treatment of part-tinlers, rather 
than a measure adopted by the German legislature in the exercise of its discretionary power or 
an application of a basic principle of the national social security system. On this basis, the 
exclusion by collective agreement of those engaged in minor employment from entitlement to 
the annual bonus was found to constitute indirect sex discrimination. 
The reasoning applied in distinguishing the origin of the discriminatory measure in the CUlTent 
case from discrimination which arises through the application of national legislation in the 
social or employment fields tells us much about the development of the social policy 
justification since its establishment in Rinner-Kilhn. Although willing to apply a generally 
consistent approach to cases involving employers' policies causing disproportionate adverse 
impact for part-time women workers, the Court appeared reluctant to apply the same 
interpretation of the principle of equality under Article 141 and associated legislation in cases 
concerning the 'broad margin of discretion' afforded to Member States. Rinner-Kiihn had 
come before the Court in 1989 and Kriiger in 1999. During the intervening ten years, the 
637 AG Leger's Opinion at para. A43. 
638 In cases C-317/93 Nolte v Landesversicherllngsanstalt Hannover [1995] ECR 1-4625 and C-444/93 Megner 
and Scheffil v lnnungskrankenkasse Rheinhessen-Pfalz [1995] ECR 1-4741- see judgment in Kriiger at para 28. 
639 Judgment at para 28. 
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Court had considered the discriminatory impact of national measures on tlu'ee occasions, It is 
on those cases that attention will now be focused. 
Measures Arising though the Application of National Legislation 
In a line of German cases with almost identical facts, the Court was asked on tlu'ee separate 
occasions to interpret Article 119 and Directive 75/117 in the context of compensation for 
attendance at training courses connected with the work of staff committees. In Botel, the first 
of the cases to come before the ECl, the claimant who worked an average of 29.25 hours per 
week attended training for 50.3 hours in one week. Those normally working 40 hours per 
week were entitled to compensation equal to the amount of time spent on the course in excess 
of their normal working week. 640 Ms Botel was paid for her normal working hours but did not 
receive pay for the additional time spent at the training course due to a loophole in the 
legislation which made no provision for part-tinle workers' attendance at such training in 
excess of their usual working hours. This appears to have arisen by accident rather than 
design as 'the BetrVG envisaged only the case of full-time workers ,.641 
In giving its judgment, the Court observed that the exclusion of part-time workers from 
provisions enabling the payment of compensation for attendance at training courses over and 
above their normal working hours would be likely to dissuade such workers, the majority of 
whom are women, from participating in staff committees and related activities, thus making it 
more difficult for such workers to be represented. Accordingly, the cOUlt had no hesitation in 
finding the national legislation in question to be contrary to Article 119 and Directive 75/117 
640 As provided for under s.37 of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (Act on the Organisation of Enterprises) 
hereinafter referred to as "the BetrVG". 
641 Case C-360/90 Arbeiterwohlfahrt del' Stadt Berlin NV v Botel [1992] ECR 1-3589, at para. 451. 
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unless the Member State could establish that it was justified by objective factors unrelated to 
sex discrimination. 
In Lewark,642 the same issue was reopened by the Bundesarbeitsgericht643 which was of the 
opinion that the judgment given in Botel was based on a misunderstanding of the legal 
position of staff council members under German legislation. What the ECJ had failed to 
consider, according to the Bundesarbeitsgericht, was that staff council functions are 
performed on an honorary and unpaid basis 'outside of any relationship of subordination,.644 
Accordingly, their performance does not constitute 'work' within the meaning of Article 119 
and the compensation provided for by the legislation does not constitute pay but is aimed at 
ensuring that staff council members do not lose wages as a result of attending training. 
Furthermore, it was contended, the German legislation did not differentiate between staff 
council members working part-time and full-time as they were all protected in the same way 
against loss of wages. In an attempt to cover all possibilities, the Court offered as a potential 
justification the fact that payment of staff council functions at a rate above that equal to the 
actual loss of wages might potentially compromise the independence of staff council members 
who might be influenced by the 'attraction of special payment,.G45 
The ECJ, in part, held on to its reasoning in Botel by stating that, although the compensation 
in question was not contractual in nature, it was 'nevertheless paid by the employer by virtue 
of legislative provisions and under a contract of payment,64G and, accordingly, did fall within 
the scope of Article 119. FUlihermore, following Helmig, 647 the Court found that unequal 
642 Case C-457/93 Kuratorium fUr Dialyse und Nierentransplantation v Lewark [1996] ECR 1-243. 
643 Federal Labour Court 
644 Judgment at para 14. 
645 Judgment at para 16. 
646 Judgment at para 22. 
647 Cases C-399/92, C-409 and 425/92, C-34, 50 and 78/93 [1994] ECR 1-5727 ibid 
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treatment arose wherever the overall pay of full-time employees is higher than that of part-
time employees for the same number of hours worked. This was the case in circumstances 
where training courses were organised during full-time working hours, but outside the 
individual working hours of part-time workers, if the amount of compensation for attendance 
was only payable in proportion to the number of hours nonnally worked by the individual. As 
a consequence, the Court held that the application of the legislative provisions under review 
did amount to indirect discrimination. However, the Court was less emphatic on the issue of 
objective justification leaving the door ajar to the possibility that the role of staff councils in 
the development and operation of German social policy meant that 'the concern to ensure the 
independence of the members of those councils thus ... reflects a legitimate aim of social 
1· ,648 po iCy. It would still be up to the national court to determine that the difference in 
treatment was suitable and necessary for achieving that aim. An identical approach was taken 
in Freers649 later the same year in which the Court went one step closer to condoning the 
German government's line of defence by stating that the aim of assuring the independence of 
staff council members appeared to be 'unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex. ,650 
Strictly speaking this is true, but it is the Court's change in direction from its earlier judgment 
in Botez651 that is the most striking feature of the COUlt'S jurisprudence in this respect. In 
finding that the oversight which had primarily excluded part-timers from inclusion in the 
legislative arrangements for compensatory payment ultimately amounted to a potentially 
legitimate aim of social policy in Lewark652 and Freel's,653 the COUlt appears to have backed 
down under the pressure exerted by the German legislature. In fact the defence advanced in 
648 Judgment at para 38. 
649 Case C-278/93 Freel'S a11d SpeCka1ll1111 v Deutsche BU11despost [1996] ECR 1-1165. 
650 Ibid at para 27 
651 Op cit at 11. 118. 
652 Op cit at 11. 119. 
653 Op cit at 11. 126 
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Lewark and Freel's is reminiscent, at least in its presumptive tone regarding the utilisation of 
non-working time by those who work part-time, of the Court's judgment in Helmig. 654 The 
assumption that any hours which are not spent participating in paid employment are at the 
disposal of part-time workers as 'leisure time' fails to recognise the reasons why so many 
women engage in such work. Furthermore, for those who usually assume responsibility for 
childcare during hours when they are not in paid employment, the attendance at training 
courses may result in an additional financial burden if alternative anangements such as 
nursery provision or childminder hours are necessary. The argument that compensation for 
effectively working overtime would potentially be seen as a bonus or an incentive to 
participate in staff council activities, thus undermining the independence of such participants, 
is nonsensical when applied to part-time workers who, if they wished to increase their income 
and had the time available, would surely simply increase their usual contractual hours. 
As envisaged from the Court's early jurisprudence on the application of the equality principle 
to atypical women workers, the imposition of State measures which have an indirectly 
discrinlinatory impact on such workers has presented the COUlt with particular difficulties. 
The need to reconcile a consistent application of the law in observance of the principles of 
legal certainty and legitimate expectation with the 'broad margin of discretion ,655 afforded to 
Member States in choosing the measures capable of achieving the aims of their social and 
employment policy appears to have prevented the Court from providing clear guidance in 
cases concerning State-imposed measures. Added to this dynamic is the potential scope for 
circumvention of the equality principle presented to Member States in relation to their dual 
role as legislature and employer. The following group of cases concern the alleged 
discriminatory impact of measures applied to civil service workers. The Court's treatment of 
6540p cit at n. 10l. 
655 See Kriiger op cit at n. 110. 
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the attempted justifications advanced by the various State departments will be considered in 
order to discern whether, in such cases, the State's role as law-making authority is given 
prominence over the obligations placed on it by EC law as employer. 
The State as Employer 
In Gerster656 and Kordinl57 the ECJ was asked to consider the compatibility of Article 119 
and Directives 75/117 and 76/207 with German statutory rules which distinguished between 
part-time and full-time civil service workers for the purposes of calculating length of service 
as a prerequisite for promotion (in Gerstel') and for the granting of exemption from a 
qualifying exam for tax consultants (in Kording). Although caught by different provisions of 
Statute,658 what both cases had in common was the differential calculations applied under the 
statutory rules for length of service in respect of full and part-time workers. 
In Gerster, periods of employment for those who worked for at least half of the full-time 
hours were counted as being equal to two-thirds of normal working time. 659 Under the BAT, 
progression to a higher grade with a resulting pay rise was partially dependent on the 
completion of six years' employment at normal working hours.66o On completion of the 
requisite period of employment, individual staff members were automatically placed on a 
waiting list for consideration for promotion with their cases reviewed when they reached the 
656 Case C-1I95 Gersterv. Freistaat Bayern [1997] ECR 1-5253. 
657 Case C-1 00/95 Kording v Senator Fiir Finanzen [1997] ECR 1-5289. 
658 The Laufbahnverordung (Bavarian Regulations on Career Structure) in Gerstel' and the Steuerberatungsgesetz 
(Act on Tax Consultancy) in Kording. 
659 For those who worked less than 50% of full-time hours, there was no calculation made for length of service 
(see AG Pergola's Opinion at fu 3), presumably meaning that such workers were completely excluded from 
consideration for promotion under the appropriate mles. However, as Ms Gerster was included in the category of 
those who worked between 50 and 75% of full-time hours this aspect was never investigated. 
660 This case differed from Nimz (see above), as promotion to the higher grade was not based solely on the 
completion of a specific period of service. 
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top of the list at which time other relevant factors pertaining to the individual's suitability for 
promotion were considered. Ms Gerster had a long record of employment with the civil 
service (since 1968) but had taken 3-years' unpaid leave for family reasons, returning to work 
part-time in 1987. In 1993, she requested that her six years part-time employment be treated 
as full-time employment for the purposes of calculating length of service for promotional 
purposes. Her request was rejected and she was informed that the vacant post would be filled 
by an official on the list of those eligible for promotion. 
In Kording, 661 the applicant had been employed by the Revenue office in Bremen for 20 years 
at the time of her claim, although her weekly hours had varied from full-time from 1972-1980 
to 20 hours per week from 1980 to 1992. In 1992, Ms Kording asked the Finance Minister 
whether her period of employment met the requirements as to length of service for exemption 
from the examination to qualify as a tax consultant. The national rules stated that such 
exemption should be granted to those who had been employed in one of a specified number of 
posts for not less than 15 years. She was informed that the length of service requirement for 
exemption from the examination referred to full-time work with part-time workers' length of 
service calculated pro rata the hours actually worked and normal working hours. 
In restricting its judgment to the specific circumstances of the Gerster662 case, the Court held 
that, although Article 119 was applicable to public servants, the rules in question were 
primarily concerned with access to career advancement and were only indirectly linked to pay 
and, thus, fell outside of the scope of Article 119 and Directive 75/117.663 However, Articles 
1 and 3 of Directive 76/207 were held to be relevant to the measures under review which had 
a disproportionate impact on the promotional prospects of part-time workers as compared to 
661 Op cit. at n. 134. 
662 Op cit. at n. 133. 
663 Gerster Judgment at para. 25. 
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full-time workers. As 87% of part-time employees in the Bavarian civil service were women, 
the differential calculation of length of service as a basis for consideration for career 
advancement was held to be prohibited in principle by Directive 76/207 unless it could be 
objectively justified. 664 The Court then turned its attention to the justification advanced by the 
Bavarian State that the system was based on the need to establish a 'general yardstick in terms 
of length of service against which the professional experience of employees can be assessed 
before they can be regarded as eligible for promotion to a higher grade. ,665 The different 
length of service requirements were, thus, justified on the basis that part-time workers would 
take longer than their full-time counterparts to acquire the professional skills and abilities 
necessary for duties at a higher level. Ms Gerster had countered this claim by asserting that, in 
the course of the last 10 years of her employment, she had performed duties attaching to the 
grade to which she aspired to be promoted.666 
Referring to its judgment in Nimz,667 the COUli repeated its criticism of the subjective nature 
of 'an alleged special link' between length of service and the acquisition of knowledge and 
experience as amounting to no more than a generalisation concerning certain categories of 
worker. 668 It was up to the national court to decide whether part-time employees were 
'generally slower than full-time employees in acquiring job-related abilities and skills ,669 and 
to consider whether the competent authorities were in a position to establish that the measures 
chosen complied with the test for an objective justification in accordance with the Court's 
decision in Rinner-Kuhn. 670 It is unclear fi'om reading this part of the judgment whether the 
COUli intended the question of justification to hinge on the Bavarian State's need to establish 
664 1d. at para 34. 
(,(,5 Judgment at para 36. 
666 Judgment at para 37. 
667 Op cit. at n. 92. 
668 Judgment at para 39. 
6691d. 
670 Op cit. at n. 72. 
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a clear connection between the number of total hours prescribed by the statutory rule 
governing promotion and the acquisition of the requisite skills and experience to do the job at 
the higher grade or whether, in the event that such a connection could not be established, the 
statutory rules could be justified by alternative means so long as they amounted to a 
legitimate social policy aim and were proportionate to the achievement of that aim. 
In Hill and Stapleton,671 the court was confronted with the application of a measure 
applicable to civil servants employed by the Irish Revenue Commission which differentiated 
between those employed on a job-share basis672 and full-time employees in the calculation of 
length of service for the purposes of incremental progression up a pay scale. On returning to 
full-time work after two years of job-sharing, the applicants had been denied assimilation to a 
point on the scale in accordance with their actual length of service on the basis of a rule673 
which distinguished between job-sharers and full-time staff in relation to pay with the scale of 
pay applicable to job-sharing staff being equal to 50% of that appropriate to full-time staff. 
The relevant scheme made no specific reference to the incremental credit for those who job-
shared and later converted to full-time work, however, a letter sent by the Department of 
Finance in 1987 had provided that 'an officer who has served for two years in a job-sharing 
capacity should be placed on the second point of the full-time scale (equivalent to one years' 
full-time service). ,674 
Under the relevant scheme, an increment was defmed as 'an increase in pay for which 
provision is made in a pay scale. As a general rule, increments are granted annually provided 
671 Case C-243/95 Kathleen Hill and Ann Stapleton v. Revenue Commissioners and Department of Finance 
[1998] ECR 1-3739. 
672 Who worked one week on, one week off. 
673 Namely Circular 3/84. 
674 Judgment in Hill and Stapleton at para 8. 
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an officer's services are satisfactory. ,675 Both applicants returned to full-time work after two 
years' job-sharing and were placed one point up the scale from where they had been placed on 
commencing their job shares. The Irish Labour Court referred the case to the ECl in order to 
determine whether the scheme in question was contrary to Article 119 and Directive 75/117 if 
its effect was that employees who convert from job-sharing to full-time work 'regress on 
incremental scale and hence on their salary scale,676 or whether such a measure could be 
objectively justified. 
In contrast to the situation in Gerster,677 the national court had ah-eady considered the 
relationship between time served by the applicants and the acquisition of experience and was 
satisfied that 'a job-sharer could acquire the same experience as a full-time worker,.678 This 
removed from the ECl the opportunity to rely in giving its judgment on this aspect as a 
possible justification for the differences in pay as it had done in Gerster. Instead, the Court 
was compelled to reject as irrelevant the justifications provided by the Revenue 
Commissioners and Department of Finance that there was an established practice in the civil 
service of crediting only actual service and that the reward system established by this practice 
maintained staff motivation, commitment and morale. 679 Furthermore, the employer'S 
attempts to justify the differential pay rates on economic grounds were also rejected by the 
ECl as 'an employer cannot justify discrimination arising from a job-sharing scheme solely 
on the ground that avoidance of such discrimination would involve increased costs. ,680 
The Court acknowledged that ahnost all of those who worked under job-sharing arrangements 
675 Circular 9/87 as quoted at para 9 of the Judgment. 
676 Part (b) of the question refened as quoted in para 15 of the Judgment. 
677 Op cit. at n. 133 
678 Judgment at para 27. 
679 Judgment at para 38. 
680 Judgment at para 40. 
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in the Irish Republic were women and that approximately 83% of those who chose that option 
did so in order to be able to combine work and family responsibilities. Furthermore, the 
Court stated that 'Community policy in this area is to encourage and, if possible, adapt 
working conditions to family responsibilities. ,681 The onus was, thus, on the Revenue 
Commissioners and the Department of Finance to establish before the national court that the 
measure under review could be objectively justified by application of the criteria set down in 
Rinner-Kiihn. 682 
In Elsner-Lakeberg683 a teacher who nonnally worked for 60 hours per month was prevented 
from receiving remuneration for working an additional 2.5 hours a month on the grounds of a 
rule684 that excluded civil servants from receiving overtime payments unless the additional 
hours worked exceeded three hours a month. The Administrative Court685 at Minden refened 
the case to the ECJ in order to ascertain the compatibility of the national provision with 
Article 119 and Directive 75/117. The Land Nordrhein-Westfalen as employer, backed by the 
German Government, sought to counter the allegation of discrimination on the grounds that 
part-time teachers and full-time teachers were treated in exactly the same way under the 
scheme in question as both groups of workers would be eligible to overtime payment only in 
circumstances where the overtime worked exceeded 3 hours in one month. 
The Couti, however, took a different Vlew ill finding that the requirement to work an 
additional three hours before the entitlement to remuneration for additional hours was 
681 Judgment at para 42. 
682 Op cit. at n. 72. 
683 Case C-285/02 Elsner-Lakeberg v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [2004] ECR 1-5861. 
684 The Verordnung uber die Gewiihrung von Mehrarbeitsvergutung fur Beamte (Regulation on the granting of 
remuneration for excess hours for civil servants) 1992 as amended 1998. 
685 Verwaltungsgericht. 
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triggered represented a 'greater burden for part-time teachers than ... for full-time teachers ,686 
as the extra hours represented 3% of a full-time teacher's usual working hours and 5% of a 
part-time teacher's usual working hours. Since the number of additional teaching hours giving 
entitlement to pay was not reduced for part-timers in proportion to their working hours, their 
treatment differed from that received by full-time teachers. As usual, whether such different 
treatment could be objectively justified was a matter for the national court. 
h .. 687. d 688 d 7 b 689 T e Court's reasonmg m Gerster, Hill an Stapleton an Elsner-LaKe erg represents, 
to some extent, a continuation of its recognition in Nimz690 that those who work part-time 
comprise an autonomous group whose treatment by employers need not be defmed by the 
nature of their difference from those who work full-time. This is illustrated in Gerster691 by 
the Court's finding that part-timers may well be capable of attaining the necessary experience 
for promotional purposes within the same timeframe as those who work full-time Of, at least, 
should not be assumed to require double the amount of time needed by full-time workers to 
acquire such experience. This ascribes a greater value to the contribution made by part-time 
workers than that afforded them under the Court's previous judgments in Helmig, 692 
Lewark693 and Freers. 694 The Court's treatment of the issues in Hill and Stapleton695 is 
indicative of a more explicit acceptance of the relationship between family responsibilities 
and women's need to work part-time than had previously been the case in Jenkins696 and 
686 Judgment at para 17. 
687 Op cit at 11. 133. 
688 Op cit at n. 148. 
6890pcitatn.160. 
690 Op cit at n. 92. 
691 Opcitatn. 133. 
6920pcitatn.l01. 
693 Op cit at n. 119. 
694 Op cit at 11. 126. 
695 Op cit at n. 148. 
696 Op cit. at n. 13. 
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Bilka.697 This is illustrated by the Court's acknowledgment that the aim of Community policy 
was to adapt working conditions to fit family circumstances. In Elsner-Lakeberl/98 the 
Court's reasoning is based on the notion that providing the same (equal) treatment to those 
who are differently situated can, in certain circumstances, result in discrimination. This view 
represents an alternative perspective from what was previously perceived to be the correct 
formulation as demonstrated by the earlier case of Helm ig. 699 
Of course, the possibility of objective justification was left open in each of these cases as a 
matter to be decided by the court of origin with the State's position as employer providing the 
opportunity for justification on the grounds of social policy. However, the reasoning 
informing the Court's judgments, at least, demonstrates a move towards the application of the 
equality principle as a means of providing self-standing rights to part-time workers with their 
treatment assessed independently of that received by full-time workers. In each of these cases, 
the COUlt considered the outcomes resulting from the application of the policies in question in 
order to inform its decision-making regarding their compatibility with the principle of 
equality. This is encouraging and the fact that the policies under review were essentially 
imposed by the State appears to have made no difference to the COUlt'S robust approach. 
However, the area of policy that has been the most contentious in this respect is that 
concerned with retirement benefits on which the ECl's interpretation has been sought on 
several occasions. Attention will now be focused on this area. 
697 Op cit. at n. 41. 
698 Op cit. at n. 160. 
699 Op cit. atn. 101. 
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Retirement and Work-Related Benefits 
The Court's jurisprudence on part-time workers' pension entitlement has evolved through its 
consideration of two separate but related policy strands. Many of the cases concern the 
applicability of the equality principle to State pension schemes, whilst in others it is the 
applicability of rules concernmg the operation of occupational or contracted-out schemes 
which are in question. The focus of this thesis is on the regulation of the employment 
relationship, and so the former group of cases, which have as their legal base the social 
security provisions of EC law,70o are outside of its scope and will not be specifically 
considered. However, the Court's jurisprudence in the remaining cases concerning part-time 
workers' rights of access to occupational pension schemes provides a fascinating insight into 
the Court's reasoning where furtherance of the principles of equality, effectiveness and legal 
certainty converge, ultimately leading to the development of a strategy which reveals much 
about the place of sex equality in the European legal order and the underpinning 
conceptualisation of gender relations. 
The Court's first opportunity to consider the issue of part-time workers' rights of access to 
occupational pension schemes after its early ruling in Bilka was presented by the cases 
Vroege 701 and Fisscher. 702 In these cases, which followed the Court's judgment in Barbe/03 
700 Council Directive 79/7IEEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of 
the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security; Council 
Directive 8613781EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes; Council Directive 
961971EC of 20 December 1996 amending Directive 8613781EEC of 24 July 1986 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social 
security schemes. 
701 Case C-57/93 Vroege v NCIV Instituut voor Volkhuisvesting BV and Stichting Pensioenjimds NCIV [1994] 
ECR 1-4541. 
702 Case C-128/93 Fisscher v Voorhuis Hengelo BV and Stichting Bedrij[spensioenjimds voor de Detailhandel 
[1994] ECR 1-4583. 
703 Case C-262/88 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] I ECR 1889. 
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four years earlier, the Dutch Court704 requested guidance in relation to the applicability of 
Barbel' to part-time women workers who were members of an occupational pension scheme. 
The court was asked to consider, for the fIrst time, the interpretation of the temporal limitation 
imposed by the Barber Protocol on the applicability of Article 119 to benefits under 
occupational pension schemes. Under the Protocol such benefits should not be considered as 
remuneration for the purposes of Article 119 if they were attributable to periods of 
employment prior to 17 May 1990705 except where they arose in respect of claims which were 
instigated prior to that date. The claims in Vroege and Fisscher concerned the payment of 
back-dated benefits to part-time workers previously denied membership of the pension 
schemes. Ms Vroege's claim was based on the terms of a collective agreemene06 which had 
excluded those who worked less than 80 per cent of full-time hours and Ms Fisscher's claim 
on Dutch legislation707 which had excluded married women from joining such schemes. 
Following the Barber judgment, the Dutch legislation and the terms of the collective 
agreement had been amended to enable those who had previously been excluded from the 
schemes to join. Both claimants sought to have their membership of the pension schemes 
backdated to the date of the Court's judgment in Defi'enne Il.708 The national court sought 
clarification of the applicability of the temporal effect of the Barber Protocol in such 
circumstances. 
In giving its judgment in Vroege,709 the Court cited Bilka-Kaufhaus710 as authority for the 
proposition that Article 119 'covers not only entitlement to benefits paid by an occupational 
704 The Kantongericht Utrecht. 
705 The date of the judgment in Barber. 
7U6 The NCIV collective labour agreement. 
707 Namely the Bedrijfspensioenwet (Act on Compulsory Membership of an Occupational Pension Scheme 
1949). 
708 Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA [1976] ECR 455 (Defi'enne II). 
709 Op cit. at n. 178. 
710 Op cit. at n. 41. 
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pension scheme but also the right to be a member of such a scheme'. 711 With regard to the 
Barber Protocol, the Court stated that the imposition of the temporal limitation should be 
restricted to the context of that case. It had arisen due to the Court's finding that Member 
States and the other parties concerned had been reasonably entitled to consider that Article 
119 did not apply to pensions paid under contracted out schemes due to the transitional 
derogations in respect of the determination of pensionable age permitted by Directives 7917712 
and 86/378. 713 However, as far as the right to join an occupational pension was concerned, 
'there is no reason to suppose that the professional groups concerned could have been 
mistaken about the applicability of Article 119,.714 This had been settled since the Court's 
judgment in Bilka which did not impose any temporal limitation, thus enabling those deprived 
of the right to claim retroactive membership from 8 April 1976715 as long as the contributions 
relating to the appropriate period of membership were paid in full by the worker. The same 
reasoning was applied in order to grant rights of access to additional benefits payable under 
such a scheme in the Northern Irish case Magon'ian. 716 However it is the Court's treatment 
of another aspect of the claims in Fisschel' and Jviagol'l'ian which is most worthy of comment 
in the current context, that of the application of time limits under national legislation as a 
means of restricting the effectiveness of the remedies available under EC law. 
711 Judgment in Vl'oege at para 15. 
712 Article 7(I)(a). 
713 Article 9(a). 
714 Judgment at para 25. 
715 The date of the judgment in DeJi'enne II. 
716 Case C-246/96 Magorrian and Cunningham v Easte1'l7 Health and Social Services Board and Department of 
Health and Social Services [1997] ECR 1-7153. 
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National Procedural Autonomy 
In Fisscher, 717 the Court had been asked, as a side issue, whether it was relevant that the 
claimant had not acted earlier to enforce the rights she now claimed to have had. 718 The 
cOUli interpreted this as a reference to whether national rules relating to time limits for 
bringing actions could be relied on against workers who were asserting their right to join an 
occupational pension scheme. In response the Court stated that such rules could be relied on 
with regard to actions based on Community law as long as they were no less favourable with 
regard to such actions than for similar actions of a domestic nature. 719 
In Magorrian, 720 this issue was revisited with reference to the time limits imposed by the UK 
legislation which, in the case of occupational pensions, limited the retroactive application of 
such schemes to two years. 721 The imposition of time limits per se was not an issue in 
Magorrian, as both applicants were still employed at the tinle of their claims. However, the 
scheme in lvJagorrian contained a provision that, in order to obtain certain benefits, a 
minimum of 20 years' membership was required. The imposition of the two-year rule, if 
allowed to stand, could potentially prevent a part-time worker from ever qualifying for 
additional benefits under such a scheme as she could only ever benefit from the two year 
retroactive application of the scheme in question and would, thus, never be able to attain the 
necessary 20 years' membership. This anomaly would have occurred if the COlTect 
interpretation of the two-year rule was deemed to be that it should be applied before 
calculating the worker's pension entitlement. With reference to this issue, the industrial 
717 Op cit. at n. 179. 
718 See Question 6 referred by the national court in Fisscher. 
719 The Judgment in Vroege and Fisscher at para 39. 
720 Op cit. at n. 193. 
72l Regulation 12 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Equal Access to Membership) Regulations (North em 
Ireland) 1976 No 238. 
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tribunal asked whether the two-year rule amounted to 'denial of an effective remedy under 
Community law'. The Court responded that Community law did preclude the application of 
such a time limit in circumstances where, in the event of a successful claim, its application 
would 'render any action by individuals relying on Community law impossible in practice. ,722 
However, this finding was qualified by the Court's observation that, in general, the laying 
down of such procedural rules was a matter for Member States.723 By confining the 
application of the two-year rule to the circumstances of the scheme in Magorrian, the COUli 
was able to preserve the maintenance of the national rule whilst enabling the claimants in the 
present case to have access to an effective remedy. 
Thus the scene was set for the next UK case to come before the Court on the issue of 
retroactive membership by female part-time workers of an occupational pension scheme. In 
Preston 724 the stakes were somewhat higher as the pension entitlements of 60,000 UK public 
and private sector workers, previously denied membership of a pension scheme, rested on the 
outcome of the case. In accordance with UK legislation,725 every contract of employment is 
deemed to include an equality clause. The statutory rules under review in the case provided 
that any claim in respect of such a clause must be brought within a period of six months 
following the cessation of employment 726 and that retroactive claims in respect of a failure to 
comply with an equality clause would be restricted to a period of two years before the date on 
which the proceedings were instigated. 727 
722 A;fagorrian Judgment at para 44. 
723 Judgment at para 37. 
714 Case C-78/98 Preston and Others v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust [2000] ECR 1-320l. 
725 Section 1 (1) Equal Pay Act 1970. 
726 Section 2 (4) Equal Pay Act 1970. 
727 Section 2 (5) Equal Pay Act 1970 as amended by Regulation 12(1) Occupational Pension Schemes (Equal 
Access to Membership) Regulations 1976. 
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The 22 claimants were all part-time workers who had been denied membership of contracted-
out pension schemes 728 at some time in the past on the grounds of their part-time status and 
whose claims had been selected as test cases in order to establish the correct legal framework 
for disposal of such cases. Following the Court's judgments in Vroege729 and FisscheJ',730 
some 60,000 pati-time workers in the UK had instigated proceedings before industrial 
tribunals claiming they had been denied membership of the various occupational pension 
schemes in contravention of Atiicle 119. The schemes had been amended at various times 
between 1986 and 1995 in order to admit them and their claims related to retroactive 
membership dating back, in some cases, to before 8 April 1976.731 None of the schemes in 
question contained the type of qualifying period provided for in the lviagoJ'rian 732 scheme, so 
that the application of the two-year rule stood to seriously undermine the effectiveness of any 
remedies available to the claimants, some of whose claims were in any case time-barred by 
the application of the six-month rule. 733 The House of Lords, accordingly, referred the cases 
to the ECl to determine the compatibility of the national time limits with 'the principle of EC 
law that national procedural rules for breach of Community law must not make it excessively 
difficult or impossible in practice for the claimant to exercise her rights under Article 119. ,734 
The Judgment in Prestoll 
In giving consideration to the compatibility of the 'six month rule' with European provisions, 
the COUli referred to the 'principle of effectiveness' which seeks to ensure that procedural 
728 Such as the National Health Service (NBS) Pension Scheme, the Teachers' Superannuation Scheme, the 
Local Government Superannuation Scheme, The Electricity Supply (Staff) Superannuation Pension Scheme, The 
Electricity Supply Pension Scheme, the Midland Bank Pension Scheme and the Midland Bank Key-Time 
Pension Scheme. 
729 Op cit at n. 178. 
730 Op cit at 11. 179. 
731 The date of the judgment in Defi'enne ll. 
732 Op cit at n. 193. 
733 Equal Pay Act 1970, s. 1(1). 
734 Question 1 in Preston. 
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rules laid down by Member States do not have the effect of rendering rights conferred by 
Community law ineffective in practice. The Court stated that, where such time limits were 
reasonable, it was settled in case law that they represented an application of the principle of 
legal certainty by preventing administrative decisions from being vulnerable to legal 
challenge indefinitely. 735 On this basis, and following the reasoning of Advocate-General 
Leger,736 the Court held that the six month limitation provided by s.2(4) of the EqPA ' ... does 
not render impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights confelTed by the 
Community legal order and is not therefore liable to strike at the very essence of those 
. h ,737 
ng ts. 
The Court considered the limitation imposed by the application of the two-year rule. 
Referring to its judgment in M agorrian, 738 the Court acknowledged that, although application 
of the two year time limit did not completely deprive the claimants of their rights, such 
restriction of access to membership did nonetheless have the effect of severely reducing the 
practical effect of the right to claim retroactive membership of an occupational pension 
scheme. 739 In finding national procedural rules which seek to restrict the calculation of a 
claimant's pensionable service to be precluded by Community law, the Court's judgment 
appears, prima facie, to be clear and consistent with its earlier jurisprudence in Vl'Oege 740 and 
Fisscher. 741 
735 see Case 33176 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989; Case C-261/95 Palmisani v Instituto Nazionale della Previdenza 
Sociale [1997] ECR 1-4025. 
736 In his opinion delivered on 14 September 1999. See also A-G Leger's opinion and the judgment of the ECJ 
in the related case C-326/96 Levez v Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd (1998) ECR 1-7835. 
737 Id. at 34. 
7380pcitatn.193. 
739 Preston judgment id at 35. 
740 Op cit at n. 178. 
741 Op cit at n. 179. 
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However, the distinction drawn by the Court between the inter-related legal concepts of time 
limits and limitations in time actually served to severely diminish the usefulness of this 
decision for those awaiting guidance on how best to advance related claims. The former are 
legislative provisions which set out the time in which something must be done, represented in 
this case by the six-month time limit provided for by the EqP A. The latter relate to the limit 
imposed on the periods of service that may count towards the accmal of a benefit in the 
approximation of a remedy, such as the two-year rule. Although theoretically diverse, the 
concurrent application of such provisions has the practical effect of fudging such apparent 
distinction. This is because the operation of a time limit imposed on the right to make a claim 
will depend on the duration of the limitation in time which will, in tum, have a direct effect on 
the availability of a remedy. In Preston,742 the fact that all of the appropriate pension schemes 
were amended between 1985 and 1996 to admit part-time workers as members, ironically, 
presented insurmountable difficulties for many of the women. Those whose employment had 
ceased on the grounds of retirement (or for some other reason) following their admittance to 
the appropriate scheme, were prevented from initiating proceedings on the grounds of the 
application of the two year mle. In this context the judgment changed nothing as failure to 
initiate proceedings in the six months following cessation of the employment rendered any 
potential claims time-barred despite the otherwise potentially retroactive nature of the claim. 
This is particularly unjust as the failure to instigate proceedings arose due to the apparent lack 
of a suitable legal basis at the time of their cessation of employment. The ECJ dealt with the 
two mles separately in line with the terms in which the refel1'ed questions were framed, but, 
for the reasons set out above, it is necessary to apply an integrated approach in order to 
analyse the practical inlpact ofthe mling. 743 
742 Op cit at n. 20l. 
743 For an analysis of the practical effects of this ruling on the various categories of UK workers represented by 
the test case, see N. Busby 'Only a Matter of Time' Modern Law Review, 64 (2001) 3, 489-499. 
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The reasonmg informing the judgment in Preston 744 is revealing in its failure to follow 
through the practical implications of the imposition of national procedural rules in 
circumstances which, after all, resulted from the UK's failure actively to acknowledge the 
impact of the Court's jurisprudence, arguably since Defi'enne 11, 745 but certainly since 
Bilka. 746 The fact that the UK government did not sit up and take notice that the exclusion of 
part-time workers from occupational pension schemes was prohibited by EC law until, in 
some cases 20 years after the ECl's articulation of that fact, appears to have had little bearing 
on the COUlt'S treatment of the resulting litigation. Rather than achieving the stated ainl of 
preserving legal certainty, the judgment in Preston747 seems to have been the likely source of 
confusion surrounding the legitimate expectations of those with apparently worthy claims and 
an uneven application of available remedies for those directly involved in the litigation. 
The deference shown to Member States' authority in autonomous procedural policy-making 
by the COUlt is surprising if considered alongside the fundamental issues at stake which 
basically concerned the entitlement of one generation of female workers to retirement 
pensions which, according to Community law, were always rightfully theirs. This disregard 
for the welfare rights of women in old age is indicative ofthe questionable commitment of the 
Court to interpret Community law in order to remedy the discriminatory effects of the past. 
Without a more explicit acknowledgment in its reasoning of the economic contribution made 
by working women in both the labour market and corresponding arrangements surrounding 
family life, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Court, when faced with choices regarding the 
relative importance of various legal principles, chose to subordinate women's rights to equal 
pay and treatment to the rights of autonomy enjoyed by Member States. 
744 Op cit. at n. 201. 
745 Op cit. at n. 12. 
746 Op cit. at n. 41. 
747 Opcit. atn. 201. 
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The Court's abdication of responsibility towards the generation of women caught in the post-
Defi'enne era, many of whom face retirement with reduced pensions as a result of the effects 
of national procedural rules which mayor may not have been struck by the incremental 
development of the Court's jurisprudence on State and occupational pension provisions, is 
further illustrated by its judgment in the earlier case Grau-Hupka. 748 The claimant, who was 
in receipt of a State pension and worked part-time, was paid at a lower rate than comparable 
full-timers in line with national legislation749 intended to be applied to those who combined 
part-time work with a full-time occupation. 750 Ms Grau-Hupka argued that, the fact that her 
pension had been reduced by the loss of eal11ings resulting from time away from paid 
employment due to child rearing, distinguished her pension from wages eal11ed through full-
time employment and necessitated her continued employment. Thus, she contended, it was 
contrary to Article 119 to treat both forms of income in the same way. The Court, in giving its 
judgment, stated that the relevant Community provisions on social security751 did not oblige 
Member States to grant advantages in respect of old-age pension schemes to those who had 
brought up children or to provide benefits where employment had been intenllpted to bring up 
children. 752 Consequently, the resulting reduction in pension entitlement did not preclude 
payment at a lower rate for part-time work than full-time work under Article 119.753 
748 Case C-297/93 Grau-Hupka v Stadtgemeinde Bremen [1994] ECR I-5535. 
749 Namely Section 2(1) of the Beschaftigungsforderungesetz (Act to Promote Employment). 
750 The national court acknowledged that most of the workers in this category were men as women's 'hvin 
responsibilities of career and family' made it unlikely that they would be able to engage in full and part-time 
work concurrently - see the Judgment at para 15. 
751 Directive 79/7 on equal treatment in matters of social security. 
752 Judgment at para 27. 
753 Although see also the Court's judgment in Case C-77/02 Steinicke v Bllndesanstalt fiJI' Arbeit [2003] ECR 1-
9027 in which the COUli found that a statutory rule which restricted the right of public sector workers to work 
part-time upon retirement to those who had worked in a full-time capacity for three of the five years preceding 
retirement was prohibited by Articles 2(1) and 5(1) of Directive 76/207. 
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Schl'odel' - The Tide Turns? 
In Schtodet754 the Court was, once again, asked to consider the applicability of the Barber 
Protocol to national rules permitting previously excluded part-time workers access to an 
occupational pension scheme. The claimant, who had worked for her employers for 20 
years 755 before retiring in 1994, sought to challenge the rules under which her supplementary 
pensionable entitlement had been calculated. The rules in question were contained in a 
collective agreement756 which, until 1992, excluded those who worked for less than full-tinle 
hours. Although at the time of Ms Schroder's retirement, the collective agreement had been 
amended to give part-tinle workers access to the occupational pension scheme, the temporal 
limitation contained in the Barber Protocol had been applied with the effect that her 
entitlement was limited to benefits accruing from the date of the Batbe/57 Judgment in 1992. 
The claimant sought to obtain the benefits that she would have accrued if she had been 
granted retroactive membership of the scheme from the date that she was given a permanent 
contract with the employer in 1975. 
Deutsche Telekom contended that, although the principle of equality between men and 
women was enshrined in the constitutional provisions of German law,758 Article 119 of the 
Treaty had precedence over the German Constitution and, thus, the limitation of its effects in 
time arising from the Barber Protocol should be applied to limit the application of the 
provisions of national law. This was the first time that an attempt had been made, in the 
754 Case C-50/96 Deutsche Telekoll1 v Schroder [2000] ECR 1-743. 
755 The first year of her employment had been on a temporary contract and was, thus, outside of the scope of her 
claim. 
756 Tarif\rertrag iiber die Versorgung der Arbeitnehmer der Deutschen Bundespost (Collective Agreement 
concerning Pensions for Employees of the German Post Office). 
757 Op cit. at n. 231. 
758 Article 3 of the Grundgesetz fUr die Budesrepublik Deutschland (the Basic Law) provides '(I) All persons 
shall be equal before the law. Men and women shall have equal rights. (2) The State shall encourage effective 
attainment of equal rights for men and women and shall take actions to remove existing disadvantages.' 
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context of atypical workers' rights, to utilise the Comt's jurisprudence as a means of reducing 
the rights available under national law. Furthermore, it provided the Court with its first 
oppOltunity to explicitly consider a potential conflict between the social and economic aims 
of Article 141 since the 'dual purpose' of the Article had been articulated by the Court in 
Defi'enne II. This was because the constitutional provision, if applied, would provide a 
solution to the problem posed in Schroder by enabling access to the occupational pension 
scheme in question as a basic constitutional right with no retroactive restrictions. 759 This 
could be interpreted as giving rise to a distortion of competition between economic 
undertakings within Member States as not all national legal systems provided such rights 
which would, thus, put German employers and pension administrators in a less favourable 
position than comparable organisations in other States. 
In glvmg its judgment, the Court referred to the proposition that the 'right not to be 
discriminated against on ground of sex is one of the fundamental human rights whose 
observance the Court has a duty to ensure. ,760 This meant that the 'economic aim pursued by 
Article 119 of the Treaty, namely the elimination of distortions of competition between 
undertakings established in different Member States, is secondary to the social aim pursued 
by the same provision, which constitutes the expression of a fundamental human right,.761 
Accordingly, part-time workers in Germany could claim retroactive membership of 
occupational pension schemes unfettered by either of the temporal restrictions 762 applicable 
under Community law. 
759 See Question 6 refen'ed by the Landesarbeitsgericht (Regional Labour Court). The Grundgesetz predates even 
the Court's judgment in Defi'enne II and, if applied, would provide rights for women in Gennany with less 
retroactive restrictions than those applicable in any other Member State. 
760 Judgment at para 56. 
761 Judgment at para 57. 
762 In respect of the dates of the Court's judgments in Defi'enne II or Barbel'. 
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The Court's recognition of the application of the equality principle as a fundamental human 
right is welcomed and this development, although expressly linked to its own 
jurisprudence,763 surely owed much to the Member States' approval and subsequent adoption 
of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. Given that the vast majority of the cases under 
review in this analysis (15 out of 23) were refelTed by German courts largely to determine the 
compatibility of Article 119 with the provisions of national law,764 it is surprising that the 
explicit articulation of the equality principle under German constitutional law had not been 
directly raised before in this context. However, even if it had, it is not a certainty that the 
Court would have given priority to the social, rather than economic, aim of Article 141. By 
the time Sch1'oder765 came along, the external environment in which the Court operates was 
changing with the recognition of human rights as a principle of Community law placed very 
high up the political agenda. 766 Against this backdrop and faced with an inescapable 
challenge to consider the prevalence of national human rights standards over corresponding 
Community standards, the COUli was left with little option but to make a rare admission that 
the former should prevai1. Whether this proclamation will translate into a substantive 
development in the Court's jurisprudence on equality between the sexes, or amount to nothing 
more than a mere ideological statement, remains to be seen. 
The common thread in all of the cases reviewed thus far has been in the ECJ's 
conceptualisation and treatment of indirect discrimination claims raised by part-time female 
workers. However, in the broader spectrum of 'atypical' working practices by which women 
have sought to combine family commitments with paid employment, the differentiation of 
763 Specifically Case 149/77 Defi"enne v SABENA [1978] ECR 1365; Joined Cases 75 and 117/82 Razzouk and 
Beydolln v EC Commission [1984] ECR 1509 and Case C- 13/94 P v Sand C01'l7wall County Council [1996] 
ECRI-2143. 
764 Albeit through their articulation in collective agreements. 
765 Op cit. at n. 23l. 
766 As illustrated by the development of the 'new' Article 13 as an enabling measure intended to significantly 
broaden the grounds of discrimination prohibited under EC law. 
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other contractual tenns alongside those relating solely to hours of work have ansen. The 
mam development here has been in the use of temporary contracts and, under national 
provisions, 'contracting out' arrangements which enable employing organisations to avoid the 
usual obligations arising through contractual relations. In Member States where collective 
agreements are used as a means of regulating industrial relations, there is generally little 
difference between the terms and conditions of those employed directly and those whose 
services are procured through indirect means. 767 However, in labour markets characterised by 
high levels of deregulation in which employment protection is increasingly reliant on 
individual agreements,768 these types of arrangements have flourished. In the last group of 
cases under review, the use of such practices within two Member States is considered. 
Allonb/69 was concerned with the UK practice of contracting out part-time workers 
previously employed by the public sector to private concerns and Nikoloudi 770 with the use of 
temporary contracts in respect of part-time employees. 
Contl'act status - Allol1by and Nikoloudi 
In Allonby, the claimant's temporary employment contract was tenninated by her employer 
along with those of other temporary staff (mostly female) in order to avoid new legal 
obligations to provide equal treatment for part-time workers. 771 Ms Allonby's services were 
subsequently 'bought in' by atTangement with an employment agency with which she was 
required to register as self-employed. Consequently, she suffered a reduction in her hourly 
767 Suoh as through tripartite anangements involving the use of employment agenoies - see N. Busby and D. 
Christie, 'The Regulation of Temporary Agenoy Work in the European Union', The Cambrian Law Review, 
(2005) 36, 15-28. 
768 See Chapter 3 supra. 
769 Case C-256/01 Allonby v Accrington & Rosendale College [2004] 1RLR 224 
770 Case C-196/02 Nikoloudi v Organismos Tilepikinonion Ellados AE [2005] ECR 1-1789. 
771 Part-time Workers (prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 (S1 2000/1551) whioh 
transposed Counoil Direotive 97/81/EC into UK. law, see para 10 A llo n by. 
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rate of pay and was excluded from a state-administered penslOn scheme772 which was 
restricted to those employed by public bodies. The services of the permanent lecturing staff 
(mostly male) were directly retained by the college, thus preserving their employment status 
. d . h . I .. 773 m accor ance WIt natIOna prOVIsIOns, Ms Allonby's attempt to claim equal pay by 
comparing herself with one of these individuals failed at the employment tribunal on the 
grounds that, as a temporary agency worker, she was not in 'the same employment' as the 
college's own employees. The Court of Appeal referred the case to the ECl in order to clarify 
whether the direct effect of Article 141 enabled a woman to claim equal pay with a man in the 
circumstances of the case and also to claim access to the pension scheme either by 
comparison with her male colleague or by proving indirect discrimination on the grounds that 
the number of female teachers who would be eligible to join the pension scheme by 
complying with the requirement of employment was considerably lower than the number of 
eligible male teachers. 
In giving its response to the first question, the COUli adopted a consistent approach in line 
with its decision in an earlier case 774 in finding that, as the difference in pay could not be 
attributable to a single source, Article 141 could not be relied on as directly effective. 775 On 
the issue of the pension scheme, however, the Court found that Ms Allonby's exclusion did 
amount to indirect discrimination under Community law without the need to identify an actual 
comparator.776 This was because the classification, under national law, of a worker as self-
772 The Teachers' Superannuation Scheme. 
m Section 1 (6) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 which required a comparison with a member of the opposite sex in 
the same employment. 
774 Case C-320/00 Lawrence v Regent Office Care Ltd [2002] ECR 1-7325. The claimants in Lawrence were 
providers of a range of Council services which, in line with UK public policy, had been subjected to compulsory 
competitive tendering. Although not specifically considered here, the Court's reasoning in Lawrence serves as a 
precursor to its treatment of the wider issues raised in Allonby. For the author's analysis of the impact of the 
Court's judgment in Lawrence, see N. Busby, 'Equal Pay and Contracting Out: Lawrence v Regent Office Care 
Ltd' 7 EdinLR 2 (2003) 233-240. 
775 Judgment in Allonby at para 50. 
776 Ibid at paras 79 and 84. 
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employed could not prevent the application of Article 141 if the worker's independence was 
'merely notional, thereby disguising an employment relationship within the meaning of that 
Article. ,777 
Although the clarification given to the definition of a 'worker' under Article 141 is to be 
welcomed,778 this decision is indicative of the danger posed by the deregulation of labour 
markets and the resulting marginalisation of the equality principle as articulated by Atiicle 
141. Setting the pension issue to one side, the Court's reasoning underpinning its response to 
the question of the direct effect of Article 141 in the current circumstances is revealing in its 
interpretation of the nature of the relationship between the worker and the organisation 
utilising her services. As in its earlier judgment in Lawrence,779 the Court was of the opinion 
that liability for discrimination will only arise if fault can be established. However, this 
approach denies recognition of the systemic forms of discrimination which result from 
institutional arrangements for which it has become increasingly difficult to appOliion blame. 
In the context of the current case, the Court's denial of a relationship between the College and 
the agency, which was set up specifically to reemploy lecturers on less favourable terms and 
conditions than those directly employed, reveals an extremely narrow interpretation of the 
concept of 'fault'. The fact that the difference in treatment in Allonb/80 resulted directly from 
a managerial decision which was based explicitly on the desire to circumvent the effects of 
Community legislation appears to have had no influence over the Couti's ruling. This sends 
out a won-ying message to UK employers - specifically that reductions in labour costs can be 
achieved by avoiding the obligations arising fi'om the application of the equality principle 
777 Judgment in Allonby at para 71. 
778 It was in fact the first time that the term has been defined for the purposes of Article 141. The definition is 'a 
person who, for a certain period of time, performs services for and under the direction of another person in return 
for which he receives remuneration '. Para 67 of the judgment. 
779 Op cit atn. 251. 
780 Op cit at n. 246. 
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through the contracting out of services.781 The Court's treatment of the penslOn 1ssue 1S 
comforting insofar as it illustrates a lack of tolerance for the 'dressing up' of an employment 
relationship as self-employment for the purposes of escaping certain forms of liability but, 
read alongside the ruling on the equal pay claim, it provides an inconsistency in outcome. 
In Nikoloudi,782 the COUlt was confronted with a provision of a workplace rule book783 which 
disregarded periods of part-time work entirely for the purposes of calculating length of 
service. In order to be appointed as an established member of staff, temporary staff must have 
completed two years of continuous full-time employment.784 The claimant worked as a 
cleaner on a part-time basis for 18 of the 20 years she was employed 'as a temporary member 
of staff under an employment contract of indefmite duration'. 785 During the remaining two 
years of her employment, she worked on a full-time basis, after which she was pensioned off. 
She sought to claim the difference in pay that she would have received during the last two 
years of her employment if her pmt-time employment had been taken into account in 
calculating her length of service. Furthermore, she claimed that the rule which excluded her 
from claiming her status as an established staff member amounted to sex discrimination 
contrary to Community law. This assertion was supported by the fact that the only temporary 
members of staff working part-time were cleaners who were all female. 786 
781 The proposed Temporary Agency Workers' Directive (see COM (2002) 149 Final) was designed to counter 
such practices by providing some much needed specific protection to the vulnerable group of agency workers 
typified, in the UK context, by the claimant in Allonby. However, a lack of progress at Council-level, due to a 
veto in which the UK played a major part, has meant that the proposal failed to make progress and has, for the 
time being, been shelved. 
782 Case C-196/02 Nikoloudi v Orgal1ismos Tilepikinonion Ellados AE [2005] ECR I-1789. 
783 Namely the General Staff Regulations of the Organism os Tilepikinonion Ellados (the Greek public 
telecol1un unications organisation). 
784 In accordance with a collective agreement. 
785 See para 14 of the judgment in Nikoloudi. 
786 Nikoloudi at para H3. This was in accordance with the General Staff Regulations, Article 24(2)(a) of which 
stated that only 'female cleaners' could be taken on for indefinite duration for part-time work. 
255 
The Small Claims Court in Athens 787 referred the case to the ECJ asking a series of five 
questions which are complex in stucture and inter-related in nature but which, in essence, seek 
clarification on the compatibility of the rules in question with Article 141 and Directives 
75/117 and 76/207. In addition, the Court was asked to consider whether the exclusion of 
part-time temporary female workers from the benefits derived from the collective agreement 
was prohibited under Article 141. 
The Court first considered whether the rule which allowed only women to be employed on a 
part-time basis amounted to direct discrinlination. The employers contended that this rule had 
been introduced 'for socio-political reasons to support women and to meet their particular 
needs. ,788 The Court responded to this by stating that 'the creation of a category of 
exclusively female workers ... does not constitute in itself direct discrimination against 
women', rather it was the unfavourable treatment by reference to that category which could 
potentially amount to discrimination. 789 The application of the rule that only full-time workers 
qualified for appointment as established staff members implicitly excluded the part-time 
female cleaners and this potentially amounted to direct discrimination. In order for there to be 
no direct discrimination, 'the factor characterising the category to which the excluded worker 
belongs must be such as to place that worker in a situation that is objectively different, with 
regard to appointment as an established member of staff, from the situation of those who are 
eligible to become established. ,790 It is unclear what factors the Court had in mind m 
providing what effectively amounts to a possible justification for direct discrimination. 
787 The Irinodikio Athinon. 
788 A-G'g opinion at AG25. 
789 Ibid at para 34. 
790 Para 40 of the judgment. 
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On the issue of whether the exclusion of part-time workers from the terms of the collective 
agreement, which in effect prevented their conversion to permanent contracts, was prohibited 
by Article 119, the Court was more magnanimous. In line with its earlier rulings in Nim/91 
and Gerster, 792 the Court held that, where an employee's benefits depend on length of service 
requirements, it may be indirectly discriminatory for the employer to disregard part-time 
service or to count such service only on a pro rata basis unless the policy can be objectively 
justified. The employer's contention that the difference in treatment was founded on objective 
reasons of general public and social interest, namely that 'the national public-utility 
undertaking should not bear excessive burdens' 793 was found by the Court to amount to 'a 
mere generalisation insufficient to show that the aim of the measures at issue were unrelated 
t d···· h d f ,794 o any Iscnmmatlon on t e groun s 0 sex. 
These final two cases provide a sharp contrast in terms of the different public sector policies 
relating to part-time work in place within Member States. The UK and Greek national cOUlis' 
relationships with the European Court are distinct but this fact appears to have made little 
practical difference to the effect of the policies under review on the workers concerned. The 
UK courts were among the first to refer equal pay cases involving part-time female workers to 
the ECl and it is interesting to note that the public employers in Allonb/95 were only moved 
to take action to avoid the equalisation of terms and conditions of part-time and full-time staff 
on the introduction of the Part-Time Workers Regulations. 796 The timing of this action reveals 
the lack of impact that over 20 years of equal pay litigation at national and European levels 
has had on the prospects of part-time women workers. The circumstances in Allonby represent 
791 Op cit. at ll. 92. 
792 Op cit. at ll. 133. 
793 Para 50. 
794 Para 52. 
795 Op cit at ll. 246. 
796 See ll. 248 ibid. 
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a strategy pursued with the specific aim of continuing the practice of differential treatment for 
part-time workers in comparison to their full-time counterparts. Furthermore, on the main 
issue of equal pay, the claim failed as Article 141 was found not to be applicable. 
Nikoloudi, in contrast, represents an early attempt to bring an indirect discrimination claim 
before the Greek courts 797 and is the first sex discrimination case to be refened by Greece to 
the ECl The facts as reported and the questions referred reveal a complex situation in which 
workplace rules and the terms of a collective agreement converge to specifically exclude part-
time women workers from access to certain work-related benefits, not least of which is the 
security associated with permanent employment. Despite the apparently obvious 
discriminatory effect of a rule which ascribes part-time work as a women-only activity, with 
the effect that only women can be deprived of such benefits, the ECJ steered away from 
giving a clear ruling in this respect choosing instead to provide an opportunity to the public 
employers to offer a justification for direct discrimination. 
Conclusions 
In seeking to draw some meaningful conclusions from the above analysis, it is necessary to 
identify aspects of commonality in the Court's treatment of the cases under review. This is 
not an easy task as the analysis reveals a high degree of divergence in the Court's reasoning, 
despite the factual similarities between the cases. Some of the claims are concerned with the 
effects of a collective agreement on the pay rates of part-time workers (Kowalska, 798 Nimz, 799 
797 See Bulletin of the Commission's network of legal expetis on the application of Community law on equal 
treatment between women and men No 1/2004, at p. 32 in which the Greek expert states (in 2004) that, until 
very recently, no indirect discrimination claims were brought before the courts. 
798 Case 33/89 [1990] ECR 1-2591. 
799 Case 184/89 [1991] ECR 1-297. 
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H elmiloo and Kruge"s01); some with the application of national legislation which prima facie 
has a discriminatory effect on certain workers' pay rates (BoteZ802, Lewark803 and Freeri04); 
in other cases it is the State's role as employer that is under scrutiny (Gerster,805 Kordinl06 
and Hill and StapZeton807); the arrangements relating to retirement and work-related benefits 
h I d · h fir;: 808. 1 809 M . 810 8Jl ave a so prove a nc source 0 case aw (v 1'Oege ,F1SSC 1er , ago rl'l an, Preston , 
Grau-Hupka812 and Schrode"sJ3); and, finally, the contract status of certain categories of 
worker has given rise to allegations of sex discrimination (Allonb/14 and Nikoloudi815). 
Despite the varied nature of the policies under review and their different national origins, all 
of the claims are concerned with the use of different terms and conditions of employment for 
'standard' workers and those deemed to be 'atypical'. In the case of the latter group, which, 
consists wholly or mainly of women in all the cases, this differentiation tends to have a 
detrimental effect on pay and work-related benefits. 
The expansion of women's employment that has taken place in the post-war economies of 
Europe's Member States has largely been in the provision of part-time work816 which enables 
those with children to combine family responsibilities with paid employment. As Jenkins 
illustrates, prior to the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation, women were subjected 
to less favourable treatment in employment on the grounds of assumptions concerning their 
800 Op cit at n. 10I. 
801 Opcitatn. 1l0. 
802 Op cit at n. 118. 
803 Op cit at n. 119. 
804 Op cit at n. 126. 
8050pcitatn.133. 
806 Op cit at 11. 134. 
8070pcitatn.148. 
808 Op cit at n. 178. 
809 0p cit at n. 179. 
8100pcitatn.193. 
811 Opcitatn. 20I. 
812 Op cit atn. 225. 
813 Opcitatn. 23I. 
814 Op cit. at 11. 246. 
815 Op cit at n. 247. 
816 See Chapter 3 infra. 
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value as workers arising from what was perceived to be their lack of commitment to the 
labour market. Once the legal landscape changed and female workers gained formal equality 
with their male counterparts, new ways in which to differentiate their tenns and conditions 
were sought by employers with variations in working arrangements providing the most 
obvious ground. So, discrimination on the grounds of sex, now unlawful, became 
discrimination on the grounds of hours of work which may have been legally questionable but 
was not specifically prohibited. Unsurprisingly, legal challenges to this new form of 
legitimate discrimination were raised on the grounds that, despite the re-Iabelling, the effect 
of such policies was the same. National courts, unsure of the effect of European Community 
provisions on this new uncharted area of law, referred cases to the ECJ and those early 
referrals resulted in the development of a conceptual framework that is still in place today. 
Once this framework had been established, celiain ideological foundations were bedded in 
which influenced the further development of the Court's jurisprudence. When placed in the 
more general context of the Court's jurisprudence on sex discrimination, the judgments under 
review appear to conform to the application of a consistent approach. However, as a detailed 
analysis demonstrates, the concepts and underpinning ideology have been subjected to a high 
degree of divergence in certain respects. Taking each of these aspects in turn, I will attempt 
to identify the nature of this divergence by way of the case law reviewed. 
The Conceptual Frameworl{ 
Indit"ect Discrimination 
The above analysis of the Court's conceptual framework questions the use of indirect 
discrimination as a suitable means of classifying claims of alleged discrimination against 
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atypical workers in all circumstances. This is the approach adopted by the Court since Jenkins 
and rests on a distinction made in that case between the nature of the job performed by part-
time and full-time workers. In Jenkins, 817 the work performed by both groups of workers was 
essentially the same, the only differences being the sex of the workers concerned and the 
hours of work performed. The Court accepted the employer's explanation that the differences 
in pay were not linked to the workers' sex and so the only factor that remained on which the 
differential pay rates could be explained was that of hours of work. Men were not prevented 
from working part-tinle although the vast majority of such workers were women. Thus the 
basis for the subsequent finding of indirect rather than direct discrinlination was deemed to be 
the nature of the job as performed by a part-time worker. The Court ruled that such 
differentiation was based on the application of a neutral policy which, if it had a 
disproportionate impact on the members of one sex, was prohibited by Article 119, although 
if the distinction between part-time and full-time work could be justified in some way, the 
resulting discrimination might be acceptable. The Court was silent on what factors 
distinguished one from the other, leaving interested parties to fill in the blanks. In deciding 
the case in this way, the Court subordinated the operation of the equality principle in this 
context to the need to show that a neutral policy had caused a disproportionate impact on the 
members of one sex. The fact that the policy in Jenkins 818 was not 'neutral', but was designed 
as a means of escaping liability for sex discrimination and served to perpetuate the 
discrimination that had existed prior to the introduction of the legislation, was overlooked. 
In attempting to identify the differences in the nature of a job as performed by part-time and 
full-tinle workers, one possible explanation could rest in the total amount of tinle spent by 
workers performing the tasks required by the job. If a con-elation could be established 
817 Op cit at n. 13. 
818 Ibid 
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between the total amount of time spent by the worker on the tasks and the acquis ition of skills 
and experience which served to benefit the organisation, the differences in pay could, perhaps, 
be justified. This was the basis of the employers' defences in Nimz819, Gel'ster820 and 
Kordinl21 in which it was asserted that the time taken by part-timers to acquire the necessary 
skills and experience for progression up an incremental pay scale or for promotional purposes 
was proportionate to the time actually worked so that those who worked half of the standard 
working hours would take twice as long as full-timers to reach the required standard. The 
Court sensibly rejected this approach in all three cases stating that the assumption that time 
spent performing particular tasks equated to a proportionate acquisition of skills and 
experience amounted to generalisations about certain categories of workers which were 
unsustainable. This finding appeared to free the rights of part-time workers from the need to 
adhere to standards set by those able to conform to the normative full-time model, thus 
recognising atypical workers as being capable of operating autonomously despite their 
differences from the norm. However, in Helmig,822 the Court returned to the nan-ow 
construction of achievement by finding that the payment of overtime supplements was only 
appropriate if the extra hours worked were above and beyond those performed by the standard 
full-time worker. Furthermore, in Nikoloud/,23 the Court appeared to hint at the possible 
existence of a factor capable of characterising part-time workers (apart from their sex) which 
would justify the differentiation of contractual terms and in Allonb/24 the transfer of part-
time workers to different contractual an-angements was found to amount to just such a factor. 
819 Op cit at n. 92. 
8200pcftatn.133. 
821 Op cit at n. 134. 
822 Op cit at n. 101. 
823 Op cit at 11. 247. 
824 Op cit at n. 246. 
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The Use of the Objective Justification Test 
The use of a proportionality test as a means of gauging the appropriateness of various forms 
of justification for indirect discrimination appears, prima facie, to provide a fair and 
consistent approach to what are essentially a range of diverse grounds. However, the nature 
of the test itself is wholly subjective and can be interpreted as dependent on employer-led 
criteria rather than on the requirement for a balanced assessment of all of the factors at stake. 
It is unsurprising that the Court's reasoning surrounding the test has varied considerably in 
certain respects and, although always qualified by deference to the national court as the 
appropriate authority to determine whether the ground advanced should be regarded as 
meeting the required standard, the Court has, on occasion, opined as to the suitability of 
certain criteria. This has generally arisen in cases where the framing of the questions by the 
national cOUli have required a direct response. For example, in Bilka,825 the COUli was 
specifically asked to rule on whether the objective to employ as few part-time workers as 
possible was an acceptable means of justifying lower pay rates for such workers. However, 
the Court has, on occasion, responded unprompted to the justifications advanced by 
employers or, more commonly, tlrrough the submissions of the government of the country of 
origin. This was the case in Rinner-Kiihn826 in which the court refuted the German 
government's claim that those working less than 10 hours per week were not sufficiently 
integrated in or dependent on the employing organisation to justify the payment of sickness 
benefit. In contrast, the COUli has also sometimes desisted from giving an opinion of the 
relative weight of a potential justification as it did in Kowalska. 827 This was despite the stereo-
typical basis of the justification which rested on the perceived lack of economic necessity for 
825 Op cit at n. 4l. 
826 Op cit at n. 72. 
827 Op cit at n. 85. 
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those working part-time to be eligible for severance pay under a collective agreement and 
which was similar in nature to that in Rinner-Kiihn. 828 
Given the limited number of cases under reVIew, it IS difficult to reach any definitive 
conclusions regarding differences in the Court's treatment of employer and State-led 
justifications, but some preliminary observations can be made. In its role as employer, the 
State does not appear to have been the recipient of particularly favourable treatment in this 
respect as the judgments in Gerstel29, Kordinl3o and Hill and Stapleton831 illustrate. 
However, where the alleged discrimination results from a legislative measure and the 
attempted justification is correspondingly advanced by the Member State's government, the 
Court appears to be more receptive to persuasion than in cases involving the imposition of an 
employer's policy or one arising from a collective agreement (see Kriiger832). This is 
demonstrated by the Court's treatment of the incremental development of the justification in 
Botel,833 Leware3.J and Freers835 which remained the same in substance but which grew in 
prominence, at the German government's insistence, as the cases unfolded. This is perhaps 
not surprising given the different standards in operation with respect to employers' policies 
which must comply with the test as expounded in Bilka836 and those arising on the grounds of 
social policy for which Member States retain a 'wide margin of discretion'. The use of this 
discretion is most notable in the context of the Court's treatment of retirement and work-
related pensions, in which respect the procedural autonomy of Member States appears to 
trump the equality principle regardless of the consequences, as shown by the Court's 
828 Op cit at n. 72. 
829 Op cit at 11. 133. 
830 Op cit at 11. 134. 
831 Op cit at n. 148. 
8320p cit at 11. 110. 
833 Op cit at 11. 118. 
834 Op cit at n. 119. 
835 Op cit at 11. 126. 
836 Op cit at 11. 41. 
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reasonmg m Preston. 837 With ultimate responsibility for the acceptance or rejection of 
attempted justification resting with the national courts, the influence of the ECJ on this aspect 
is not finite. However, the inconsistent treatment of potential defences for discriminatory 
policies is surely questionable in the context of the Court's objective of furtherance of the 
principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectation. 
Ideological Foundations 
In establishing the conceptual framework within which such claims could be assessed, the 
Court's reasoning has, by necessity, ventured into considerations of the relationship between 
labour market participation and family responsibility. The effects of past discrimination loom 
large in this respect as many of the unfounded assumptions regarding women's ability to 
combine this 'dual role' were the cause of unfavourable treatment by employers prior to the 
introduction of the anti-discrimination legislation and the Court's interpretation of Article 
119/141. Furthermore, many ofthe legislative measures and those arising from the application 
of collective agreements are based on such assumptions, and the stories told by the cases 
themselves often concern women who, despite long periods in paid employment, find 
themselves the recipients of reduced pension entitlement in old age. Consequently, the issues 
for the Court have been whether, and to what extent, the effects of past discrimination should 
inform the reasoning applied in its case law and what role the relationship between women's 
paid employment and unpaid labour within the family should have in the ideological 
foundations underpinning its jurisprudence. 
837 Op cit at n. 201. 
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In this respect, as in the application of the conceptual framework, the Court's reasoning has 
proved inconsistent with, on the one hand, its rejection of generalisations concerning certain 
, f k b'" iii ' ( B II 838 N' 839 d N'I 1 d·840) d categones 0 wor ers as 0 ~ect1ve Just tcatlons see i Ka, lmz an liW ou I an, 
on the other, its adherence to the standard employment model as a yardstick against which all 
other categories should be measured (see Helmil41). The Court's jurisprudence on overtime 
payments can be used to illustrate this inconsistency, In Helmig, 842 the COUli held that those 
working part-time were not eligible for overtime supplements unless they exceeded the 
standard (full-tinle) working hours, whereas in Elsner-Lakebel'l43 a requirement that all 
workers, regardless of normal hours of work, would only receive overtime payments for 
working in excess of three extra hours per month was prohibited by Article 141. The reason 
for the prohibition was that the application of a blanket provision resulted in a 'greater 
burden' for part-time workers. In contrast, in Lewal'k844 and Freas,845 the Court found that 
the non-payment of overtime for part-time workers' attendance at training courses in 
accordance with national legislation could amount to a legitimate aim of social policy as it 
preserved the independence of those serving on staff committees. The fact that part-time 
workers often work reduced hours because of the need to balance paid employment with other 
responsibilities was not considered to be relevant. 
In its case law in this context, the Court oscillates from one position to another, sometimes 
accepting the effects of the past and the difficulties inherent in combining paid employment 
with family responsibilities as relevant factors in its decision-making, sometimes not. In 
838 Op cit atn. 411 
839 Op cit at n. 92, 
840 Op cit at n. 247. 
8410pcitatn.101. 
842 Ibid 
843 Op cit atn. 160. 
844 Op cit at n. 119. 
845 Op cit atn. 126. 
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Grau_Hupka,846 the Court found that, as the calculation of statutory pension entitlement is not 
required to take account of years spent bringing up children, paying a reduced rate to a 
woman who is in receipt of a reduced state pension is compatible with the equality principle. 
In a later judgment (Steinicke847), the court held that to exclude former part-time workers from 
a scheme designed to enable those in receipt of pensions to undertake part-time work as a 
means of supplementing their income is contrary to Article 119 unless it can be objectively 
justified. 848 In Hill and Stapleton849 the Court acknowledged that Community policy should 
encourage and, if possible, adapt working conditions to family responsibilities, yet, in 
Niko lou dl.850, the Court rejected the notion that workplace rules which allowed women 
cleaners to work only on a temporary and part-time basis and then subjected them to less 
favourable tenllS and conditions than their permanent, full-time (mostly male) colleagues 
amounted to direct discrimination as 'there is nothing to prevent women working full-time. ' 
In drawing distinctions between the theoretical approaches to different cases, the Court does 
reveal something of its underlying logic. As illustrated by its use of the test for objective 
justification (see above), the Court appears to be more receptive to the notion that account 
should be taken of the effects of past discrimination and family responsibility in 
circumstances in which no particular burden will be imposed on the State. For example, the 
contrast provided by its preservation of national procedural autonomy in Preston851 and the 
approach taken in Schroder852 is stark. In Preston, the six-month time limit for bringing 
actions was allowed to stand despite the practical difficulties that its imposition would present 
846 Op cit at n. 225. 
847 Case C-77 /02 Steinicke v. Bundesanstalt Fur Arbeit [2003] ECR 1-9027. 
848 Admittedly the rationale applied here was economic in nature as it was noted the 'the provision at issue 
excludes from access to a part-time working scheme the very group of people, namely public servants working 
part-time, who in fact make a considerable contribution to the unblocking of the employment market.' See the 
judgment in Steinicke at para 65. 
849 0p cit at n. 148. 
850 Op cit at n. 247. 
851 Op cit at n. 201. 
852 Op cit at n. 231. 
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to would-be claimants, whereas, in Schroder the application of a temporal limitation as a 
means of restricting retroactive membership of an occupational pension scheme was 
prohibited on the grounds that the right not to be discriminated against on ground of sex arises 
as a fundamental human right. This distinction, however, does not extend to cases concerning 
the State as employer, as evidenced by the Court's rulings in Gerster, Kording and Hill and 
Stapleton. 
Perhaps the most startling aspect of the Court's jurisprudence in the context of the cases under 
review is not demonstrable by what factors it did consider in preparing the majority of its 
judgments, but rather, in the potential items for consideration that it did not consider. 
Following the Court's judgment in Defi'enne I~ 853 in which its teleological approach to 
reasoning was used to great effect, it was assumed (if not expected) that the Court's 
jurisprudence in the social policy field would continue to draw on the interpretation of Article 
119 in telTI1S of its position in the wider legal framework provided by the Treaty. In Chapter 5 
the Court's exercise of its judicial function was assessed, with many commentators taking the 
view that the 'judicial activism', for which the ECJ has on occasion been criticised, is wholly 
justifiable in the context of its position within the European Community legal order. The 
teleological nature of the Court's reasoning, apparent in other areas of its work, promised 
much in terms of its interpretation of the equality principle. In Defi'enne II the Court 
delivered what must still be regarded as an insightful judgment based on the aspirational 
thrust of the Treaty. In finding that the principle, as enshrined in Article 119, was directly 
effective, the Court alticulated the social objectives of the Community which were interpreted 
as providing new possibilities for those concerned with the elimination of sex equality.854 In 
853 Op cit at n. 12. 
854 See A. Lester, 'The Uncertain Trumpet. References to the European Court of Justice from the United 
Kingdom: Equal Pay and Equal Treatment without Sex Discrimination' in H. G. SchelIDers et al (eds ) Article 177 
EEC: Experiences and Problems (TMV Asser Instituut 1987) 164. 
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support of this proclamation, reference was made to the contextual position of Article 119 as 
part of a chapter devoted to social policy and whose preliminary provision, Article 117,855 
marked the need to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living 
for workers. 
In its subsequent rulings on the interpretation of Article 141 in the context of the employment 
rights of atypical female workers, the Court has made an undeniable contribution through its 
recognition of the applicability of the concept of indirect discrimination. However, its 
judgments in this respect have been, in the main, both conservative and inconsistent allowing 
a slow and incremental development of those rights based on a restrictive interpretation of the 
equality principle. Only in Schroder,856 is there evidence of a return to the wide-ranging, 
pragmatic decision-making of DeFenne II and, even then if its later judgments are 
considered,857 the COUli's recognition of the over-riding importance of the Treaty's social 
objectives appears as little more than a political statement. 
855 Now Article 136. 
856 In 'which the Court reiterates the contextual importance of Article 141 's position in the Treaty in the same 
telms as in Defi'enne II - see the judgment in Schroder op cit at para. 55. 
857 Preston op cit at n. 201; Nikoloud i op cit at n. 247. 
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Chapter 7 
Introduction 
Conclusions 
'Now, with our experience, we see Community law 
through a glass darkly,858 
The organisation of work can tell us much about society generally and the place of individuals 
within it. By studying the labour market behaviour of women and men, it is possible to 
establish a connection to the corresponding arrangements pertaining to the family and to gain 
an insight into the personal and formal relations between citizens and the State. This enables 
an understanding of the value systems which inform both personal and group choices which, 
in tum, are reflected in the extent and nature of State regulation. Ultimately, some assessment 
is possible of the circumstances of those engaged in paid employment, culminating in the 
corresponding levels of economic independence possible through group membership and the 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by the individual. In this thesis, the study of labour markets and 
corresponding legal responses in the field of gender relations has been undertaken with a view 
to ascertaining whether the European Court of Justice has developed an identifiable 
jurisprudence in this context. This has necessitated a wide-ranging field of enquiry which has 
been concemed with the establishment of the underlying theoretical foundations, 
identification of the nature of the different employment experiences of women and men, 
assessment of the relevant legal responses and, ultinlately, with an analysis of the reasoning 
informing the Eel's decision-making in a group of cases conceming the anti- discrimination 
provisions of Community law. 
858 A. Lester, 'The Uncertain Trumpet. References to the European Court of Justice from the United Kingdom: 
Equal Pay and Equal Treatment without Sex Discrimination' in HG. Schermers et al (eds) Article 177 EEC: 
Experiences and Problems (TMV Asser Instituut 1987) 164, at p. 165, cited in Chapters 4 and 6 inji-a. 
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The array of working arrangements which are to be found within contemporary labour 
markets are diverse, reflecting the rich social and cultural mL,{ of those deemed to be 
economically active. However, in even the most elementary analysis of the labour markets of 
Western Europe, the sexual divisions of work cannot be overlooked. Gendered patterns of 
behaviour persist, to varying degrees, in all of the European Union Member States under 
review in this thesis. Women continue to work in different occupations and sectors £i'om men 
and at different levels within occupational hierarchies, often with less favourable pay and 
conditions. Furthermore, incidences of discrimination on the grounds of sex persist so that 
women are subjected to less favourable treatment than men, both through the workplace 
practices of individual employers and through systemic discrimination which arises from 
procedures and policies at the macro-level which have a disproportionate impact on women as 
a group. This is despite the long-standing existence of legal intervention intended to equalise 
the employment 0ppoltunities of both sexes. The difficulties inherent in the effective targeting 
of legal responses to such complex and diverse issues give the Court of Justice a particular 
prominence in its role as the interpreter of Community law. 
Although its limited potential as a sole engme of change is acknowledged, the normative 
value of the law as an organising force has long been recognised in terms of its contribution to 
the ascription of acceptable modes of behaviour and, through its punitive effects, the 
enforcement of such behaviour. The possible legal responses to incidences of sex 
discrimination are many and varied and generally consist of a combination of constitutional 
provisions, legislative activity, 'soft law' policy measures and the interaction of courts in 
interpreting such measures. Success will be largely dependent on the interpretation given to 
the central concepts utilised in the development of a doctrinal response which can only be 
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achieved through the judicial function. From the early days of its inception, the European 
Community has undoubtedly been at the forefront of the development of sex equality law in 
the employment sphere. The concepts of non-discrimination and equality are enslu'ined in the 
EC Treaty and have been further articulated by the provisions of secondary legislation and 
through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. 859 Despite its influence in this 
respect, the conceptualisation of the notions surrounding gender relations utilised by 
Community law are largely dependent on the foundations of traditional social and legal theory 
and, thus, the weaknesses inherent in such theory are transposed into its provisions. In fact 
those same weaknesses, which combine to thwart or dilute attempts aimed at bringing 
improvements to women's labour market position, are also present in the work of 
contemporary theorists and have necessitated the development of a specific school of feminist 
legal theory as a means of taking account of the life experiences of women in the 
development of proposals for legal and social refonn. 860 
In the discharge of its judicial function, the Court has generally adopted a teleological 
approach to its decision-making so that it interprets the provision in question in furtherance of 
the aims and objectives of the Community and Union as a whole. If the Court's early 
jurisprudence in the field of sex discrimination is considered, the reasoning informing its 
judgments was undoubtedly of this nature so that, for example, in finding Article 119 to be 
directly effective, consideration was given to its place in the overall scheme of Community 
law. 861 This approach also enabled the Court's atticulation of the 'double aim' of Article 119 
in recognition of the social as well as economic objectives of Community law. These aspects 
of the Court's jurisprudence on sex discrimination were instrumental in instigating the 
dialogues on gender relations with national courts in which the ECJ has engaged for the past 
859 See Chapter 4 inji-a. 
860 See further Chapter 2 infi'a. 
861 Case 43/75 Deji-enne v Sabena (No 2) [1976] ECR 455. 
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30 years through the Article 234 reference procedure. 862 The expectations of claimants and 
legal advisers regarding the likely impact of Community law were initially high and the 
national courts' willingness to refer cases for adjudication provided the ECJ with 
opportunities to reorient the conceptualisation of gender relations through its jurisprudence. 
However, rather than the informed reasoning which might have been expected in this regard, 
the COUlt's decision-making has generally been based on a narrow and, at times restrictive, 
interpretation of Article 119/141. This prompts questions regarding the particular theoretical 
perspective taken by the Court and, indeed, whether a coherent and consistent strategy has 
actually been developed in this respect. It is with this enquiry that the thesis presented here is 
primarily concerned in its objective of uncovering the extent to which the Court's 
adjudications on cases referred under the Article 234 procedure can be characterised as having 
a common output amounting to an identifiable jurisprudence on gender relations. 
The theoretical perspective adopted in this investigation is undoubtedly a feminist one. The 
school of feminist legal theory is broad and encompasses many different approaches to the 
study of sex and gender. However, what all of these approaches share as a common goal is the 
inclusion of women's voices which have for so long been excluded in dominant studies of 
social, economic and legal theory. This exclusion has arisen both intentionally, on the grounds 
that women were not worthy of specific attention, and incidentally due to oversights on the 
part of (male) theorists. Regardless of the reasons for its exclusion, the denial of woman's 
experience serves to weaken such theory and, in areas where broad observations are made 
regarding the organisation of society and the potential development of appropriate legal rules, 
render it unhelpfu1. 
862 See Chapter 6 infi"a. 
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Much of the debate within contemporary feminist theory has been concerned with whether the 
differences between men and women should be considered as paramount in the development 
of doctrinal responses to work-related discrimination or whether focusing attention on such 
difference weakens claims regarding the attainment of equality between the sexes as women 
are, once again, defined by their biological function. 863 The approach adopted in this thesis to 
what has been characterised as the 'same/difference' debate is that there is a middle ground 
between these two diametrically opposed positions. The different experiences of women and 
men on the labour market and within family arrangements result as much from gender 
differences as from those associated with physiology, but they do exist and they do impact on 
the lives of women, often detrimentally. To deny them would be to deny woman's voice. 
Furthermore, to intentionally overlook the differences in women's labour market behaviour 
would be implicitly to condone the assimilation of woman to the normative construct of the 
standard (male) worker and passively accept the value of that standard. What the preceding 
analysis has demonstrated is that, even for men, the usefulness of the full-time, permanent 
model of employment as a target for protective legislation is diminishing. 864 The so-called 
'atypical' worker, personified by the claimants in the case analysis in Chapter 6, may well be 
the standard worker of the future. 
In this respect, the conceptualisation of gender relations adopted by the Court is instrumental 
in the confen'al of rights to 'atypical' workers who suffer sex-based discrinlination ostensibly 
on the grounds of their working arrangements. This is because, in the absence of effective 
specific legislation, such workers have been solely reliant on the COUlt'S interpretation of the 
principle of equality to gain any improvements in their working conditions. As the 
arrangements surrounding employment become more complex and diverse, the targeting of 
863 See the discussion of the Greek School and the Social Contract theorists in Chapter 2 supra. 
864 See Chapter 3 inji-a. 
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legislation becomes more difficult with resulting provisions often being ineffective in giving 
protection to those most in need. Furthermore, in its broad context, the existing body of 
Community law already implicitly provides potential responses to the legal problems 
identified. The Court of Justice occupies a unique position in this regard as the only authority 
with the ability to make the requisite connections between labour market inequalities and 
legal remedy. This is possible tluough the process of rationalisation in its decision-making as 
well as tlu'ough the effect of the judgments themselves. In order to effectively address the 
shortcomings within the current legal framework, it is necessary for the Court's philosophical 
position to encompass consideration of women's life experiences in giving effect to the 
equality principle. 
Concepts and Constructs: Polar Opposites or Ejusdem Gelleris? 
In Chapter 2 consideration was paid to the development of feminist legal theory as a means of 
explaining and countering the differing labour market experiences of men and women. Some 
feminist analysts use as their starting point the central concepts identified by traditional 
explorations of such difference, others choose to reject established dogma on the basis that 
they were conceived from a male perspective without any attempt to incorporate woman's 
viewpoint. Although much can be learned about the nature of society from the approaches 
adopted in the earliest considerations of gender relations, what most traditional accounts have 
in common is the absence of woman's voice, so that her contribution to social arrangements is 
either completely ignored or is explained on the basis of unrealistic assumptions about her 
identity. Nevertheless, such considerations do provide a useful starting point, not least 
because they continue to inform much contemporary thinking in the public policy arena, but 
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also because by exploring the standard against which all things are measured, it is possible to 
identify the 'otherness ,865 that constitutes women's perceived identity. 
The Greek School, through the work of Aristotle and Plato, established the use of 
dichotomisation as a means of exploring the differences between the sexes, so that woman 
was defmed by her physiological difference from man as the weaker sex, confmed by her 
ability to bear children to the private sphere of the family. Woman's physical difference from 
man was perceived as being indicative of her non-rational psychological state, while man's 
assumed predisposition to rationality and reason meant that he was 'more fitted to rule than 
the female'. 866 Although no longer expressly articulated in contemporary thinking on gender 
relations, the legacy of the Greek philosophers has been that certain fundamental elements of 
their schema continue to have a profound influence on the provisions of welfare and labour 
law. In the current context, this influence is manifested in three inter-related aspects: the 
polarisation of the sexes tlu-ough the ascription of gender roles; the identification of the 'male 
norm'; and the Aristotelian notion of equality. 
The social construction of gender has, as its starting point, the physical differences between 
the sexes. However, the biological functions of woman and man are merely the bases on 
which gender is constructed so that, long after the physiological states of pregnancy and 
childbirth have passed, the tasks inherent in caring and nurturing, however menial and far 
removed from the reproductive function, continue to be viewed as 'woman's work'. Busied 
with the daily toil of house-keeping and tending to the needs of others, women are often less 
available and less willing to commit to full-time paid employment. Men, on the other hand, 
having performed their biological function early in the procreative process, are able to meet 
865 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (trans. HM.Parshley) (Vintage 1949), discussed in Chapter 2 infi"a. 
866 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, D. Ross (trans) (OUP 1925): the Politics Bk 1 xii, 1259a 37. 
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the needs of their dependants through participation in the labour market, by the exchange of 
labour for remuneration. This co-dependency within the family means that woman is 
economically dependent on man and he relies on woman for the fulfilment of his 
physiological and psychological needs. This scenario may be grounded as much in stereo-
typical notions as in the reality of life in contemporary society. However, it does have a 
certain resonance given that, even in two-parent families where both patiners work, women 
are more likely than men to assume domestic responsibility. This division of labour (his paid, 
hers unpaid) gives rise to a set of binary factors organised around the central concepts of 
work/family and public/private which continue to shape our perception of what it is to be 
male or female. Where such divis ions are reflected in the reality of family and working life, it 
is unclear whether they are the result of free choice made on the basis of individual aspiration 
or whether they are the product of socialisation, perpetuated by the reflected organisation of 
social arrangements and State support mechanisms. What is clear is the message that 
women's and men's experiences are different and that difference is clearly demonstrated by 
their labour market behaviour. 
As growing numbers of women continue to work outside of the home during the years of 
family formation, the State and employers face challenges to the established legal framework 
within which labour law operates. The constituent parts of this framework are at once formal 
and informal, regulatory and voluntary and arise through a combination of State intervention 
and the development of employee relations at the workplace level. Like all socially 
constructed institutions, the world of work is gendered. Through its association with the 
public sphere, the arrangement of paid work is male-dominated and, thus, the product of 
patriarchal forces. To be economically active is to be available and willing to work full-time: 
to be able to maximise output, so that the standard worker is employed on a full-time, 
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permanent basis with no other demands on his time and, due to the ascription of gendered 
roles within the family, is male. The working mother with her obviously divergent needs 
poses a problem for employers and the State: she has other competing interests on her time 
and requires to mould work around the needs of her family which will vary over her life 
cycle, so that she has differing phases of dependency outside of her employment which are 
reflected in her availability for work. In fact, she is so different from the male standard 
worker that she is viewed as non-standard, her working arrangements are categorised as 
'atypical' and she is defined as 'the other'. 
The Aristotelian principle of equality dictates that 'likes should be treated alike' unless there 
is a compelling justification for doing otherwise. This is the basic tenet on which the current 
approach to the elimination of discrimination is based within the European Community legal 
system. 867 It necessitates an 'equal oppOltunities' conception of equality so that women are 
deemed to be the same as men and, thus, assimilated to the same model as that displayed by 
the normative construct of the standard worker. Manifestations of the physical differences 
between the sexes are accounted for within the general framework, so that maternity attracts 
specific employment protection based on a system of rights which apply throughout the 
duration of the pregnancy and for the period of maternity leave provided for under national 
rules. Beyond this period, differences on the grounds of sex (or gender) will cease to be 
acknowledged and likes will once again be treated alike. What this approach overlooks is the 
fact of woman's experience arising fi·om historical disadvantage which has left her differently 
situated from man and is reflected in contemporary family arrangements. This disadvantage is 
perpetuated by her inability to confornl to male-based n01111S such as that of the standard 
worker on the grounds of domestic responsibility. Thus woman is trapped within the confines 
867 See Chapter 4 inji-a. 
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of her gender by the ascription of her role which detenuines the division of labour within 
families and which is reflected in the institutional arrangements pertaining to paid 
employment. While it is true that some men might also favour the opportunity to attempt a 
more even balance of paid employment and family involvement, the current legal and social 
framework is generally unsupportive ofthis. 
The Role of the State 
In attempting to theorise the reordering of social arrangements which took place during the 
Enlightenment, writers of the time acknowledged the dissolution of the confining effects of 
patriarchy and its replacement with individual freedom. 868 The social contract theorists of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may have differed in their opinions on the precise nature 
of the renegotiation that was taking place, but they concurred on one important issue - the 
place of woman in society. The influence of Greek philosophy is clear in analyses of the 
reordering of society from Locke's 'last Detenuination', in which a husband retained the right 
to all decision-making within a marriage on the basis of his sex's predisposition to logic and 
reason, to Rousseau's belief in the separation of mind and biology with woman's nature 
detenuined by the latter and man's by the former. Despite the notion of an agreement between 
the ruler and the ruled under the auspices of the sovereign State, the forces of patriarchy 
continued as the central source of power in relations between the sexes. Women were largely 
confined to the private world of the family, while men enjoyed greater political freedom 
through participation in public life. There was no negotiation over the tenus of the sexual 
contract which was dictated by men. 869 In fact the new emphasis on individual consent and 
the State's retreat in matters of personal decision-making left the private spheres of home and 
868 See the discussion of the social contract theorists in Chapter 2 irifi·a. 
869 C. Pateman The Sexual Contract, Cambridge, (Polity Press 1988), discussed in Chapter 2 supra. 
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family untouched and the resulting power dynamic vulnerable to the effects of the free 
market. 
In the contemporary context, the notion of the neutral State in liberal theory presupposes that 
the distribution of resources via the market will reach a state of equilibrium free from 
unjustified State interventionism. The emphasis is, thus, on individualistic notions of 
attainment and personal freedom. Such thinking overlooks the effects of patriarchy which are 
evident in the institutional at1'angements governing employment and family relations and 
which are manifested in gender-based discrimination in the labour market. Feminist critics 
argue that, far from being neutral, the State in its many guises is undeniably male. From the 
Marxist perspective, the State as an ideological and political actor can, in the right conditions, 
serve as a force for good in overcoming inequalities. Contemporary theorists such as Dworkin 
and Rawls 870 have focused their attention on how the fair distribution of resources might best 
be achieved and their insights provide valuable analyses of both group and individual 
behaviour in the attainment of equality and of the concept of equality itself. However, in 
common with their predecessors, these theorists omit to pay any specific attention to women's 
position in society, so that their theories are unsatisfactory in considerations of sex and 
gender. 
Through the study of industrial relations' theory871 it is possible to assess the role of the State 
in shaping the overall environment within which the exchange of labour for remuneration 
takes place. Such analyses have tended to overlook the gender dimension inherent within the 
organising forces, so that employers, trade unions and the State appear as gender-neutral. 
Nevertheless, the emerging picture is one of segmentation within the labour market which 
870 Both of whose work is discussed in Chapter 2 slpra. 
871 See Chapter 3 infi'a. 
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tells us much about the nature of relations between the relevant parties. The Europeanisation 
of the exchange between worker and employer has dis empowered the institutions involved in 
industrial relations at the national levels, so that regulation takes place at the supranational 
level without the traditional forms of worker involvement in the negotiation process. At the 
Community level, economic factors such as the creation of new jobs as a means of countering 
rising unemployment have shaped the policy agenda in recent years. The redesign of the EU 
regulatory model has led to a shift away from the development of hard law provisions in the 
broad field of social policy, intended to correct the discrinlinatory effects of the market, 
towards the co-ordination of national policy in the narrower sphere of employment. This 
development is based on the notion that increased labour market flexibility requires a retreat 
from State interventionism. However, as the neo-liberalism of the 1980s and 1990s illustrates, 
deregulation actually involves the systematic intervention of government and a corresponding 
increase in State power. 
LaboUl' Market Regulation: F.'om National to Supmnational 
The very existence of the European Union is predicated on the liberal notion of free market 
ideology with minimal State intervention. This dynamic means that the Community law-
making institutions are unlikely to engage in the process of legislative activity designed to 
ensure better employment protection unless such action can be economically rationalised. 
This is particularly true where improvements in worker security are associated with greater 
regulation and a diminution of labour market flexibility. The inclusion of Article 119 in the 
Treaty of Rome was predicated on the basis of a pro-competitive argument. Its potential, 
which was later exploited by the ECJ, was initially overlooked. The growth of part-time work 
contributed to the creation of a segmented labour market through the interaction of the 
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employment system and the system of social organisation. The forces of supply and demand 
converged to create a largely unregulated workforce of part-time female workers 
distinguishable from their male counterparts, not on the protected ground of their gender, but 
on the unprotected ground of their working arrangements. As early case law illustrates, faced 
with the prospect of having to provide equal pay for women and men, employers found new 
ways of differentiating workers for the purposes of circumventing legal obligations. 872 
The rise in unregulated labour market practices and the accompanying shift towards flexibility 
from jobs for life has involved what Supiot has identified as the advance of contract and 
erosion of status so that the qUid pro quo of subordination for security has broken down and 
has not been renegotiated. 873 This trend is clearly reflected in the practices and policies 
highlighted in the cases under review in this thesis. The State is not a neutral player in the 
developing industrial relations environment, but the traditional bipolar classification of 
minimalist State or protector State is misleading. Each of the Member States, though their 
own employee relations models, represent a combination of these two positions. State 
responsibility for the perpetuation of inequalities between the sexes is not solely attributable 
to market forces and, through the transfer of sovereignty to the European Community, such 
responsibility must be shared with the institutions of the Community law. However, as is clear 
from the changing nature of work itself and the institutions which support it, the target of 
legislative and judicial activity is no longer sex discrimination per se, but rather the 
normalisation of non-standard employment. 
872 Case 96/80 Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Limited [1981] ECR 911, discussed in Chapter 6, 
supra. 
873 A. Supiot 'The Transformation of Work and the Future of Labour Lml' in Europe: A A:fultidisciplinal)1 
Perspective', Illtematiollal Labour Review 138 (1999) 1, 32, discussed in Chapter 3 supra. 
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The Role of European Community Law 
Through its recognition of equality as one of the fundamental principles of Community law, 
the European Court of Justice has been at the forefront of developments in this area. 
However, as the updated application of Fredman's critique of Community law874 in Chapter 4 
has shown, the furtherance of this principle within the current legislative fi-amework is 
problematic. This is largely due to the fact that the current conceptualisation of the central 
determinants is based on the attainment of fonnal rather than substantive equality. This 
approach has been useful in its promotion of sex equality as a desirable goa~ but its 
limitations are particularly apparent when the furtherance of women's rights conflicts with the 
Community's overarching objective of preserving the market order. The 'flexicurity' ideal is 
a case in point, as the tension inherent in the realisation of the dual goals of labour market 
flexibility and worker security is palpable. That is not to say that it is unattainable but, rather, 
that the current regulatory framework works against the simultaneous achievement of both 
goals. Attempts have been made in recent years to redress the imbalance in the relationship 
between these two objectives by the introduction of specific legislation intended to equalise 
terms and conditions of employment for part-time and temporary workers. However, as the 
analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrates,875 inequalities which are experienced by such workers on 
the grounds of working arrangements and gender remain outside of the scope of such 
initiatives. This is due to the legislation's reliance on the use of comparisons as a means of 
providing rights which, given the high levels of gendered labour market segregation that are 
particularly prevalent in the lower paid end of the jobs spectrum, makes it unworkable for 
many. Alongside this substantial technical hurdle is another more fundamental flaw. The 
874 S. Fredman, EUI'Dpean Community Discrimination Law: A Critique, 1992 Industrial Law loumal21, pp. 119-
134. 
875 See Chapter 4 supra at pp. 126-7. 
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derivative nature of the legislation leaves workers identified as being 'atypical' outside of the 
norm. Their right to equality is dependent on how similar to the 'standard worker' they can 
show themselves to be. This means that its provisions do not provide any self-standing rights 
to workers identified as being disadvantaged and vulnerable and, thus, present no challenge to 
the causes or nature of such disadvantage. 
What is required in order to standardise the 'atypical' worker is, therefore, the recognition of 
an individual right to equality and non-discrimination which is not subordinated to the 
normative construct presented by the 'standard' worker'. It is, in fact, what Dworkin defines 
as the right to treatment as an equal876 which is distinguished from equal treatment on the 
basis that the fIrst entails the equal distribution of opportunities, resources and burdens and 
the second is the right 'to be treated with the same respect and concern as anyone else'. In 
order to recognise the differing needs of individuals, it may be necessary to vary the 
appropriate treatment. The right to treatment as an equal is fundamental, whereas the right to 
equal treatment is derivative. This particular objective is difficult to legislate for, particularly 
within the current Community framework, as it is indefinable in statutory terms and its 
identification and application requires creative thinking with the emphasis on outcomes rather 
than processes. However, it does have currency within the human rights approach to the 
conferment of equality and is articulated in International instruments such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It is, thus, compatible with the equality provisions of the EC 
Treaty. In certain circumstances, Atiicle 141 and associated legislation could be interpreted as 
conferring a right to be treated as an equal alongside the more commonly recognised right to 
equal treatment. As the interpretive force within the Community legal order, the ECJ is in a 
unique position to develop this particular conceptualisation of the principle of equality. Given 
876 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriol/sly (Duckworth, 1978) at p. 227 - for a discussion of Dworkin's theory of 
rights and its subjection to a feminist analysis, see Chapter 2 inji-a. 
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the Court's ground-breaking work in the area of sex equality, particularly in light of its ruling 
in Defi'enne II,877 this would perhaps not be out of step with its early jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, the Court's development of its own role within the legal order has led it to 
consider a wide range of sources in its reasoning, attracting criticism at times for what has 
been perceived as political activism. 878 
In Chapter 5 the COUlt's role as an institutional actor was considered. Although the 
chronological development of the Court's jurisprudence can be linked to a series of historical 
and political events, the Court's perceived activism has undoubtedly been overplayed by 
certain analysts. Rather than fulfilling its own political agenda, the judicial creativity 
employed by the Court in its decision-making can be largely attributed to the necessity, 
inherent in its function, to give interpretation to what were hitherto undefined and uncharted 
areas of the Treaty. By establishing the principles of supremacy and direct effect through its 
jurisprudence, the COUlt certainly grew in prominence within the institutional context and has 
been rightly acknowledged as a driving force in European integration. Following its early 
ruling in Defi'enne 11,879 in which recognition was given to the social as well as economic 
objectives of integration, the Court has been identified as an influential force in the 
furtherance of equality. However, the opaque, aspirational language in which the Treaty 
provisions were drafted and the incremental development of a new and complete legal system 
are both factors which have contributed to the Court's development of its purposive and 
teleological approach to reasoning. Furthermore, the democratic deficiencies arising due to 
the relative infancy of the institutions has conferred legitimacy on levels of judicial creativity 
which may well not have been acceptable within the legal systems of developed democracies. 
Alongside these factors, the political inertia that characterised certain stages of the European 
877 Case 43/75 [1976] ECR 455. 
878 See further Chapter 5 infi·a at pp. ?? 
879 Op cit at n. 4. 
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Community's legislative history,880 has meant that in order to discharge its judicial function, 
the COUlt has been required to fill the void by engaging in problem-solving as a means of 
providing answers to the questions referred by national courts under the Article 234 
procedure. 
Given the Court's unique role, the anticipation of those concerned with the development of 
the equality principle has been immense. Much was expected of the Court in this context 
following the early promise of its ruling in Defrenne II, perhaps too much for the Court to 
deliver. In focusing on a relatively narrow range of non-contentious issues in this thesis, an 
attempt was made to avoid the temptation of overestimating the Court's likely contribution. 
The principles of equality and non-discrimination were clearly provided for in the Treaty and 
their meanings had been enunciated by the Court by the time the group of cases considered in 
Chapter 6 came along. All of these cases were primarily concerned with issues of sex 
discrimination but all of them presented aspects which required further clarification: fme 
tuning or the slight reorientation of the doctrine established in previous judgments. In 
developing responses to the questions asked by national courts, the ECJ was presented with 
the opportunity to sow small yet important seeds of progress in the field of gender relations. 
By utilising the existing provisions of Community law and building on its own jurisprudence, 
the Court's influence in this respect could have been wide-reaching yet relatively non-
controversial. What requires to be identified, then, is whether the Court has delivered its early 
promlse. 
880 See further Chapter 4 infi'a. 
286 
The European Court's Jurisprudence on Gender Relations: 
Delphic Utterances or Coherent Reasoning? 
In this thesis the 'atypical' female worker is personified by the claimants in the group of cases 
which form the central analysis presented in Chapter 6. These workers are all classified under 
Community law as 'atypical' or 'non-standard' on the basis of the hours they work or through 
their contractual status. The role of the State is examined in the context of the imposition of 
policies which operate at the macro-level and through consideration of its role as employer as 
many of the cases are concerned with public sector employment practices. By analysing the 
text of the ECJ's judgments and accompanying Advocate Generals' opinions, it has been 
possible to deduce something of the Court's reasoning. These findings are organised around 
what have been identified as the central issues which emerge from a consideration of the 
differences between women's and men's labour market behaviour and which are, thus, central 
to any discussion of judicial approaches to gender relations. Furthermore, the anomalies 1ll 
treatment which result from denial of these factors require to be adequately addressed 111 
future cases if the principle of equality is going to be usefully developed so as to provide 
improved rights for women workers. The central issues, which will be considered below in 
the context of the case analysis presented in Chapter 6, are: the alleviation of the effects of 
past discrimination; consideration of women's 'dual role' in flexible work arrangements; the 
use of the 'standard worker' model and the changing nature of work. Although the cases 
reviewed in this thesis are concerned with the application of the equality principle to atypical 
workers, it is hoped that the observations presented here regarding the Court's contribution to 
the development of gender relations will have application across a wider range of cases with 
which the Court's jurisprudence is concerned. 
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The Effects of Past Discl'imination 
It can be asserted that the only effective means of fully addressing the legacy of past 
discriminatory practices and policies is through a programme of positive discrimination which 
would entitle women to favourable treatment with a view to increasing representation in those 
sectors and levels of employment in which they are currently undelTepresented881 . This 
observation, however well-founded, is not particularly helpful in the current context for two 
reasons. First, the conception and application of positive action is still developing under 
Community law and, while there are good reasons for optimism regarding its future use, 
positive discrimination has never been expressly permitted due to its incompatibility with the 
equal treatment approach which underpins Community anti-discrimination law. Secondly, 
even though positive action may serve as a very useful means of addressing under 
representation where vertical segregation indicates a paucity of women in promoted or senior 
posts, it cannot do much to counter the effects of horizontal segregation which finds women 
and men working in different sectors and in different jobs from each other. This type of 
segregation is a st11lctural feature of the labour markets of all ED Member States and has been 
a major contributory factor in the persistence of gender-based inequalities such as the 
d . 882 en urmg pay gap. 
Many of the cases analysed in Chapter 6 illustrate the difficulties inherent in attempts to draw 
comparisons between workers of different sexes for the purposes of complying with the 
technical requirements of legislation when the requisite 'comparators' simply do not exist. 
However, in some of the cases reviewed, the Court was provided with the opportunity to take 
881 For a rationalisation of reverse discrimination on these lines, see C Bacchi, 'Policy and Discourse: 
Challenging the Construction of Affirmative Action as Preferential Treatment' (2004) 11 Joumal of European 
Public Policy 128, cited in Chapter 4 supra. 
882 See Chapter 3 inji-a. 
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account of the effects of past discrimination in its reasoning as a means of informing its 
interpretation of Article 141. 883 While enabling the Court to stay within the legally defined 
boundaries, such interpretation would have provided much needed clarification regarding the 
purpose of Article 141 which, through this process, could have been used as a means of 
providing treatment as an equal beyond the formal provision of equal treatment. As its 
reasoning in Schroder884 has indicated, the COUlt has not been completely unreceptive to this 
notion and has made use, on occasion, of a purposive interpretation in order to further develop 
the equality principle along these lines. However, the most striking feature of this aspect of 
the Court's reasoning has been its inconsistency. By the categorisation of the cases presented 
in Chapter 6, it has been possible to show how this aspect of the Court's reasoning has been 
heavily influenced by its adherence to the market order. In those cases in which the Court's 
decision-making could have resulted in high levels of government expenditure through a 
requisite change in policy or by compensatory payments at the Member State-level, the Court 
has resOlted to a narrow application of the equality principle885 or has placed controls on the 
. = f' . d 886 retroactive e.l.Lects 0 Its own JU gments. 
The most obvious area in which an appreciation of the effects of past discrimination on 
women's position in society could have been used by the Court to further develop the equality 
principle through its jurisprudence is that relating to retirement and pensions. Many of the 
claimants represented in this area of the Court's case law were among the first citizens of a 
united Europe. Their work experiences had no doubt been blighted by the economic 
instability which led to the creation of the Community and by the effects of legitimate 
883 See in particular the cases discussed in the section on Retirement and Workplace Benefits in Chapter 6 il?(i·a. 
884 Case C-50!96 Deutsche Telekomm v Schroder [2000] ECR 1-743 discussed in Chapter 6 infra. 
885 For example Case C-297!93 G/'Qu-Hupka v Stadtgemeinde Bremen [1994] ECR 1-5535 discussed in Chapter 6 
inji'a. 
886 Case C-262!88 Barbel' v Guardian Royal Exchange Assu/'Qnce Group [1990] I ECR 1889; Case C-78!98 
Preston and Others v Wolvel'hampton Healthcare NHS Trust [2000] ECR 1-3201, discussed in Chapter 6 inji'Q. 
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discrimination visited against women in the labour market. At the time their cases were 
considered by the ECJ, many of these women found themselves living on reduced pensions at 
the end of long working lives. By resorting to litigation, they had attempted to use the law as a 
means of ensuring that, at least in old age, the effects of past discrimination might be 
acknowledged and partially overcome. The questions posed by the national courts in this 
context arose on the grounds of uncertainty about the meaning and extent of the equality 
principle. The Court of Justice was repeatedly given the opportunity to provide some relief to 
a generation recognised as the victinlS of earlier discrimination. However, in its efforts to 
protect Member States' competence in detennining issues of social policy, the Court refused 
to consider the effects of past discrimination, thus enabling its perpetuation, on the grounds of 
national procedural autonomy and legal certainty. 
Women's 'Dual Role' 
The rise of part-time employment among women is closely related to the need to balance 
work and family responsibilities. The decision increasingly taken by women to remain in paid 
employment during the child-bearing and rearing years undoubtedly results from a wide range 
of cultural, social and economic influences. In seeking to combine the needs of family with 
labour market participation, women display a communitarian ethos 887 through their 
commitment to both the public and private domains which runs counter to the individualistic 
principles of neo-liberalism. This dual role not only serves the needs of the wider society but 
is also compatible with labour market policy which is targeted at the creation of flexible 
working arrangements. However, the trade off for seeking to balance family needs with paid 
employment is to be found in corresponding levels of job security, as those who work part-
887See E. Frazer and N. Lacey The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critiqlle of the Liberal-Commllnitarian 
Debate (Harvester, 1993), cited in Chapter 2 supra. 
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time are often subjected to reduced tenus and conditions in comparison to full-time workers 
and are also vulnerable to precarious contractual arrangements. 
As the cases reviewed in Chapter 6 demonstrate, the Court of Justice has been asked to 
consider whether the family responsibilities of women should be taken into account in the 
intelpretation of the equality principle on many occasions. 888 Given the factual bases of many 
of these cases, recognition of the relationship between labour market behaviour and family 
responsibilities would appear to be inlplicit in the issues before the Court in any case: if 
women did not need to reconcile work inside the home with that undertaken outside, the issue 
of sex discrimination would not have arisen in relation to non-standard working 
arrangements. However, rather than acknowledging that this is de facto the basis of many of 
the referrals, the Court has generally resisted allowing any explicit consideration of the 
connection between working arrangements and the needs of families to enter into its 
reasoning. This has been the cause of confusion regarding the conceptualisation of gender 
relations in the Court's jurisprudence which can be illustrated with reference to the use of 
indirect discrimination as a means of detenuining the application of the equality principle in 
11 " 1 1 889 a cases concernmg atyplca wor cers. 
Indirect discrimination may be defmed as arising due to the imposition of a gender neutral 
policy which disproportionately affects one sex. However, can a policy which expressly 
permits the differential treatment of part-time workers really be deemed 'gender neutral' if all 
888See, for example, Cases C-399/92, C-409 and 425/92, C-34, 50 and 78/93 Stadt Lengerich v. Helmig [1994] 
ECR 1-5727; Case C-457/93 Kuratorium foil" Dialyse lind Nierentransplantation v Lewal"k [1996] ECR 1-243; 
Case C-278/93 Freel"s and Speckamnn v Deutsche Bllndespost [1996] ECR 1-1165 in which the Court's 
reasoning is discussed in Chapter 6 supra. 
889 Following the Court's initial judgment on the application of the equality principle to part-time workers in 
Case 96/80 Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Limited [1981] ECR 911, discussed at length in Chapter 
6 inji-a. 
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or the majority of such workers are female? This is particularly questionable if such an 
arrangement is sought to enable the conciliation of family responsibilities with paid 
employment. In its fmdings of indirect discrimination, the Court has indicated that such 
practices are only potentially incompatible with the principle of equality, as the outcome of 
cases is determined by the vagaries of the objective justification test applied by the national 
courts. The meaning and correct application of indirect discrimination has, thus, become 
confused. As useful as it has been in developing rights for atypical workers, its application in 
certain circumstances to cases in which the practices or policies complained of actually 
amounted to direct discrimination has impeded the development of such rights. 
The 'Standa.'d Worke." Model and the Normalisation of Atypical WOI'k 
The last aspect of the Court's reasoning worthy of further consideration is related both to the 
effects of past discrimination and to women's dual role and its contemplation presents an 
ideal juncture at which to close this discussion. The use of the standard worker as a normative 
model for the purposes of policy formulation and the targeting of legal intervention has 
appeared throughout this thesis as a recurring theme. This particular concept has its origins in 
the philosophical and social theory considered in Chapter 2. The assessment of the changing 
nature of work in Chapter 3 concluded that the use of new working arrangements has led to a 
decline in full-time, permanent employment contracts. However, the presence of the standard 
worker is tangible throughout much of the Court's reasoning, as evidenced by the analysis in 
Chapter 6. 
It is, in fact, the preservation of this model as the measure of everything that has led to the 
categorisation of part-time or non-permanent working arrangements as 'atypical'. In the wider 
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context, this standard IS the subject of political attention with the variety of alternative 
working arrangements constituting 'the other'. Of course, what the standard worker model 
actually represents is the worker of a disappearing age. In its adherence through its decision-
making to this model as a means of identifying the relative merits of the claims before it, the 
European Court has contributed to the subordination of the rights of women workers to this 
out-dated and diminishing standard. The reasoning of the Court in the cases under review, on 
occasion, has enabled recognition of woman's right to autonomy, to achievement on her own 
ternls and in her own way, independent of the normative model of the standard worker. The 
resulting decisions which, prima faCie, appear to be fairly innocuous, have actually been 
among the most important of the Court's judgments due to their contribution to the 
standardisation of the atypical worker. 890 The effect of such action is to liberate woman from 
her subordination to man. However, such reasoning has been rare and has generally been 
accompanied by the possibility of the removal or restriction of her freedom through the 
opportunity given to the relevant authority to legitimise its discriminatory behaviour. 891 That 
the Court has not been bolder in this respect has severely diminished its overall contribution 
to the development of the equality principle through the recognition of woman's difference 
from man as a positive force. 
To return to the question at the centre of this enquiry, it would appear from the cases reviewed 
that the Court has indeed developed an identifiable jurisprudence on gender relations through 
its interpretation and application of Article 141. However, the resulting philosophical position 
890 See, for example, Case 184/89 Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1991] ECR 1-297 (discussed in 
Chapter 6 inji-a), in which the Court's rejection of the alleged link between length of service and the attainment 
of knowledge and experience as a sole basis for incremental progression could, if given more prominence in the 
judgment, have made a substantial contribution to the COUli's jurisprudence in this respect. Nevertheless, this 
stance was usefully reapplied in its reasoning in subsequent cases - see Case C-1I95 Gersterv. Freistaat Bayel'l1 
ECR 1-5253; Case C-243/95 Kathleen Hill and Ann Stapleton v. Revenue Commissioners and Department of 
Finance [1998] ECR 1-3739; Case C-285/02 Elsner Lakeberg [2004] ECR 1-5861. 
891 By the use of the objective justification defence discussed in Chapter 6 supra. 
293 
is coloured by the presence of the standard worker to such an extent that it replicates many of 
the mistakes of the past. A systematic assessment of the Court's decision-making certainly 
uncovers far more in this respect than an overview of its judgments alone can reveal. The 
Court's rulings are apparently consistent and have been heralded as providing rights to 
workers hitherto outside of the scope of anti-discrimination provisions. However, at a deeper 
level, its jurisprudence is strewn with inconsistencies in terms of its theoretical dogma and its 
conceptualisation of the basic tenets which vary considerably dependent on the interests at 
stake which are, in tum, dictated by its attachment to the market order. FurthemlOre, the 
Court's theoretical perspective is steeped in the basic assumptions of neo-liberalism, such as 
the neutrality of the State, the focus on individualism and the attainment of market 
equilibrium through non-intervention, despite the fact that such assumptions are grounded in 
ideological doctrine rather than independent objectivity. Perhaps the most disappointing 
aspect of the Court's reasoning in this respect has been its failure to take account of woman's 
voice and, by doing so, to perpetuate the denial of its value. 
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